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Primary sources

Original records, exact passages, retrieval dates, and pinned archive hashes.

Each citation below identifies the original document and the exact provision or passage supporting a published claim. A primary document does not automatically earn the strongest evidence tier. Official records resolve to third-party reporting, provider publications remain self-reported, audits require an independent audit report, and directly tested evidence requires a Cunicula test record.

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Releases: GrapheneOS 2026091000, 2026091700 and 2026091900

Issuing body
GrapheneOS
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
transparency-report
Evidence tier
SELF-REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:91e8f131994ffa0517c761d638abb92f5bcc09f2bcbd114767a403c151b6a2d8
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

GrapheneOS release 2026091000 reports the full 2026-09-01 security patch level.

Location: 2026091000: Changes since the 2026090700 release (included in September 19 release history), PDF page 1

full 2026-09-01 security patch level

Attached to: Article: grapheneos-privacy-phone-guide

GrapheneOS release 2026091700 reports a Pixel cellular modem firmware backport from Android 17 QPR1.

Location: 2026091700: Changes since the 2026091000 release, PDF page 1

Pixels: backport cellular modem firmware from Android 17 QPR1

Attached to: Article: grapheneos-privacy-phone-guide

License Plate Reader Policy

Issuing body
Flock Safety
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
transparency-report
Evidence tier
SELF-REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:c92398d62608b2c249021bbf86484959b6f0191c26b215f6cc83d26a114d3182
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

Flock's LPR policy says queries are stored for auditing with user, date, time, purpose and search elements; this is not verification of OS Investigate logging.

Location: Authorized Users and Access, PDF page 1

All queries of the LPR system are stored for auditing purposes, including: Username Date Time Purpose of query License plate and other elements used to query the system

Attached to: Article: license-plate-readers-traffic-enforcement

Flock states a seven-day default deletion period with customer law or policy exceptions; the policy expressly governs its LPR system, not every investigative record.

Location: Data Retention and Privacy (page labelled June 30; wording retrieved September 21), PDF page 1

LPR data is hard deleted on a rolling 7-day basis by default; this may be increased or decreased on a case-by-case basis if a different schedule is required by a customer’s law or policy. Privacy: This policy governs the LPR system provided by Flock Safety.

Attached to: Article: license-plate-readers-traffic-enforcement

Security incident at Brevo, our third-party email provider

Issuing body
Trezor
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
transparency-report
Evidence tier
SELF-REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:e174a3abc49460f24aea0ff048e281a6d6b9fe7949cf5b00b7b550ccdc369bb4
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

Trezor's September 17 update reports 347,149 marketing email contacts exported through Brevo's API.

Location: Updated September 17, 2026, PDF page 1

Brevo has confirmed that 347,149 marketing email contacts were exported from our list through the API during this incident.

Attached to: Service: trezor, field incidents

Trezor says its product, wallet and account systems were not affected by the Brevo incident.

Location: Was Trezor itself hacked?, PDF page 1

No Trezor product, wallet, or account system was affected.

Attached to: Service: trezor, field incidents

Trezor describes a phishing email linking to an app that asked for a wallet backup, not a verified hardware repair.

Location: Phishing email description, PDF page 1

The phishing email sent from our account contained a malicious link that prompted users to download an app that asked users to enter their wallet backup.

Attached to: Service: trezor, field incidents

Recent customer data exposed in shipping provider incident

Issuing body
Trezor
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
transparency-report
Evidence tier
SELF-REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:53efa089aabc2bf3bea34d06df8eb646a961acc81560c98da1a8d38d621d568f
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

Trezor's updated ShipMonk disclosure states that 80,689 customers are affected by that incident.

Location: How many customers are affected by this incident? (September 4 update; header August 12, body says original August 13), PDF page 1

80,689 customers are affected.

Attached to: Service: trezor, field incidents

Trezor's September 4 update adds approximately 67,000 US customers with full name, email, phone, shipping-address and order-number exposure.

Location: Updated September 4, 2026, PDF page 1

This leaked data affects another approximately 67,000 US customers and includes full exposure (name, email, phone number, shipping address, order number).

