# Cunicula AI Reference (Full) This is the deep-context machine-readable reference for AI systems, search assistants, and retrieval pipelines that want a richer understanding of Cunicula. Site: https://cunicula.com Services indexed: 177 Article summaries indexed: 98 Glossary terms indexed: 50 ## Project Summary Cunicula compares 177 privacy services with source evidence and publishes research on surveillance, private communications, infrastructure, and financial privacy. Privacy claims are worthless without records. Cunicula is not a certification body, an audit, an endorsement, or a recommendation engine. Crypto is one research lane. Project position: https://cunicula.com/en/what-is-cunicula ## Public API Contract Contract version: 1.3. - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/services - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/services/{slug} - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/articles - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/articles/{slug} - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/search - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/categories - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/stats - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/changes - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/incidents - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/alpr - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/policy - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/topics - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/documents - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/primary-sources - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/glossary - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/map - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/acceptance - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/provider-analysis - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/government-sources - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/ownership-graph - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/agent-money/options - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/agent-money/protocols - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/data-broker-intelligence/fields - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/dataset - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/dataset/current - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/capabilities - PUBLIC GET /api/v1/openapi.json - LICENSED GET /api/v1/agent-money/export - COMPATIBILITY GET/OPTIONS /api/articles -> /api/v1/articles (deprecated; no-removal-date) - COMPATIBILITY GET/OPTIONS /api/directory -> /api/v1/services (supported; no-removal-date) - COMPATIBILITY GET /api/logo -> /brand-marks/{slug}.png or /brands/{slug}.{ext} (supported; no-removal-date) - COMPATIBILITY GET/OPTIONS /api/score -> /api/v1/services (deprecated; no-removal-date) - COMPATIBILITY GET/OPTIONS /api/score/{slug} -> /api/v1/services/{slug} (deprecated; no-removal-date) ## Full Service Directory - @lnp2pBot (lnp2pbot) URL: https://lnp2pbot.com/ Open-source Telegram P2P Bitcoin marketplace over Lightning hold invoices, with no registration or KYC stated. KYC: none. Fees: 0.6% paid by seller, including network fees; community discounts may apply. Limits: No bot-imposed volume limit; Lightning capacity and channel liquidity constrain trades. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Telegram P2P (Lightning). Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: TG escrow, LN only, Global. Privacy warning: Telegram links use to an account. The bot retains trade totals, ratings and disputes; trade count and rating are public by default. Fiat payments happen directly between traders.. - 1984 Hosting (1984-hosting) URL: https://1984.hosting/ Iceland-based provider of domains, VPS and shared hosting under Icelandic data protection, taking XMR and BTC. KYC: light. Fees: VPS from EUR 8.72/mo; shared hosting EUR 32.90 first year and EUR 218/year renewal. Jurisdiction: IS. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Hosting. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Iceland jurisdiction, XMR accepted, BTC accepted, Domains, VPS, Shared hosting, FreeDNS. Privacy warning: 1984 requires and records a subscriber name, active email address, username, password, active telephone number, payment details and a PIN. It may disclose information when required by law or a valid court order. Its terms say personal data is erased within 30 days after service termination.. - addy.io (addy-io) URL: https://addy.io/ Open-source email aliasing service supporting self-hosting and crypto subscriptions for yearly plans. KYC: none. Fees: Free / $1/mo Lite / $4/mo Pro. Jurisdiction: GB. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Email, Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Email aliasing, No KYC, XMR payment accepted, Open source, Self-hostable, Securitum audited, Unlimited aliases (free tier), Custom domains. Privacy warning: Terms are governed by England and Wales. addy.io stores service data on UpCloud servers in the Netherlands, retains Nginx/Postfix logs with IP addresses for 3 days, and can disclose when compelled by law. Open source and self-hostable if UK/legal-process risk is unacceptable.. - AirVPN (airvpn) URL: https://airvpn.org/ Italian hacktivist-operated VPN with OpenVPN, WireGuard and an open-source client, accepting BTC and XMR. KYC: none. Fees: ~€7/mo. Jurisdiction: IT. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: VPN. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No logs, No email required, BTC accepted, XMR accepted, OpenVPN, WireGuard, Tor over VPN, Eddie client open source. Privacy warning: Italy is EU jurisdiction - subject to Italian court orders and EU data directives. Less restrictive than Five Eyes but not Mullvad/IVPN tier. Official terms also prohibit use by residents of Italy.. - Anon Shop (anonshop) URL: https://anonshop.app/ Shopping service that accepts Monero and orders from Amazon, eBay and other stores, with locker or address delivery. KYC: none. Fees: Locker delivery: 10% with a $10 minimum. Address delivery: 15% with a $15 minimum.. Limits: Package forwarding has a $600 minimum. Other order limits are not published consistently.. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Merchants. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Proxy shopping, Monero payment, Amazon locker delivery, Address delivery, Built-in order chat. Privacy warning: The operator receives purchase details, payment references and order messages. Address delivery also shares a name and shipping address. The FAQ says Amazon returns require an Amazon account. Current retention and deletion terms are not published.. - AzireVPN (azirevpn) URL: https://www.azirevpn.com/ Swedish RAM-only WireGuard VPN with Blind Operator mode and no personal data required at signup. KYC: none. Fees: From €5/mo. Jurisdiction: SE. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: VPN. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: RAM-only servers, Blind Operator 2.0, No personal data required, WireGuard native, Monero accepted, No logs, Multi-hop support, Open source client. Privacy warning: Sweden is a 14 Eyes intelligence-sharing country. AzireVPN uses diskless servers and says its no-logs design was independently audited, but its April 2026 audit disclosure still listed one critical, one medium, and one low finding as in progress. Malwarebytes' privacy policy applies to its websites and products and describes broader website/product data collection.. - Azteco (azteco) URL: https://azte.co/ Bitcoin vouchers bought with cash at retail in 190+ countries, redeemed to any Bitcoin or Lightning address. KYC: light. Fees: Retailer-set commission plus applicable network or processing fees. Limits: Varies by voucher and distributor. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Gift Cards, Merchants. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Cash purchase option, No Azteco account generally required, Identity verification may apply by country or purchase channel, Lightning or on-chain, Voucher-based, Retail locations, Bitcoin only. Privacy warning: Azteco collects personal information for direct purchases and redemption, including IP address, browser or partner service and receiving wallet address. Direct website purchases in several Latin American countries may require an identity document and live face scan. Brazil redemption requires CPF, email and partner-exchange KYC. Retail cash purchases may expose less payment data, but policies vary by retailer and country.. - Bando (bando) URL: https://bando.cool/ Business treasury platform for Mexican CETES and digital dollars, with MXN conversion and required KYB/KYC onboarding; China payouts are marked coming soon. KYC: full. Fees: Product-specific; disclosed during onboarding or in the applicable service terms.. Jurisdiction: MX. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Treasury, Stablecoin Payments. Coverage: MX. Features: Mexican CETES, Digital-dollar treasury, MXN conversion, KYB/KYC onboarding, China payouts (coming soon). Privacy warning: No longer fits a no-KYC spend/top-up listing. Financial services are compliance-managed by Etherfuse entities; Bando operates as technology provider ETERNAL TECH HIRO S.A. DE C.V.. - BasicSwap (basicswap) URL: https://basicswapdex.com Open-source cross-chain atomic-swap protocol using a distributed order book, with no central operator or user account. KYC: none. Fees: no fees (atomic swap). Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: P2P. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Atomic swaps (trustless), BTC/XMR native support, No account, no custodian, Decentralized order book (SMSG), Open source, No central operator. Privacy warning: BasicSwap has no central operator or legal entity identified by its current terms, so Swiss/Five-Eyes jurisdiction claims are unsupported. It remains low-liquidity software without a published independent BasicSwap code audit. July and August 2026 swap-security issues were fixed in mandatory releases; update before trading.. Incidents: Adaptor-signature counterparty fund-trapping issue (resolved, critical, since 2026-08-01); July 2026 swap-security issue (resolved, high, since 2026-07-14). - Bisq (bisq) URL: https://bisq.network/ Decentralized open-source desktop P2P Bitcoin exchange over Tor, with no registration stated as required. KYC: none. Fees: BTC fee: 0.15% maker and 1.15% taker; BSQ target: 0.075% maker and 0.575% taker; minimum fees apply. Limits: Varies by payment method, account signing and asset. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: danger. Categories: P2P / Desktop. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Tor, Non-custodial, Bank/Cash/SEPA. Privacy warning: Bisq does not perform KYC, but payment-method, account-signing and asset-specific trade limits apply. A May 2026 Bisq 1 altcoin exploit affected 10 users and 11.59104 BTC; Bisq reported all victims reimbursed on June 5. The June update said XMR auto-confirmation remained disabled pending audit work. Use Bisq 1 v1.10.7 or later and Bisq 2 v2.1.12 or later. Fiat payment details are still shared with counterparties, and Bisq should not be treated as a savings wallet.. Incidents: Security Incident Post-Mortem (active, high, since 2026-05-01). - BitBox02 (bitbox02) URL: https://bitbox.swiss/ Swiss hardware wallet from Shift Crypto. The shop takes on-chain Bitcoin and Lightning through BTCPay, plus cards via Stripe. KYC: none. Fees: One-time hardware purchase. Jurisdiction: CH. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Bitcoin-only edition, Multi-coin edition, Open source firmware, Swiss operator, On-chain Bitcoin checkout, Lightning checkout, microSD backup, BitBoxApp companion. Privacy warning: BitBox02 is a physical product. Shift Crypto AG holds order and shipping data even when payment settles in Bitcoin or over Lightning. Orders ship from Swiss and German warehouses, and duties and taxes are prepaid on some routes, which adds a customs record.. - Bitchat (bitchat) URL: https://bitchat.free Peer-to-peer messaging over Bluetooth mesh and Nostr relays, with device-held identity keys, no account, and optional persistent local history. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Messaging, Offline, Bitcoin. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Open source, Bluetooth mesh, Nostr transport, No account, No phone number, Private messages, Emergency wipe, Wear OS, Live push-to-talk, Persistent local conversations, Cashu token preview/redemption. Privacy warning: The published web privacy policy says delivered messages are not retained and data is not sent to remote servers, but current clients use Nostr relays and Android 2.0.1 persists private conversation history locally. Bluetooth exposes proximity/relay patterns, Nostr relays can observe connection metadata, and a persistent device identifier is derived from the identity key.. - Bitcoin Depot (bitcoin-depot) URL: https://www.bitcoindepot.com/ Bitcoin ATM network taken offline in May 2026 when its operator filed for Chapter 11. KYC: full. Fees: 15%. Limits: 900 daily (currency not recorded). Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: danger. Categories: Bitcoin ATM. Coverage: US, CA. Features: US/CA, Buy & Sell, Cash. Privacy warning: US/Five Eyes MSB, FinCEN/FINTRAC registered, that collected phone, email, wallet/transaction, ID, biometric and SSN-related data. Now in Chapter 11 wind-down: customer records are an asset in a court-supervised sale, and a claims agent holds the process.. - BitcoinVoucherBot (bitcoinvoucherbot) URL: https://bitcoinvoucher.bot/ Pseudonymous P2P Bitcoin marketplace described by its operator as non-custodial, with Lightning-funded Liquid multisig escrow. KYC: none. Fees: Official manual: 2.5% of order amount per party, plus network fees; check the live invoice. Limits: Manual documents 10,000-500,000 sats per order; live app parameters are authoritative. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: P2P / Lightning. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No document KYC stated, No email or phone required, Pseudonymous avatar, Lightning funding / Liquid multisig escrow, Tor-friendly. Privacy warning: Fiat payments and disputes can expose identity details. The manual and homepage describe different payout and collateral arrangements. Live custody controls were not verified.. - BitPay Gift Cards (bitpay-gift-cards) URL: https://www.bitpay.com/gift-cards Gift cards from more than 100 brands purchased through the BitPay app or browser extension after BitPay ID approval. KYC: full. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Gift Cards. Coverage: US. Features: 100+ gift-card brands, BitPay app, Browser extension, BitPay ID required. Privacy warning: Buying a gift card requires a BitPay account and approved BitPay ID. BitPay ID can require identity documents, a selfie, facial biometrics and a liveness check through Sumsub. Brand-specific purchase limits and merchant terms apply.. - Bitrefill (bitrefill) URL: https://www.bitrefill.com/ Sells gift cards, mobile top-ups, eSIMs and bill payments for crypto, with Airfill Prepaid AB named in its terms. KYC: light. Fees: 2%. Limits: 10,000 daily (currency not recorded). Jurisdiction: SE. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Gift Cards, Agent Money. Coverage: US, UK, EU, AU, IN, CA, SG, ZA, NG, KE, BR, AR, MX. Features: AU Visa Digital, 170+ Countries, Lightning, eSIMs, Instant. Privacy warning: Bitrefill monitors platform use for compliance and can collect account, email, purchase, payment, IP and verification data. Public reporting says a March 2026 breach exposed about 18,500 purchase records, including email, crypto-payment-address and IP metadata; about 1,000 records also included customer names.. - Boltz (boltz) URL: https://boltz.exchange/ Non-custodial Bitcoin bridge swapping between Lightning, on-chain and Liquid using submarine swaps. KYC: none. Fees: 0.1%. Jurisdiction: SV. Recorded risk: danger. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Non-custodial, No account required, Lightning ↔ On-chain, Liquid swaps, Open source, Submarine swaps, HTLC-based. Privacy warning: Boltz swap services have been disabled since 3 August 2026 and remain disabled until further notice. The provider says its API remains available for cooperative refunds and unilateral refunds do not depend on its infrastructure. It reported repeated attacks and contained exploits, said no user funds were at risk, and did not give a reopening date.. Incidents: Service suspension and ownership handover after targeted attacks (monitoring, high, since 2026-08-12). - Briar (briar) URL: https://briarproject.org/ Free, open-source peer-to-peer messaging over Tor, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth without central messaging servers; the project is in maintenance mode. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: GB. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Messaging, Offline. Coverage: GLOBAL. Privacy warning: The project entered maintenance mode on 9 July 2026 and limits work to essential security updates and bug fixes. Official pages list grant funding from Small Media, OTF, Internews, NLnet, Prototype Fund and others; no reviewed primary source establishes donor operational control or a backdoor.. - BTCPay Server (btcpay-server) URL: https://btcpayserver.org/ Self-hosted open-source Bitcoin and Lightning payment processor that is non-custodial and charges no fees. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Merchants, Privacy Tools, Agent Money. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Self-hosted, Open source, Lightning, No processor fees, No software KYC, Non-custodial, Merchant payments, WooCommerce plugin. Privacy warning: BTCPay Server versions before 2.4.2 exposed LND macaroon credentials to unauthenticated remote access, and attackers exploited the flaw to steal funds. Only LND deployments were exposed; built-in on-chain wallets were not affected. Update to a current release, regenerate or rotate credentials, and inspect node activity. Separately managed LND exposure paths need manual credential rotation.. Incidents: This is a security release; updating is recommended for servers shared with many users. (active, medium, since 2026-08-24). - BTCVPS (btcvps) URL: https://btcvps.com/ KVM VPS provider with email-only signup and Monero or Bitcoin payment, on server locations in the Netherlands and Lithuania. KYC: none. Fees: KVM VPS from €6/mo or €64.80/yr. Jurisdiction: NL. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Hosting. Coverage: GLOBAL, NL, LT. Features: Email-only signup, No identity verification, KVM VPS, Full root access, Encrypted storage, Netherlands and Lithuania locations, Monero and Bitcoin payments. Privacy warning: Not bulletproof hosting. Terms say BTCVPS complies with Dutch law and valid court orders. Privacy policy says app-level IP tracking is not used, but default Nginx access logs may include IP, path, timestamp, user agent and status for operations/security.. - Cake Pay (cake-pay) URL: https://cakepay.com/ Cake Labs service buying merchant gift cards and payment cards with crypto, requiring a valid email address. KYC: light. Fees: Products are sold at face value plus a small cryptocurrency-conversion fee.. Limits: USD 5,000 daily; individual card minimums and maximums vary. Jurisdiction: KN. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Gift Cards. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Gift cards, Prepaid cards, 150,000+ merchants, Email-only signup, No name or ID requested by Cake Pay, Bitcoin, Litecoin, Monero and Zcash payments. Privacy warning: Cake Pay requires an email address for purchase, delivery and support. It says it asks for no name or ID, but merchants may require additional information when a product is redeemed or used. Cake Wallet's optional third-party services apply their own privacy policies and may request identity information. The dedicated Cake Pay terms and privacy pages currently expose no policy body.. - Cake Wallet (cake-wallet) URL: https://cakewallet.com/ Multi-coin privacy wallet - XMR, ZEC, BTC, LTC. Self-custody, built-in no-KYC swap, open source. iOS and Android. (Zero KYC) KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: XMR + ZEC + BTC + LTC, Self-custody, Built-in swap, Open source, iOS + Android, No account, Exchange via Trocador. Privacy warning: Cake Labs nodes may transiently receive IP address, wallet sync height, and submitted transactions/channels but state they do not retain them. Optional third-party buy/sell and swap services have separate privacy/KYC practices and may request personal information.. - Calyx Institute (calyx-institute) URL: https://calyxinstitute.org/ US nonprofit digital-rights organization offering privacy tools, memberships, hotspots and CalyxOS phones. KYC: light. Fees: CalyxOS is free; mobile internet memberships start at USD 500/year. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: CalyxOS, Android fork, microG included, Pixel, Motorola, Fairphone and SHIFT support, Open source, VPN included with mobile internet membership, No Google account required. Privacy warning: Mobile internet membership requires contact, shipping and payment data and uses Mobile Citizen and T-Mobile infrastructure. T-Mobile can observe network and location metadata, and Calyx recommends using a VPN. Encrypted membership data is hosted on Vultr. New CalyxOS phone memberships remain temporarily paused, while existing memberships and phones are unaffected.. - Cashu (cashu) URL: https://cashu.space Chaumian e-cash protocol on Bitcoin Lightning where each mint is a custodian holding the backing funds. KYC: none. Fees: Protocol and mint fees vary; Lightning routing and on-chain fees may also apply.. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Privacy Tools, Wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Chaumian e-cash, Lightning-native, Offline transactions, QR code / Bluetooth transfer, No account required, Open source, Blind signature privacy, Multi-wallet support. Privacy warning: Custodial risk: every Cashu mint is a single-sig custodian of your sats. If a mint rugs, is hacked, or disappears, ecash tokens become worthless. Only use trusted mints and keep amounts small. Proof-of-liabilities not yet standardized. Multi-mint splitting helps but adds UX complexity.. - ChangeHero (changehero) URL: https://changehero.io/ No-account crypto swap and fiat on-ramp advertising no KYC to 700 EUR, with terms reserving AML document requests. KYC: light. Fees: Up to 0.5% Best Rate / up to 0.7% Fixed Rate. Limits: Crypto swaps: no hard maximum; fiat purchases: €25 minimum. Jurisdiction: CR. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No account, ZEC supported, XMR supported, Instant, Fixed + floating rate, 350+ swap assets, 150+ fiat-purchase assets. Privacy warning: Canadian MSB/Five Eyes exposure via MoneyMaple Tech Ltd.; terms allow AML/KYC procedures and identity-document requests.. - CheapGPT (cheapgpt) URL: https://cheapgp.selly.store/ Selly-hosted storefront selling AI subscription and voucher products such as Perplexity, Grammarly and Picsart. KYC: light. Fees: Varies by voucher. A separate buyer-fee schedule is not published.. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Developer Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: AI and software vouchers, Email delivery, Crypto and fiat payment methods, Purchase-protection claim. Privacy warning: Selly's policy permits collection of email, IP address, browser, device and payment details, with some information shared with the seller. Payments go directly to sellers without Selly escrow. CheapGPT does not disclose its legal operator or retention terms; voucher validity depends on the reseller and issuing platform.. - ClearSwap (clearswap) URL: https://clearswap.io/ Cross-network swap app with generic terms rather than a stated no-KYC policy, and Google Analytics on its site. KYC: light. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Open-source protocol, Peer-to-peer and liquidity-pool swaps, On-chain and cross-chain swaps, EVM and non-EVM token interface, Staking. Privacy warning: ClearSwap exposes an open-source swap protocol through an interface operated by an unnamed Administration. Its policy permits collection of wallet, IP, device and interaction data, cookies and web beacons, and the current site loads Google Analytics. The legal operator, incorporation jurisdiction, KYC policy and reusable limits remain undisclosed.. - CoinCards (coincards) URL: https://coincards.com/ Canadian gift cards and top-ups from Stuff Technologies Inc., paid in Bitcoin, Lightning, Monero or Litecoin. KYC: light. Jurisdiction: CA. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Gift Cards. Coverage: US, CA, EU, UK. Features: US and Canada storefront, Electronic gift cards, Physical gift cards, Mobile top-ups. Privacy warning: Coincards may require identity verification before service and can request formal identity, address and source documents. The service collects transaction, device, IP and fraud-control data and shares data with payment, fulfillment, compliance and legal recipients. Product fees and limits vary.. Incidents: Security Incident - August 04, 2025 (active, high, since 2025-08-04). - CoinFlip (coinflip) URL: https://coinflip.tech/ CoinFlip/Olliv crypto ATM and wallet service, with US ATM locations and a separate EU page operating under MiCA. KYC: light. Fees: Kiosk and cashier transactions: 4.99% to 21.90%; Preferred: 0.5% to 9.99%; minimum USD 2.49 network fee also applies. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Bitcoin ATM. Coverage: US, CA. Features: US, Buy & Sell, Cash. Privacy warning: CoinFlip uses tiered identity and transaction monitoring. Depending on service and limit, it can collect identity documents, Social Security number, source-of-funds evidence, location, device, session-replay, selfie and facial data. Transaction limits vary by verification tier, customer and location. Current terms cover US and Canadian dollar transactions.. - CoinGate Gift Cards (coingate-gift-cards) URL: https://coingate.com/gift-cards Worldwide e-gift card marketplace taking crypto or card, run by Lithuanian UAB Decentralized under EU MiCA. KYC: light. Jurisdiction: LT. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Gift Cards. Coverage: EU, UK, US. Features: 6000+ Brands, 70+ cryptocurrencies, Cards and mobile wallets, Instant delivery. Privacy warning: Rewards Distributed UAB operates CoinGate Gift Cards and collects order, payment, recipient, IP, browser, device and fraud-screening data. Its policy says gift-card purchase records can be kept for 10 years and shared with payment, gift-card, fraud, AML and legal recipients. Verification can be required before a redeem page or gift card is released.. - CoinoSwap (coinoswap) URL: https://coinoswap.com/ Non-custodial swap aggregator and rate comparison site whose partner ramps apply their own KYC thresholds. KYC: light. Fees: No separate CoinoSwap fee; the quoted rate includes exchange costs except blockchain network fees.. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap, Aggregator. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Rate comparison, 10+ exchange partners, No registration, Fixed and floating rates, 1000+ cryptocurrencies, Partner KYC risk indicator. Privacy warning: CoinoSwap is an aggregator and partner exchanges may require KYC or hold a transaction. CoinoSwap itself records wallet addresses, swap amounts, timestamps, IP and device data, cookies and optional email, and does not state a retention period for transaction or device data.. - Coinsbee (coinsbee) URL: https://www.coinsbee.com/ Gift-card and mobile top-up marketplace with 5,000+ brands in 185+ countries; verification is required past applicable limits. KYC: light. Fees: 1.5%. Limits: 10,000 daily (currency not recorded). Jurisdiction: DE. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Gift Cards. Coverage: US, UK, EU, AU, IN, CA, ZA, NG, KE, MX, BR, AR. Features: 5,000+ brands, 200+ cryptocurrencies, 185+ countries, Instant delivery. Privacy warning: Coinsbee GmbH is German/EU-regulated; account/order data, crypto payment metadata and Sumsub KYC data can be collected when limits or product rules trigger verification.. - Coldcard (coldcard) URL: https://coldcard.com/ Bitcoin-only air-gapped hardware signer by Coinkite with PSBT signing over MicroSD or QR and duress PIN support. KYC: none. Fees: Mk5 USD 189; Q USD 289. Jurisdiction: CA. Recorded risk: danger. Categories: Wallet, Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Air-gapped signing, Bitcoin-only, Verifiable firmware source, Duress PIN, PSBT via MicroSD, Sparrow compatible, No companion app required, Dual secure elements, Mk5 and Q models. Privacy warning: A July 2026 firmware random-number-generator defect weakened seeds generated on affected Coldcard versions and was exploited offline to steal funds. Devices were not remotely hacked. Installing fixed firmware does not repair an existing weak seed. Users who generated a seed on an affected version must follow Coinkite's migration procedure and move funds to a new seed unless the documented dice-roll exception applies.. Incidents: 2021-2026 firmware RNG entropy defect and Bitcoin theft (monitoring, critical, since 2026-07-30). - Cryptomator (cryptomator) URL: https://cryptomator.org/ Client-side encryption for files you keep in any cloud. Free on desktop, one-time purchase on mobile, no account needed. KYC: none. Fees: Free on desktop, EUR 29.99 one-time per mobile platform. Jurisdiction: DE. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Client-side vault encryption, Works with any cloud storage, Unlimited vaults, Open source, Independently audited, Free on Windows, macOS, and Linux, No account required, Filename encryption, Cryptomator Hub for teams. Privacy warning: Cryptomator protects file contents and filenames inside a vault, but it does not hide the vault itself: the cloud provider still sees vault size, file count, and modification times. Mobile apps are free only in read-only mode, and a paid licence is tied to one platform.. - Crypton.sh (crypton-sh) URL: https://crypton.sh/ Phone numbers, travel eSIMs, email aliases and SMS from Rinzler Labs, a Scotland-registered operator. KYC: none. Jurisdiction: GB. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Comms. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Anonymous SMS, eSIM, Crypto only, No accounts, No-KYC. Privacy warning: Telecom numbers/eSIMs are carrier-facing services; payment, phone-number use, account login and support flows can create metadata even when identity KYC is not required.. - CryptoRefills (cryptorefills) URL: https://www.cryptorefills.com/ Gift cards, eSIMs, mobile top-ups, flights and stays across 6,600+ products in 180+ countries, payable with 100+ cryptocurrencies; risk and travel cases can trigger identity data. KYC: light. Fees: No fixed platform fee published; final total is shown at checkout and blockchain network fees vary. Jurisdiction: NL. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Gift Cards. Coverage: US, EU, UK, AU, IN, ZA, NG, KE, BR, AR, MX. Features: Flights & Hotels, eSIMs, Mobile Top-Ups, 6,600+ products, 100+ cryptocurrencies, AI-agent purchasing (MCP/x402), eSIM data-balance tracking. Privacy warning: No-KYC marketing is limit/risk-dependent; privacy policy covers passenger/guest data for travel bookings plus fraud, legal and traffic-data processing.. - Cryptostorm (cryptostorm) URL: https://cryptostorm.is/ Token-based VPN with no account or email on the XMR purchase path, plus Tor and I2P site access and multihop. KYC: none. Fees: $1.86/week; $6/month; $16/three months; $28/six months; $52/year; $94/two years; simultaneous-device limits vary by duration.. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: VPN. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Token-based, No accounts, No email for XMR/NOWPayments, Tor and I2P access, OpenVPN, WireGuard, Multihop, Open-source tooling. Privacy warning: Cryptostorm says VPN nodes do not retain per-session activity logs, but its website logs IP, user agent, referrer, request and time for up to two weeks. Applicable payment flows retain email, delivered token and a processor transaction ID; XMR and NOWPayments do not request email. These are operator claims, not an independent audit.. - CypherGoat (cyphergoat) URL: https://cyphergoat.com/ Open-source Monero-native swap aggregator comparing partner exchanges over non-custodial routing. KYC: light. Fees: No added CypherGoat fee; partner exchange and network fees apply. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap, Aggregator. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: CypherGoat does not perform KYC; partners may, Rate comparison, No accounts, Non-custodial, Open source web client, SafeRoute split routing. Privacy warning: CypherGoat may use affiliate-tracking cookies; for specified compliance-requiring partners it logs IP address, user agent and language, anonymizes destination-address/amount transaction data after 14 days, and may retain partner-required IP logs longer. Partner exchanges have separate policies and may require KYC.. - DivestOS (divestos) URL: https://divested.dev/pages/software Discontinued Android and LineageOS privacy fork whose development ended in December 2024 without further updates. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: danger. Categories: Privacy OS. Coverage: GLOBAL. Privacy warning: PROJECT DISCONTINUED December 2024 - no current OS/app/security updates. Treat as historical reference only; use maintained Android privacy OS projects for live devices.. - eGifter (egifter) URL: https://www.egifter.com/crypto US e-gift marketplace with Visa and brand cards on crypto checkout, subject to account and payment-authenticity checks. KYC: light. Limits: USD 10,000 across all gift cards; USD 2,000 per brand. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Gift Cards. Coverage: US. Features: US gift cards, Crypto accepted, eGifter Rewards, Instant delivery. Privacy warning: eGifter requires an account and collects identity, contact, payment, gift-card order, recipient, device and network data. It uses payment and fraud providers and may request additional information when an order is flagged. Gift-card sales are generally final.. - eigenwallet (eigenwallet) URL: https://eigenwallet.org/ Open-source Monero wallet and BTC to XMR atomic swap DEX, formerly UnstoppableSwap, with built-in Tor. KYC: none. Fees: Varies by maker offer. Limits: Varies by live liquidity. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: P2P, Wallet, Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: BTC to XMR atomic swaps, No account, Non-custodial Monero wallet, Built-in Tor, Open source, Onion site. Privacy warning: Pricing and liquidity depend on swap makers. Primary sources do not confirm the earlier incident's exact loss, recovery or resolution. EUR/SEPA purchases are separate from Bitcoin-to-Monero swaps; their identity requirements remain unclear.. - Electrum (electrum) URL: https://electrum.org/ Bitcoin desktop and Android wallet running since 2011. No account, keys stay local, and releases are reproducible and signed. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: DE. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Bitcoin only, No account and no signup, Keys stay on the device, Seed phrase recovery, Reproducible builds, Multisig wallets, Cold storage and watch-only, Hardware wallet support, Tor and custom server support. Privacy warning: Electrum is a light client. Its own FAQ states the client subscribes its addresses to one main server, so that server can reasonably guess the addresses belong to the same entity, and all connected servers see the client IP address unless a proxy, VPN, or Tor is used. Confirmed transactions are checked with SPV, but the server is trusted for unconfirmed transactions and can lie by omission. Running your own server or connecting over Tor removes most of that exposure. The site also warns to download only from electrum.org and verify GPG signatures. Electrum 4.8.1 says it contains important security fixes whose details will be disclosed later, so the unresolved disclosure should be monitored.. - encryptSIM (encryptsim) URL: https://encryptsim.com Global data eSIM for 200+ destinations whose terms state no account registration or personal data collection. KYC: light. Fees: Shown at checkout. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Comms. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Global eSIM, Account email generally required, Cryptocurrency payments, Data, voice and SMS services, Instant digital delivery. Privacy warning: Standard eSIM purchases generally require an account email and payment information. Government ID is not ordinarily required, but encryptSIM may request it for legal, fraud, voice or numbering, abuse, sanctions or dispute checks. Lumific Labs Inc. processes account, order, payment, wallet, telecom, support, IP, device, location, cookie and analytics data through globally distributed providers.. - Ente (ente) URL: https://ente.com/ End-to-end encrypted photo storage with a 10GB free tier. Paid plans run through Stripe or PayPal, with no crypto option. KYC: none. Fees: 10GB free, $2.49/mo 50GB, $4.99/mo 200GB, $9.99/mo 1TB. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Cloud Storage. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: End-to-end encrypted photo backup, Open source clients and server, Self-hostable, Stored in 3 locations, On-device face recognition, Family plan sharing, Public links, Independently audited, 10GB free tier. Privacy warning: Paid plans cannot be bought privately: Stripe and PayPal are the only rails and both link a real identity to the account. The terms name Ente Technologies, Inc. and set Delaware governing law with venue in Santa Clara County, so US legal process reaches account metadata even though file contents are end-to-end encrypted.. - Exolix (exolix) URL: https://exolix.com/ Cross-chain swap aggregator routing thousands of tokens across 200+ blockchains, with fixed/floating rates and risk-based AML/KYC. KYC: light. Fees: No separate Exolix fee shown; costs are included in the displayed rate and network overhead. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No registration, Thousands of tokens, 200+ blockchains, Fixed and floating rates, Risk-based AML/KYC, XMR support, API available. Privacy warning: Operator and jurisdiction remain unresolved. Exolix routes swaps through independent providers and applies a risk-based AML/KYC policy that can require checks; its anonymity marketing is not a never-KYC guarantee.. - Feather Wallet (feather-wallet) URL: https://featherwallet.org/ A free, open-source Monero wallet for desktop. Connects via Tor by default, heavily optimized for privacy and power users. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: XMR only, Electrum-like, Tor built-in, Tails OS support, Coin control. Privacy warning: Feather bundles Tor, but by default routes all network traffic over Tor except wallet synchronization. Synchronization contacts a node, while websocket features fetch fiat price, CCS and block-height data and the updater contacts featherwallet.org; users with stronger threat models should configure always-over-Tor or a local node.. - Filen (filen) URL: https://filen.io German zero-knowledge cloud storage with end-to-end encrypted files, chats and collaboration tools. KYC: none. Fees: Free 10GB / from €0.99/mo. Jurisdiction: DE. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Cloud Storage. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: End-to-end encrypted, Zero-knowledge, German jurisdiction, Open source, Major cards + PayPal, Desktop + mobile apps, GDPR compliant. Privacy warning: German hosted cloud account with payment, support and account-activity metadata. No current official crypto-payment route was source-verified in this pass.. - FixedFloat (fixedfloat) URL: https://ff.io/ Fixed and floating rate crypto swaps with no account required, supporting Lightning Network and major assets. KYC: light. Fees: 0.5–1%. Jurisdiction: GE. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Fixed rate, Variable rate, No account, Instant, Refund address. Privacy warning: Two thefts were reported in 2024: $26.1M on February 16 and $2.8M on April 1. The service attributed the incidents to infrastructure vulnerabilities involving third-party providers. The operating team is not named.. - Flexa (flexa) URL: https://flexa.co/ Licensed crypto payment and money-movement network for merchants and wallets, tying each account to a verifiable identity and operating in the US and 37 SEPA countries/territories. KYC: light. Fees: No end-user transaction fee; merchant/provider pricing is not publicly stated. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Merchants. Coverage: US, EU. Features: ZEC at major retailers, XMR supported, BTC supported, Works via Zashi, Chipotle, GameStop, Sheetz, Instant settlement, Money-movement platform in 37 SEPA countries/territories. Privacy warning: US/Five Eyes payment network; privacy policy says Flexa may collect name, email and identity-verification information directly or through third parties.. Incidents: SPEDN consumer app shutdown (resolved, medium, since 2026-03-31). - FlokiNET (flokinet) URL: https://flokinet.is/ Offshore VPS and dedicated servers in Iceland, Romania and Finland, accepting XMR, ZEC and BTC. KYC: none. Fees: From €7.99/mo. Jurisdiction: IS. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Hosting. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Hosting in Iceland, Romania, Finland and the Netherlands, XMR accepted, ZEC accepted, BTC accepted, No government ID required, Email required, VPS, Dedicated servers, Shared hosting, Tor and onion hosting support. Privacy warning: The privacy policy says FlokiNET logs IP address and visit metadata, may collect full name, billing and contact data for customer accounts, may retain network access logs for any period at its discretion, and may retain personal information indefinitely in specified cases.. - Forward Email (forward-email) URL: https://forwardemail.net/ Custom-domain email forwarding with a free tier and paid inboxes from $3/mo. Checkout accepts USDC crypto alongside cards and PayPal. KYC: none. Fees: Free forwarding, $3/mo Enhanced Protection, $9/mo Team. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Email. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Email forwarding on your own domain, Unlimited domains and aliases, Free forwarding tier, Crypto checkout through Stripe, Open source service code, Self-hostable, IMAP, POP3, CalDAV, and CardDAV, Outbound SMTP on paid plans, No third-party analytics. Privacy warning: Forward Email LLC is a United States company and its terms set Delaware governing law, so US legal process reaches stored account data. The privacy policy states forwarded email and its metadata are not written to disk or database, but the service does store your account email address, domains, aliases, 4xx and 5xx SMTP error logs for 7 days, and outbound SMTP records for about 30 days. Paying in USDC still runs through Stripe, so the crypto option reduces the card trail rather than removing an intermediary.. - Foundation Passport Prime (foundation-passport) URL: https://foundation.xyz/ Passport Prime is open-source human-authority hardware combining a Bitcoin wallet, offline 2FA codes, NFC/USB security keys, 50GB encrypted storage and sandboxed KeyOS apps. KYC: none. Fees: Passport Prime listed at €384.95 (locale/tax dependent). Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Bitcoin wallet, Offline 2FA codes, NFC/USB security keys, 50GB encrypted storage, KeyOS microkernel, Sandboxed open-source apps, Encrypted QuantumLink Bluetooth, Envoy companion app, Physical approval. Privacy warning: Foundation is a US company. Passport keeps keys on the device and publishes its hardware and firmware source. Purchase and shipping records can still identify the buyer.. - Framework Computer (framework) URL: https://frame.work/ Modular repairable laptops with camera and microphone kill switches, sold without a preinstalled proprietary OS. KYC: none. Fees: Hardware prices vary. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Hardware. Coverage: US, GLOBAL. Privacy warning: Framework’s ecommerce policy states that billing identity and payment data are processed and that necessary personal data can be shared with marketing, shipping, payment-processing and customer-support providers. Normal hardware orders do not state document KYC but still identify the buyer.. - FreeSocks (freesocks) URL: https://freesocks.org/ FreeSocks v2 distributes dated free-tier and paid Membership proxy access through an Unredacted-operated control plane. KYC: none. Fees: Free tier: 50 GB/month for 90 days; Membership: $5/1 month, $14/3 months, $27/6 months, or $50/12 months. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Censorship, Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: 50 GB/month free tier for 90 days, Optional paid Membership, Xray through Remnawave enabled, Outline code path present but live backend disabled, Self-hosted control plane, Public source code, Access-key rotation. Privacy warning: FreeSocks is a censorship-circumvention proxy, not a VPN anonymity guarantee. Live anonymous analytics remain enabled, while the public configuration does not expose analytics.forwardIp or geo-mode settings. Unredacted's privacy policy says FreeSocks encrypted content is encrypted in transit and not stored, while the public control-plane documentation describes additional retention defaults; neither independently verifies production node logging or retention. CDN-delivered JavaScript remains an accepted active-CDN threat despite HPKE and proof-of-possession mitigations.. - GhostSwap (ghostswap) URL: https://ghostswap.io/ No-account swap aggregator for BTC, ETH, XMR and 1,600+ coins, with automated AML checks by licensed processing partners. KYC: light. Fees: Included in swap rate. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap, Aggregator. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No account for standard swaps, No signup/no email marketing claim, 1,600+ coins, XMR support, Tor browser support content, AML partner screening disclosure. Privacy warning: GhostSwap does not require an account for standard swaps, but its terms say licensed processing partners run AML/sanctions checks and may block, reject, or refund flagged transactions. Not a pure zero-risk no-KYC venue.. - Godex.io (godex) URL: https://godex.io/ No-registration crypto swaps across 935 cryptocurrencies including XMR and ZEC; AML policy can trigger verification and regional exclusions. KYC: light. Fees: 0.5%. Jurisdiction: SC. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No email, No registration, Non-custodial, XMR supported, ZEC supported, No limit, Tor-friendly, 935 cryptocurrencies, 24/7 support. Privacy warning: Godex publishes an AML/KYC policy with customer verification language despite no-KYC marketing; US and sanctioned jurisdictions are prohibited.. - GrapheneOS (grapheneos) URL: https://grapheneos.org/ Open-source Android-compatible mobile OS for Pixel devices, with no account required to install or use it. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: CA. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Hardened Android fork, Google-free option, Sandboxed Google Play, Verified boot, Open source, Pixel devices, No account required, Auto-updates, Advanced permission controls, Duress PIN/password. - Haveno (haveno-dex) URL: https://haveno.exchange/ Decentralized Tor-only P2P exchange settling in Monero, using a non-custodial security deposit model. KYC: none. Fees: 0.15% maker / 0.75% taker. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: P2P. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: XMR settlement, Fiat-to-XMR, Crypto-to-XMR, Tor-only, Non-custodial, Open source, Security deposit, Decentralized, Bisq fork. Privacy warning: The Haveno core team publishes software but does not operate or endorse a live mainnet network. Mainnet installers, fees, operators, privacy terms and dispute agents are network-specific; fiat payment methods may expose identity and payment-account data to a counterparty.. - Hodl Hodl (hodlhodl) URL: https://hodlhodl.com/ Non-custodial P2P Bitcoin exchange using multisig escrow, with an official no-KYC and no-custody claim. KYC: none. Fees: 0.6%. Limits: No Limit. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: P2P / Escrow. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Multisig escrow, 100+ fiat rails, BTC/LTC. Privacy warning: Accounts use username, email and password. Identity/KYC/AML information may be collected for disputes or compliance; AML-related personal data may be retained for five years. Counterparty payment methods add separate exposure.. - Hyperliquid (hyperliquid) URL: https://app.hyperliquid.xyz Wallet-connected perpetuals and spot trading on Hyperliquid L1; interface terms exclude listed restricted persons, Singapore access is blocked, and MAS lists Hyperliquid on its Investor Alert List. KYC: none. Fees: Base perps: 0.045% taker / 0.015% maker; base spot: 0.070% taker / 0.040% maker; tiers, staking discounts and rebates vary. Limits: No Limit. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No account, Perpetuals, Instant, Spot Trading. Privacy warning: Wallet-only/no-account does not mean anonymous: Hyperliquid Corp. collects IP/device/usage and wallet/transaction information, uses analytics/cookies, applies automated risk controls, restricts US persons, Ontario and sanctioned persons, blocks Singapore access, and prohibits VPN/proxy circumvention. MAS added Hyperliquid to its Investor Alert List on 2026-06-26.. - I2P (Invisible Internet Project) (i2p) URL: https://i2p.net/ Decentralized network routing traffic through layered encryption across volunteer-operated nodes. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Networking. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Layered encrypted routing, Volunteer-operated nodes, Internal hidden services, Open source, Post-quantum NTCP2 transport (2.13.0), DNS-like address book, BitTorrent and messaging applications. Privacy warning: I2P is optimized for internal hidden services, not clearnet exit browsing; privacy depends on correct client/app configuration and threat model.. - IncogNET (incognet) URL: https://incognet.io/ Anonymous VPS and dedicated server hosting. Accepts XMR and BTC, no personal info required. No logs. (Zero KYC) KYC: none. Fees: VPN from USD 2/mo per location on a three-year term. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Hosting. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: XMR accepted, BTC accepted, Email required; aliases accepted, VPS, Dedicated servers, No VPN traffic or DNS logging, US-based, WireGuard VPN. Privacy warning: Wyoming/United States jurisdiction applies. IncogNET may log IP addresses for new orders and sign-ups, standard webserver access logs, transaction records, and security-related records; it uses third-party operational software, deletes accounts periodically rather than immediately, and may disclose information when legally required.. Incidents: Kansas City network DDoS event (active, high, since 2026-07-19). - Infinity Exchanger (infinity-exchanger) URL: https://exchanger.infinity.taxi/ Cryptocurrency exchanger advertising its own reserves and Tor access. Its public link page is online, but the exchange interface could not be reached. KYC: none. Fees: Fixed commission claimed; amount and calculation are not published.. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No-account claim, No-KYC and no-AML claim, Own-reserve claim, Exchange reference and letter of guarantee, Reusable deposit address. Privacy warning: The clearnet exchange link returned a gateway error; the published onion address was not tested. The operator, jurisdiction, fee amount, limits and data-retention terms are undisclosed. The linked source code covers onion routing, not the exchange itself.. - Intercambio (intercambio) URL: https://intercambio.app/ Accountless swap aggregator with Tor and I2P mirrors; JavaScript is optional. Its FAQ states exchange data is deleted after two weeks or on request. KYC: none. Fees: Typically 0.5-2% depending on exchange; transaction fees may be additional. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Swap, Aggregator. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No aggregator account required, Tor and I2P mirrors, Rate comparison, Works without JavaScript, Partner-dependent KYC. Privacy warning: Partner exchanges hold funds and set identity requirements. Intercambio says exchange data is deleted after two weeks or on request. This has not been independently tested; the legal operator is unknown.. - Internxt (internxt) URL: https://internxt.com Spanish zero-knowledge encrypted cloud storage and file transfer, taking crypto for lifetime plans. KYC: none. Fees: Free 1GB; paid annual/lifetime/business pricing is plan-specific. Jurisdiction: ES. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Cloud Storage. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Zero-knowledge encryption, Post-quantum encryption, No identity or email verification, 1 GB free tier, Crypto payments, Open source, Drive + Send suite, Spanish jurisdiction. Privacy warning: Spanish/EU provider with account, payment and support metadata. Existing investor/state-aligned telecom and security-contractor cautions remain relevant despite zero-knowledge storage claims.. - IVPN (ivpn) URL: https://www.ivpn.net/ Anonymous VPN - account ID only, no email, accepts XMR/BTC. No logs, independently audited, multi-hop. Open source. (Zero KYC) KYC: none. Fees: $6/mo. Jurisdiction: GI. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: VPN. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No email required, Account ID only, XMR accepted, BTC accepted, No VPN activity logs, Open source clients, Multi-hop, WireGuard and OpenVPN, Annual independent security audits. Privacy warning: On 7 August 2026, an exploited critical BTCPay Server vulnerability exposed IVPN’s Lightning-node credentials and 0.6168 BTC in operating funds was stolen. IVPN says no customer data or funds and no VPN infrastructure were affected; Lightning payments were restored on 10 August after patching, credential rotation and a rebuild.. Incidents: BTCPay and Lightning payment-server compromise (resolved, high, since 2026-08-07). - JMP.chat (jmp-chat) URL: https://jmp.chat/ Canadian and US phone numbers for SMS, MMS and calls over XMPP, operating under Canadian and BC jurisdiction. KYC: none. Fees: $2.99/mo. Jurisdiction: CA. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Comms. Coverage: US, CA. Features: XMPP-based, Real US phone number, SMS + calls, BTC + Lightning, Open source, No identity required, Jabber/XMPP. Privacy warning: XMPP account data and telecom metadata are processed. Voicemail/MMS are deleted after 30 days; other message content may leave cache after 7 days; call records, DID number and destination metadata may persist for billing and troubleshooting.. - JoinMarket (joinmarket) URL: https://github.com/JoinMarket-Org/joinmarket-clientserver Bitcoin CoinJoin implementation whose clientserver repository was archived read-only as of April 2026. KYC: none. Fees: ~0.1% (market rate). Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Privacy Tools, Bitcoin. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Decentralized CoinJoin, No coordinator, Earn fees as maker, Bitcoin privacy, Tor-native, Open source, Self-custodial, JoinMarket-Qt GUI. Privacy warning: Official repository is archived/read-only; advanced Bitcoin Core/Tor setup is required and future maintenance should be verified before use.. - JuicySMS (juicysms) URL: https://juicysms.com/ SMS verification and number rental with API access, paid by card, Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin or Monero. KYC: light. Fees: From €0.50 per delivered SMS; $10 minimum account recharge; same-number reuse for the same service at half the original price. Jurisdiction: NL. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Comms. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: SMS verification, Account balance, API, USA/UK/Netherlands/Philippines numbers, Card and crypto payments, Pay only for delivered SMS. Privacy warning: Account, balance, API and number-use metadata are service-side. The privacy policy also names payment processors and analytics/advertising providers including Google, Meta, Reddit and Crazy Egg; verification numbers may be rejected or recycled by target platforms.. - KeePassXC (keepassxc) URL: https://keepassxc.org/ Offline password manager keeping credentials in a local encrypted file. No account, no cloud, no subscription. GPLv3. KYC: none. Fees: Free (GPLv3). Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Offline encrypted database, No cloud and no account, Windows, macOS, and Linux, Browser integration, Auto-type, Attachments and notes, ANSSI Security Visa, GPLv3 licensed, No ads, trackers, or subscriptions. Privacy warning: The app and password database remain local. The website collects anonymized IP address, user-agent, referrer, screen, and geolocation metrics through self-hosted Matomo; visitor logs are retained for 90 days and detailed reports for 12 months. GitHub update checks and user-requested favicon downloads create optional network connections. CVE-2026-4158 affected Windows releases through 2.7.11 and is patched in the current 2.7.12 release.. - KemyCard (kemycard) URL: https://kemycard.com/en/home Crypto-funded virtual and physical cards whose terms require full eKYC via Sumsub or Veriff plus AML monitoring. KYC: full. Fees: 5%. Limits: 10,000 daily (currency not recorded). Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Virtual/Physical Card. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Virtual cards, Physical Mastercard, Multi-currency accounts, Crypto top-up, Apple Pay, Google Pay, Full eKYC, AML monitoring. Privacy warning: US MSB/Five Eyes jurisdiction. Requires account registration, personal-data processing, full eKYC, biometric/ID verification, and AML transaction monitoring.. - KYUN (kyun) URL: https://kyun.sh/ Privacy-focused cloud hosting for virtual machines, one-click apps, and block storage in Romania, the Netherlands, and the United States, with Monero and card payments. KYC: none. Fees: VMs from €1.60/month; HDD block storage from €5/TB/month.. Jurisdiction: RO. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Hosting. Coverage: RO, NL, US. Features: KVM virtual machines, Linux containers, One-click private apps, Block storage, DDoS protection, Monero deposits, Card payments, Tor access. Privacy warning: Kyun stores account contact data, assigned-IP history, payments and service configuration. VM disks are not provider-encrypted or backed up. Kyoko live-chat messages go to a third-party LLM unless Ultra Private Mode is enabled. Romanian law and the host country's law apply, and uptime is not guaranteed.. - Laso Finance (laso-finance) URL: https://laso.finance Stablecoin-funded prepaid cards, gift cards and payouts, with an x402 API and a provider-custodied managed-agent-wallet option. KYC: light. Fees: USA prepaid cards: 0%; international: 3.8%; gift cards: up to 4.8%; payout fees vary by route and live quote. Limits: USA prepaid cards: $5-$1,000; international: $100-$1,000, manually fulfilled; other products have separate limits. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Virtual/Physical Card, Agent Money. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Stablecoin-funded prepaid cards, Option-specific identity verification, USDT, USDC, DAI, USA and international card options, x402 agent API, Single-load and verified reloadable cards. Privacy warning: Laso collects wallet, transaction, IP and device data and shares data with payment and compliance partners. It says financial records are kept for at least five years. Managed agent wallets are held by Laso; issuer identity and current registration remain unverified.. - Ledger (ledger) URL: https://www.ledger.com/ Ledger sells self-custody hardware signers and provides the Ledger Wallet desktop/mobile application. Private keys remain under user control on the signer; buying, selling, swapping and some staking functions route through separate providers with their own terms, fees, availability and KYC/KYT rules. KYC: none. Fees: Current official comparison payload showed base USD prices from $59 to $399 (Nano S Plus $59; Nano X $79; Nano Gen5 $179; Flex $249; Stax + Recovery Key $399). Final checkout pricing, taxes, delivery, import charges, partner fees and network fees vary.. Limits: No device-level transaction limit stated; blockchain rules and integrated third-party provider limits apply.. Jurisdiction: FR. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Hardware wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Current hardware line: Ledger Stax, Ledger Flex, Ledger Nano Gen5, Ledger Nano X and Ledger Nano S Plus, Certified Secure Element (CC EAL6+ on the current comparison page), Ledger Wallet desktop and mobile companion apps, 500+ coins directly in Ledger Wallet; 15,000+ crypto and 100+ chains advertised across supported integrations, Buy, sell, swap and stake integrations through third-party service providers, Ledger Wallet CLI and Agent Stack with physical signer approval for every signing step, Public Ledger Wallet source repository; most projects MIT-licensed, Proprietary Ledger OS firmware with separately developed device applications. Privacy warning: Hardware purchases expose name, email, billing/shipping address, phone, order and payment-method metadata to Ledger and Global-e; Ledger says order data is retained ten years and archived after three months. Ledger Wallet generates equipment/signer IDs and may retain wallet-address/on-chain analytics for five years; optional features and third-party financial services create additional data flows. The 2020 customer-data breach materially increases phishing and physical-targeting risk.. Incidents: Ledger Connect Kit supply-chain compromise (resolved, critical, since 2023-12-14); E-commerce and marketing database breach (resolved, high, since 2020-06-25). - Librewolf (librewolf) URL: https://librewolf.net/ Firefox fork that removes telemetry and data collection while shipping strict privacy and security defaults. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Firefox fork, Telemetry disabled, uBlock Origin bundled, Strict tracking protection, Firefox Sync disabled by default, Open source, Windows/Mac/Linux, Privacy hardened. Privacy warning: Some sites break under strict defaults. Settings changes can make a browser easier to fingerprint. Sync is optional; the privacy policy does not rule out all data reaching third parties.. - LNVPN (lnvpn) URL: https://nadanada.me/ VPN, disposable SMS numbers and eSIMs with no account or email stated as required, paid in BTC, XMR or ZEC. KYC: none. Fees: Pay-per-minute via Lightning. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: VPN. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Lightning-native, No account, No logs, No email, Pay-per-minute, eSIMs, Disposable numbers, WireGuard. Privacy warning: The website stores a truncated IP prefix for 7 days. VPN endpoints retain public key, PSK and bandwidth use, with source IP held in memory until 5 minutes of inactivity; eSIM service metadata and rental SMS are retained for service duration. Stripe/MixPay and telecom partners process additional data. The public site does not identify a legal operator or jurisdiction.. - Localcoin (AU) (localcoin-au) URL: https://localcoinatm.com/en-au/ Australian crypto ATM service for cash trades, requiring government-issued ID verification before transactions. KYC: full. Fees: Variable exchange fee included in the displayed rate; exact percentage is not published. Limits: $5 AUD minimum; $5,000 per transaction; $20,000 daily. Jurisdiction: AU. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Bitcoin ATM. Coverage: AU. Features: Australia, BTC/ETH/USDT/USDC. Privacy warning: Australia/Five Eyes ATM operator; identity, selfie, phone, wallet, cash transaction and support data are exposed to compliance workflows.. - LocalCoinSwap (localcoinswap) URL: https://localcoinswap.com/ P2P crypto marketplace with escrow and hundreds of payment methods, whose terms reserve discretionary KYC checks. KYC: light. Fees: 0.25%. Limits: No Limit. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: P2P / Escrow. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Multi-crypto, Escrow, Global. Privacy warning: Registration requires account information; the privacy policy lists email, usage data, geographic position, username, picture, city, phone number, cookies and system logs/IP addresses. Disputes can require payment records, government ID, proof of address, photos, audio or video. The terms permit disclosure and account restrictions and exclude multiple jurisdictions.. - Lokinet (lokinet) URL: https://lokinet.org/ An onion-routed internet natively supporting all IP-based protocols (TCP, UDP, ICMP). Part of the Oxen privacy ecosystem. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: AU. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Networking. Coverage: GLOBAL. - Machankura (machankura) URL: https://8333.mobi Custodial Bitcoin Lightning wallet over USSD, SMS and WhatsApp that works on feature phones without internet. KYC: light. Fees: 1% transaction fee on wallet spends; network and mobile-operator charges may also apply.. Jurisdiction: ZA. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Wallet. Coverage: NG, GH, KE, ZA, TZ, UG, ZM, MW. Features: USSD Bitcoin, Custodial Lightning wallet, Phone-number accounts, No smartphone required, No internet required, Africa-focused, Feature phone compatible. Privacy warning: Custodial wallet operated by Port 8333 (Pty) Ltd. The South African service processes phone/account, device, transaction, identity-verification, support, and partner data. FICA identity and transaction records must be retained for at least five years and cannot be deleted on request during that period.. - Mailbox.org (mailbox-org) URL: https://mailbox.org German email and workspace suite allowing pseudonymous signup, paid by bank, card, PayPal or cash by post. KYC: light. Fees: From €1/mo. Jurisdiction: DE. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Email. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: OpenPGP encryption, Alias addresses, German jurisdiction, Pseudonymous signup, Cash payment, Calendar + contacts, No ads. Privacy warning: Hosted German email/workspace account with billing/support metadata. Real-name billing data may be needed for invoices or employer reimbursement.. - Mailfence (mailfence) URL: https://mailfence.com/ Belgian encrypted email and groupware with OpenPGP, calendar, contacts and documents under Belgian and EU law. KYC: none. Fees: Free / €2.50/mo Entry / €7.50/mo Pro. Jurisdiction: BE. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Email. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: End-to-end encrypted, OpenPGP support, No ads, Calendar + docs, Custom domains, Belgian law, BTC accepted, Open source (client). Privacy warning: Belgian/EU provider, not Five Eyes, but Mailfence can process account, message-index, payment and anti-abuse data and may disclose information when required by Belgian law. Use OpenPGP for content that must stay end-to-end encrypted.. - Meshtastic (meshtastic) URL: https://meshtastic.org Open-source LoRa mesh networking for off-grid encrypted text without cellular service or internet. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Messaging, Offline, Hardware. Coverage: GLOBAL. Privacy warning: LoRa traffic and node/location metadata can be observable. Channel AES-CTR uses a shared PSK without authentication, so anyone with the PSK can read traffic and impersonate a channel member. Direct messages on 2.5+ use x25519/AES-CCM when keys are known, but may fall back to less-secure channel encryption.. - Monerujo (monerujo) URL: https://www.monerujo.app/ Open-source Android Monero wallet with custom nodes/Orbot routing, Ledger and Sidekick support, plus optional Exolix swaps. KYC: none. Fees: Network fees only. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Monero-only, Android native, Open source, Tor routing via Orbot, Ledger hardware-wallet support, No account required, Sidekick companion-device signing, Exolix integrated swaps, Street Mode, PocketChange, Custom nodes. Privacy warning: Wallet keys stay local, but selected Monero daemon nodes can observe network metadata. Optional exchange-rate APIs receive requests, and using integrated Exolix shares the destination address and amount while making the user's IP collectable.. - Moon (Pay with Moon) (moon) URL: https://paywithmoon.com/ Moon LLC crypto-funded virtual Visa cards issued by partner financial institutions, plus merchant gift-card spend. KYC: light. Fees: Moon X: 1% per transaction (USD 1 minimum). Moon 1X: USD 1.49 issuance. Other fees apply.. Limits: 10 cards daily; 30 cards monthly; USD 4,000 monthly card spend; Moon Credit purchases up to USD 10,000 daily and USD 30,000 monthly; Moon 1X Card USD 5 to USD 1,000. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Virtual Visa Codes. Coverage: US. Features: Moon X Card, Moon 1X Card, Bitcoin and Lightning, USDT and USDC, Merchant gift cards. Privacy warning: Moon requires an email account and can collect name, account, federated-login, IP, device, usage, cookie, tracking and support data. It uses cloud, analytics, advertising, replay and support providers and can process data outside the United States. Optional features can require light or full customer identification, and suspicious transactions can trigger identification or source-of-funds review at any time. Card issuer terms also apply. Moon Credit is not insured, and the general terms are governed by Prospera, Honduras.. - Mullvad DNS (mullvad-dns) URL: https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls/ Public encrypted DNS over HTTPS and TLS, scheduled to close on November 2, 2026. Manually configured users must migrate; Mullvad VPN internal DNS is unaffected. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: SE. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: DNS. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: DNS over HTTPS, DNS over TLS, No logging, Ad blocking, Tracker blocking, Malware blocking, Swedish jurisdiction. Privacy warning: Scheduled closure, not a current outage: Mullvad announced on September 3 that its public encrypted DNS service will close on November 2, 2026. This covers unfiltered and blocking DoH/DoT variants. Replace manual OS/browser settings and Apple DNS profiles before closure. Default and included ad-blocking Mullvad Browser DoH settings will migrate automatically to Quad9; custom settings will not. Mullvad VPN internal DNS is separate and unaffected. Encrypted DNS does not hide destination connections or replace a VPN. Closure scope checked September 21, 2026 against Mullvad's announcement and public DNS documentation.. - Mullvad VPN (mullvad-vpn) URL: https://mullvad.net/ Swedish VPN using numbered accounts, whose policy states no activity logging and accepts cash, BTC and XMR. KYC: none. Fees: €5/mo. Jurisdiction: SE. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: VPN. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No email required, Account number only, Cash accepted, XMR accepted, BTC accepted, No logs, Audited, No Cloudflare, Open source client, WireGuard + OpenVPN. - MyNymBox (mynymbox) URL: https://mynymbox.io/ Hosting and domain registration needing only a working email, paid in BTC, Lightning, XMR, LTC or ZEC. KYC: none. Fees: Shared from €3.50/mo; VPS from €4/mo. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Hosting. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: BTC/Lightning/XMR payments, Email alias accepted, Tor/VPN access allowed, KVM VPS, Dedicated servers, Anonymous domains, WHOIS privacy, NL/FI locations. Privacy warning: Account is required and the username is an email address, though aliases are allowed. Privacy policy says IP addresses may be logged for client portal, service management panels and administrative/service interfaces for security and abuse handling. Mynymbox says it is not bulletproof hosting and will comply with valid legal orders; altcoin swaps use Trocador and fiat/onramp paths use Malum/PayPal/Stripe-style rails.. - MySudo (mysudo) URL: https://mysudo.com/ MySudo/Anonyome app suite for private phone numbers, email aliases, messaging, VPN and optional virtual-card/identity services. KYC: light. Fees: Free tier / $0.99-$14.99/mo. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Comms. Coverage: US, CA, UK, AU. Features: Multiple phone numbers, Separate identities (Sudos), Email aliases, Private browser, Calls + SMS, iOS + Android, Option-level identity verification. Privacy warning: Anonyome Labs Inc. is US/Five Eyes; some phone-number and virtual-card features require identity verification, and existing founder surveillance-tech warning remains material.. - NanoGPT (nanogpt) URL: https://nano-gpt.com/ Pay-per-use AI platform for chat, image, video and API access, with local conversations and prepaid balances. KYC: light. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Developer Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Pay-per-query AI, Crypto accepted, Multiple models, No subscription. Privacy warning: Prompts, attachments, tool context, media inputs and required settings are sent to selected model/provider routes; provider retention claims are not independently auditable, optional cloud/storage features create additional retention paths, and payment/abuse systems process metadata.. - NextDNS (nextdns) URL: https://nextdns.io Configurable DNS firewall with blocklists, per-device profiles and logging retention that can be disabled. KYC: light. Fees: Free 300k queries/mo / $1.99/mo. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: DNS. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Fully configurable, DNS over HTTPS, DNS over TLS, QUIC support, Ad + tracker blocking, Per-device profiles, Crypto payment. Privacy warning: US-incorporated DNS resolver. Logs and analytics are configurable from no-logs to long retention; disable logging for privacy-sensitive use.. - NiceVPS (nicevps) URL: https://nicevps.net/ VPS, hosting, domains, SMTP relay and VPN whose homepage states no personal details or KYC, paid in BTC or XMR. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: DM. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Hosting. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: VPS and dedicated servers, Domains and hosting, VPN, Direct crypto payments, Tor access, No phone verification. Privacy warning: NiceVPS says signup requires email, username and password and that personal data is otherwise optional, but its published terms were last updated in 2017 and no separate current privacy policy was found. The site makes a zero-logs VPN claim without linking an independent audit. Customers remain responsible for securing and backing up unmanaged services, and NiceVPS reserves broad suspension discretion.. - Nighthawk Wallet (nighthawk-wallet) URL: https://nighthawkwallet.com/ Open-source Zcash mobile wallet with shielded support and Unified Addresses. Community-built, no KYC, self-custodial. (Zero KYC) KYC: none. Fees: 0.0001 ZEC/tx. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Shielded ZEC, Unified Addresses, Self-custody, Open source, Android + iOS, Community-built. Privacy warning: Current privacy policy says App Store/Play Store error reporting can collect IP address, device name, OS version, app configuration, usage time/date and statistics. The official site now markets a DarkFi testnet wallet as coming soon while the linked Android repository's latest release is the November 2024 Zcash v2.2.16 build.. - Njalla (njalla) URL: https://njal.la/ Domain and VPS provider that holds domains on the customer's behalf, with email or XMPP signup and XMR payments. KYC: none. Fees: Varies by product; domains start at EUR 15 per year, servers at EUR 15 per month, and VPN is EUR 5 per month. Jurisdiction: CR. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Hosting. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Domain privacy registration, VPS, VPN, Crypto payments, Email or XMPP signup, Tor access. Privacy warning: Njalla normally appears as the public domain registrant, while the customer retains beneficial ownership and can request formal transfer. It requires an email or XMPP address and password and can disclose relevant account data to authorities. Its terms allow suspension, cancellation, retention or expiry of a domain in specified legal, registry, abuse and non-payment cases.. - Nym VPN (nym-vpn) URL: https://nymvpn.com/ Decentralized mixnet VPN. Scrambles traffic across up to 5 hops for metadata surveillance protection. Powered by NYM token. KYC: none. Fees: From $4.49/mo. Jurisdiction: CH. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: VPN. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Decentralized Mixnet, Tor-like routing, Open Source, Zero-Knowledge Proofs. - Obscura VPN (obscuravpn) URL: https://obscura.com/ Two-party relay VPN pairing an Obscura ingress with an independent Mullvad exit and randomized account numbers. KYC: none. Fees: see site. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: VPN. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: 2-party relay (Obscura ingress + Mullvad exit), WireGuard, No email needed, Randomized account number, Monero & Bitcoin LN payments, iOS + macOS + Android. Privacy warning: US-incorporated operator caveat retained. The two-party relay design reduces single-party correlation, but ingress account/payment metadata and app-platform metadata still matter.. - Obtainium (obtainium) URL: https://github.com/ImranR98/Obtainium Android app that installs and updates apps straight from their own release pages, so you can skip Google Play entirely. KYC: none. Fees: Free (GPL-3.0). Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Installs Android apps from source releases, Update notifications, GitHub and GitLab sources, Forgejo and Codeberg sources, F-Droid and third-party repos, IzzyOnDroid support, HTML fallback source, No account required, GPL-3.0 licensed. Privacy warning: Obtainium removes the Google Play account link, but it does not anonymise downloads: each configured source still sees your IP address when the app checks for updates. Trust moves to whoever publishes the release, and the project recommends pairing it with an app verification tool.. - Offline Protocol (offline-protocol) URL: https://www.offlineprotocol.com/ Software and network layer for offline device-to-device communication, identity verification, service discovery, file transfer and opt-in telemetry across multiple transports. KYC: light. Fees: AGPL community evaluation; commercial SDK and production use priced by quote; supported pilot lasts 6 to 10 weeks. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Messaging, Offline, Payments, Identity. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: AGPL community SDK, Commercial SDK licensing, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi Direct mesh networking, Offline identity, Service discovery, Supported 6 to 10 week pilots. Privacy warning: The marketing site uses consent-gated PostHog analytics and short-lived server logs. Product data practices vary: the MINE app requires an email account and collects device, service, rewards, wallet and security metadata, while some location and mesh metrics stay on-device. Review the policy for the specific Offline Protocol product.. - OrangeFren (orangefren) URL: https://orangefren.com/ Crypto exchange and service directory comparing rates and partner policies, with Tor recommended; OrangeFren states it never touches users' coins. KYC: none. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Swap, Aggregator. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Never-KYC filter, Conditional refund guarantee, Rate comparison, No account required for comparison. Privacy warning: Partner exchanges hold funds and set identity requirements. Refunds apply only to participating offers and reported policy violations within four weeks, not identity checks allowed by those policies. OrangeFren's no-tracking claim has not been independently tested.. - OrangeWebsite (orangewebsite) URL: https://orangewebsite.com Iceland-based hosting under IceNetworks Hong Kong Ltd., with content regulated by Icelandic law. KYC: none. Fees: Shared hosting from €3.40/mo; Cloud VPS from €22.40/mo. Jurisdiction: IS. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Hosting. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Iceland datacenter, Freedom of speech hosting, Crypto payments, Monero via CoinPayments, Domain registration, VPS + web hosting. Privacy warning: Legal entity changed from the old Belize note to IceNetworks Hong Kong Ltd. under current terms. Icelandic hosting/content law remains relevant, but privacy policy can collect name, address, phone, email, service/payment history, and domain data depending on service/support/payment path.. - PayPerQ (ppq-ai) URL: https://ppq.ai/ Pay-per-use web app and API for hundreds of chat, image, video and voice AI models, with no registration required for basic use. KYC: none. Fees: Usage-based; average web query stated as about 1.5¢; no subscriptions. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Developer Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No registration for basic use, Pay per use, Hundreds of AI models, Optional account, Crypto and card funding, Anon/ZDR/E2EE privacy labels. Privacy warning: Prompts are sent to model providers. PPQ does not store prompt content, but provider retention depends on the selected Anon/ZDR/E2EE tier; API ZDR is opt-in per request, OpenAI-developed models receive a pseudonymous abuse-prevention identifier, and optional accounts/card payments add email/payment metadata.. - Payy (payylink) URL: https://payy.network/ Privacy-first EVM-compatible stablecoin chain with native zero-knowledge support and zero-fee private ERC-20 transfers. KYC: none. Fees: Zero fee for private ERC-20 transfers; other operations and integrations may require gas or provider fees. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Stablecoin Card, Private Payments. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Ethereum layer 2, Private stablecoin transfers, Zero-knowledge proofs, Payy wallet, Card and business infrastructure. Privacy warning: Protocol privacy does not make every Payy product private or no-KYC. Payy Network transfers can hide transaction details, but the wallet processes public keys, device and usage data, support data, an IP-based sanctions check and third-party ramp data. Payy's current site also offers card and business products and says users and businesses are KYC-verified across those products.. - Peach Bitcoin (peachbitcoin) URL: https://peachbitcoin.com/ Swiss non-custodial P2P Bitcoin marketplace with no-registration standard trading, optional KYC for verified high-volume sellers, and material jurisdiction restrictions. KYC: light. Fees: 2% of escrow output plus applicable Bitcoin network fees. Limits: CHF 1,000 daily without registration except peer-to-peer payment methods; CHF 1,000 monthly for peer-to-peer payment methods without registration; CHF 100,000 yearly without registration. Jurisdiction: CH. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: P2P / Mobile. Coverage: Global. Features: Mobile and web app, 2-of-2 Bitcoin escrow, Peer-to-peer fiat payments, No KYC where local law permits. Privacy warning: Peach shares payment details and chat with the matched counterparty through end-to-end encrypted channels. Peach can decrypt trade data when a dispute is opened and can require supporting payment or identity evidence. It retains encrypted order, payment and chat records plus device and payment-data hashes, with some dispute and ban-related data kept for 10 years or longer. The United States, China and other named countries are blocked, and Peach does not actively offer or market the service in the EU or EEA.. - PegasusSwap (pegasusswap) URL: https://pegasusswap.com/ No-account crypto swap platform supporting Monero, offering fixed or floating rates and a KYCnot guaranteed level-0 listing. KYC: none. Fees: Included in displayed swap rate. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No account, No KYC claim, No personal data collection claim, XMR support, Fixed and floating rates, Refund address option, KYCnot score 9/10. Privacy warning: Official privacy policy says PegasusSwap does not collect, request, or verify identity-related information under any circumstances. Terms still allow refunds to depend on technical feasibility, and operator/jurisdiction are opaque; use small test swaps first.. - Phoenix Wallet (phoenix-wallet) URL: https://phoenix.acinq.co/ Self-custodial Lightning wallet by ACINQ that manages channels automatically behind a 12-word seed. KYC: none. Fees: Lightning send: 0.4% + 4 sat; liquidity: 1% + mining fees; channel creation: 1,000 sat; other on-chain mining fees vary.. Jurisdiction: FR. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Self-custodial, No account required, Lightning native, Automated channel management, Taproot on-chain addresses, 12-word seed backup, Open source, iOS + Android. Privacy warning: Self-custodial but ACINQ is the Lightning service provider. Phoenix's current FAQ says ACINQ knows the final destination and amount of payments. Channel operations depend on ACINQ availability, although emergency force-close recovery remains available.. - Phreeli (phreeli) URL: https://www.phreeli.com US wireless MVNO whose eSIM purchase avoids name and street address but still requires a residential ZIP code. KYC: light. Fees: prepay. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Comms. Coverage: US. Features: eSIM, Anonymous Signup, Tor Delivery, Zero-Knowledge Payments, US Coverage. Privacy warning: Delaware/US corporation using upstream telecom providers. Privacy policy says username, ZIP and payment are separated from phone usage, but IMEI/eSIM or ICCID can link to issued numbers and upstream providers such as T-Mobile/MVNO Connect can receive required telecom data.. - PikaSIM (pikasim) URL: https://pikasim.com/ Accountless travel eSIM and phone-number service covering 190+ countries, with card or cryptocurrency payments and infrastructure hosted in Finland. KYC: none. Fees: Country plans from $1.50; regional from $4.50; global from $9; unlimited from $6/day; forever plans from $14/GB; SMS from $0.50. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Comms. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Anonymous eSIM, 190+ countries, BTC/Lightning/XMR payments, No account required, No email, No identity, Self-hosted BTCPay, Cryptocurrency payments, Card payments. Privacy warning: Crypto checkout avoids account and email collection. Stripe requires an email for card payments, but PikaSIM says it cannot access or store that email. eSIM suppliers and mobile carriers still process activation, routing and network metadata. PikaSIM also keeps service records for its SMS and wallet products until deletion is requested.. Incidents: PikaSIM network connectivity interruption (03:31 UTC) (resolved, low, since 2026-08-21); PikaSIM network connectivity interruption (05:15 UTC) (resolved, low, since 2026-08-21). - Pintopay (pintopay) URL: https://pintopay.me/ Crypto card and top-up product. Its official homepage advertises AML/KYC controls and 3D Secure. KYC: full. Fees: 3%. Limits: Disclosed in the product flow. Jurisdiction: HK. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Virtual/Physical Card. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Apple/Google Pay, ATM on physical, USDT top-ups. Privacy warning: Pintopay requires account onboarding and identity verification and can request additional AML and source-of-funds evidence. UANT Limited and its partners process identity, transaction, device and financial-profile data and share it with issuers, payment, custody, KYC, fraud, infrastructure and legal recipients. Although the operator is incorporated in Hong Kong, the current terms exclude Hong Kong residents, citizens and tax residents and access from Hong Kong.. - Posteo (posteo) URL: https://posteo.de German privacy email from Posteo e.K. with 4GB included at €1/month, anonymous signup/payment options, no ads and no linking of payment data to accounts. KYC: none. Fees: €1/mo. Jurisdiction: DE. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Email. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Anonymous signup, Cash payment by mail, German jurisdiction, End-to-end encrypted, No IP logging, Sustainable infrastructure, No tracking, 4 GB included storage. Privacy warning: German/EU jurisdiction; service is privacy-forward, but lawful orders can still compel whatever account/payment data exists.. - Privacy.com (privacy-com) URL: https://www.privacy.com/ US bank-linked virtual cards with merchant locks and spend limits, requiring KYC and a US checking account. KYC: full. Fees: Free domestic personal plan; paid plans from $5/mo; Personal foreign transactions incur fees. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Virtual/Physical Card, Developer Tools, Private Payments, Agent Money. Coverage: US. Features: Virtual cards, Single-use cards, Merchant-locked cards, Category-locked cards, Spend limits, Pause and close cards, Transaction listing, Developer API, CLI, MCP server, ACH funding. Privacy warning: Strong spend-control surface, weak identity privacy. Privacy.com, its issuing bank, linked bank account, merchants, API/MCP usage, and transaction logs remain in the payment data path. Use for card-number isolation and hard caps, not for no-KYC financial privacy.. - PrivateAlps (privatealps) URL: https://privatealps.net/ Swiss VPS and cloud hosting advertising privacy, no-logs infrastructure and anonymous payment options. KYC: none. Fees: From €12.90/mo for Linux VPS. Jurisdiction: CH. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: VPN, Hosting. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Swiss privacy, VPN+VPS, Anonymous payment options, Tor-friendly. Privacy warning: PrivateAlps publishes current terms and a privacy policy claiming no VPN-session, browsing-history or access-record logs, but it will act on competent Swiss court orders. The operator’s legal entity and registry identity remain unresolved, and service deposits are generally final.. - Proton Drive (proton-drive) URL: https://proton.me/drive Swiss end-to-end encrypted cloud storage encrypting file contents, filenames and folder names before upload. KYC: none. Fees: Free plan includes 5 GB; paid plans are available.. Jurisdiction: CH. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Cloud Storage. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: End-to-end encrypted, Zero-access encryption, Password-protected sharing, Private Docs and Sheets, Automatic photo backup, Anonymous account option, Swiss jurisdiction, BTC payment, Integrated Proton suite, Open source. Privacy warning: Same Proton AG compliance surface as Proton Mail. Drive encrypts file contents and names client-side, but account, billing, sharing and legal-request metadata remain outside file encryption.. - Proton Mail (proton-mail) URL: https://proton.me/mail Swiss end-to-end encrypted email with free accounts, zero-access encryption and no phone signup by default. KYC: none. Fees: Free / from $3.99/mo. Jurisdiction: CH. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Email. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: End-to-end encrypted, Zero-access encryption, Anonymous signup, Swiss jurisdiction, Open source, Tor onion site, BTC payment accepted, Automatic inbox categories. Privacy warning: Swiss provider with strong privacy posture but court-order history; privacy policy says IPs/emails/phone numbers supplied for verification can be saved temporarily for anti-spam/abuse controls.. - Proton Pass (proton-pass) URL: https://proton.me/pass End-to-end encrypted password and identity manager from Proton AG with encrypted vault fields and metadata, open-source clients, passkeys, sharing and hide-my-email aliases. KYC: none. Fees: Free plan; Pass Plus advertised from $1.99/month; paid pricing varies by billing cycle and plan. Jurisdiction: CH. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: End-to-end encrypted vaults, Encrypted metadata, Open-source apps, Independent Cure53 audit, Passkeys, Hide-my-email aliases, Secure vault and item sharing, Dark web monitoring, Emergency access, Command line interface. Privacy warning: A Proton account still creates account and activity metadata. Hide-my-email alias addresses are not encrypted, and paid subscriptions add payment records. Vault content and vault metadata are end-to-end encrypted.. - Proton VPN (proton-vpn) URL: https://protonvpn.com/ Open-source Swiss VPN with an audited no-logs policy, though account and payment metadata risk remains. KYC: none. Fees: Free tier available. Jurisdiction: CH. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: VPN. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Free tier, XMR accepted, BTC accepted, No logs, Audited, Open source, Tor servers, Secure Core. Privacy warning: The 2021 IP-logging case concerned Proton Mail, not Proton VPN. Proton states that Swiss law treats email and VPN differently and cannot compel Proton VPN to log user data. Account, payment and abuse/security metadata can still be processed, and crypto payment does not make an account anonymous by itself.. - ProxyStore (proxystore) URL: https://digitalgoods.proxysto.re/ German storefront for software, privacy services and vouchers, taking XMR, BTC, cash by mail or SEPA transfer. KYC: none. Jurisdiction: DE. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Merchants. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Digital goods, Crypto accepted, No-KYC, Privacy-focused. Privacy warning: Operated by Itermann & Wansing OHG in Leipzig, Germany. Online shops are hosted on Hetzner in Germany; ProxyStore says it does not log web access/errors and deletes delivered codes after 30 days, but SEPA, shipping, issuer and optional notification paths create metadata.. - Quad9 (quad9) URL: https://quad9.net Free recursive DNS from a Swiss foundation with malware blocking, DNSSEC and DoH, DoT and DoQ options. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: CH. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: DNS. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: DNS over HTTPS, DNS over TLS, Malware blocking, No IP logging, Swiss nonprofit, DNSSEC validation, No account required. Privacy warning: Resolver operator still sits in the DNS path. Threat blocking depends on vetted third-party intelligence providers, and the existing IBM/GCA governance caveat remains relevant for adversarial threat models.. Incidents: Quad9.net website short outage (resolved, low, since 2026-06-29). - Qubes OS (qubes-os) URL: https://qubes-os.org/ Operating system using Xen to isolate activities in separate VMs, with 4.3.1 stable and 4.2 end-of-life. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Privacy OS. Coverage: GLOBAL. Privacy warning: Security depends on compartmentalization plus prompt updates and required restarts. QSB-116 states that multiple Xen issues could allow a malicious qube to compromise Qubes OS or leak data; patched Xen packages are identified for Qubes 4.3.. - RAILGUN (railgun) URL: https://railgun.org/ On-chain zero-knowledge privacy protocol for Ethereum and EVM chains with Private Proofs of Innocence. KYC: none. Fees: 0.25% per shield/unshield, plus gas or optional broadcaster premium. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Mixer. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: On-Chain Privacy, zk-SNARKs, Private DeFi, Auditable. Privacy warning: Regulatory and sanctions risk remains for mixer/privacy-protocol usage despite Proofs of Innocence; not a consumer cash-out route.. - RDP.monster (rdp-monster) URL: https://rdp.monster/ Remote desktop and VPS hosting advertising instant delivery, full admin access and BTC, USDT or XMR payment. KYC: none. Fees: VPS plans from $8.99 per month; quarterly and annual discounts vary by plan.. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Hosting. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Remote desktop, Crypto accepted, No-KYC, Windows VPS. Privacy warning: RDP.monster claims no identity-document KYC, but it records delivery email and crypto order metadata including deposit address, asset, network, amount, transaction hash and timestamp. The former UK company dissolved on 2025-07-08, the current legal operator is not disclosed, and official pages conflict on whether a seven-day refund is available.. - RetoSwap (retoswap) URL: https://retoswap.com/ Haveno-based P2P exchange whose FAQ states it has no means to verify identities, settling in Monero. KYC: none. Fees: 0.1% maker / 0.8% crypto taker / 2% fiat taker. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: P2P. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Haveno-based, XMR settlement, Tor + I2P, Non-custodial, Open source, No registration. Privacy warning: RetoSwap is anonymous/pseudonymous open-source P2P software with no verified legal entity. A June 2026 Haveno trade-protocol exploit caused a trading halt; service resumed on v1.8.0 and recovery was coordinated with affected users. P2P counterparty, arbitration, software, and live-liquidity risk remain.. Incidents: Haveno trade-protocol exploit and trading halt (resolved, high, since 2026-06-16). - Rewarble (rewarble) URL: https://rewarble.com/ Digital payout platform issuing Visa and Mastercard codes, e-wallet top-ups, bank transfers and virtual prepaid cards. KYC: light. Fees: Varies by reward option; current schedule uses product-specific fixed and percentage fees. Limits: Varies by reward option. Jurisdiction: NL. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Visa Gift Codes. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Virtual Visa, 3-D Secure options, Instant. Privacy warning: Rewarble can request identity, address and source-of-funds evidence before redemption and can block a reward while checks are pending. It collects payment, redemption, device, IP and KYC data, shares data with issuers, processors and compliance providers, and generally retains it for five years after the latest purchase or redemption. An inactivity fee can apply after six months.. - RoboSats (robosats) URL: https://robosats.org/ Open-source P2P Bitcoin exchange using Lightning hold invoices, robot avatars and Tor-first access. KYC: none. Fees: 0.2% total: 0.025% maker and 0.175% taker; Lightning routing and on-chain payout fees can be additional. Limits: Coordinator-specific. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: P2P / Lightning. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Tor, LN escrow, Quick trades. Privacy warning: RoboSats is no-KYC and normally used over Tor, but users still trust the selected coordinator for availability, dispute handling and its configured trade limit. Versions through 0.8.6 had a raw HTML execution issue and a private-order data leak. Both are patched in v0.8.7-alpha, released September 4, 2026. Update before trading and verify the coordinator and client version.. Incidents: Python CI workflow allowed pull-request code execution (resolved, high, since 2026-08-20); JavaScript CI workflow allowed pull-request code execution (resolved, high, since 2026-08-20); Coordinator notice raw HTML permits JavaScript execution (monitoring, medium, since 2026-08-20); Private orders exposed through unauthenticated API filters (monitoring, medium, since 2026-08-20); Concurrent reward withdrawals could drain coordinator funds (resolved, medium, since 2026-08-20). - Safing SPN (safing-spn) URL: https://safing.io/ Portmaster and SPN privacy network using per-connection multi-hop routing, priced in cards, Bitcoin or Monero. KYC: light. Fees: Portmaster Free: free; Plus: €40/yr; Pro with SPN: €8/mo or €80/yr. Jurisdiction: AT. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: VPN, Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: SPN multi-hop routing, Per-app routing, Open source, Portmaster firewall, Bitcoin payments, Monero payments, Split tunneling. Privacy warning: Not a no-account VPN. Official privacy policy details account, tax-country, payment, IP/user-agent log retention, and SPN service metadata handling; Austrian jurisdiction verified.. - SageSwap (sageswap) URL: https://sageswap.io/ No-account crypto swaps supporting Monero and Lightning, with a separate AML-swap mode for high-risk coins. KYC: none. Fees: Standard swaps: 1% to 2% plus network gas; amounts below $50 may add up to 6%. High-risk AML or NO AML mode adds 2.2% and usually totals 3% to 4%.. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No account, Never-KYC claim, XMR support, BTC Lightning support, Fixed and floating rates, AML-swap mode, Refund address option. Privacy warning: SageSwap claims never-KYC operation, no IP or identifying-data collection, and permanent deletion of successful swap records after seven days. These are operator assertions without published legal or privacy terms. Its high-risk mode accepts coins rejected by the standard AML screen for an added 2.2 percent fee, and the legal operator and jurisdiction remain undisclosed.. Incidents: Support impersonation and phishing campaign targeting SageSwap users (active, medium, since 2026-08-24). - SearXNG (searxng) URL: https://searxng.org/ Free, open-source metasearch software aggregating multiple search services; privacy and logging depend on the instance operator and configuration. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Self-hosted, Metasearch engine, No profiling by software design, Instance-configurable logging, Open source, Multiple search engines, Tor-compatible, No software account required. Privacy warning: Privacy depends on the selected instance. Public instances can log or misconfigure requests; self-host or use a trusted operator for sensitive searches.. - SeedSigner (seedsigner) URL: https://seedsigner.com/ DIY stateless Bitcoin signing device built from Raspberry Pi Zero parts, using air-gapped QR code signing. KYC: none. Fees: Free software; DIY hardware cost varies (project advertises usually under $50). Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Wallet, Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: DIY hardware signer, Seeds held in volatile memory, Air-gapped QR signing, Open source, Raspberry Pi Zero and other supported Pi boards, Optional persistent settings, SeedQR backup format, Bitcoin-only. Privacy warning: Seeds stay in memory while powered; settings can persist. Release signatures identify the signer, not the hardware supplier or assembler.. - Servers Guru (servers-guru) URL: https://servers.guru/ VPS, dedicated server and web hosting collecting only a working email, paid in BTC, XMR, LTC, cards or PayPal. KYC: none. Fees: VPS from €4.99/month; cloud servers from €21.99/month.. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Hosting. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Crypto accepted, VPS, Cloud servers, Dedicated servers, S3 object storage, 1 Gbps ports, DDoS protection, 24/7 support, No identity-document KYC advertised. Privacy warning: Moula World LLC requires an email address and processes hosting, IP, payment/billing, and support records. The service is not bulletproof hosting, may respond to valid legal process, and its Terms select New Mexico law and courts.. - Servury (servury) URL: https://servury.com VPS, VDS and proxy hosting from Canadian operator Avalanche Systems, with credential-only access, no signup form, and an optional zero-knowledge Blackbox VPS using user-managed disk encryption and SEV-SNP RAM isolation. KYC: none. Fees: from $9.99/mo. Jurisdiction: CA. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Hosting. Coverage: US, CA, UK, EU. Features: No Account, 7 Locations, 30s Deploy, Zero Logs, Reseller API, Zero-knowledge encrypted VPS. Privacy warning: Canada/Five Eyes caveat remains. Privacy policy is source-backed under PIPEDA; terms prohibit illegal use and cryptocurrency mining.. - Session (session) URL: https://getsession.org/ Decentralized encrypted messenger needing no phone number or email, stewarded by a Swiss foundation. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: CH. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Comms, Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No phone number, No email required, End-to-end encrypted, Community-operated node network, Metadata-minimizing design, Open source, iOS, Android and Desktop, Onion routing. Privacy warning: Initial setup connects to an STF seed node that can see but says it does not record the IP address. Fast push notifications expose a device IP and token to Apple or Google and an account ID and token to an STF push server. The last official independent app audit located is from 2021. Development resumed in July 2026 with three developers, but resources remain highly constrained and funding still relies on donations and nonprofit grants.. - SHOPINBIT (shopinbit) URL: https://shopinbit.com/ Crypto concierge marketplace for goods, travel and cars, advertising no login or extra verification to start. KYC: none. Jurisdiction: PL. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Merchants, Agent Money. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Crypto concierge, Goods and travel, Cars, No login to start, No invasive KYC, Crypto-native payments, Global sourcing, Privacy-first handling. Privacy warning: Now operated by ShopinBit EU sp. z o.o. in Kraków, Poland. Privacy policy covers purchase, shipment, account, contact and legal-processing data; concierge/travel/car orders are not anonymous even when there is no routine KYC gate.. - SideShift.ai (sideshift) URL: https://sideshift.ai/ Direct-to-wallet swaps across 300+ coins with fixed/variable rates; automated risk controls may freeze or refuse a transaction and request compliance information. KYC: light. Fees: Variable and included in the quoted transaction rate; network/deployer fees may vary. Jurisdiction: KN. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Direct-to-wallet, 300+ coins, Fixed and variable rates, Wallet-connected interface, Automated transaction risk screening. Privacy warning: SideShift collects IP/device/usage, wallet addresses, transaction metadata and PostHog analytics. Automated risk screening may freeze/refuse a shift and compliance information may be requested or disclosed to authorities. Terms exclude US, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Syria.. - Silent Exchange (silent-exchange) URL: https://silent.exchange/ No-account crypto exchange with a Telegram bot, where screening can trigger AML or KYC requests in flagged cases. KYC: light. Fees: Included in the final exchange rate; miner fees and exceptional recovery charges may apply. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No account, Fixed and floating rates, Anonymous-exchange marketing, Telegram exchange bot, Many crypto pairs. Privacy warning: Silent Exchange is not zero-KYC. It screens every transaction and may request identity and source-of-funds documents, freeze funds, use SumSub, collect broad identity and financial data, and share IP or personal data with partners and authorities. Its terms prohibit VPN or proxy use to conceal IP. The terms choose Seychelles law but do not name the operating company.. - Silent.link (silentlink) URL: https://silent.link/ Global eSIM and data service covering 160+ countries, paid with Bitcoin, Lightning, Monero or USDT. KYC: none. Fees: Pay-as-you-go. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Comms. Coverage: Global. Features: Anonymous eSIM, 160+ countries, No email, No KYC, XMR accepted, BTC and Lightning, USDT accepted, No signup, Data eSIM, US inbound SMS option, QR code activation. Privacy warning: Silent Link does not disclose a legal entity or operating jurisdiction on its public site. It claims to collect no user data, but mobile operators can still see network metadata and legacy calls and texts are not private.. - SimpleLogin (simplelogin) URL: https://simplelogin.io Open-source email alias service from Proton AG, forwarding and replying without exposing the real mailbox. KYC: none. Fees: Free / $36/yr premium for new subscribers. Jurisdiction: CH. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Email. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Email aliasing, Anonymous forwarding, No document KYC, Open source, Self-hostable, Proton-integrated, BTC payment. Privacy warning: Owned by Proton AG under Swiss terms; destination mailbox, aliases and abuse/payment metadata can still be account-linked even though aliases hide the real address from third parties.. - SimpleSwap (simpleswap) URL: https://simpleswap.io/ No-account instant crypto swaps across 1,000+ coins with fixed and floating rate options, including XMR. KYC: light. Fees: Quoted through the selected fixed or floating exchange rate; network and provider-route costs may apply.. Jurisdiction: PA. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No registration for standard swaps, 1,000+ cryptocurrencies, Non-custodial, Fixed + floating rates, Optional Sumsub verification, API available, XMR supported, Mobile app. Privacy warning: UK FCA issued a warning for UK users (2023). Jurisdiction and ownership are not publicly verified. KYC is occasionally triggered on large or algorithmically-flagged transactions. Use for small amounts until service has more independent review.. - SimpleX Chat (simplex-chat) URL: https://simplex.chat Decentralized encrypted messenger with no user IDs, connecting through invitation links or QR codes. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: UK. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Messaging. Coverage: GLOBAL. Privacy warning: UK company under Five Eyes jurisdiction; existing investor caveats remain. The core privacy advantage is protocol-level absence of global user identifiers, not immunity from endpoint/support metadata.. - Simsup (simsup) URL: https://simsup.com/ No-account data eSIM and dedicated-number eSIM seller for 130+ destinations, paid with Bitcoin or Monero; email is optional. KYC: none. Fees: Data eSIM plans from EUR 0.96; prices, validity and fair-use limits vary by destination and plan.. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Comms. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Data eSIM, Dedicated-number eSIM, Bitcoin accepted, Monero accepted, No account, No ID / No-KYC, 130+ destinations. Privacy warning: Simsup delivers eSIMs digitally and does not use a physical shipping flow. It retains order and activation data, optional email, crypto invoice data and short-lived security logs. Carrier provisioning and mobile use still create telecom metadata outside Simsup's direct control.. Incidents: Simsup private-network storefront route degradation (resolved, low, since 2026-08-25). - sms4sats (sms4sats) URL: https://sms4sats.com/ Disposable SMS receive, send and rental service paid over Bitcoin Lightning; supports per-order invoices and optional prepaid API-key balances. KYC: none. Fees: Quoted in sats by country, service and operation; check current pricing. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Comms. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: SMS for Lightning, Per-order Lightning invoices, Optional prepaid API-key balances, Receive, send and rent. Privacy warning: Disposable numbers may be rejected, reused or require later verification. The provider holds prepaid API balances; account requirements, retention and refunds remain unclear.. - SMSPool (smspool) URL: https://smspool.net/ Non-VoIP SMS verification marketplace across 150+ countries with rentals, API access and username/password signup; email is optional. KYC: light. Jurisdiction: NL. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Comms. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: SMS verification, 150+ countries, API, Username/password signup; email optional, Crypto accepted via processors/resellers. Privacy warning: SMSPool B.V. operates a Dutch marketplace for OTP numbers. Registration collects username/password and optional email; request IPs may be stored for DDoS/rate limiting, Cloudflare monitors visitor behavior, Stripe receives user ID/payment data, AML/payment screening may request identity/address, and data can be disclosed to law enforcement.. - SolvoCard (solvocard) URL: https://www.solvocard.com/ Crypto-funded virtual cards claiming email-only signup, with a June 2026 refund-delay incident still unresolved. KYC: none. Fees: 4% crypto deposit; $99 virtual card; terms list $1 per top-up. Limits: No maximum single top-up claimed; $25,000 monthly per card on several pages; EURO page also claims EUR50,000. Jurisdiction: SC. Recorded risk: danger. Categories: Virtual/Physical Card. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No identity documents, Email-only account, XMR/BTC/ETH/stablecoin funding, Virtual Visa/Mastercard, Google Pay, Apple Pay on USD card, 3DS, Physical card pre-order. Privacy warning: Active refund-delay incident remains unresolved in the existing record and the official site publishes no incident notice. Current sources also conflict: terms name Seychelles-based TivoLabs LTD but are governed by US law, while the privacy page calls SolvoCard United States-based. Card partners remain unnamed; treat issuer-level no-KYC and refund claims as unverified.. Incidents: Card program ended with refunds still reported unpaid (active, high, since 2026-06-10). - Sparrow Wallet (sparrow-wallet) URL: https://sparrowwallet.com/ Free, open-source Bitcoin desktop wallet with full-node and hardware-wallet support, PSBT signing and UTXO control. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Bitcoin only, Full node support, PSBT signing, Hardware wallet, Open source, Desktop, UTXO control. Privacy warning: The published privacy policy is explicitly scoped to a mobile App on the Apple App Store, not the desktop wallet described in this record.. - SporeStack (sporestack) URL: https://sporestack.com/ VPS and bare-metal hosting with token-based account funds and no email required, paid in BTC, BCH or XMR. KYC: none. Fees: From $3/mo. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Hosting. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: XMR/BTC/BCH payments, No email, No KYC, API-driven, No account required, IPv6 native, Linux VPS, Since 2017. Privacy warning: SporeStack publishes a Law Enforcement FAQ and states they will comply with valid legal requests. This is more transparent than most hosts, but means they are not zero-compliance. Use Tor when administering servers for maximum operational security.. - Standard Notes (standard-notes) URL: https://standardnotes.com/ Proton-owned end-to-end encrypted notes and productivity suite operated by Standard Notes Ltd in the United States. KYC: none. Fees: Free tier, $90/yr Productivity, $120/yr Professional. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: End-to-end encrypted notes, XChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption, Unlimited device sync, Offline access, Open source clients, Two-factor authentication, Full encrypted export, Self-hostable sync server, 100GB encrypted files on Professional. Privacy warning: Note content is end-to-end encrypted, but Standard Notes Ltd is the U.S. service operator and contracting entity under U.S. law. Account, billing, support, IP/device, and third-party payment metadata remain outside note-content encryption; Proton ownership does not make the service operator Swiss.. - StartMail (startmail) URL: https://www.startmail.com/ Dutch encrypted mail with unlimited aliases and PGP. Bitcoin is accepted on annual plans by contacting support before renewal. KYC: none. Fees: $4.99/mo Personal, $6.99/mo Business (billed annually). Jurisdiction: NL. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Email. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Unlimited email aliases, PGP encryption, Custom domain support, 20GB storage on Personal, 30GB storage on Business, Netherlands servers, No ads and no tracking, Instant email deletion, Bitcoin on annual plans. Privacy warning: Bitcoin is limited to annual plans and requires contacting support to obtain an address, so a support thread ties the payment to the account. StartMail states offices and servers are in the Netherlands under GDPR, which means Dutch legal process still applies to stored account data.. - StealthEX (stealthex) URL: https://stealthex.io/ Instant swap front-end with no registration step, though its terms reserve KYC checks through third parties. KYC: light. Fees: 0.4%. Jurisdiction: CR. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: 1000+ pairs, No account, Non-custodial, Instant, No registration. Privacy warning: Risk-based KYC can be requested directly by StealthEx, and third-party fiat providers conduct their own compliance checks. The privacy policy also covers IP/device, transaction, blockchain-analytics, profile, and identity-verification data.. - Stealths (stealths) URL: https://stealths.net/ Crypto-funded prepaid card, gift card and eSIM shop tracking orders by number rather than contact details. KYC: none. Fees: Product-specific total shown before order; wallet network fees are separate.. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Gift Cards, Comms. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Anonymous cards, eSIM, Gift cards, Crypto only, No-KYC, Tor-friendly. Privacy warning: Stealths claims no customer verification and no stored IP or browser fingerprint, but its payment partner may reject transactions associated with mixers or suspected illegal funds. Card issuers, merchants and telecom providers can still apply their own checks, monitoring, 3DS, blocked merchant categories and usage records.. - Swapzone (swapzone) URL: https://swapzone.io/ Accountless non-custodial aggregator comparing 18+ exchange, DEX and P2P partners that mark KYC frequency. KYC: light. Fees: Swapzone charges users no direct fee; partner exchange fees are included in displayed quotes unless stated otherwise.. Jurisdiction: GE. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap, Aggregator. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Rate comparison, Multiple exchange partners, No account required, Fixed and floating offers. Privacy warning: Swapzone is an aggregator and partner exchanges control execution, KYC checks, freezes and payout. Swapzone also collects technical metadata, uses analytics and marketing cookies, and may request documents or suspend a suspicious transaction.. - System76 (system76) URL: https://system76.com/ Linux hardware manufacturer developing System76 Open Firmware for supported models using coreboot and EDK2. KYC: none. Fees: Hardware prices vary. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Hardware. Coverage: US, GLOBAL. Privacy warning: US hardware seller collecting name, email, phone, shipping and billing addresses. Order/account/shipping/hosting/reporting/marketing partners may receive data; AWS hosts it, and database backups may retain personal information for up to 30 days after deletion.. - Tails OS (tails-os) URL: https://tails.boum.org/ Amnesic live operating system booted from USB that routes traffic through Tor and forgets state at shutdown. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Amnesic live OS, Tor-only network, USB bootable, Leaves no trace, Encrypted persistent storage, Tor Browser included, KeePassXC included, Open source. Privacy warning: Tails does not make a user invisible: local networks can see Tor use, websites can block Tor, exit traffic can be exposed when unencrypted, and powerful end-to-end correlation or compromised hardware can defeat protections.. - Textverified (textverified) URL: https://textverified.com/ US non-VoIP numbers for SMS and voice verifications, with rentals, API access and card or crypto payment. KYC: none. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Comms. Coverage: US. Features: SMS verification, US numbers, Crypto accepted, API. Privacy warning: US verification-number service that collects registration name/email and may log IP address, browser, ISP, access time, pages and clicks; it uses analytics/advertising providers and retains personal information as needed for operations, records, legal obligations and disputes.. - THORSwap (thorswap) URL: https://app.thorswap.finance/ Bitcoin-first, non-custodial cross-chain swap interface covering 10,000+ assets across 26+ blockchains with a built-in wallet. KYC: none. Fees: Interface fee is displayed before confirmation; gas and network fees are separate.. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: 10,000+ assets across 26+ chains, Native BTC/ETH/LTC swaps, Built-in self-custody wallet, Streaming swaps, No bridges or wrapped assets, No account required, No KYC by protocol, Non-custodial, THORChain protocol. Privacy warning: THORChain's lending module became insolvent in January 2025 - the SWAP functionality is unaffected but the lending/borrowing module is frozen. Use THORSwap for swaps only. The protocol is genuinely non-custodial for swaps. RUNE token exposure is inherent to the protocol security model.. - Tor Browser (tor-browser) URL: https://www.torproject.org/ Browser from the Tor Project routing traffic over Tor, resisting fingerprinting and enabling .onion access. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Onion routing, No tracking, Fingerprint resistance, Access .onion sites, Leak-resistant default configuration, Open source, Windows/Mac/Linux/Android, Built-in privacy modes. Privacy warning: The Tor Project is a US non-profit with historical US government funding. Logging into personal accounts identifies the account holder even over Tor. Do not install extra plugins or add-ons: Tor warns they may bypass Tor, reveal an IP address, or otherwise compromise privacy.. - TradeOgre (tradeogre) URL: https://tradeogre.com/ Privacy-coin friendly custodial exchange with order books, advertising easy registration and no trade limits. KYC: none. Recorded risk: danger. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Service dismantled by RCMP, Historical no-identity accounts, Historical privacy-coin trading. Privacy warning: Do not deposit or trade. The RCMP says TradeOgre was dismantled, its platform and cryptoassets were seized, transaction data will be analysed, and charges may follow.. - Trezor (trezor) URL: https://trezor.io/ Czech hardware wallet vendor. The shop accepts Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Ethereum alongside cards and PayPal, and ships worldwide. KYC: none. Fees: From EUR 47 (one-time hardware). Jurisdiction: CZ. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Multi-coin hardware signer, Bitcoin-only firmware option, Open source firmware, Secure Element on Safe models, PIN and passphrase, On-device confirmation, Coin control in Trezor Suite, Tor support in Trezor Suite, Bitcoin and crypto checkout. Privacy warning: Trezor reports 347,149 newsletter email addresses exported through Brevo (September 17, 2026 update) and, separately, 80,689 customers affected by ShipMonk order-data exposure (September 4 update). These populations may overlap. The STM32 security email was phishing, not evidence of compromised wallet hardware. Trezor says its devices and wallet systems were unaffected. Shipping addresses add physical-security risk; never disclose a wallet backup in response to a message. Earlier 2024 support and newsletter incidents remain recorded separately.. Incidents: Brevo newsletter export and fraudulent STM32 email (active, high, since 2026-09-09); ShipMonk shipping data and historical-order exposure (active, high, since 2026-08-10); Unauthorized newsletter email (resolved, high, since 2024-01-24); Third-party support portal contact exposure (resolved, high, since 2024-01-17). - Trocador (trocador) URL: https://trocador.app/ Crypto swap rate aggregator covering XMR, plus prepaid cards, gift cards, DeFi bridges and AnonPay surfaces. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Rate aggregator, XMR pairs, No account, Tor-accessible, Privacy-first. Privacy warning: Trocador is an aggregator, not the executing exchange. Partner exchanges can collect data, impose KYC and apply separate terms. Trocador says ordinary trade details are deleted after 14 days or earlier on request, but IP, browser-language, user-agent and exchange-provided data can be kept longer for security, fraud, support or legal reasons. Current terms prohibit US and EEA citizens or residents and users in sanctioned jurisdictions.. - Trocador Gift Cards (trocador-gift-cards) URL: https://trocador.app/en/giftcard/ Trocador store gift cards bought with crypto, with a stated daily limit of $5,000 per email address. KYC: light. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Gift Cards. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Gift cards via Trocador, Crypto, No-KYC, Instant, Multiple brands. Privacy warning: Partner gift-card providers, issuer terms and email-based limits can create KYC/AML or redemption risk even when Trocador itself is only routing the purchase.. - Trocador Prepaid Cards (trocador-prepaid) URL: https://trocador.app/en/prepaidcards/ Prepaid Visa and Mastercard through Trocador, where activation can require name, address and phone but no documents. KYC: light. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Virtual/Physical Card. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Prepaid Visa, Crypto, No-KYC, Via Trocador. Privacy warning: Cards are nonrefundable; restricted-country or VPN/proxy redemption attempts can block the redeem code. Trocador collects the checkout email, providers collect activation identity/contact data, and the published Trocador privacy policy excludes third-party collection.. - Tuta (tuta) URL: https://tuta.com German encrypted email, calendar and contacts from Tutao GmbH with end-to-end/post-quantum encryption and open-source clients. KYC: none. Fees: Free / from €3/mo. Jurisdiction: DE. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Email. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: End-to-end encrypted, Encrypted subject lines, Anonymous signup, German jurisdiction, Open source, Calendar included, No ad tracking. Privacy warning: German/EU jurisdiction with data-minimization posture; paid/business billing metadata may still exist.. - unbroker (unbroker) URL: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/tree/main/optional-skills/security/unbroker Open-source Hermes Agent skill for consent-gated data broker removal, run through a local CLI and ledger. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Privacy Tools, Developer Tools, Frameworks. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Open source, Hermes skill, Data broker opt-outs, Consent gate, Local ledger, Least-disclosure planning, Email verification polling, Recurring re-scan queue, California DROP workflow, BADBOOL broker list ingestion. Privacy warning: The person must consent before a scan. The workflow keeps local records and limits fields sent to broker forms. A later re-scan verifies removal; a broker confirmation does not.. - Unified Attestation (unified-attestation) URL: https://uattest.net/ Open-source Play Integrity alternative issuing short-lived Android tokens verifiable offline without device IDs. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: DE. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Developer Tools, Privacy OS, Frameworks. Coverage: GLOBAL. Privacy warning: Attestation infrastructure can become an app-access gate even when it avoids Google Play Integrity. Privacy depends on relying apps and server deployment, not only the framework.. - Unredacted (unredacted) URL: https://unredacted.org/ Provider hub for Unredacted Inc's anti-censorship, messaging, collaboration, network, and education services. KYC: none. Fees: Free public services; FreeSocks also offers paid Membership. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Privacy Tools, Infrastructure, Censorship. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: FreeSocks, Tor relays and bridges, Unredacted Door and Snowflake, Signal and Telegram proxies, XMPP.is, Matrix, CryptPad, Etherpad, Jitsi, Excalidraw, PrivateBin, Cryptgeon, Monero remote node, Unredacted Social (instance policy capture deferred), Guides, Unredacted Labs. Privacy warning: Unredacted's policy does not support a blanket no-logs or end-to-end-encryption claim. It discloses rule-triggered website IP and user-agent processing, Cloudflare use, 24-hour proxy-retrieval metadata, and service-specific Matrix and XMPP account, room, contact, message, and upload fields. FreeSocks' live config enables anonymous analytics and paid Membership, while XMPP.is publishes authentication logging, server-side message/archive storage, third-party Romanian hosting, off-site backups, and no self-service deletion; its former emailed manual procedure is struck through and current deletion availability is unclear. Delaware law and US legal process apply to the operator.. - UQUID Shop (uquid) URL: https://uquid.com/ Crypto shopping, gift-card, top-up and prepaid-card platform where card limits can require identity documents. KYC: light. Fees: Varies by product and payment route; no current platform-wide 2% fee was substantiated. Limits: Product-specific. Jurisdiction: CZ. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Gift Cards & Top-ups. Coverage: IN, NG, KE, ZA, BR, MX, AR, US, EU, UK, AU. Features: Top-ups, eSIMs, Bills. Privacy warning: Uquid Shop can require identity verification and additional information as account activity increases. It collects account, order, payment, contact, device, IP and browsing data for fulfillment, fraud controls and compliance. Product, seller and payment-provider terms can add separate fees, limits and verification requirements.. - VeilCards (veilcards) URL: https://veil.cards Virtual card service whose original website is unavailable. Current card terms and issuer details are unconfirmed. KYC: none. Recorded risk: danger. Categories: Virtual/Physical Card. Coverage: GLOBAL. Privacy warning: The original domain is on hold and does not resolve. getveil.cards uses the VeilCards name and refers to veil.cards, but a change of domain is unconfirmed. That site's no-KYC advertising conflicts with terms describing identity data collection and a linked US bank account.. - Vexl (vexl) URL: https://vexl.it/ Mobile P2P Bitcoin marketplace built on phone verification and a contact-graph web-of-trust rather than accounts. KYC: light. Fees: Free; Vexl takes no cut, while counterparties set any offer fee. Jurisdiction: CZ. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: P2P, Bitcoin. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: P2P contact graph, Phone verification, No traditional password account, Open source, On-chain and Lightning offers, Encrypted chat. Privacy warning: A valid phone number and contact graph are required. FAQ says encrypted messages are temporarily stored on Vexl servers, FCM handles push notifications, and revealing identity shares profile/phone information; this is narrower than the homepage's absolute no-personal-data/no-message-storage claim.. - VirtualSIM (virtualsms) URL: https://virtualsim.net/ Virtual phone numbers for SMS verification and automation, requiring a site profile or account created at first order. KYC: light. Jurisdiction: UA. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Comms. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Short-term number rental, Long-term number rental, SMS reception, Crypto and listed payment gateways, Multiple countries, Physical SIM infrastructure. Privacy warning: The operator may collect account credentials and optional contact details, rented-number and timestamp usage logs, transaction metadata, support communications, IP address, browser type and device information. Shared SIMs may already carry other clients' accounts for different services, and a number may eventually be reissued by a telecom operator after expiry.. - Wasabi Wallet (wasabi-wallet) URL: https://wasabiwallet.io/ Self-custodial Bitcoin desktop wallet with Tor, Silent Payments and optional third-party coordinated CoinJoin. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Bitcoin CoinJoin, Tor built-in, Self-custody, Open source, Desktop, Non-custodial, UTXO management, Third-party coordinators, Silent Payments. Privacy warning: The default zkSNACKs coordinator ended service in 2024; current Wasabi CoinJoin use requires a third-party coordination provider. Wallet remains self-custodial, but coordinator availability and policy are no longer controlled by the original service.. - Whonix (whonix) URL: https://www.whonix.org/ Operating system splitting a Tor gateway and workstation across two VMs to keep the real IP off the workstation. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: MH. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Two-VM architecture, Tor gateway isolation, IP leak prevention, Persistent anonymous workspace, Qubes OS compatible, Open source, KVM / VirtualBox, Fingerprinting resistance. Privacy warning: Runs as virtual machines - requires a trusted host OS. Combine with Qubes OS for strongest isolation. More complex setup than Tails but offers persistent anonymous workspace.. - WizardSwap (wizardswap) URL: https://www.wizardswap.io/ Registration-free swap front-end covering BTC, XMR, ETH, ZEC, DASH and LTC pairs, with URL-verification warnings. KYC: none. Fees: Typically 2.2%; up to +10% on low-liquidity/excess-demand pairs; network fee deducted from refunds. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No-KYC, No accounts, Tor-friendly, Instant. Privacy warning: Anonymous operator with no disclosed legal entity and no substantive published privacy policy or terms. The service runs its own wallets/infrastructure, may freeze or seize suspected stolen funds, warns about phishing domains, and charges a typical 2.2% fee with up to 10% extra on low-liquidity or excess-demand pairs.. - xChange.me (xchange-me) URL: https://xchange.me/ Accountless exchanger for 200+ coins including Monero, with an onion mirror and Pacific Ventures LTD named as controller. KYC: light. Fees: BTC and XMR: 2%. ETH, DASH, ZEC, LTC, KMD, OXEN, FIRO and BDX: 3%. Minimums vary by asset.. Jurisdiction: MH. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Swap. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Accountless exchange flow, Anonymous exchange terms, 200+ cryptocurrencies, XMR support, Onion mirror, Marshall Islands controller disclosed. Privacy warning: The accountless flow does not guarantee no identity checks: the terms permit requests for identity, source-of-wealth and source-of-funds documentation, wallet scanning, location investigation, order blocking and reporting to authorities. Iran, North Korea, Russia and Belarus are expressly restricted. Support communications may be retained, and the privacy policy permits lawful and legitimate-business disclosures.. - Xeovo VPN (xeovo) URL: https://xeovo.com/ Finland-based no-logs VPN and stealth proxy where accounts use a username and password with optional email. KYC: light. Jurisdiction: FI. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: VPN. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: No logs, Crypto accepted, WireGuard, Finnish jurisdiction. Privacy warning: Xeovo can provide account/payment metadata for a specific user if a valid court order targets that person; it says it stores no activity logs.. - XMPP.is (xmpp-is) URL: https://xmpp.is/ A separately branded XMPP account and federation service operated by Unredacted Inc. KYC: none. Fees: Free. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Messaging, Privacy Tools. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: XMPP federation, Optional OMEMO, Optional OTR, MAM off by default, 100 MB uploads expiring after one week, Daily encrypted off-site backups, Public configuration source, Optional recovery email. Privacy warning: OMEMO and OTR are client-selected, not server-wide guarantees. XMPP.is says its info log records authentication but not user IP addresses, and names stored hashed passwords, offline messages, MAM archives, vCards, rosters, and enabled-module data. Its server page says uploads are limited to 100 MB and expire after one week, MAM is off by default with a published 30-day expiry, encrypted backups sync off-site daily, and a donated FlokiNET server is located in Romania; Unredacted Inc remains the US/Delaware operator. The current public Prosody config agrees on authentication/info logging and one-week uploads but sets MAM expiry to 90 days and PostgreSQL storage, conflicting with the site's 30-day and flat-file statements, so the running values are not independently confirmed. The deletion page says automated deletion is unavailable and strikes through its former emailed manual soft/hard procedure, so current deletion availability is unclear. Federation and XEP-0384 also leave traffic-analysis metadata outside client E2EE.. - XMR Bazaar (xmrbazaar) URL: https://xmrbazaar.com/ Peer-to-peer Monero marketplace for goods, jobs, rentals and fiat trades with optional client-side escrow. KYC: none. Fees: Free (no platform fee). Recorded risk: caution. Categories: P2P. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: P2P Monero trading, No KYC, No fund custody, No IP logging, PGP encrypted comms, Pseudonymous accounts, Email optional, Monero-only. Privacy warning: Direct trades are between users, and XmrBazaar says it cannot refund lost money or products. Optional multisig mediators and bond holders are fellow users rather than platform employees or agents. The terms say the platform cannot guarantee security, remains in beta, and escrow may still have bugs; avoid large trades without careful counterparty and mediator review.. - XMR Cards (xmr-cards) URL: https://xmr.cards/ Gift-card marketplace funded with Monero, offering Tor access and catalogues without JavaScript or cookies. KYC: none. Jurisdiction: ??. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Gift Cards. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Gift cards, XMR only, No-KYC, Tor-friendly, No JavaScript/cookies. Privacy warning: Anonymous operator and no published terms. FAQ claims no JavaScript, cookies or collected/logged data, but acknowledges the web server can see IP addresses; no refunds after issuance and order recovery depends on the order page or transaction details.. - YWallet (ywallet) URL: https://ywallet.app/ Advanced Zcash wallet for iOS, Android and desktop with full shielded support, fast sync and encrypted memos. KYC: none. Fees: Network and coin settings apply; no current universal 0.0001 ZEC fee was substantiated. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Zcash and Ycash, Shielded and transparent addresses, Local wallet data, Configurable lightwalletd server, Deprecated maintenance mode. Privacy warning: YWallet is deprecated and receives only security and protocol updates. The maintainer recommends ZKool as the successor for Zcash. The repository says YWallet still works and does not support the stronger claim that Zcash support ended after Ironwood. Wallet data remains local, but privacy also depends on the selected lightwalletd server and whether transparent addresses are used.. - Zeus Wallet (zeus-wallet) URL: https://zeusln.com/ Open-source self-custodial Lightning wallet and node manager. Version 13.2.0 adds custom Mempool endpoints, 12/24-word LDK seeds, and security hardening. KYC: none. Fees: Network fees only. Recorded risk: standard. Categories: Wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Connect your own node, Self-hosted, Open source, Tor support, No account required, LND / CLN / Eclair, Lightning + On-chain, ZEUS Pay (embedded node), Custom Mempool instance, 12/24-word LDK seeds, Embedded LND 0.21.2-beta, Cashu CDK 0.17.4, Complete wallet data wipes, NWC expiry and budget hardening, Expired invoice and payment submission guards, BIP353 DNSSEC validation, SHA-256-verified native libraries, Sensitive log scrubbing. Privacy warning: Best privacy requires connecting to your own node over Tor. Embedded/LSP or Cashu flows add service/provider metadata that does not exist in a pure own-node setup.. - Zodl (formerly Zashi) (zashi-wallet) URL: https://zodl.com/ Self-custodial Zcash wallet with shielded payments, CrossPay, private swaps through NEAR Intents, Keystone hardware-wallet support, and Flexa merchant checkout. KYC: none. Fees: 0.0001 ZEC/tx. Jurisdiction: US. Recorded risk: caution. Categories: Wallet. Coverage: GLOBAL. Features: Shielded ZEC, Zcash Shielded Assets, Self-custody, Open source, CrossPay, Private swaps via NEAR Intents, Keystone hardware-wallet support, Flexa merchant spend, iOS + Android, Zcash Open Development Lab. Privacy warning: Wallet keys and activity stay local to Zodl, but CrossPay, NEAR Intents swap routing, transparent-address interactions, app stores, crash reporting, and Flexa merchant checkout can expose metadata to third parties. Third-party routes may impose their own screening, availability, and fee rules.. ## Full Article Summaries - India’s 2026 Biometric SIM Rules, Explained (india-biometric-sim-rules-2026) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/india-biometric-sim-rules-2026 Summary: What India’s final user-identification rules require for SIM enrolment, account changes, disconnection and reverification, and why draft BIVS is not the separate DIP system. Answer: What India’s final user-identification rules require for SIM enrolment, account changes, disconnection and reverification, and why draft BIVS is not the separate DIP system. Meta: date=2026-08-26 | published=2026-08-26 | reviewed=2026-08-26 | read_time=~10 min read | tags=Policy, Phone, Privacy Figure: FIG.C07: Draft BIVS, final rules and DIP are three different systems. The final rules omit the draft named BIVS and instead retain per-operator records; the DIP representative-image check is a separate connection-cap direction. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/india-biometric-sim-rules-2026/india-sim-identity-systems--article-desktop.png (1200x602; alt: Three-column comparison separating India’s unenacted 2025 draft BIVS, the final 2026 per-operator SIM identity rules, and the separate DIP connection-cap circular.) Figure data: India SIM identity instruments and implementation boundaries - Instrument=2025 draft rules | Record or system=Named BIVS with a unique cross-operator user ID | Biometric function=Proposed real-time biometric verification and information exchange | Status=Not enacted in this form - Instrument=2026 final rules | Record or system=Per-operator customer application form and subscriber data record | Biometric function=Identification at four defined account events | Status=In force from 21 August 2026 - Instrument=17 August 2026 DIP circular | Record or system=DIP grouping for existing mobile-connection-cap enforcement | Biometric function=Representative-image check during enrolment for people at the cap | Status=Separate direction with a 30 November real-time target - The four final-rule identification events: The final text does not retain the draft's separate periodic-reverification provision. It also drops the draft's express mobile-number-porting and prepaid-to-postpaid triggers. A carrier may still have obligations under other instruments, but those events are not listed as standalone triggers in these final rules. Draft Rules 9 and 12 ; final Rules 3, 6, 7 and 9 . - e-KYC, D-KYC and accessibility: For an Aadhaar holder, e-KYC is the required route unless the narrow inability exception applies. The person authenticates through a live face, fingerprint or iris check as directed by the government, and the operator receives e-KYC data from UIDAI. The operator stores and processes that data, including the Aadhaar number, in the customer application form and the subscriber data record, together with the user's name, gender, date of birth, live facial image and any portal-specified data. Rules 2, 3 and 4, retrieved 25 August 2026 . - What operators store and what the point of sale cannot keep: The operator's subscriber data record is a named record in the final rules. It links the enrolled user to the mobile connection and stores the information created at enrolment and later updates, with timestamps. Under e-KYC this includes the live facial image and other defined user information. Under D-KYC it includes captured document images and verification data. Rules 2, 4, 5 and 6, retrieved 25 August 2026 . - Confirmation alerts can pause or reverse account actions: The final rules define confirmation alerts, but they operate when a government order specifies the process. After a biometric identification, the operator sends an alert through each of the user's existing connections asking the user to confirm that the enrolment, update or disconnection request was really made by that user. A negative response can suspend the new connection, suspend a replacement SIM, restore previous subscriber details, hold an update, or reverse or hold a requested disconnection. Rule 10, retrieved 25 August 2026 . Sources: - Draft Telecommunications (User Identification) Rules, 2025, G.S.R. 691(E): https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2025/266292.pdf (retrieved 2026-08-25) - S.O. 4623(E), notified telecommunications services: https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2026/275654.pdf (retrieved 2026-08-25) - S.O. 4622(E), Telecom eServices Portal notification: https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2026/275655.pdf (retrieved 2026-08-25) - Telecommunications (User Identification) Rules, 2026, G.S.R. 750(E): https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2026/275657.pdf (retrieved 2026-08-25) - DoT circular on DIP-based enforcement of mobile-connection limits, 17 August 2026: https://www.dot.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/08/6d4fa4522c106536260492e8ae32a61f.pdf (retrieved 2026-08-25) - A ClarityCheck Database Exposed 9 Million Face Images (claritycheck-exposed-face-images) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/claritycheck-exposed-face-images Summary: A ClarityCheck database held 9,042,977 image files and was reachable without a password. What was exposed, what remains unknown, and what affected people can do. Answer: A ClarityCheck database held 9,042,977 image files and was reachable without a password. What was exposed, what remains unknown, and what affected people can do. Meta: date=2026-08-24 | published=2026-08-24 | reviewed=2026-08-25 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=ClarityCheck, Data Exposure, Face Images Figure: FIG.C07: What the public record establishes. The database was restricted after responsible disclosure; its exposure duration, downstream access, and number of unique people remain unknown. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/claritycheck-exposed-face-images/claritycheck-exposure-record--article-desktop.png (1200x624; alt: Summary of the ClarityCheck image exposure showing public storage, 9,042,977 files, faces and profiles folders, sampled age groups, response, retention discrepancy, and unknown access.) Figure data: ClarityCheck image exposure: observed facts, response, and unresolved questions - Area=Storage access | What the sources establish=Publicly reachable without a password or encryption | Boundary=Not evidence of an internal-system intrusion - Area=Scale | What the sources establish=9,042,977 image files totaling 450.2GB | Boundary=File count, not unique people - Area=Contents | What the sources establish=Faces and profiles folders; sampled adults, teenagers, and children | Boundary=Raw images, not confirmed formal biometric templates - Area=Response | What the sources establish=Responsible disclosure, company acknowledgement, and restricted access | Boundary=No longer public at publication - Area=Retention | What the sources establish=Terms said 14 days; researcher observed older timestamps | Boundary=Number and reason for older files unknown - Area=Unresolved | What the sources establish=Exposure duration and downstream access | Boundary=Only internal logs and forensics could answer - What ClarityCheck does: ClarityCheck is a people-finder service. Its reverse image search lets a customer upload a photograph and look for places where the same person or image may appear online. The service also advertises searches using details such as a name, phone number, email address, or vehicle identification number. - What was exposed: Fowler's original disclosure describes image files in a cloud database. The folders were named faces and profiles , and his sample included profile pictures, screenshots, and photographs. The database location was visible in ClarityCheck's public website code and could be opened by anyone who had the URL because it did not require authentication. - ClarityCheck's response: Fowler says he sent a responsible disclosure notice as soon as he confirmed the database belonged to ClarityCheck. The company thanked him for bringing the sensitive-image exposure to its attention, and the database was no longer publicly accessible by the time his report was published. - Why a face photograph can identify someone: A face is not a secret in the same way as a password, but a photograph can still be an identifying record. Reverse image search uses the picture itself as the search input. A match can connect an otherwise unnamed photograph to a public profile, workplace page, school page, dating account, or other context. Sources: - Jeremiah Fowler's original ClarityCheck disclosure, published by ExpressVPN: https://www.expressvpn.com/blog/clarity-check-data-exposed/ - WIRED's report and ClarityCheck response: https://www.wired.com/story/reverse-lookup-service-exposed-millions-of-photos-of-peoples-faces/ - WIRED's public post summarizing the report: https://x.com/WIRED/status/2090016916710556087 - Qwen3.8-27B OBLITERATED: Why the Same Model Gives Different Answers (qwen38-obliterated-local-model) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/qwen38-obliterated-local-model Summary: What Qwen is, what the unofficial OBLITERATED version changed, why local AI apps can produce different answers, and the developer's 23 August 2026 GGUF redownload notice. Answer: What Qwen is, what the unofficial OBLITERATED version changed, why local AI apps can produce different answers, and the developer's 23 August 2026 GGUF redownload notice. Meta: date=2026-08-22 | published=2026-08-22 | reviewed=2026-08-23 | read_time=~6 min read | tags=AI Privacy, Local AI, Guide Figure: FIG.C05: The same download gave two answers. The downloaded files, typed request, and answer settings stayed the same; only the extra directions added by the app changed. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/qwen38-obliterated-local-model/qwen38-obliterated-provenance-contract--article-desktop.png (1200x622; alt: Diagram showing an unofficial changed copy of Qwen and how the same downloaded files answered differently when one setup sent only the typed request and another added app directions.) Figure data: How the download and app setup affected the local comparison - Part=Official base | What it was=Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B | Why it mattered=The original model - Part=Unofficial changed copy | What it was=OBLITERATUS version designed to refuse less | Why it mattered=Not an official Qwen release - Part=Downloaded files | What it was=Saved copy of the developer's second version for Apple computers, since removed from the download page | Why it mattered=Exactly the same files were used both times - Part=First setup | What it was=Sent only the request typed by the user | Why it mattered=The model answered the request - Part=Second setup | What it was=Included extra directions added by the app | Why it mattered=The same request was refused - What the unofficial version changed: The OBLITERATUS project looks for patterns inside an AI model that are associated with refusing a request, then changes the model to weaken those patterns. The developer says the goal is to reduce refusals while keeping the model's other abilities. Those performance claims come from the developer's own tests and should not be read as an independent guarantee. - Why the same download gave two answers: What you type into a chat box is not always everything the model reads. Before an app asks the model for an answer, it may add its own hidden directions. These can describe the assistant's role, tell it when to refuse, or explain how it should use features built into the app. Another app may add different directions or none at all. - What the local comparison did: The comparison was deliberately small. Both setups loaded the same saved copy of the earlier Apple version, used the same answer settings, and ran in direct-answer mode. It tried one request involving content the model would normally refuse and one ordinary coding request. The refusal changed when the app's extra directions changed. Both setups answered the coding request. - What to check before you download or compare it: The practical conclusion is simple: a model download is only one part of a local AI setup. The app still decides how your request is prepared before the model sees it. Record both the exact download and the app settings if you want a comparison that another person can understand or repeat. Sources: - OBLITERATUS project: https://github.com/elder-plinius/OBLITERATUS - Current OBLITERATUS Qwen3.8-27B download page: https://huggingface.co/OBLITERATUS/Qwen3.8-27B-OBLITERATED - Second OBLITERATUS release for Apple computers, since removed: https://huggingface.co/OBLITERATUS/Qwen3.8-27B-OBLITERATED/commit/ed77303604d422221952f9f10f3d876ee9603acd - OBLITERATUS Qwen3.8-27B model card, saved copy used for the comparison: https://huggingface.co/OBLITERATUS/Qwen3.8-27B-OBLITERATED/raw/08a7ab67298e9ffab4b55612d946cc96e1e34c6f/README.md - Official Qwen3.8-27B model: https://huggingface.co/Qwen/Qwen3.8-27B - Developer's 23 August 2026 announcement about the GGUF conversion error: https://x.com/elder_plinius/status/2091339694303068467 - BTCPay Server 2.4.2: The Lightning Credential Incident (btcpay-server-lnd-macaroon-incident) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/btcpay-server-lnd-macaroon-incident Summary: BTCPay Server versions before 2.4.2 let attackers steal the credentials that control a store's Lightning funds. What happened, which versions are affected, and what operators should do now. Answer: BTCPay Server versions before 2.4.2 let attackers steal the credentials that control a store's Lightning funds. What happened, which versions are affected, and what operators should do now. Meta: date=2026-08-22 | published=2026-08-22 | reviewed=2026-08-23 | read_time=~7 min read | tags=BTCPay Server, Lightning, Security Figure: FIG.C06: The exposed path reached LND control. BTCPay Server versions before 2.4.2 exposed LND macaroons; 2.4.2 fixes the path and regenerates BTCPay-managed credentials. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/btcpay-server-lnd-macaroon-incident/btcpay-lnd-macaroon-blast-radius--article-desktop.png (1200x624; alt: Four-stage diagram showing an unauthenticated attacker crossing a vulnerable BTCPay Server instance to obtain an LND macaroon and reach LND administrator control.) Figure data: BTCPay Server LND credential path and response boundaries - Stage=Remote attacker | Condition=Unauthenticated access | Operator implication=Internet-facing entry path - Stage=BTCPay Server | Condition=Version before 2.4.2 | Operator implication=Affected, including release candidates - Stage=LND macaroon | Condition=Administrator credential obtained | Operator implication=LND node control - Stage=Exposed surfaces | Condition=Lightning channels and LND on-chain funds | Operator implication=Review node activity and reconcile funds - Stage=Patch boundary | Condition=Version 2.4.2 with LND 0.21.1 | Operator implication=Update and regenerate credentials - Stage=What the update cannot fix | Condition=LND routes exposed outside BTCPay stay open until the operator acts | Operator implication=Close routes and rotate credentials - Stage=What was not affected | Condition=BTCPay on-chain wallet and other Lightning implementations | Operator implication=Outside this specific LND exposure - What happened and when: The BTCPay security advisory covers BTCPay Server versions before 2.4.2 when LND was enabled. Release candidates for 2.4.2 were also affected. An unauthenticated remote attacker could obtain LND .macaroon credential files, and with them control of the LND node, its Lightning channels and the funds in LND's own on-chain wallet. - What to do now: The update regenerates the macaroons managed by BTCPay. It cannot close an LND route or replace a credential that was exposed outside BTCPay's own configuration. Docker deployments also temporarily lose public LND API access in 2.4.2, an incident-control measure the project applied deliberately, so check dependent integrations after updating. - What remains unknown: BTCPay's follow-up confirmed attacks, affected users and stolen funds, and says the project is offering recovery bounties and coordinating with exchanges and law enforcement. It did not publish the number of affected instances, a total loss, the attacker's identity or a full technical account of the root cause. For our ongoing assessment of BTCPay Server as a service, see the BTCPay Server provider page . Sources: - BTCPay incident response and next steps: https://blog.btcpayserver.org/btcpay-server-security-incident-response-and-next-steps - BTCPay Server 2.4.2 security advisory: https://blog.btcpayserver.org/security-advisory-btcpay-server-2-4-2 - BTCPay Server 2.4.2 release: https://github.com/btcpayserver/btcpayserver/releases/tag/v2.4.2 - Tor Browser Hardening Setup (tor-browser-hardening-setup) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/tor-browser-hardening-setup Summary: Verify and configure Tor Browser 15.0.19, preserve its shared fingerprint, test Tor routing and New Identity, and control downloads and account crossover. Answer: Verify and configure Tor Browser 15.0.19, preserve its shared fingerprint, test Tor routing and New Identity, and control downloads and account crossover. Meta: date=2026-08-10 | published=2026-08-10 | reviewed=2026-08-10 | read_time=~12 min read | tags=Browser, Tor, Guide Figure: FIG.A02: Accept the route, then reset between compartments. The acceptance sequence for Tor Browser 15.0.19: verify the build and route, avoid unique customization, then clear session state with New Identity between compartments. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/tor-browser-hardening-setup/tor-browser-session-rail--article-desktop.png (1200x568; alt: Tor Browser hardening state rail from compartment rule through signature verification, Tor Check, Safer level, New Identity reset, and final reboot test, with unsafe branches blocked.) Figure data: Tor Browser hardening acceptance checklist - Step=Write session rule | Verify condition=One allowed and one forbidden identity class are recorded | Source=Tor Browser safe-use guidance - Step=Verify download | Verify condition=Good signature and published fingerprint match | Source=Tor Project verification guide - Step=Install | Verify condition=No imported browser profile or user data | Source=Tor Browser scope - Step=Connect | Verify condition=Tor Check confirms Tor and exit IP differs | Source=Tor Project check - Step=Security level | Verify condition=Safer remains selected after restart | Source=Tor security levels - Step=Preserve fingerprint | Verify condition=No user extensions or about:config changes | Source=Tor fingerprinting guidance - Step=New Identity | Verify condition=All windows close and prior session cookie is absent | Source=Tor identity management - Step=Final test | Verify condition=All acceptance checks pass after reboot | Source=Tor Project guidance - Before you start: Tor Browser is free. The relevant costs are the reader's normal network data and time. This walkthrough is fixed to stable Tor Browser 15.0.19, released on 21 July 2026. Do not apply these menu paths to an alpha build or to another Firefox-based browser. - What this setup does not protect: LIMITATION SOURCES: Tor Browser safe-use guidance (retrieved 10 August 2026 ); Tor Browser fingerprinting protections (retrieved 10 August 2026 ); Tor Browser scope (retrieved 10 August 2026 ). - Maintenance: Install stable Tor Browser updates promptly from the in-browser update flow or the verified official distribution. After each update, record the new version and repeat Tor Check, security level, extension, and New Identity checks. Revisit the compartment rule when adding an account or download type. The safest default is to change no browser preference that the Tor Project did not instruct you to change. Sources: - Tor Browser 15.0.19 release notice: https://blog.torproject.org/new-release-tor-browser-15019/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Tor Project connection check: https://check.torproject.org/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Tor Browser fingerprinting protections: https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/fingerprinting-protections/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Tor Browser New Identity behavior: https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/managing-identities/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Tor Browser extension and plugin guidance: https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/plugins/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Tor Browser security levels: https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/features/security-levels/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Tor Browser installation and first start: https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/getting-started/about-tor-browser/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Tor Project signature-verification procedure and fingerprint: https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/getting-started/verifying-tor-browser/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Tor Browser downloaded-document warning: https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/security/using-tb-safely/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Tor Browser official site: https://www.torproject.org/ - Tor Project download page: https://www.torproject.org/download/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - California DROP: Delete Data Broker Records and Check Results (california-drop-data-broker-removal) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/california-drop-data-broker-removal Summary: A step-by-step California DROP guide covering identifiers, broker matching, deletion statuses, 45-day processing, 90-day reporting, later checks, and records that return. Answer: A step-by-step California DROP guide covering identifiers, broker matching, deletion statuses, 45-day processing, 90-day reporting, later checks, and records that return. Meta: date=2026-08-05 | published=2026-08-05 | reviewed=2026-08-05 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=Data Brokers, Removal, Guide Figure: FIG.06: One request, five outcomes, one recheck loop. The five broker statuses and the recheck loop, with the 45-day processing and 90-day reporting windows. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/california-drop-data-broker-removal/drop-lifecycle--article-desktop.png (1200x475; alt: Lifecycle of a California DROP deletion request from residency verification through per-broker status and the public recheck loop.) Figure data: The five broker statuses and the recheck loop, with the 45-day processing and 90-day reporting windows. - Status=DELETED | Meaning=match found, non-exempt data deleted | Next check=search the broker again later - Status=EXEMPTED | Meaning=matched record is exempt | Next check=record what remains visible - Status=OPTED OUT | Meaning=no exact match · sale and sharing stop | Next check=add missing identifiers - Status=NOT FOUND | Meaning=no record from submitted identifiers | Next check=compare with the public record you found - Status=PENDING | Meaning=no result reported yet | Next check=check within the 90-day window - What the status means: Read each broker row separately. Deleted, exempted, opted out, not found, and pending are different outcomes; a later public search checks whether the exposed record actually disappeared or returned. - Before you start: DROP requires a name, date of birth, and ZIP code. It also accepts multiple names, email addresses, and phone numbers. Optional identifiers include mobile advertising IDs, connected-TV IDs, and vehicle identification numbers. More matching identifiers can find more records, but each added field is another item submitted to the system. - 1. Verify California residency: Open the official DROP page and select Get started. The state offers verification using basic personal information or an existing Login.gov account. Residency verification runs through the California Identity Gateway. - 2. Add the identifiers brokers are likely to hold: Enter the required name, date of birth, and ZIP code. Add old names, email addresses, phone numbers, and ZIP codes that appear in broker listings. A broker can only match the values it can connect to its own record. Sources: - CalPrivacy: how broker deletion matching works: https://privacy.ca.gov/2026/07/drop-data-broker-deletions-how-do-they-work/ - CalPrivacy: DROP requirements for data brokers: https://privacy.ca.gov/drop-for-data-brokers/ - DROP page: https://privacy.ca.gov/drop/ - CalPrivacy: how DROP works: https://privacy.ca.gov/drop/how-drop-works/ - CalPrivacy: optional identifiers used for matching: https://privacy.ca.gov/drop/unique-identifiers/ - Proton Pass vs Bitwarden With SimpleLogin (proton-pass-vs-bitwarden-simplelogin) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/proton-pass-vs-bitwarden-simplelogin Summary: Proton Pass and Bitwarden with SimpleLogin compared by alias setup, account separation, custom domains, self-hosting, exports, recovery, and provider portability. Answer: Proton Pass and Bitwarden with SimpleLogin compared by alias setup, account separation, custom domains, self-hosting, exports, recovery, and provider portability. Meta: date=2026-08-05 | published=2026-08-05 | reviewed=2026-08-05 | read_time=~9 min read | tags=Passwords, Email Aliases, Comparison Figure: FIG.B02: One recovery zone or two systems joined by an API key. The main architectural choice is one joined recovery boundary versus two separately recoverable services connected by a revocable API key; a custom domain is the portable address option. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/proton-pass-vs-bitwarden-simplelogin/password-alias-boundaries--article-desktop.png (1200x573; alt: Side-by-side account boundaries showing Proton Pass as one vault-and-alias account and Bitwarden with SimpleLogin as two accounts connected by an API key, plus alias portability paths.) Figure data: Password manager and email alias comparison - Question=Alias creation | Proton Pass=Built into Proton Pass and backed by SimpleLogin | Bitwarden with SimpleLogin=Created through Bitwarden using a SimpleLogin API key - Question=Account boundary | Proton Pass=Vault and aliases can use one Proton account | Bitwarden with SimpleLogin=Vault and alias service use separate accounts - Question=Other alias services | Proton Pass=Focused on Proton Pass and SimpleLogin | Bitwarden with SimpleLogin=Also supports Addy.io, Firefox Relay, Fastmail, Forward Email, and DuckDuckGo - Question=Custom domains | Proton Pass=Supported through plans that include the feature | Bitwarden with SimpleLogin=Configured at the selected alias provider - Question=Self-hosting | Proton Pass=Proton Pass is hosted; SimpleLogin can be self-hosted separately | Bitwarden with SimpleLogin=Bitwarden and SimpleLogin both publish self-hosted options - Question=Vault export | Proton Pass=Encrypted PGP JSON, unencrypted ZIP, or CSV | Bitwarden with SimpleLogin=JSON, CSV, encrypted JSON, or ZIP depending on client and data - Question=Main failure boundary | Proton Pass=One Proton account can affect passwords and aliases | Bitwarden with SimpleLogin=Two accounts and an API key must remain available - Password manager and email alias comparison: The figure above separates the one-account Proton Pass path from the two-account Bitwarden and SimpleLogin path. The remaining sections cover setup, recovery, portability, and the exit test for each choice. - What an alias changes: A forwarded alias sits between a website and the real mailbox. The website receives the alias. The alias provider receives mail for that address and forwards it to the mailbox. Replies can use a reverse alias so the real address remains hidden from the website or sender. - Use Proton Pass when one account is the point: Proton Pass can create a hide-my-email alias while saving a login. Proton documents that these aliases use SimpleLogin infrastructure. Existing SimpleLogin aliases can be synchronized into Proton Pass, and a Proton account can be linked to SimpleLogin. - Use Bitwarden when separation is the point: Bitwarden's username generator connects to several alias services. With SimpleLogin, Bitwarden uses an API key to request a new alias and places it in the username field. The password vault and forwarding service remain separate systems. Sources: - Bitwarden: export vault data: https://bitwarden.com/help/export-your-data/ - Bitwarden: forwarded email alias generator: https://bitwarden.com/help/generator/ - Proton: link SimpleLogin and Proton accounts: https://proton.me/support/link-simplelogin-account-proton-account - Proton: hide-my-email aliases in Proton Pass: https://proton.me/support/pass-email-alias - Proton: export Proton Pass data: https://proton.me/support/pass-export - SimpleLogin: replies and reverse aliases: https://simplelogin.io/docs/getting-started/reverse-alias/ - Private Home Network Setup: Router, DNS, Isolation, and Remote Access (private-home-network-setup) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/private-home-network-setup Summary: A practical home network guide covering router control, trusted and guest networks, camera and IoT isolation, DNS, firewall rules, private remote access, and verification. Answer: A practical home network guide covering router control, trusted and guest networks, camera and IoT isolation, DNS, firewall rules, private remote access, and verification. Meta: date=2026-08-05 | published=2026-08-05 | reviewed=2026-08-05 | read_time=~10 min read | tags=Home Privacy, Networking, Guide Figure: FIG.02: Five networks, one blocked-by-default boundary. The firewall plan from the article: default block between networks, narrow allow rules for actual services. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/private-home-network-setup/home-network-zones--article-desktop.png (1200x520; alt: Home network trust zones with allow and block rules between trusted, server, camera, guest, and admin networks.) Figure data: The firewall plan from the article: default block between networks, narrow allow rules for actual services. - From=GUEST | To=INTERNET | Verdict=allow | Note=internet only - From=GUEST | To=ALL LOCAL NETWORKS | Verdict=block | Note=and router admin - From=CAMERAS + IOT | To=LOCAL RECORDER | Verdict=allow | Note=required stream ports only - From=CAMERAS + IOT | To=TRUSTED / ADMIN | Verdict=block | Note=no device-to-person path - From=CAMERAS + IOT | To=GENERAL INTERNET | Verdict=block | Note=explicit exceptions only - From=TRUSTED | To=SELECTED LOCAL SERVICES | Verdict=allow | Note=narrow rules - From=REMOTE TUNNEL | To=USED SERVICES ONLY | Verdict=allow | Note=wireguard / tailscale, no public admin - From=ANY OTHER NEW PATH | To=ANY LOCAL NETWORK | Verdict=block | Note=block until required - Before changing the router: Download the current configuration backup. - 1. Put the router under your control: On OpenWrt, set the root password before exposing the router to ordinary use. OpenWrt's security documentation notes that a new installation starts with passwordless local administration until that password is set. - 2. Create separate networks: Create at least Trusted, Devices, and Guest networks. Add Servers and Administration when the router and switches can keep those groups separate. Give each network its own address range and DHCP scope so logs and firewall rules remain readable. - 3. Write the firewall from required connections: Keep the default cross-network action blocked. Add narrow rules for actual services. A camera recorder may need RTSP streams from cameras, while cameras do not need to initiate connections back to laptops. Sources: - Frigate: camera stream configuration: https://docs.frigate.video/configuration/cameras - OpenWrt: isolated guest Wi-Fi: https://openwrt.org/docs/guide-user/network/wifi/guestwifi/guest-wlan - OpenWrt: security features and initial administration: https://openwrt.org/docs/guide-user/security/security-features - OpenWrt: DNS and encrypted resolver options: https://openwrt.org/docs/guide-user/services/dns/start - Tailscale: access policy syntax and tests: https://tailscale.com/kb/1337/policy-syntax - WireGuard: official quick start: https://www.wireguard.com/quickstart/ - De-Google Without Breaking Everything (degoogle-without-breaking-everything) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/degoogle-without-breaking-everything Summary: A staged de-Googling plan that maps dependencies before migration, separates identity, storage, sync, media, Android, and paid purchases, and adds rollback checks. Answer: A staged de-Googling plan that maps dependencies before migration, separates identity, storage, sync, media, Android, and paid purchases, and adds rollback checks. Meta: date=2026-08-05 | published=2026-08-05 | reviewed=2026-08-05 | read_time=~11 min read | tags=Guide, Google, Privacy Figure: FIG.A05: Retire dependencies before deleting the account. A Google account is a dependency bundle. Exporting is not deletion; each critical sign-in, library, purchase, and recovery path must be moved or explicitly retained before deletion. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/degoogle-without-breaking-everything/degoogle-migration-rail--article-desktop.png (1200x854; alt: Seven-stage de-Google migration rail with eight Google dependencies mapped to the stage that retires or explicitly retains them, ending in a signed-out cold-test gate.) Figure data: Google dependency retirement plan - Dependency=Gmail | Retirement stage=Replacement and critical-account migration | Required evidence=New address confirmed on every critical account - Dependency=Sign in with Google | Retirement stage=Independent sign-in migration | Required evidence=Independent login and recovery tested - Dependency=Photos | Retirement stage=Export and verify | Required evidence=Replacement library opens; spot checks pass - Dependency=Drive and Docs | Retirement stage=Export and verify | Required evidence=Exports open; shared-work ownership transferred - Dependency=Calendar and Contacts | Retirement stage=Export and verify | Required evidence=Imports complete; sample records match - Dependency=Android and Play | Retirement stage=Handle separately or retain | Required evidence=Purchases, subscriptions and recovery plan recorded - Dependency=YouTube | Retirement stage=Export or retain | Required evidence=Archive downloaded; channel ownership handled - Dependency=Maps and location history | Retirement stage=Export and reduce collection | Required evidence=Required records exported; future controls reviewed - 1. Create a replacement identity first: Create the new mailbox before changing anything. Use an address you expect to control for years. Add a strong unique password, multi-factor authentication, recovery codes stored offline, and a non-Google recovery channel. Do not make the old Gmail address the only recovery path for the new account. - 2. Export, verify, then export again if needed: Google Takeout can export data from selected products. Google explicitly says downloading an archive does not delete the original. Select only products you need, choose an archive destination you control, and avoid sending the only copy to the same Drive account you plan to close. - 3. Move critical accounts by consequence: Start with accounts where lockout or missed mail causes the most damage: password manager, domain registrar, primary financial services, health portals, tax and government services, work systems, mobile carrier, and insurance. Then move subscriptions, shopping, travel, communities, and low-value accounts. - 4. Replace Sign in with Google: Changing a contact email does not always replace the login identity. For each site using Google sign-in, add an independent password or passkey if the service supports it, add the new email, sign out, and test the independent login in a private window. Do not revoke Google access until that test passes. Sources: - Google Account Help: how account data deletion works: https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/10549751 - Google Account Help: download your data: https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/3024190 - Google Account Help: delete your Google Account: https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/32046 - Google Account Help: find, control, and delete account information: https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/7660719 - Axon Police AI: Body Cameras, Draft One, and Fusus (axon-police-ai-body-cameras) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/axon-police-ai-body-cameras Summary: Axon sells AI that drafts police reports from body-camera audio and software that watches live city cameras. How the data flows from recording to courtroom, and which public records show how your city uses it. Answer: Axon sells AI that drafts police reports from body-camera audio and software that watches live city cameras. How the data flows from recording to courtroom, and which public records show how your city uses it. Meta: date=2026-08-05 | published=2026-08-05 | reviewed=2026-08-23 | read_time=~14 min read | tags=Surveillance, AI, Public Records Figure: FIG.C02: Draft One makes a draft; Vision makes an alert. An officer approves a Draft One report, while a trained person decides what happens after a Vision activity alert. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/axon-police-ai-body-cameras/axon-report-approval-pipeline--article-desktop.png (1200x566; alt: Two Axon paths: body-camera audio through Draft One and officer approval, plus a fixed-camera feed through activity detection, human review and a trained-person decision.) Figure data: How Draft One and Vision pass work to people - Surface=Body-worn camera | Role in the path=Captures video, audio, time, device, and event context | Record to request=Activation policy, buffering, upload behavior, and device logs - Surface=Axon Evidence | Role in the path=Stores and manages digital evidence and audit trails | Record to request=Retention schedule, access log, sharing log, and deletion exceptions - Surface=Transcript | Role in the path=Provides the text input used by Draft One | Record to request=Transcript, source evidence IDs, and transcription error records - Surface=Draft One | Role in the path=Generates an initial report narrative from body-camera audio transcripts | Record to request=Feature settings, original draft, usage audit, disclosure, and incident restrictions - Surface=Officer review | Role in the path=Fills missing information, edits, attests to accuracy, and approves submission | Record to request=Edit history, sign-off, supervisor review, and correction records - Surface=Records system | Role in the path=Receives the reviewed final report | Record to request=Final report, revision history, disclosure, and retention policy - Surface=Fusus | Role in the path=Unifies live video, alerts, locations, dispatch, ALPR, drone, and third-party feeds | Record to request=Integration inventory, access controls, incident exports, and audit trail - Surface=Community Connect | Role in the path=Supports registration or connection of participating private cameras | Record to request=Participation terms, owner consent, live-access limits, and revocation process - Surface=Approved fixed feed | Role in the path=Provides the agency-selected camera input for Axon Vision | Record to request=Approved camera inventory, purpose, access policy, and retention - Surface=Vision activity model | Role in the path=Evaluates configured activity categories without documented identity recognition | Record to request=Enabled categories, thresholds, model version, and false-positive audit - Surface=Lower-confidence review | Role in the path=Can route detections to trained human reviewers before operational notification | Record to request=Reviewer contract, training, escalation rules, and review logs - Surface=Fusus alert | Role in the path=Presents the activity alert inside the real-time operations workflow | Record to request=Alert log, recipients, response record, and Evidence transfer - Surface=Trained-person decision | Role in the path=Retains dispatch and enforcement authority outside the Vision model | Record to request=Decision log, dispatch record, enforcement action, and policy - Draft One turns audio into an official-document workflow: Axon says body-camera audio is uploaded, transcribed, and used to generate a draft report narrative. The company describes an officer-in-the-loop process: the officer must fill missing information, edit the draft, attest to accuracy, and approve it before submission. Axon also documents audit events for draft requests, evidence IDs, users, IP addresses, incident information, and sign-off. - One named deployment has a public procurement trail: Axon's July 2026 case study names Lafayette Police Department in Indiana as a user of Body 4, Fleet 3, Evidence, Draft One, Records, and Fusus. The City of Lafayette's October 24, 2023 Board of Public Works agenda separately lists a master services and purchasing agreement with Axon for the police and fire departments. Neither document shows the executed agreement, the price schedule, or the settings the department actually chose. - Original drafts are a policy and version question: EFF reported in July 2025 that Draft One's then-described workflow did not retain the generated draft or later versions, which made independent auditing difficult. Axon's current help documentation describes an optional feature for retaining and reporting original AI-generated drafts, with settings for when they are stored and deleted. Both records matter: the criticism documents the earlier transparency problem, while the current manual documents a product capability that an agency may or may not enable. - Human review is necessary but not sufficient: Officer approval assigns responsibility, but it does not measure whether the transcript missed speech, whether the generated narrative framed an encounter differently, whether required disclosure remained enabled, or how closely supervisors reviewed the result. Those questions need paired records and outcome data. Sources: - Axon Customer Experience Improvement Program disclosure: https://www.axon.com/aceip - Axon: Vision design and rollout statement: https://www.axon.com/blog/rethinking-vision-building-systems-that-understand-not-just-see - Axon Draft One auditing and reporting documentation: https://www.axon.com/help/draft-one/software/draft-one/auditing-reporting.htm - Axon Fusus product page: https://www.axon.com/products/axon-fusus - Axon Vision product page: https://www.axon.com/products/axon-vision - Axon Draft One product page: https://www.axon.com/products/draft-one - Axon case study: Lafayette Police Department deployment: https://www.axon.com/resources/how-lafayette-pd-used-draft-one - Axon case study: North Carolina corrections: https://www.axon.com/resources/prioritizing-officer-safety-at-scale - Baltimore Brew: Axon Vision in the proposed package: https://www.baltimorebrew.com/2026/05/05/baltimore-to-spend-a-record-amount-on-new-police-technology-via-single-source-contract - CBS Baltimore: approved Axon contract and provisional AI testing: https://www.cbsnews.com/baltimore/news/police-body-worn-camera-taser-ai-maryland - EFF: Draft One transparency investigation: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/07/axons-draft-one-designed-defy-transparency - FTC: Axon and VieVu administrative complaint announcement: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2020/01/ftc-challenges-consummated-merger-companies-market-body-worn-camera-systems-large-metropolitan - City of Lafayette Board of Public Works agenda: Axon master agreement: https://www.lafayette.in.gov/AgendaCenter/ViewFile/ArchivedAgenda/_10242023-3087 - Axon Q1 2026 shareholder letter filed with the SEC: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1069183/000162828026031285/axon-20260506xex991.htm - Frigate Private Camera Network: Local NVR Setup and Remote Access (frigate-private-camera-network) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/frigate-private-camera-network Summary: A local Frigate NVR setup covering camera segmentation, detection and recording streams, storage, authenticated access, Tailscale, integrations, and operational failure tests. Answer: A local Frigate NVR setup covering camera segmentation, detection and recording streams, storage, authenticated access, Tailscale, integrations, and operational failure tests. Meta: date=2026-08-05 | published=2026-08-05 | reviewed=2026-08-05 | read_time=~12 min read | tags=Home Privacy, Self-Hosted, Cameras Figure: FIG.03: What leaves the camera network, and what must not. The documented Frigate surfaces: port 8971 authenticated, port 5000 internal only, remote access through a private tailnet. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/frigate-private-camera-network/frigate-data-path--article-desktop.png (1200x381; alt: Data path from isolated cameras through detect and record streams to a local Frigate host, with port boundaries and tailnet-only remote access.) Figure data: The documented Frigate surfaces: port 8971 authenticated, port 5000 internal only, remote access through a private tailnet. - Port=8971 | Purpose=authenticated ui + api | Verdict=allow | Boundary=trusted network or proxy - Port=5000 | Purpose=internal unauthenticated api | Verdict=block | Boundary=container / integration net only - Port=8554 | Purpose=rtsp restream | Verdict=caution | Boundary=authenticate outside localhost - Port=8555 | Purpose=webrtc | Verdict=caution | Boundary=only where live view needs it - Choose a deployment shape: These are planning starts, not a bill of materials. Frigate's documentation ties load to camera count, resolution, frame rate, codecs, detection, enrichments, and retention. Benchmark the real streams. The official guide describes 4 GB as a basic minimum, 8 GB as a minimum when enrichments are used, and 16 GB as a general recommendation for larger or heavier setups. - Keep cameras on a restricted network: Put cameras on a dedicated VLAN or firewall segment when the router supports it. Allow each camera to reach the Frigate host on the required stream and management ports. Block camera-initiated internet access unless a documented feature requires it. Use unique camera credentials, update firmware, disable vendor peer-to-peer cloud access, and prefer a read-only viewer account for RTSP or ONVIF where supported. - Use separate detection and recording streams: The project recommends tuning a low-rate stream for detection and a higher-quality stream for recording. A lower-resolution substream reduces decode and detection load, while the main stream preserves evidence quality. Frigate's camera guide recommends about 5 frames per second for typical detection and treats 10 frames per second as a practical upper range for most use cases. - Container and storage boundary: The recommended Docker Compose installation maps persistent configuration into /config and recordings into /media/frigate . Frigate first writes recording segments to /tmp/cache ; the installation guide recommends a memory-backed tmpfs for that cache. Keep the database on reliable local storage. The project warns that placing the SQLite database on SMB or NFS can create locking problems. Sources: - Frigate authentication and roles: https://docs.frigate.video/configuration/authentication/ - Frigate restream security: https://docs.frigate.video/configuration/restream/ - Frigate camera stream setup: https://docs.frigate.video/frigate/camera_setup - Frigate installation and port documentation: https://docs.frigate.video/frigate/installation/ - Frigate hardware and storage planning: https://docs.frigate.video/frigate/planning_setup/ - Tailscale subnet router documentation: https://tailscale.com/docs/features/subnet-routers - Tailscale Serve and access controls: https://tailscale.com/docs/features/tailscale-serve - Self-OSINT Audit: Find and Reduce Your Personal Exposure (self-osint-personal-exposure-audit) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/self-osint-personal-exposure-audit Summary: A practical self-OSINT workflow for finding your public identifiers, profiles, breach exposure, broker records, images, and documents, then verifying remediation and repeat exposure. Answer: A practical self-OSINT workflow for finding your public identifiers, profiles, breach exposure, broker records, images, and documents, then verifying remediation and repeat exposure. Meta: date=2026-08-05 | published=2026-08-05 | reviewed=2026-08-05 | read_time=~12 min read | tags=OSINT, Doxxing Defense, Workflow Figure: FIG.C05: Confirm twice, choose one response, verify before closure. Discovery does not authorize removal: the workflow requires two independent matching fields, one chosen response per finding, and separate verification of the source page and search result. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/self-osint-personal-exposure-audit/self-osint-audit-gates--article-desktop.png (1200x636; alt: Ten-stage self-OSINT audit rail with gates at two-field match confirmation, response selection, and verification, plus four remediation priority levels and separate source-removal and deindexing states.) Figure data: Self-OSINT audit stages and stop gates - Stage=Build identifier list | Required output=Known names, usernames, emails, phones, domains, profiles, and owned images | Gate or caution=Use only identifiers already known and controlled - Stage=Search from clean context | Required output=Logged-out results from more than one search engine | Gate or caution=Avoid adding data to aggressive or deceptive sites - Stage=Confirm match | Required output=At least two independent matching fields | Gate or caution=Ambiguous records do not become removal tasks - Stage=Check accounts and breaches | Required output=Exposed fields and account-hardening actions | Gate or caution=A breach hit is evidence, not proof of current compromise - Stage=Check broker listings | Required output=Broker, profile URL, fields shown, opt-out route, and proof requested | Gate or caution=Minimize information sent back - Stage=Separate source and search | Required output=Distinct source-removal and deindexing tasks | Gate or caution=Search removal does not delete the source page - Stage=Audit metadata and links | Required output=Sanitized evidence and confidence-labeled exposure paths | Gate or caution=Do not build unnecessary graphs - Stage=Choose response | Required output=One control selected by impact and reversibility | Gate or caution=Remove, deindex, correct, lock down, separate, monitor, or accept - Stage=Verify remediation | Required output=Source and search checks after the stated processing time | Gate or caution=Submission alone is not removal - Stage=Report and recheck | Required output=Scope, exposure summary, paths, queue, residual risk, and next date | Gate or caution=Listings and indexed copies can return - Prepare a private evidence register: Use an encrypted local document or database. Give findings opaque IDs rather than filenames containing the exposed phone number or address. Store only what you need to remediate the exposure. A screenshot of an entire people-search profile creates a new copy of the data; a URL, field list, date, and narrowly cropped evidence may be enough. - 1. Build your identifier list: Start with identifiers you already know and control: full name variants, prior surnames, usernames, email addresses, phone numbers, domains, public profile URLs, and profile images. Add old cities only when needed to distinguish your record from someone with the same name. - 2. Search from a clean context: EFF recommends searching for your own name, nickname, handle, avatar, address, phone number, and email. Use a private window or separate browser while logged out so personalization does not dominate the results. Test more than one search engine because deindexing and ranking differ. - 3. Check accounts and breach exposure: Review public profiles from the outside, not only while logged in. Record exposed contact details, location history, workplace, family connections, public friend lists, old posts, visible recovery hints, and reused usernames. Then inspect the platform's own privacy and session controls. Sources: - Have I Been Pwned: verified breach notifications: https://haveibeenpwned.com/NotifyMe - Have I Been Pwned privacy and service scope: https://haveibeenpwned.com/privacy - EFF Surveillance Self-Defense: manage your digital footprint: https://ssd.eff.org/module/how-to-manage-your-digital-footprint - Google Search Help: Results about you: https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/12719076 - Google Search Help: remove private information: https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/9673730 - EFF: doxxing prevention and harm reduction: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/12/doxxing-tips-protect-yourself-online-how-minimize-harm - Private Email Migration with Proton and SimpleLogin (private-email-providers) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/private-email-providers Summary: Move an existing inbox to Proton Mail, add one-address-per-account SimpleLogin aliases, verify replies, import mail, and run a 30-day cutover. Answer: Move an existing inbox to Proton Mail, add one-address-per-account SimpleLogin aliases, verify replies, import mail, and run a 30-day cutover. Meta: date=2026-07-16 | published=2026-07-16 | reviewed=2026-08-10 | read_time=~13 min read | tags=Comms, Email, Guide Figure: FIG.B01: The alias hides the mailbox, not the routing relationship. SimpleLogin keeps the Proton address from the sender and supports replies through a reverse alias, but it must process the routing relationship and normal email metadata remains visible. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/private-email-providers/email-alias-routing--article-desktop.png (1200x540; alt: Email path from an external sender through a SimpleLogin alias to a Proton mailbox, with the reverse-alias reply path, observed routing metadata, and a 30-day cutover window.) Figure data: Email migration cutover checklist - Stage=Create Proton account | Verify condition=Fresh private-window sign-in works with the stored credential - Stage=Secure recovery | Verify condition=Authenticator, offline recovery code, recovery phrase, and an independent recovery method are tested - Stage=Attach SimpleLogin | Verify condition=Proton mailbox is verified and a test alias receives mail - Stage=Create aliases | Verify condition=Each first account class has a distinct alias that forwards only to Proton - Stage=Test reverse alias | Verify condition=Recipient sees the alias, not the Proton address, and a reply returns through SimpleLogin - Stage=Import old mailbox | Verify condition=Inbox, Sent, custom-folder samples, contacts count, and import errors are recorded - Stage=Forward and update | Verify condition=Mail to the old inbox arrives once and each critical account can deliver to its alias - Stage=Thirty-day cutover | Verify condition=Every old-address-only message is classified and no critical recovery path remains untested - Before you start: The zero-cost route uses Proton Free and SimpleLogin Free, which includes 10 aliases. SimpleLogin Premium is listed at $36 USD per year and adds unlimited aliases and custom domains. Domain registration, Proton paid storage, and extra addresses are separate. Confirm current prices before paying. - What this setup does not protect: LIMITATION SOURCES: Proton external-recipient encryption (retrieved 10 August 2026 ); Proton encryption scope (retrieved 10 August 2026 ); SimpleLogin mailbox routing (retrieved 10 August 2026 ). - Maintenance: Review disabled or blocked aliases monthly. Test the recovery phrase and offline recovery-code location every six months without consuming a code. Before changing the Proton mailbox or SimpleLogin plan, export the alias register and identify which recovery-critical accounts depend on it. A working migration is a maintained routing map, not a one-time import. Sources: - Proton Mail official site: https://proton.me/mail - Proton account creation: https://proton.me/support/create-a-free-email-account (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Proton migration controls: https://proton.me/support/easy-switch (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Proton account and plan documentation: https://proton.me/support/proton-plans (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Proton external-recipient encryption: https://proton.me/support/send-messages - Proton account recovery: https://proton.me/support/set-account-recovery-methods (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Proton Gmail forwarding and transition: https://proton.me/support/switch-from-gmail-to-proton (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Proton two-factor authentication: https://proton.me/support/two-factor-authentication-2fa (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Proton encryption scope: https://proton.me/support/what-is-encrypted-within-protonmail - SimpleLogin official site: https://simplelogin.io - SimpleLogin alias operation: https://simplelogin.io/docs/getting-started/create-alias/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - SimpleLogin registration: https://simplelogin.io/docs/getting-started/register-account/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - SimpleLogin reverse aliases: https://simplelogin.io/docs/getting-started/reverse-alias/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - SimpleLogin send-from-alias procedure: https://simplelogin.io/docs/getting-started/send-email/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - SimpleLogin mailbox verification: https://simplelogin.io/docs/mailbox/add-mailbox/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - SimpleLogin free and premium limits: https://simplelogin.io/pricing/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - What the KIDS Act Would Change Online (kids-act-age-checks-online) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/kids-act-age-checks-online Summary: The House passed the KIDS Act on June 29, 2026. The bill would require age checks on some sites and change privacy, messaging, and content rules for minors. Answer: The House passed the KIDS Act on June 29, 2026. The bill would require age checks on some sites and change privacy, messaging, and content rules for minors. Meta: date=2026-07-12 | published=2026-07-12 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=Policy, Age Verification, Communications - Age checks are explicit for a narrow group of sites: Title I applies to a covered platform where more than one-third of the material available on the service meets the bill's definition of sexual material harmful to minors. Those services would have to use commercially available technology to identify minors and block their access to that material. - Other sections create a harder age question: The online-platform rules apply when a provider knows a user is a minor. Covered platforms would have to set protective defaults, limit contact from other users, restrict geolocation sharing, offer recommendation controls, and provide time controls. Parents would get tools to view or manage settings in defined cases. - The current messaging text is narrower than earlier criticism: The House-passed text defines children as users under 13 and teens as users aged 13 through 16 for its online-platform section. It requires covered platforms to give minors controls over direct and disappearing messages. Teens must be able to approve or deny a request from an unapproved contact before messaging starts, block contacts, disable messaging features, and hide their profiles. - Content rules could affect lawful posts: The bill would require covered platforms to maintain policies that address severe threats of violence, sexual exploitation and abuse, the distribution, sale, or use of narcotic drugs, tobacco, cannabis, gambling, or alcohol, and financial harm caused by deceptive practices. The text says this section does not impose a duty of care. It also protects a minor's ability to search deliberately for content or request it directly. Sources: - Center for Democracy & Technology: March 5, 2026 committee letter on the earlier bill text: https://cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/CDT-letter-to-House-Energy-and-Commerce-Full-Committee-for-Kids-Safety-Markup-3.5.26.pdf - Congress.gov: H.R. 7757 status, actions, and legislative summary: https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/7757 - Congress.gov: House engrossed text passed June 29, 2026: https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/7757/text/eh?format=txt - Congress.gov: House roll call 228: https://www.congress.gov/votes/house/119-2/228 - Electronic Frontier Foundation: July 9, 2026 analysis of the House-passed bill: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/07/house-passed-kids-act-senate-should-reject-it - Privacy Controls for AI-Agent Payments (ai-agent-money-privacy-controls) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/ai-agent-money-privacy-controls Summary: Source-backed controls for AI-agent payments: narrow tool scopes, spend limits, separate signing, human approval, revocation, and the records each rail retains. Answer: Source-backed controls for AI-agent payments: narrow tool scopes, spend limits, separate signing, human approval, revocation, and the records each rail retains. Meta: date=2026-07-04 | published=2026-07-04 | reviewed=2026-07-14 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=AI Privacy, Payments, Agent Money - Privacy.com is an identity-bearing control surface: Privacy.com's agent controls document card creation with spend limits plus list, pause, unpause, close, and transaction commands. Its MCP documentation and MCP announcement show how an AI client can access those card controls. - Bitrefill exposes authenticated commerce tools: Bitrefill's API documentation covers programmatic gift-card, top-up, and eSIM purchases. Its eCommerce MCP documentation describes AI-assisted search and purchase flows authenticated through a Bitrefill account with OAuth or an API key. - BTCPay Server moves control to the operator: BTCPay Server is open-source, self-hosted merchant infrastructure. Its custom integration guide and Greenfield API document invoice creation and payment automation. - SHOPINBIT documents a manual concierge, not autonomous spend: SHOPINBIT's concierge page describes a person sourcing goods, communicating with suppliers, placing orders, arranging shipping, and handling customs. That supports a human-approved request path. It does not support treating the service as an automated agent rail or accepting its no-KYC marketing as proof of anonymity. Sources: - agent controls: https://agents.privacy.com/ - Agent Payments Protocol: https://ap2-protocol.org/ - BTCPay Server: https://btcpayserver.org/ - developer onboarding documentation: https://developers.privacy.com/docs/getting-started - MCP documentation: https://developers.privacy.com/docs/mcp-server - API documentation: https://docs.bitrefill.com/docs/api-overview - eCommerce MCP documentation: https://docs.bitrefill.com/docs/ecommerce-mcp - Greenfield API: https://docs.btcpayserver.org/API/Greenfield/v1/ - custom integration guide: https://docs.btcpayserver.org/CustomIntegration/ - Coinbase documentation: https://docs.cdp.coinbase.com/x402/welcome - Model Context Protocol specification: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18 - Machine Payments Protocol: https://mpp.dev/overview - concierge page: https://shopinbit.com/concierge/ - MCP announcement: https://www.privacy.com/blog/privacy-mcp-connect-ai-assistant-privacy-account - Privacy.com terms: https://www.privacy.com/terms - x402 protocol site: https://www.x402.org/ - How to Self-Host unbroker for Data Broker Removal (self-host-unbroker-data-broker-removal) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/self-host-unbroker-data-broker-removal Summary: A practical guide to running unbroker locally or on an isolated server, with local records, browser and email modes, DROP, human fallback, and recurring re-scans. Answer: A practical guide to running unbroker locally or on an isolated server, with local records, browser and email modes, DROP, human fallback, and recurring re-scans. Meta: date=2026-07-05 | published=2026-07-05 | reviewed=2026-08-05 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=Data Brokers, AI Privacy, How To Figure: FIG.C06: Consent gates the run; custody grows with the host surface. The workflow records consent before scanning, keeps deterministic run state and verification in a ledger, and treats a shared hosted app as the highest personal-data custody option. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/self-host-unbroker-data-broker-removal/unbroker-consent-custody-pipeline--article-desktop.png (1200x624; alt: unbroker pipeline from consent through local dossier, action queue, scan or opt-out, ledger, verification poll, and human digest, with local, temporary VPS, and shared-host custody boundaries.) Figure data: unbroker operating stages and custody boundaries - Stage or host=Local workstation | Stable role=Personal runs with local dossiers and controlled browser or email sessions | Boundary or record=Lower hosting surface; machine availability remains required - Stage or host=Temporary VPS | Stable role=Clean isolated run without local machine dependency | Boundary or record=Encrypt storage, restrict access, avoid backups, and delete the workspace after reporting - Stage or host=Shared hosted app | Stable role=Convenient multi-user hosting | Boundary or record=Highest PII custody burden; the article says not to start here - Stage or host=Consent | Stable role=Record authorization before scanning or removal requests | Boundary or record=No consent means no run - Stage or host=Deterministic state | Stable role=CLI owns dossiers, broker data, planning, ledger, drafts, reports, polling, and queue | Boundary or record=Keep collected fields narrow and use opaque subject IDs - Stage or host=Agent actions | Stable role=Execute scans, browser steps, email work, and scheduled rechecks | Boundary or record=Anti-bot and identity-proof gates move to a human task - Stage or host=Ledger | Stable role=Record removal route, fields disclosed, result, and fallback reason | Boundary or record=Submitted is not the same as removed - Stage or host=Verification poll | Stable role=Re-scan and classify hidden, deleted, corrected, or unresolved outcomes | Boundary or record=Broker and source-record removal remain separate - Stage or host=Human digest | Stable role=Present blocked tasks and schedule rechecks | Boundary or record=Monitoring duration controls person-record retention - Stage or host=California DROP | Stable role=One deletion request can cover more than 600 registered brokers | Boundary or record=Covered data must be deleted within 90 days starting August 1, 2026 - What you are hosting: The upstream skill splits the work in two. A Python CLI owns deterministic state: setup, dossiers, broker data, planning, ledger, drafts, reports, verification polling, and the next action queue. The agent handles scanning, browser steps, email work, and scheduled re-checks. - Basic run shape: Install the skill through Hermes, then start a fresh session and drive the workflow from the skill directory. - Consent and intake: The intake data is sensitive by design. It can include names, aliases, emails, phones, current location, and prior locations. Keep it narrow. If a broker cannot search by a field, do not collect it just because it feels complete. - Email and browser mode: Removal flows often need email verification. The upstream skill supports browser-mode email and programmatic SMTP/IMAP. Browser mode avoids storing a mail password, but it requires a logged-in browser session. Programmatic email is more automated, but the credential surface is larger. Sources: - California Data Broker Registry: https://cppa.ca.gov/data_broker_registry/ - unbroker README on GitHub: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/tree/main/optional-skills/security/unbroker - BADBOOL broker opt-out list: https://github.com/yaelwrites/Big-Ass-Data-Broker-Opt-Out-List - California DROP official page: https://privacy.ca.gov/drop/ - unbroker SKILL.md: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/main/optional-skills/security/unbroker/SKILL.md - Local-First Data Broker Removal: Extraction, Deletion, and Rechecks (unbroker-ai-data-broker-removal-agent) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/unbroker-ai-data-broker-removal-agent Summary: A local-first workflow for finding data-broker records, approving least-disclosure opt-outs, tracking proof, escalating to a human, and rechecking for reappearance. Answer: A local-first workflow for finding data-broker records, approving least-disclosure opt-outs, tracking proof, escalating to a human, and rechecking for reappearance. Meta: date=2026-07-05 | published=2026-07-05 | reviewed=2026-08-05 | read_time=~10 min read | tags=AI Privacy, OPSEC, Data Brokers - What it is: unbroker is an optional Hermes Agent security skill. Its README describes a deterministic Python CLI that owns the state: config, dossiers, broker data, tier planning, ledger, drafts, reports, and the action queue. - What to check: A removal agent handles the same personal data it is trying to suppress. Check consent, local storage, disclosure rules, verification, human fallback, and re-scan timing before using one. - What matters operationally: Keep autonomy constrained. unbroker says consent is required, hard CAPTCHA and government-ID cases become human tasks, and confirmed removal should only be recorded after a verifying re-scan. - How DROP changes removal work in California: California DROP is now a separate path for California residents. The official state page says a California resident can submit one request to more than 600 registered brokers, and that brokers must begin processing DROP deletion requests on August 1, 2026. Sources: - California Data Broker Registry: https://cppa.ca.gov/data_broker_registry/ - unbroker README on GitHub: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent/tree/main/optional-skills/security/unbroker - BADBOOL broker opt-out list: https://github.com/yaelwrites/Big-Ass-Data-Broker-Opt-Out-List - Hermes Agent unbroker skill docs: https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs/user-guide/skills/optional/security/security-unbroker - California DROP official page: https://privacy.ca.gov/drop/ - EFF digital-footprint guide: https://ssd.eff.org/module/how-to-manage-your-digital-footprint - AI Agent Payment Protocols Compared (ap2-x402-mpp-agent-payment-privacy) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/ap2-x402-mpp-agent-payment-privacy Summary: A privacy-first comparison of AP2, x402, and MPP for AI-agent payments: authorization, HTTP 402 challenges, settlement rails, logs, wallets, and metadata exposure. Answer: A privacy-first comparison of AP2, x402, and MPP for AI-agent payments: authorization, HTTP 402 challenges, settlement rails, logs, wallets, and metadata exposure. Meta: date=2026-07-05 | published=2026-07-05 | reviewed=2026-07-05 | read_time=~5 min read | tags=AI Privacy, Payments, Agent Money - What each layer does: AP2 is mainly an authorization and accountability layer. Its useful privacy question is whether mandates prove user intent without leaking more identity, shopping, or account context than necessary. - The privacy split: AP2 asks: did the user authorize this transaction, and can participants prove it later? x402 and MPP ask: can a machine pay for this resource programmatically? Those are not the same question. - Privacy guidance: For low-risk API access, x402 or MPP can be reasonable if the wallet is low-balance, single-purpose, and not linked to a main identity. - Before letting an agent pay: Name the authority model: mandate, API key, wallet grant, policy engine, or human approval. Sources: - AP2 protocol docs: https://ap2-protocol.org/ - Google AP2 announcement: https://cloud.google.com/blog/products/ai-machine-learning/announcing-agents-to-payments-ap2-protocol - Cloudflare MPP compatibility note: https://developers.cloudflare.com/agents/tools/payments/mpp/ - Coinbase x402 docs: https://docs.cdp.coinbase.com/x402/welcome - Stripe Machine Payments Protocol: https://stripe.com/blog/machine-payments-protocol - Privacy.com MCP Is Spend Control, Not Anonymity (privacy-com-mcp-spend-control-not-anonymity) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/privacy-com-mcp-spend-control-not-anonymity Summary: Privacy.com MCP gives AI tools access to virtual-card controls, but identity checks and linked funding make it spend control, not anonymous money. Answer: Privacy.com MCP gives AI tools access to virtual-card controls, but identity checks and linked funding make it spend control, not anonymous money. Meta: date=2026-07-05 | published=2026-07-05 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~4 min read | tags=AI Privacy, Payments, Privacy.com - What MCP changes: The MCP server lets an authorized AI client list, create, pause, close, and update virtual cards. It can also retrieve card details, full card numbers, and transaction records. - What MCP does not change: Privacy.com verifies identity and eligibility. Its privacy policy says it collects names, contact details, birth dates, government identification numbers, bank or payment-card details, transaction data, device data, and IP addresses. - Where it fits: Privacy.com MCP fits purchases where the account holder wants a hard spending boundary and accepts identity verification and payment records. A separate card can reduce exposure of the underlying card number, but it does not remove the account holder from Privacy.com's records. - Use Privacy.com MCP only when: The problem is spend control, not anonymity. Sources: - Privacy MCP server documentation: https://developers.privacy.com/docs/mcp-server - Privacy CLI docs: https://developers.privacy.com/docs/privacy-cli - Privacy.com MCP announcement: https://www.privacy.com/blog/privacy-mcp-connect-ai-assistant-privacy-account - Privacy.com privacy policy: https://www.privacy.com/privacy-policy - Agent Wallet Threat Model: Keys, Sessions, Budgets, and Receipts (agent-wallet-threat-model) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/agent-wallet-threat-model Summary: A practical threat model for AI-agent wallets: key custody, prompt injection, sessions, budgets, receipts, approval policies, wallet reuse, and privacy logs. Answer: A practical threat model for AI-agent wallets: key custody, prompt injection, sessions, budgets, receipts, approval policies, wallet reuse, and privacy logs. Meta: date=2026-07-05 | published=2026-07-05 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~5 min read | tags=AI Privacy, Wallets, OPSEC Figure: FIG.05: The agent drafts. It never signs.. The safer architecture from the article: intent and signing authority are separated, with limits enforced before payment. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/agent-wallet-threat-model/agent-wallet-approval--article-desktop.png (1200x475; alt: Approval path from agent-drafted payment request through policy check, human approval, and an external signer, with four failure modes and where each is caught.) Figure data: The safer architecture from the article: intent and signing authority are separated, with limits enforced before payment. - Failure=PROMPT INJECTION | Effect=asks the agent to pay the wrong party | Caught by=policy check + approval - Failure=MERCHANT SESSION LEAK | Effect=identity crosses unrelated tasks | Caught by=one wallet per task compartment - Failure=WALLET ADDRESS REUSE | Effect=links agent tasks on a public ledger | Caught by=one wallet per task compartment - Failure=BROAD API KEY | Effect=creates spend surfaces without review | Caught by=hard maximum before the workflow starts - Main assets: Money is only one asset. An agent payment can expose account identity, purchase intent, wallet history, receipts, API keys, merchant sessions, and the prompts that explain why the payment happened. - Main failure modes: The worst design puts seed material, browser automation, untrusted web content, and open-ended spending authority in one runtime. OWASP warns that indirect prompt injection can arrive through websites or files and trigger unauthorized tool use or commands. - Safer architecture: Use a separate wallet, card, or balance for each task compartment. Keep signing authority outside the browsing and prompt runtime. Put a deterministic policy check between the agent request and the payment tool. - Minimum controls: No seed phrases in the agent runtime. Sources: - AP2 v0.2 specification: https://ap2-protocol.org/ap2/specification/ - Coinbase x402 docs: https://docs.cdp.coinbase.com/x402/welcome - Stripe machine payments docs: https://docs.stripe.com/payments/machine - Ethereum privacy documentation: https://ethereum.org/en/privacy/ - OWASP prompt injection guidance: https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm01-prompt-injection/ - Pay Per Crawl and the Paid Web: Privacy Risks of HTTP 402 (pay-per-crawl-http-402-privacy-risks) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/pay-per-crawl-http-402-privacy-risks Summary: How x402 and pay-per-crawl can connect AI-agent requests to wallets, accounts, facilitators, timing, and resource metadata. Answer: How x402 and pay-per-crawl can connect AI-agent requests to wallets, accounts, facilitators, timing, and resource metadata. Meta: date=2026-07-05 | published=2026-07-05 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~4 min read | tags=AI Privacy, HTTP 402, Payments - The clean engineering story: RFC 9110 reserves HTTP 402 Payment Required for future use and does not define a standard payment flow. x402 adds one: a server returns payment requirements, the client authorizes payment and retries, and the server returns the resource after verification. - The privacy cost: The server necessarily receives the requested path and request timing. In the x402 examples published by Coinbase, Cloudflare, and Stripe, the payment requirements also identify an amount, recipient, network, or facilitator. A facilitator verifies or settles the payment. Each party can therefore observe part of the request and payment flow, subject to its implementation and retention policy. - Privacy guidance: Before using paid crawl, identify which party sees the resource path, payment account, wallet address, IP address, and crawler identity. Check retention terms rather than assuming that protocol-level accountlessness means no records. - Before using paid crawl: Map which server, facilitator, and payment processor sees each field. Sources: - Cloudflare x402 foundation post: https://blog.cloudflare.com/x402/ - Coinbase HTTP 402 docs: https://docs.cdp.coinbase.com/x402/core-concepts/http-402 - Stripe x402 docs: https://docs.stripe.com/payments/machine/x402 - IETF HTTP Semantics: 402 Payment Required: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9110.html#name-402-payment-required - x402 protocol site: https://x402.org/ - Virtual Cards vs Stablecoin Wallets for AI Agents (virtual-cards-vs-stablecoin-wallets-ai-agents) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/virtual-cards-vs-stablecoin-wallets-ai-agents Summary: A privacy-first comparison of virtual cards and stablecoin wallets for AI-agent spending: KYC, issuer logs, onchain history, revocation, budgets, and merchant fit. Answer: A privacy-first comparison of virtual cards and stablecoin wallets for AI-agent spending: KYC, issuer logs, onchain history, revocation, budgets, and merchant fit. Meta: date=2026-07-05 | published=2026-07-05 | reviewed=2026-08-17 | read_time=~4 min read | tags=AI Privacy, Payments, Wallets - Virtual-card strengths: Virtual cards are useful when the merchant expects Visa or Mastercard. A good setup gives one card per merchant, a hard spend cap, pause/close controls, and transaction monitoring. - Stablecoin-wallet strengths: Stablecoin wallets fit API payments, x402-style flows, crypto-native services, and direct settlement where card networks are not needed. - How to choose: Use virtual cards for low-risk mainstream subscriptions that require cards. Use stablecoin wallets for crypto-native APIs and paid resources, but only with low balances and task-specific addresses. - Comparison checklist: Does the merchant require card rails? Sources: - Privacy AI agent cards page: https://agents.privacy.com/ - Coinbase x402 docs: https://docs.cdp.coinbase.com/x402/welcome - Stripe machine payments docs: https://docs.stripe.com/payments/machine - Evaluating AI-Agent Payment Methods (score-agent-payment-rail) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/score-agent-payment-rail Summary: A practical scoring rubric for AI-agent payment rails: identity exposure, authorization, settlement, custody, autonomy, revocation, logs, and privacy fit. Answer: A practical scoring rubric for AI-agent payment rails: identity exposure, authorization, settlement, custody, autonomy, revocation, logs, and privacy fit. Meta: date=2026-07-05 | published=2026-07-05 | reviewed=2026-08-17 | read_time=~5 min read | tags=AI Privacy, Payments, OPSEC - The seven fields that matter: Start with identity surface, authorization model, settlement rail, custody model, autonomy level, revocation path, and data path. Those fields describe the real privacy shape better than a headline. - Autonomy is a risk score: Treat autonomy as a local score, not an industry standard. Level 1 can mean the agent drafts and a human pays. Level 3 can mean scoped spend. Level 5 can mean broad authority. Lower authority reduces the damage available to a compromised agent. - How to use the score: Use the score to decide whether a rail fits your privacy and spending limits. AP2 deliberately creates a cryptographic audit trail. x402 can settle stablecoin payments on public networks. Stripe records machine payments in its payment and reporting systems. These properties aid accounting and disputes, but they are not anonymity features. - Scoring rubric: Identity: none, email, light KYC, full KYC, or unknown. Sources: - Privacy AI agent cards page: https://agents.privacy.com/ - AP2 protocol docs: https://ap2-protocol.org/ - Coinbase x402 docs: https://docs.cdp.coinbase.com/x402/welcome - Stripe machine payments docs: https://docs.stripe.com/payments/machine - Hong Kong Device Password Law (hong-kong-device-password-law) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/hong-kong-device-password-law Summary: Hong Kong now criminalises refusal to provide device passwords in national security cases. What the new rules say, where the claimed safeguards stop, and how travelers should change their device OPSEC. Answer: Hong Kong now criminalises refusal to provide device passwords in national security cases. What the new rules say, where the claimed safeguards stop, and how travelers should change their device OPSEC. Meta: date=2026-04-21 | published=2026-04-21 | reviewed=2026-08-10 | read_time=~12 min read | tags=Surveillance, Travel - What the March 2026 change actually did: Instrument A303's editorial note records that L.N. 27 of 2026 commenced on March 23, 2026. Schedule 1, section 4(2) says a police officer exercising the electronic-equipment search power may require a specified person to provide a necessary password or decryption method, or other reasonable and necessary information or assistance. - The government says there are safeguards. The details matter.: The rule itself gives the ordinary warrant route: a police officer may apply to a magistrate by information on oath for a warrant to investigate a national security offence. It also states an exception. A police officer not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner must be satisfied that the stated grounds exist. Those grounds include that obtaining a warrant would not be reasonably practicable. - Why this matters for travelers: This is where the Hong Kong story becomes a practical travel story. The State Department page does not treat the national security framework as a local-only rule set. It says the 2020 National Security Law and the 2024 Safeguarding National Security Ordinance apply to foreign nationals in Hong Kong and can also be asserted against people outside its borders. It warns that criticism of PRC or Hong Kong authorities can lead to arrest, detention, expulsion, or prosecution. If your phone contains messages, archives, cloud-session cookies, draft notes, or private chats that touch those subjects, an unlocked device can expose them. - Encryption is still useful. The strategy around it has to change.: One common mistake starts here. People hear about compelled access and conclude encryption no longer matters. The rule change does not support that conclusion. Encryption still protects against theft, device loss, malware, and many routine border searches that never escalate into a demand backed by law. What changes is the planning model. You stop treating the phone as your vault and start treating it as a temporary access terminal. Sources: - U.S. State Department's Hong Kong travel guidance: https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/international-travel/International-Travel-Country-Information-Pages/HongKong.html - Legislative Council brief: https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr2024/english/brief/sb20240308_20240308-e.pdf - Hong Kong Security Bureau FAQ: https://www.sb.gov.hk/eng/bl23/faq.html - Google Notice Policy and ICE Data Requests (google-ice-subpoena-notice) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/google-ice-subpoena-notice Summary: EFF says Google turned over subscriber data to ICE and only notified the user afterward, despite a public promise of advance notice. What simultaneous notice means and how to cut your exposure. Answer: EFF says Google turned over subscriber data to ICE and only notified the user afterward, despite a public promise of advance notice. What simultaneous notice means and how to cut your exposure. Meta: date=2026-04-19 | published=2026-04-19 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~10 min read | tags=Surveillance, Google - The Promise Matters Because Time Matters: Google's public policy says it sends users an email before disclosing information in response to a government request, subject to listed exceptions. Its government-request policy states that promise directly. The Transparency Report FAQ says Google notifies account holders by email when it does notify them, and says the company reviews each request for legal validity and can narrow or object to overbroad demands. - DHS Administrative Subpoenas Are Not Warrants: The second issue is the kind of process involved. EFF's February 2026 open letter argues that DHS administrative subpoenas are not judge-approved warrants. They are agency demands. According to EFF, if a company refuses one, DHS must either drop the request or go to court and defend it. - The ACLU Case Shows What Real Notice Looks Like: The strongest contrast comes from Doe v. DHS . In that case, the ACLU says DHS subpoenaed Google subscriber records about a man who had sent a critical email to a DHS attorney. Google notified him. He challenged the subpoena in federal court. DHS withdrew it on February 10, 2026. - Subscriber Data Is Not Harmless: The public debate often gets stuck on content. People hear that a subpoena does not include message bodies and assume the stakes are low. EFF says the Thomas-Johnson disclosure involved subscriber information such as name, address, IP address, and other personal identifiers. That is enough to anchor an account to a real person. Sources: - government-request policy: https://policies.google.com/terms/information-requests?hl=en-US - Transparency Report FAQ: https://support.google.com/transparencyreport/answer/9713961?hl=en - Doe v. DHS: https://www.aclu.org/cases/doe-v-dhs?document=Notice-of-Motion-%26-Motion-to-Quash - February 2026 open letter: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/02/open-letter-tech-companies-protect-your-users-lawless-dhs-subpoenas - EFF's April 14 account: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/04/google-broke-its-promise-me-now-ice-has-my-data - EFF press release about its state-AG complaint: https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-state-ags-investigate-googles-broken-promise-users-targeted-government - Flock Safety Expansion: License Plates, Traffic Cameras, and Drones (license-plate-readers-traffic-enforcement) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/license-plate-readers-traffic-enforcement Summary: Flock's OS Investigate pilot, linked identity searches, traffic-camera uses and local cancellations. What the evidence establishes about access, audits and retention. Answer: Flock's OS Investigate pilot, linked identity searches, traffic-camera uses and local cancellations. What the evidence establishes about access, audits and retention. Meta: date=2026-04-12 | published=2026-04-12 | reviewed=2026-09-21 | read_time=~18 min read | tags=Surveillance, Policy, Research Figure: FIG.C03: Public limits did not prevent broader recorded uses. A Georgia traffic citation and nationwide search records show why contract controls, system settings, and audit logs matter more than a narrow public description of local plate-reader use. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/license-plate-readers-traffic-enforcement/flock-claim-evidence-ledger--article-desktop.png (1200x658; alt: Claim-and-evidence ledger comparing four narrow public descriptions of Flock cameras with documented traffic, nationwide-sharing, and broader-search uses, plus dated network-scale figures.) Figure data: Flock public claims, observed records, and dated scale evidence - Record=Used after crimes occur | Observed evidence=A Georgia citation used a Flock capture to support a phone-use allegation while driving | Source or date=404 Media, March 2026 - Record=Not for traffic enforcement | Observed evidence=The ticket itself referenced the Flock camera capture as evidence | Source or date=404 Media, March 2026 - Record=Local public-safety tool | Observed evidence=ACLU reporting describes nationwide search and sharing across thousands of agencies | Source or date=ACLU and ACLU of Massachusetts - Record=Narrow investigative use | Observed evidence=Search logs and audits show immigration, abortion-related, and vaguely justified searches | Source or date=ACLU reporting - Record=Massachusetts deployment | Observed evidence=More than 80 departments had Flock contracts | Source or date=ACLU of Massachusetts, February 2026 update - Record=Network scale | Observed evidence=Nearly 7,000 networks and nearly 90,000 cameras nationwide were cited | Source or date=ACLU of Massachusetts; cameras dated July 2025 - Record=Framingham outcome | Observed evidence=The city declined to renew its contract after resident opposition | Source or date=Boston.com, June 2026 - Record=South Portland outcome | Observed evidence=The city disabled and later removed all seven cameras | Source or date=Portland Press Herald, July 2026 - The vendor now sells a connected product chain: Flock's current product pages place Falcon license-plate readers, video cameras, traffic enforcement, Raven acoustic detection, investigations software, and drone response on one public-safety platform. Its marketing describes the linked deployment as a private camera network for a community or agency. In a separate company announcement, Flock and Skydio said Skydio X10 drones would integrate with Flock Aerodome software for drone-as-first-responder deployments. - Can Flock OS Investigate find people without a known plate?: According to WIRED's August 19, 2026 investigation , OS Investigate, previously called Nightshift, is designed to start with a place, time window, or driving pattern rather than a known plate or name. It can then link matching vehicles to police and commercial identity records. That could bring ordinary drivers or potential witnesses into an investigation without their vehicle first appearing on a wanted list. A vehicle association is a lead, not proof of who was driving or of wrongdoing. - 23 Aug 2026 update: Savannah arrests and announced controls: Savannah Police said three former officers and one former civilian employee were arrested after a Georgia Bureau of Investigation inquiry into alleged misuse of the Flock camera system. The department said its own auditing surfaced concerning behavior, led to dismissals and referrals, and that the investigation remains open. The arrests and allegations are not convictions. - The public promise was narrow: Police departments and vendors have spent years telling residents these cameras are not ordinary traffic tools. In the Georgia case, 404 Media's reporting collected examples from cities that explicitly told residents the cameras would not be used for traffic enforcement, parking enforcement, immigration enforcement, or First Amendment monitoring. Sources: - Camera sensor research: rolling-shutter interference: https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.10011 - ACLU of Massachusetts: https://data.aclum.org/2025/10/07/flock-gives-law-enforcement-all-over-the-country-access-to-your-location/ - KRCG: Pulaski County decision and stated rationale: https://krcgtv.com/news/local/pulaski-county-sheriffs-office-to-discontinue-flock-safety-cameras - Savannah Police Department: response to arrests for alleged license-plate-reader misuse: https://savannahpd.org/spd-responds-to-arrest-of-four-former-savannah-police-department-employees-for-misuse-of-a-license-plate-reader-system/ - 404 Media: Georgia traffic citation based on a Flock capture: https://www.404media.co/police-used-flock-to-give-a-man-a-traffic-ticket/ - ACLU: August 2025 Flock expansion roundup: https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/flock-roundup - ACLU: local Flock opposition and contract limits: https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/tracking-alpr-cameras/how-to-fight-deployment-of-flock-and-other-mass-surveillance-license-plate-readers-in-your-community - Boston.com: Framingham contract non-renewal: https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2026/06/25/framingham-police-will-not-renew-flock-safety-contract-after-months-of-resident-opposition/ - Cornell Daily Sun: Ithaca direct-action case: https://www.cornellsun.com/article/2026/03/mcnl1fjqo786 - EFF: license-plate readers and traffic-enforcement mission creep: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/03/traffic-violation-license-plate-reader-mission-creep-already-here - Pulaski County Sheriff: official decision letter: https://www.facebook.com/PCSOMO/posts/my-letter-to-the-citizens-of-pulaski-county-from-last-nights-community-forum/1409360788041439 - Flock Safety and Skydio partnership announcement: https://www.flocksafety.com/articles/flock-safety-and-skydio-partner-to-transform-drones-as-first-responders - Flock Safety: Series E and named investors: https://www.flocksafety.com/blog/series-e-announcement - Flock Safety device portfolio: https://www.flocksafety.com/devices - Flock Safety license-plate reader policy: https://www.flocksafety.com/legal/lpr-policy - Flock Safety: FlockOS product page: https://www.flocksafety.com/products/flock-os - Green Bay Police: Automated License Plate Reader (ALPR) 2025 Annual Audit: https://www.greenbaywi.gov/DocumentCenter/View/18762/Green-Bay-PD-2025-Automated-License-Plate-Reader-ALPR-Annual-Audit - KOMU: cancellation and uninstall process: https://www.komu.com/news/midmissourinews/pulaski-county-sheriffs-office-to-stop-using-flock-cameras/article_37be7adb-7ddf-4f2e-b1f6-a437f457277c.html - OzarksFirst: ending process and removal status: https://www.ozarksfirst.com/news/pulaski-county-ends-flock-contract/amp - Portland Press Herald: South Portland camera removal: https://www.pressherald.com/2026/07/01/south-portlands-flock-cameras-have-been-removed/ - The Guardian: cities pausing or ending Flock programs: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2026/apr/06/flock-cameras-privacy-concerns - WIRED: Flock Has a Powerful New AI Tool for Police. We Got Its Code: https://www.wired.com/story/flock-safety-os-investigate/ - Flock said it would require Audit Assistance for law-enforcement customers and recommend seven-day retention: https://x.com/flocksafety/status/2090136761544388959 - case codes will be required for law-enforcement searches: https://x.com/flocksafety/status/2090499406466273656 - Flock Safety: updated terms announcement: https://x.com/flocksafety/status/2090832647748563408 - CEO said mandatory Audit Assistance would find more cases: https://x.com/glangley/status/2091175426877960499 - Section 702 Searches of Sensitive Groups (section-702-sensitive-searches) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/section-702-sensitive-searches Summary: Section 702 expired on June 12, 2026, but existing court certifications allow surveillance to continue. Sensitive FBI searches still require internal approval, not a warrant. Answer: Section 702 expired on June 12, 2026, but existing court certifications allow surveillance to continue. Sensitive FBI searches still require internal approval, not a warrant. Meta: date=2026-04-11 | published=2026-04-11 | reviewed=2026-08-17 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=Surveillance, Policy - What Wyden actually disclosed: Wyden's speech was not a broad complaint about surveillance culture. It was a specific description of how Congress's 2024 "reform" works in practice. He said that especially sensitive searches include queries for American elected officials, presidential appointees, governors, political candidates, political organizations and their leaders, media organizations, and journalists. The safeguard Congress added was not a warrant. It was a requirement that the Deputy FBI Director approve the search first. Wyden speech, March 10, 2026 - What counts as a "sensitive" search: The legal structure here comes from the 2024 Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act. Congress extended Section 702 for two years and created a special approval rule for these sensitive US person queries. It did not create a general warrant requirement before the FBI looks up Americans in raw 702 data. House Rules Committee print for H.R. 7888 - The bigger problem is scale: The surveillance pool the FBI searches keeps getting larger. ODNI reported 349,823 non-US targets in 2025, up from 291,824 in 2024. Those targets are abroad, but Americans' emails, calls, and messages can be collected when they communicate with them. ODNI 2026 transparency release - Why the 2024 fix did not fix the core issue: Congress addressed optics, not the architecture. The 2024 bill tightened some paperwork, changed approval paths for a narrow set of searches, and extended the authority for two more years. But it left intact the basic backdoor-search model: collect first under a foreign intelligence authority, then search later for Americans. If the search concerns a reporter or a politician, the answer is still an executive-branch signoff rather than neutral court review. Sources: - PCLOB: Report on the Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of FISA: https://documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/OversightReport/e9e72454-4156-49b9-961a-855706216063/2023%20PCLOB%20702%20Report%20%28002%29.pdf - Congress: H.R. 7888 / Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act text: https://www.congress.gov/118/cprt/HPRT55412/CPRT-118HPRT55412.pdf - Congress: Public Law 119-87, extending Title VII through June 12, 2026: https://www.congress.gov/119/plaws/publ87/PLAW-119publ87.htm - EFF: Section 702 expired on June 12, 2026: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/06/victory-702-has-expired - ODNI: 2026 Annual Intelligence Community Transparency Report release: https://www.odni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2026/4150-pr-05-26 - Senator Ron Wyden: March 10, 2026 remarks on Section 702, ICE surveillance, and AI monitoring: https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-calls-on-senate-to-reform-mass-surveillance-protect-americans-rights-and-reject-rudd-to-lead-nsa - Privacy and Security Concerns in the White House App (white-house-app-surveillance) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/white-house-app-surveillance Summary: A March 2026 audit found extensive third-party telemetry and bundled location capability in the White House app. Later disclosures and official statements changed parts of the record. Answer: A March 2026 audit found extensive third-party telemetry and bundled location capability in the White House app. Later disclosures and official statements changed parts of the record. Meta: date=2026-04-05 | published=2026-04-05 | reviewed=2026-08-17 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=Surveillance, OPSEC - What the Decompilation Found: Security researcher Thereallo decompiled the Android APK. Atomic.computer performed an independent iOS analysis and follow-up network traffic capture. Their findings overlap and confirm each other. - Consent Stripping: The Government Overrides Your Privacy Choices: The original release (v47.0.0) injected JavaScript and CSS into every webpage opened through its built-in browser. The injection targeted and hid: - GPS Tracking: Dormant but Remotely Activatable: The app ships with 10 separate OneSignal frameworks totaling approximately 2.4 MB. This includes OneSignalLocation.framework (104 KB) with a complete location tracking pipeline: permission requests, interval constants, fused location capture, background scheduling, and sync to OneSignal's API. - Six WebViews Loading Russian-Origin JavaScript: Version 47.0.4 loaded live JavaScript from Elfsight, a widget company founded in Tula, Russia that describes itself as based in Andorra. Six separate WebViews loaded platform.js from Elfsight's CDN. Sources: - Apple App Store: Current listing and privacy disclosure: https://apps.apple.com/us/app/the-white-house/id6759938088 - Thereallo: Decompiling the White House App: https://blog.thereallo.dev/blog/decompiling-the-white-house-app - OneSignal: Apple app privacy requirements: https://documentation.onesignal.com/docs/en/apple-app-privacy-requirements - The Newsground: White House and Elfsight responses: https://thenewsground.com/white-house-app-uses-code-from-tech-vendor-still-operating-in-russia/ - Atomic Computer: Network traffic analysis of version 47.0.4: https://www.atomic.computer/blog/white-house-app-network-traffic-analysis/ - Atomic Computer: Static analysis of the iOS app: https://www.atomic.computer/blog/white-house-app-security-analysis/ - White House: Official app launch announcement: https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/new-white-house-app-delivers-unparalleled-access-to-the-trump-administration/ - EU CSAM Scanning: Voluntary Detection Rules Restored Until 2028 (eu-csam-scanning-rejected) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/eu-csam-scanning-rejected Summary: Regulation (EU) 2026/1881 restored voluntary CSAM detection until April 2028. It excludes end-to-end encrypted chat, and mandatory scanning remains unadopted. Answer: Regulation (EU) 2026/1881 restored voluntary CSAM detection until April 2028. It excludes end-to-end encrypted chat, and mandatory scanning remains unadopted. Meta: date=2026-04-02 | published=2026-04-02 | reviewed=2026-08-10 | read_time=~4 min read | tags=Surveillance, Encryption - What the temporary rule permits: The regulation derogates from specific confidentiality rules in the ePrivacy Directive. A provider that chooses to use detection technology must satisfy conditions including necessity, proportionality, data-protection safeguards, reliability, human review, and reporting of verified suspicions. Articles 1 and 2, retrieved 10 August 2026 . - The mandatory proposal is separate: The 2022 proposal for mandatory prevention and detection duties remains a different legislative file. EUR-Lex still labels procedure 2022/0155(COD) as ongoing, while recital 11 of the temporary regulation says interinstitutional negotiations on that proposal were still ongoing when the temporary act was adopted. EUR-Lex procedure file, retrieved 10 August 2026 ; Regulation recital 11, retrieved 10 August 2026 . - What this means for encrypted services: The temporary act does not apply to interpersonal communications with end-to-end encryption. Outside that exclusion, it sets legal conditions but does not prescribe one technical implementation and does not require every provider to participate. Compare service designs in the encrypted messaging comparison . Articles 1 and 2, retrieved 10 August 2026 . Sources: - Article 2(1)(c) and Article 2(2), retrieved 10 August 2026: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/1881/oj/eng (retrieved 2026-08-10) - EUR-Lex procedure file, retrieved 10 August 2026: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/HIS/?uri=CELEX:52022PC0209 (retrieved 2026-08-10) - European Parliament procedure file 2022/0155(COD): https://oeil.