Attached to: Service: trezor, field incidents

Trezor says ShipMonk retained data despite confirmation of deletion; this is the customer's account, not an independent audit.

Location: Updated September 4, 2026, PDF page 1

We are very disappointed that, despite receiving this confirmation, the data was not deleted in their systems.

Attached to: Service: trezor, field incidents

Attacker gained access to client accounts

Issuing body
Brevo
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
transparency-report
Evidence tier
SELF-REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:47425f4490e004f7bbb073bc6302773f31c6271e59f2eacaabbcb0d67a1fd6f9
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

Brevo's postmortem reports 138 platform accounts accessed, distinct from Trezor's exported newsletter-contact count.

Location: What happened, PDF page 1

On September 10th at 6:30 AM UTC we identified a security issue where an attacker exploited a flaw in the way Brevo handles SAML SSO to gain access to 138 Brevo accounts.

Attached to: Service: trezor, field incidents

Brevo says the phishing messages passed ordinary email authentication because they used legitimate sending infrastructure.

Location: If you have received some of these emails, PDF page 1

These messages were sent through legitimate infrastructure, so they passed the usual email authentication checks and looked genuine.

Attached to: Service: trezor, field incidents

Shutting down our public encrypted DNS servers and sponsoring Quad9 instead

Issuing body
Mullvad VPN
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
transparency-report
Evidence tier
SELF-REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:3a5d9c626cb8eedba19547f3afc90fa9bdb09e8f43c25f1825f517d8dc97a6aa
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

Mullvad asks manually configured public DoH users to switch before November 2, 2026.

Location: Migrating to Quad9, PDF page 1

If you have manually configured our DoH servers, switch before November 2nd 2026.

Attached to: Service: mullvad-dns, field privacyWarning

Mullvad distinguishes its VPN internal DNS from the public encrypted DNS service being retired.

Location: Opening paragraph, PDF page 1

They are unnecessary when using Mullvad VPN — traffic is already encrypted and Mullvad VPN's internal DNS handles all queries.

Attached to: Article: private-dns-setup-guide

Mullvad Browser default and included ad-blocking DoH settings will automatically migrate to Quad9.

Location: Mullvad Browser, PDF page 1

Mullvad Browser users who have kept the default DoH settings or the included ad blocking one, will automatically be migrated to Quad9.

Attached to: Article: private-dns-setup-guide

Mullvad says customized browser DoH settings will not be changed automatically.

Location: Mullvad Browser, PDF page 1

If you have customized the DoH, we will not change them.

Attached to: Article: private-dns-setup-guide

Implementation Rules for Article 43 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

Issuing body
Chief Executive in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Hosting body
Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
regulation
Evidence tier
THIRD-PARTY REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:409c3acb01c81a53a4ffac029c7a63ffb40919bf8979416fea64864d680b104a
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

The 2026 amendments to Instrument A303 commenced on 23 March 2026.

Location: Rule 1, Editorial Note, PDF page 6

For the commencement arrangements under the subsequent amendments to these Implementation Rules, please see L.N. 166 of 2023 (commencement date: 15 December 2023) and L.N. 27 of 2026 (commencement date: 23 March 2026).

Attached to: Article: hong-kong-device-password-law

A police officer exercising the electronic-equipment search power may require a specified person to provide a necessary password or decryption method.

Location: Schedule 1, Part 1, section 4(2)(a), PDF page 11

(a) require a specified person to provide the police officer with any password, or other decryption method, that is necessary;

Attached to: Article: hong-kong-device-password-law

The same power may require other reasonable and necessary information or assistance.

Location: Schedule 1, Part 1, section 4(2)(b), PDF page 11

(b) require a specified person to provide the police officer with any other reasonable and necessary information or assistance,

Attached to: Article: hong-kong-device-password-law

Failure to comply can result in a HK$100,000 fine and one year of imprisonment on conviction on indictment.

Location: Schedule 1, Part 1, section 5(1), PDF page 12

If a person fails to comply with a requirement imposed under section 4(2) of this Schedule, the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $100,000 and to imprisonment for 1 year.

Attached to: Article: hong-kong-device-password-law

A person charged with the noncompliance offence may establish a defence by showing a reasonable excuse for failing to comply.

Location: Schedule 1, Part 1, section 5(3), PDF page 12

It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to establish that the person had a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the requirement.

Attached to: Article: hong-kong-device-password-law

Knowingly or recklessly providing materially false or misleading information can result in a HK$500,000 fine and three years of imprisonment on conviction on indictment.

Location: Schedule 1, Part 1, section 6, PDF page 13

(a) provides any information, or makes a statement, that the person knows to be false or misleading in a material particular; or (b) recklessly provides any information, or recklessly makes a statement, that is false or misleading in a material particular, the person commits an offence and is liable on conviction on indictment to a fine of $500,000 and to imprisonment for 3 years.

Attached to: Article: hong-kong-device-password-law

The ordinary warrant route requires a police officer to apply to a magistrate by information on oath.

Location: Schedule 1, Part 1, section 2(1), PDF page 8

A police officer may, for investigation of an offence endangering national security, apply to a magistrate by information on oath for a warrant under this section.

Attached to: Article: hong-kong-device-password-law

The section 3(1) warrantless route requires satisfaction by a police officer not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner.

Location: Schedule 1, Part 1, section 3(1), PDF page 10

If a police officer not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police is satisfied that

Attached to: Article: hong-kong-device-password-law

The section 3(1) warrantless route also requires that obtaining a warrant would not be reasonably practicable.

Location: Schedule 1, Part 1, section 3(1)(c), PDF page 10

for any reason it would not be reasonably practicable to obtain a warrant, the police officer, or another police officer authorized by the police officer, may exercise one or more of the powers under section 2(3) of this Schedule for investigation of an offence endangering national security without a warrant.

Attached to: Article: hong-kong-device-password-law

Rule 2(3) adds Customs and Excise Service members to the officials who may exercise Schedule 3 property freezing, restraint, confiscation, and forfeiture powers.

Location: Rule 2(3), PDF page 6

The Secretary for Justice, the Secretary for Security, a member of the Customs and Excise Service or a police officer may, in accordance with Schedule 3, exercise the power to freeze, restrain, confiscate and forfeit property relating to the commission of an offence endangering national security.

Attached to: Article: hong-kong-device-password-law

Node.js 22.23.4 (LTS)

Issuing body
Node.js
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
transparency-report
Evidence tier
SELF-REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:ab80a2708cf616c5d0f1737b6a72806167297ced43c75e81554e94b9a7cffcfc
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

Node 22.23.4 is the security release dated 21 October 2026.

Location: Notable Changes; release heading 2026-10-21, PDF page 1

This is a security release.

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

Node 22.23.4 lists a TLS IP-address security fix.

Location: Notable Changes; release heading 2026-10-21, PDF page 1

tls: reject non-canonical IP addresses

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

Node 22.23.4 lists a DNS input security fix.

Location: Notable Changes; release heading 2026-10-21, PDF page 1

dns: validate resolve inputs for null bytes

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

Node 22.23.4 includes a Brotli security patch.

Location: Notable Changes; release heading 2026-10-21, PDF page 1

deps: brotli: cherry-pick

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

CVE-2026-111497

Issuing body
Canonical
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
transparency-report
Evidence tier
SELF-REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:735b4d02a92c4dd0ed0736fc01f640cc2143fac366817cadf6680a6aa4dd34c0
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

Ubuntu lists 1.1.0-2ubuntu0.1 as the fixed Brotli package for Ubuntu 24.04.

Location: Status: brotli / Ubuntu 24.04 LTS noble; advisory update heading, PDF page 1

24.04 LTS noble Fixed in 1.1.0-2ubuntu0.1

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

The Ubuntu Brotli advisory records its last update as 29 October 2026.

Location: Status: brotli / Ubuntu 24.04 LTS noble; advisory update heading, PDF page 1

Last updated 29 October 2026

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

ChainDrop supply chain compromise: Anatomy of a self-propagating worm

Issuing body
Microsoft Security Research
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
transparency-report
Evidence tier
SELF-REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:42fc0f9e23bd1987196c48c9bc5db00d56162dc8046aa639736d74f8d102ff19
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

Microsoft reports an installation hook executing the ChainDrop malware before installation completes.

Location: Opening attack summary, PDF page 1

preinstall lifecycle hook

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

Microsoft reports that the ChainDrop malware collects credentials.

Location: Attack chain overview, action 2, PDF page 1

Collects credentials from

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

Microsoft reports coding-tool configuration changes establishing persistence.

Location: Opening attack summary, PDF page 1

configuration files into repositories, establishing persistence

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

Microsoft recommends revoking and rotating exposed credentials after the malicious installation.

Location: Opening response guidance, PDF page 1

revoke and rotate exposed credentials

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

Microsoft specifies a known-clean environment for credential recovery.

Location: Opening response guidance, PDF page 1

from a known-clean environment

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

Microsoft recommends rebuilding affected systems from trusted inputs.

Location: Opening response guidance, PDF page 1

rebuild affected systems

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

Tools

Issuing body
Model Context Protocol
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
standards-document
Evidence tier
THIRD-PARTY REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:3ebee527fc1d02019c3997ae4b2d44418f64106a999971888c0b30df2dafcd71
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

MCP tools allow model-driven access to external systems, not only user-typed chat text.

Location: Tools: introduction, PDF page 1

Tools enable models to interact with external systems, such as querying databases, calling APIs, or performing computations.

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

The MCP tool specification requires servers to implement proper access controls.

Location: Security Considerations: Servers MUST, PDF page 1

Implement proper access controls

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

The MCP tool specification recommends confirmation for sensitive actions.

Location: Security Considerations: Clients SHOULD, PDF page 1

Prompt for user confirmation on sensitive operations

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

The MCP tool specification recommends showing tool inputs before the server call.

Location: Security Considerations: Clients SHOULD, PDF page 1

Show tool inputs to the user before calling the server

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

Security Best Practices

Issuing body
Model Context Protocol
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
standards-document
Evidence tier
THIRD-PARTY REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:e457775cb66f2e2210ebc7d8a093d573239feb090eec5b0c31d1d0571f7419bb
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

MCP security guidance states that local servers may have direct access to the user system.

Location: Local MCP Server Compromise, PDF page 1

These servers may have direct access to the user’s system

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

MCP security guidance describes the risk of accepting tokens issued for other resources.

Location: Token Passthrough; Scope Minimization, PDF page 1

An attacker can gain unauthorized access or otherwise compromise an MCP server if the server accepts tokens issued for other resources.

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

MCP security guidance describes increased compromise impact from poor scope design.

Location: Token Passthrough; Scope Minimization, PDF page 1

Poor scope design increases token compromise impact

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection

Issuing body
Kai Greshake and coauthors
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
transparency-report
Evidence tier
SELF-REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:5ce40c4fba4349b9aa72b96806bc2bb802856ad92434184e488df67fd6b70833
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

Greshake and colleagues describe indirect prompt injection through instructions planted in retrieved material; the cited version was revised 5 May 2023.

Location: Abstract: Indirect Prompt Injection, PDF page 1

strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved

Attached to: Article: ai-tools-permissions-security

Tether Introduces New Policy to Strengthen Ecosystem Security

Issuing body
Tether
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
transparency-report
Evidence tier
SELF-REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:7eeb0638321f75a8f42305591f3b1641cae2d1a85c6b9173a150b59a684d7d81
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

Tether announced a voluntary wallet-freezing policy on 9 December 2023.

Location: Opening announcement; secondary-market controls, PDF page 1

new voluntary wallet-freezing policy

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Tether connects its policy with the US OFAC Specially Designated Nationals list.

Location: Opening announcement; secondary-market controls, PDF page 1

Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Tether says the sanctions controls extend to the secondary market.

Location: Opening announcement; secondary-market controls, PDF page 1

on the secondary market

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Tether Releases Letters Shared With The U.S. Senate Committee On Banking, Housing, And Urban Affairs And The U.S. House Financial Services Committee

Issuing body
Tether
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
transparency-report
Evidence tier
SELF-REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:7b9f747fe43befc759f488a99ab0f507040ab84efdc6f70810fe69be8c041ede
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

Tether described cooperation with the US Department of Justice and Secret Service in its 15 December 2023 letter publication.

Location: Published letters: cooperation with US authorities, PDF page 1

including the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Secret Service.

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Security Incident Update #2 (2026-10-30)

Issuing body
Binance
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
transparency-report
Evidence tier
SELF-REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:889c11b942af53cb5b05c77bb5d20ac2a57b335bdfb09a5bf1094bdb824e6c36
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

Binance estimated losses of about $6.3 billion in its 30 October 2026 update.

Location: Opening incident estimate; What We Have Done, PDF page 1

approximately $6.3B USD

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Binance reported about $3 billion frozen on-chain in its 30 October 2026 update.

Location: Opening incident estimate; What We Have Done, PDF page 1

Approximately $3 billion has been frozen on-chain

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Binance describes working with industry partners to trace assets; the frozen figure is its reported partner-wide total.

Location: Opening incident estimate; What We Have Done, PDF page 1

industry partners to trace

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Binance Hack: $6.3B Drained on 9 Chains, $2.7B Frozen

Issuing body
Bitquery
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
transparency-report
Evidence tier
SELF-REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:fb5a45c3f5414940338d0a4eef5a34f6aefe9072bf7009c5c6c54296fa4e9300
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

Bitquery describes matching the Binance incident transfers to wallets and following the funds.

Location: 01: What happened, Bitquery methodology, PDF page 1

matched every drain to a Binance wallet and followed the money

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Bitquery places the main Ethereum drain at 20:24 UTC on 29 October 2026.

Location: 03: The night, 29 October UTC timeline; subtraction gives 37 minutes, PDF page 1

20:24Main Ethereum drain

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Bitquery places the first Tether freeze at 21:01 UTC, 37 minutes after its 20:24 main Ethereum drain time.

Location: 03: The night, 29 October UTC timeline; subtraction gives 37 minutes, PDF page 1

21:01Tether's first freeze, on the main Ethereum receiver

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Circle's Stablecoin Smart Contracts on EVM-compatible blockchains

Issuing body
Circle
Publication date
Retrieved
Document type
transparency-report
Evidence tier
SELF-REPORTED
Content hash
sha256:654e4c7f6df47253db226db154681acac9405a4a64af7d97676ef1c09fa59c17
Copies
Official document · Archived copy

Supported claims

Circle documents a contract-level blacklist preventing listed addresses from sending or receiving its tokens, independent of wallet signing control.

Location: FiatToken features: Blacklist, PDF page 1

The contract can blacklist certain addresses which will prevent those addresses from transferring or receiving tokens.

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Circle assigns blacklist authority to the blacklister address.

Location: FiatToken features: Blacklist, PDF page 1

Access to the blacklist functionality is controlled by the `blacklister` address.

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Circle documents a pause affecting transfers across the contract.

Location: FiatToken features: Pausable, PDF page 1

No transfers can take place while the contract is paused.

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Circle assigns the pause function to the pauser address.

Location: FiatToken features: Pausable, PDF page 1

Access to the pause functionality is controlled by the `pauser` address.

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Circle documents replacement of the implementation used by its proxy contract.

Location: FiatToken features: Upgradable, PDF page 1

A new implementation contract can be deployed, and the proxy contract will forward calls to the new contract.

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Circle assigns upgrade authority to the proxyOwner address.

Location: FiatToken features: Upgradable, PDF page 1

Access to the upgrade functionality is guarded by a `proxyOwner` address.

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Circle documents owner authority to replace specified administrative roles.

Location: FiatToken features: Ownable, PDF page 1

The contract has an Owner, who can change the `owner`, `pauser`, `blacklister`, or `masterMinter` addresses.

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers

Circle documents the owner and proxyOwner as separate roles; the owner cannot replace the proxyOwner.

Location: FiatToken features: Ownable, PDF page 1

The `owner` can not change the `proxyOwner` address.

Attached to: Article: stablecoin-freezing-powers