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/en/procedure-file?reference=2022/0155(COD) (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Operating-System Age Verification Requirements (os-age-verification) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/os-age-verification Summary: What California AB 1043 requires operating systems and apps to do, what age-bracket data is shared, and what the law does not mandate. Answer: What California AB 1043 requires operating systems and apps to do, what age-bracket data is shared, and what the law does not mandate. Meta: date=2026-03-30 | published=2026-03-30 | reviewed=2026-07-14 | read_time=~7 min read | tags=Privacy, Law - What California enacted: Governor Gavin Newsom approved AB 1043 on October 13, 2025. The official bill status record lists it as Chapter 675 of the 2025 statutes. Its main requirements start on January 1, 2027. - The law limits the signal, not every inference: The text requires an operating-system provider to send only the minimum information needed to comply. It bars the provider from sharing the signal with a third party for another purpose. A developer may use the signal to comply with applicable law, may not request more data than necessary from the provider or app store, and may not share the signal for an unrelated purpose. - Platform APIs show how age ranges can move without an ID: Apple already publishes Declared Age Range documentation . Its API lets an app request an age range while the person controls whether to share it. Apple's documentation is a product design, not proof that every AB 1043 requirement has been implemented. - Shared devices remain a hard case: AB 1043 defines the user as a child who is the primary user of the device. It assigns the age-entry step to an adult account holder or a parent or guardian of a child associated with the device. That structure does not eliminate mismatches on devices used by several people. Sources: - Play Age Signals API: https://developer.android.com/google/play/age-signals/overview - Declared Age Range documentation: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/declaredagerange - chaptered text of Assembly Bill 1043: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB1043 - bill status record: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB1043 - attributed civil-liberties assessment: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/03/ab-1043s-internet-age-gates-hurt-everyone - Hardening Telegram (telegram-hardening) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/telegram-hardening Summary: Telegram cloud chats are not end-to-end encrypted. Reduce account, phone-number, metadata and session exposure with settings that have clear limits. Answer: Telegram cloud chats are not end-to-end encrypted. Reduce account, phone-number, metadata and session exposure with settings that have clear limits. Meta: date=2025-11 | published=2025-11 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~3 min read | tags=Guides, OPSEC - 1. Use Secret Chats for sensitive messages: Start a Secret Chat from the other person's profile. Telegram says Secret Chats use end-to-end encryption, are not stored in its cloud and can only be opened on the devices that created them. They do not support groups and do not sync to other devices. - 2. Lock down phone-number discovery: Open Settings, then Privacy and Security, then Phone Number. Set who can see your number to Nobody. Restrict who can find you by your number to My Contacts if that option is available on your account. A public username lets people contact you without seeing the number. - 3. Add a second login factor: Enable Two-Step Verification under Privacy and Security. This adds a password to login codes, reducing the damage from a stolen SIM or intercepted code. Add a recovery email you control and secure that mailbox with its own strong authentication. - 4. Reduce stored data: Disable contact syncing if you do not need it, then delete previously synced contacts. Set an auto-delete timer for new chats and apply it to existing chats where appropriate. Deletion reduces what remains in the chat history, but recipients can still copy, forward or capture anything they receive. Sources: - Fragment: collectible numbers: https://fragment.com/about#collectible-numbers - Telegram: no-SIM signup and auto-delete: https://telegram.org/blog/ultimate-privacy-topics-2-0 - Telegram FAQ: security and Secret Chats: https://telegram.org/faq#q-how-secure-is-telegram - Telegram Privacy Policy: https://telegram.org/privacy - No-KYC Crypto Exchange Options in 2026 (best-no-kyc-crypto-exchanges-2026) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/best-no-kyc-crypto-exchanges-2026 Summary: No-KYC exchange-style venues compared by type: aggregators, instant exchangers, and P2P markets, with KYC postures and fees from their records. Answer: No-KYC exchange-style venues compared by type: aggregators, instant exchangers, and P2P markets, with KYC postures and fees from their records. Meta: date=2026-01 | published=2026-01 | reviewed=2026-08-17 | read_time=~6 min read | tags=Swap, Guide - Quick Comparison: KYC and fee cells come from service data at build time. Each service page links sources and review dates. - What "No-KYC" Actually Means: No-KYC means the venue does not ask for identity documents in its normal flow: paste a receiving address, send funds, receive the swap. It does not mean unconditional. Several exchangers' terms allow demanding documents when a risk screen flags a deposit, and aggregator orders execute under the partner's rules. The records on this page mark that difference: a light rating means documented triggers exist even though signup asks for nothing. - Usage Notes: ZEC: a private Zcash leg needs a shielded destination (address starting zs1 ). Transparent ZEC behaves like Bitcoin and records an ordinary public trail. - Tor Access: Where IP exposure matters, venues with onion mirrors keep the session inside Tor: Godex and Trocador both publish onion addresses on their records. Bisq, Haveno, and RoboSats run over Tor by design. Stacking a VPN under Tor hides Tor use from the ISP and adds a party to trust; the tradeoff is real in both directions. Sources: - Bisq official site: https://bisq.network/ - Godex.io official site: https://godex.io/ - Haveno official site: https://haveno.exchange/ - RoboSats official site: https://robosats.org/ - SideShift.ai official site: https://sideshift.ai/ - Trocador official site: https://trocador.app/ - FATF guidance for virtual asset service providers: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Fatfgeneral/Guidance-RBA-VA-VASPs.html - Zcash vs Monero: Privacy Comparison 2026 (zcash-vs-monero-privacy-2026) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/zcash-vs-monero-privacy-2026 Summary: Compare Monero's default transaction privacy with Zcash shielded and transparent transfers, including address risks, viewing keys, and wallet checks. Answer: Compare Monero's default transaction privacy with Zcash shielded and transparent transfers, including address risks, viewing keys, and wallet checks. Meta: date=2026-01 | published=2026-01 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=Zcash, Monero - The privacy models are not interchangeable: Monero uses stealth addresses to create one-time destination addresses, ring signatures to obscure which output was spent, and RingCT to hide amounts. The Monero project states that these protections apply to every transaction. - Monero reduces address-type mistakes: A Monero wallet does not ask the user to choose between public and private transaction modes. That removes one common failure: sending through a transparent address because a wallet, exchange, or recipient does not support shielding. - Zcash privacy depends on the whole route: Zcash shielded transfers use zero-knowledge proofs so nodes can verify a transaction without publishing its shielded addresses or amount. Transparent addresses work like Bitcoin addresses and expose address and value data on-chain. - Older Zcash tracing studies need context: A 2018 USENIX study found that usage patterns around the original shielded pool could reduce users' effective anonymity. The researchers linked deposits and withdrawals through timing, amounts, and known participant behavior. That result showed the danger of moving predictable amounts into and out of a shielded pool. Sources: - Monero Docs: Running a Node: https://docs.getmonero.org/running-node/ - Monero Project: What is Monero?: https://www.getmonero.org/get-started/what-is-monero/ - USENIX Security 2018: An Empirical Analysis of Anonymity in Zcash: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity18/sec18-kappos.pdf - Zcash Documentation: Addresses and Value Pools: https://zcash.readthedocs.io/en/latest/rtd_pages/addresses.html - ZIP 316: Unified Addresses and Unified Viewing Keys: https://zips.z.cash/zip-0316 - Private Web Hosting: Domains, Servers, and Payments (the-no-kyc-stack) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/the-no-kyc-stack Summary: Build a private web stack with Njalla, FlokiNET or 1984 Hosting, Monero payments, Caddy TLS, SSH over Tor, and separate account hygiene. Answer: Build a private web stack with Njalla, FlokiNET or 1984 Hosting, Monero payments, Caddy TLS, SSH over Tor, and separate account hygiene. Meta: date=2026-01 | published=2026-01 | reviewed=2026-07-16 | read_time=~12 min read | tags=OPSEC, Guide - What Each Layer Changes: A registrar or host in the US answers to US legal process, and its records include whatever the order form and logs collected. Moving the domain behind a registration proxy removes the registrant record. Paying with Monero removes the public payment trail. Hosting outside US or UK jurisdiction changes which legal process applies. None of these steps removes the provider's own records: Njalla's terms permit collection needed for legal compliance and disclosure under court orders, FlokiNET's privacy policy documents logging of IP addresses, visit times, and browser data, and 1984 Hosting documents logging of IP addresses and device information alongside bookkeeping records. - Step 1 - Domain Registration Through a Proxy: Register through Njalla Njalla (see service details ) registers the domain in its own name and grants control through a service agreement, so the customer does not appear in WHOIS . A WHOIS query returns Njalla, not the customer. The remaining records are stated in Njalla's terms : signup requires an email or XMPP address, the service collects what it needs for legal compliance, and it can disclose data under law-enforcement requests or court orders. Njalla accepts Monero, Bitcoin, and other coins, so the payment need not add a card record. A separate email alias for the account keeps the address from linking other accounts. 1984 Hosting also sells domains with crypto payment. Conventional registrars with bolt-on WHOIS privacy still hold the registrant data themselves; the proxy-registration model moves it out of the registrant field entirely, at the cost described in the trust note below. - Step 2 - Server Outside US/UK Jurisdiction: Pick a host and read its policy The compared providers take server orders without identity documents and accept cryptocurrency. What differs is infrastructure range, locations, and exactly what each policy says it keeps. 1984 Hosting : Reykjavik, Iceland. Shared hosting, VPS, and domains, with Monero and Bitcoin accepted. Its privacy notes state it logs IP addresses and device information, retains bookkeeping records, and can transfer personal data to law enforcement under Icelandic process. FlokiNET : locations in Iceland, Romania, and Finland, with a wider infrastructure range (VPS, dedicated, colocation) and Monero, Zcash, and Bitcoin accepted. Its privacy policy documents logging of IP addresses, visit times, page activity, and browser and operating-system information, and allows disclosure to law enforcement. Njalla also offers VPS, which keeps domain and server under one account. That convenience concentrates both records with one operator; whether that is acceptable depends on the threat being addressed. - Step 3 - Payment Without a Public Trail: Use XMR where accepted; treat transparent chains as linkable Monero (XMR) does not produce a publicly readable chain record: ring signatures, stealth addresses, and confidential amounts apply to every transaction. The provider still records the order and the payment event on its side. Acquisition routes without identity checks are documented in the Monero buying guide . Zcash shielded payments are cryptographically private between shielded addresses, and FlokiNET lists ZEC among its accepted coins. Shielding must be explicit: wallets that default to transparent addresses produce ordinary public records. Bitcoin is transparent by default, and a payment from an identified wallet links that identity to the server. Coordinator-based CoinJoin availability changed when the largest coordinator shut down, documented in the Wasabi coordinator shutdown article . Where only Bitcoin is accepted, the payment should be treated as linkable and the source of the coins chosen accordingly. Sources: - 1984 Hosting official site: https://1984.hosting/ - FlokiNET official site: https://flokinet.is/ - FlokiNET privacy policy: https://flokinet.is/privacy-policy - 1984 Hosting privacy notes: https://kb.1984.is/privacy - WHOIS: https://lookup.icann.org/en - Njalla: https://njal.la - Njalla official site: https://njal.la/ - Njalla terms of service: https://njal.la/tos/ - OrangeWebsite official site: https://orangewebsite.com - Monero project documentation: https://www.getmonero.org/get-started/what-is-monero/ - Private Phone Number and Data eSIM Setup (surveillance-resistant-phone-numbers) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/surveillance-resistant-phone-numbers Summary: Set up a separate JMP.chat phone number, XMPP calling and messaging, an optional data eSIM, billing limits, and six acceptance tests. Answer: Set up a separate JMP.chat phone number, XMPP calling and messaging, an optional data eSIM, billing limits, and six acceptance tests. Meta: date=2026-03-12 | published=2026-03-12 | reviewed=2026-08-10 | read_time=~12 min read | tags=Comms, Phone, Guide Figure: FIG.B03: A separate number still crosses the public telephone boundary. JMP separates a public number from a primary mobile contract, but calls and messages still cross the PSTN; JMP documents up to seven days of SMS content retention and billing-related call metadata. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/surveillance-resistant-phone-numbers/jmp-phone-retention-path--article-desktop.png (1200x645; alt: Path from a contact through the public telephone network and JMP number to XMPP on a device, with seven-day SMS retention, call-metadata retention, six acceptance tests, and emergency calling blocked.) Figure data: JMP.chat retention and acceptance test - Test or record=Mobile data | Pass condition=With Wi-Fi off, an HTTPS page loads and account data use increases | Retention note=Carrier and radio-network records remain - Test or record=Inbound SMS | Pass condition=Independent phone message arrives in Cheogram | Retention note=JMP may retain SMS content and metadata up to seven days - Test or record=Outbound SMS | Pass condition=Cheogram reply reaches the independent phone | Retention note=JMP may retain SMS content and metadata up to seven days - Test or record=Inbound call | Pass condition=Twenty-second call reaches the configured Jabber destination | Retention note=Call metadata retained for billing until removal is requested - Test or record=Outbound call | Pass condition=Call from Cheogram reaches the independent phone | Retention note=Call metadata retained for billing until removal is requested - Test or record=Voicemail | Pass condition=Cheogram receives audio and transcription | Retention note=PSTN and provider records remain - Test or record=Emergency route | Pass condition=A separate tested carrier or other route exists | Retention note=JMP provides no emergency calling - Before you start: JMP costs $4.99 USD or $6.59 CAD per month for the number. That includes unlimited SMS and MMS plus calling credit equivalent to 120 US or Canadian minutes per calendar month. The data plan has a $9.99 USD activation fee including 1 GB; subsequent data is $6.99 per GB, bought in 5 GB blocks. Check both price pages before paying because this guide records the prices retrieved on the review date. - What this setup does not protect: LIMITATION SOURCES: JMP privacy and transparency statement (retrieved 10 August 2026 ); JMP service notice (retrieved 10 August 2026 ). - Maintenance: Once a month, check the balance, number status, data refill cap, and one inbound text. Every three months, place a call in both directions and review whether any account can be moved from this shared public number to its own alias or authenticator. If you stop using JMP, replace the number on every recovery path before cancelling it. Sources: - JMP data-plan launch details: https://blog.jmp.chat/?before=october-newsletter-2024 (retrieved 2026-08-10) - JMP account settings and data-plan notes: https://blog.jmp.chat/tag/sim (retrieved 2026-08-10) - JMP registration entry point: https://jmp.chat/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - JMP SMS, MMS, calling, and voicemail capabilities: https://jmp.chat/faq (retrieved 2026-08-10) - JMP privacy and transparency statement: https://jmp.chat/privacy (retrieved 2026-08-10) - JMP data plan price and order page: https://jmp.chat/sim (retrieved 2026-08-10) - JMP suggested Jabber services: https://jmp.chat/suggested_servers.html (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Google Pixel SIM and eSIM instructions: https://support.google.com/pixelphone/answer/9449293 (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Mullvad VPN Setup Guide (anonymous-vpn-setup-mullvad) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/anonymous-vpn-setup-mullvad Summary: Set up Mullvad without an email, pay with XMR or cash, test the tunnel, and understand the Android VPN-lockdown leak found in 2026. Answer: Set up Mullvad without an email, pay with XMR or cash, test the tunnel, and understand the Android VPN-lockdown leak found in 2026. Meta: date=2026-01 | published=2026-01 | reviewed=2026-09-21 | read_time=~9 min read | tags=VPN, Guide Figure: FIG.A04: Four privacy VPNs, seven operating facts. Privacy VPN comparison from the article, with the April 2023 Mullvad search-warrant outcome retained as historical evidence rather than a provider claim. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/anonymous-vpn-setup-mullvad/privacy-vpn-comparison--article-desktop.png (1200x532; alt: Comparison of Mullvad, IVPN, LNVPN, and Proton VPN by email requirement, Monero payment, audit, open-source apps, logs policy, and price.) Figure data: Privacy VPN provider comparison - Provider=Mullvad | No email=Yes | XMR payment=Yes | Audit=Cure53 | Open source=Yes | Logs policy=No logs | Price per month=€5 - Provider=IVPN | No email=Yes | XMR payment=Yes | Audit=Cure53 | Open source=Yes | Logs policy=No logs | Price per month=$6 - Provider=LNVPN | No email=No account | XMR payment=No; Lightning only | Audit=No | Open source=No | Logs policy=No logs | Price per month=Per minute - Provider=Proton VPN | No email=No; email required | XMR payment=Yes | Audit=SEC Consult | Open source=Yes | Logs policy=No logs | Price per month=$4–10 - Mullvad knows less: Most VPN providers, including the loud ones with "no-logs" slogans, still know your email and process a payment tied to you. If records exist, records can be demanded. With Mullvad: - Step 1: Generate the number: Create an account without credentials Go to mullvad.net and see the provider page if you want more detail. Click Generate account number . That is the signup flow. No form. No email. No CAPTCHA. You get a 16-digit code like 1234 5678 9012 3456 . Save it. That number is the account. Lose it and it is gone. There is no recovery path. That is deliberate. - Step 2: Pay without a paper trail: Fund the account anonymously Mullvad costs €5 per month. Their pricing page shows several payment methods. From most private to least: Monero (XMR): the best choice. Open the account page, enter the number, choose "Add time" → Cryptocurrency → Monero, then send the exact amount to the XMR address shown. Bitcoin via Lightning: faster and a bit cleaner than on-chain BTC. Use a non-custodial Lightning wallet. Bitcoin on-chain: Mullvad gives you a fresh BTC address per payment, but the chain is public. If the BTC came from a KYC exchange, that trail still exists. CoinJoin first if you need it. Cash by mail: slow, old, still real. Put cash and your account number in the envelope and follow Mullvad's instructions. - Step 3: Install the app: Download and sign in Download the app from mullvad.net/download for Windows, macOS, Linux, iOS, or Android. If you avoid Google Play, grab the Android APK directly from Mullvad. Open the app and enter the 16-digit account number. It connects with the number alone. No password. No 2FA. Sources: - socket keepalive API: https://developer.android.com/reference/android/net/ConnectivityManager#createSocketKeepalive(android.net.Network,%20android.net.IpSecManager.UdpEncapsulationSocket,%20java.net.InetAddress,%20java.net.InetAddress,%20java.util.concurrent.Executor,%20android.net.SocketKeepalive.Callback) - GrapheneOS issue 8617: https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/8617 - mullvad.net: https://mullvad.net - Mullvad VPN official site: https://mullvad.net/ - April 2023, Swedish police raided Mullvad's office: https://mullvad.net/en/blog/2023/4/20/mullvad-vpn-was-subject-to-a-search-warrant-customer-data-not-compromised - independent audits (Cure53, Assured): https://mullvad.net/en/blog/fourth-infrastructure-audit-completed-by-cure53 - Monero (XMR):: https://mullvad.net/en/blog/we-now-accept-monero - Their pricing page: https://mullvad.net/en/pricing - LNVPN official site: https://nadanada.me/ - Proton VPN official site: https://protonvpn.com/ - research paper: https://supuk.ch/papers/android-natt-keepalive-vpn-bypass - IVPN official site: https://www.ivpn.net/ - Cure53 audit: https://www.ivpn.net/blog/independent-security-audit-concluded/ - Mullvad's notice: https://www.mullvad.net/en/blog/2026/9/10/another-way-to-leak-traffic-on-android-has-been-discovered/ - Tor Browser: https://www.torproject.org/download/ - Paying With Shielded ZEC Through Zodl and Flexa (spend-zec-at-merchants-zashi-flexa) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/spend-zec-at-merchants-zashi-flexa Summary: Zashi is now Zodl. Use shielded ZEC through Flexa while understanding identity checks, processor records, limits, and refund rules. Answer: Zashi is now Zodl. Use shielded ZEC through Flexa while understanding identity checks, processor records, limits, and refund rules. Meta: date=2026-02 | published=2026-02 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~5 min read | tags=Zcash, Merchants - What the payment flow does: Zodl is a self-custody Zcash wallet. Its current product page lists Flexa as the checkout service for purchases at major merchants including GameStop, Sheetz, and Chipotle. Flexa says its wallet components support payments at thousands of merchant locations. - Install or update Zodl: Zodl is available through the Apple App Store, Google Play, F-Droid, and its public source repositories. The F-Droid listing identifies Zcash Open Development Lab as the author and links the current Android source. Existing Zashi installations update under the new name. - Fund the shielded balance: Zodl can receive transparent ZEC and then shield it. Its current product page says the app prompts users to shield a detected transparent balance. A transfer from a transparent address remains visible on the public chain before shielding, and the service that sent it may retain account and withdrawal records. - Pay through Flexa: Zodl's Android release history says the Flexa feature moved to More options . The exact labels can change between releases. Sources: - F-Droid: Zodl Android package: https://f-droid.org/packages/co.electriccoin.zcash.foss/ - Flexa privacy policy: https://flexa.co/legal/privacy - Flexa terms of service: https://flexa.co/legal/terms - Flexa: original Zashi integration announcement: https://flexa.co/newsroom/zashi - Zodl Android source and release history: https://github.com/zodl-inc/zodl-android - Zodl: current wallet features and Flexa payments: https://zodl.com/ - Zodl: Zashi rebrand notice: https://zodl.com/zashi-is-becoming-zodl/ - Wasabi Wallet CoinJoin Coordinator Shutdown (wasabi-coinjoin-dead-coordinator-shutdown) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/wasabi-coinjoin-dead-coordinator-shutdown Summary: zkSNACKs shut down Wasabi Wallet’s CoinJoin coordinator in June 2024. What broke, what guides became obsolete, and which Bitcoin privacy tools still matter in 2026. Answer: zkSNACKs shut down Wasabi Wallet’s CoinJoin coordinator in June 2024. What broke, what guides became obsolete, and which Bitcoin privacy tools still matter in 2026. Meta: date=2026-03-24 | published=2026-03-24 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~6 min read | tags=Bitcoin, Privacy Tools, Guides - What zkSNACKs stopped: Wasabi's official documentation records the shutdown of the zkSNACKs coordinator on June 1, 2024. The company stopped running the service that had coordinated Wasabi's default CoinJoin rounds. It did not end development of the open-source wallet or remove ordinary send, receive, recovery, and hardware-wallet functions. - Wasabi CoinJoin continued with other coordinators: Wasabi's current getting-started documentation requires users to configure a coordinator before joining a round. The project added coordinator settings after the zkSNACKs shutdown. This means the wallet still contains CoinJoin support, but there is no longer a company-run default service to rely on. - What the alternatives actually do: JoinMarket's project documentation describes its maker and taker model. It does not depend on the former zkSNACKs service and uses a different protocol and workflow. - What to change in old instructions: Remove any step that assumes Wasabi will automatically use the zkSNACKs coordinator. State that CoinJoin requires a separately configured coordinator. Include the coordinator's identity, fee policy, and the date those details were checked. Sources: - BIP 78: https://bips.dev/78/ - the WabiSabi protocol: https://blog.wasabiwallet.io/what-is-wabi-sabi/ - shutdown of the zkSNACKs coordinator: https://docs.wasabiwallet.io/FAQ/FAQ-Introduction.html - getting-started documentation: https://docs.wasabiwallet.io/getting-started/ - JoinMarket's project documentation: https://joinmarket-org.github.io/joinmarket-clientserver/ - What Is KYC? (what-is-kyc) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/what-is-kyc Summary: KYC identity checks: the data exchanges collect, the legal basis, and available alternatives. Answer: KYC identity checks: the data exchanges collect, the legal basis, and available alternatives. Meta: date=2025-11 | published=2025-11 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~7 min read | tags=Explainer - What a KYC check can collect: The form varies by country, product, and risk level. A basic check may ask for a legal name, date of birth, address, and government ID. A firm may add a selfie or video comparison, tax or national identifier, occupation, bank statement, or proof of source of funds. - Why regulated crypto firms require it: Rules differ by jurisdiction, but they usually attach duties to a business that holds, exchanges, or transmits assets for customers. The legal question depends on what the business does, not the label on its website. - The Travel Rule is not a universal $1,000 switch: FATF sets international standards that countries implement through their own laws. Its virtual-asset guidance refers to a USD or EUR 1,000 threshold for customer due diligence on occasional transactions. The same guidance says covered providers should obtain, hold, and transmit required originator and beneficiary information for virtual-asset transfers under the Travel Rule. - Direct transfers and no-KYC services: FATF defines a peer-to-peer transfer as one made without a virtual-asset service provider or other obliged entity, such as a transfer between two self-hosted wallets. Its guidance says those transfers are not explicitly subject to FATF's AML controls because the standards usually place duties on intermediaries. Sources: - EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 on information accompanying transfers: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1113/oj/eng - Coinbase Global Privacy Policy: https://www.coinbase.com/legal/privacy - FATF: Updated Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Assets and VASPs: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/guidance/Updated-Guidance-VA-VASP.pdf - FCA: Requirements for cryptoasset registration applications: https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/cryptoassets/application-registration - FinCEN: Application of FinCEN's Regulations to Certain Business Models Involving Convertible Virtual Currencies: https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/guidance/application-fincens-regulations-certain-business-models - What Is a SAR? Bank Reports to FinCEN (what-is-a-sar) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/what-is-a-sar Summary: SARs are secret bank filings to FinCEN. You are never told when one is filed. Learn what triggers them, what data is shared, and how to reduce your exposure. Answer: SARs are secret bank filings to FinCEN. You are never told when one is filed. Learn what triggers them, what data is shared, and how to reduce your exposure. Meta: date=2026-01 | published=2026-01 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~7 min read | tags=Explainer, Financial Surveillance Figure: FIG.C04: Amount alone triggers a CTR; a SAR requires suspicious facts. The reporting paths differ: CTR and Form 8300 are cash-threshold reports, while a mandatory bank SAR generally requires at least $5,000 plus one of the specified suspicious-fact conditions. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/what-is-a-sar/sar-reporting-rule-ledger--article-desktop.png (1200x574; alt: Three-row rule ledger for CTR, SAR, and Form 8300, with thresholds, triggers, customer notice, the three mandatory-SAR suspicious-fact conditions, and cryptocurrency use alone blocked as a trigger.) Figure data: US financial reporting rules and SAR decision conditions - Rule=Currency Transaction Report | Threshold or condition=More than $10,000 in cash in one business day at a bank | Customer notice or record rule=No general advance notice - Rule=Mandatory bank SAR | Threshold or condition=At least $5,000 plus specified suspicious facts | Customer notice or record rule=The bank may not disclose the SAR or reveal its existence - Rule=Voluntary SAR | Threshold or condition=Suspicious activity below the mandatory threshold may still be reported | Customer notice or record rule=The institution must assess the available facts - Rule=SAR condition: illegal proceeds | Threshold or condition=Funds may come from illegal activity or the transaction may conceal illegal proceeds | Customer notice or record rule=One of three specified grounds - Rule=SAR condition: BSA evasion | Threshold or condition=The transaction may be designed to evade Bank Secrecy Act rules | Customer notice or record rule=One of three specified grounds - Rule=SAR condition: no lawful purpose | Threshold or condition=No apparent lawful purpose, inconsistent with expected activity, and no reasonable explanation after review | Customer notice or record rule=One of three specified grounds - Rule=Form 8300 | Threshold or condition=More than $10,000 in cash received in a trade or business | Customer notice or record rule=Annual written statement generally required - Rule=SAR retention | Threshold or condition=The bank retains the SAR and supporting documentation for five years | Customer notice or record rule=Records supplied to authorized authorities on request - Rule=Cryptocurrency | Threshold or condition=Use alone is not the legal SAR test | Customer notice or record rule=Assess transaction facts, customer profile, and links to illicit activity - When a bank must file: Under 31 CFR 1020.320 , a bank must report a transaction or attempted transaction that involves at least $5,000 when it knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect one of three things: - How banks identify unusual activity: The FFIEC examination manual says banks should use risk-based monitoring. Systems may produce alerts, but staff must decide whether the activity is suspicious and document that decision. The review can compare transactions with the customer's occupation, expected account activity, sources of funds, business type, location, and prior behavior. - SAR, CTR, and Form 8300 are different reports: A CTR is based on the amount and form of a transaction. A SAR is based on suspicious facts. A bank may need to file both. Form 8300 applies to qualifying cash received by a trade or business, and the IRS generally requires the business to give the named person a written statement by January 31 of the next year. - What a SAR contains: A SAR can identify the subject, accounts, dates, amounts, transaction methods, and affected institutions. Its narrative explains who was involved, what happened, when and where it happened, and why the filer considered it suspicious. The FFIEC SAR quality guidance tells banks to include information available from account opening and due diligence records. Sources: - FFIEC SAR quality guidance: https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/manual/Appendices/13 - FFIEC BSA/AML Manual: Suspicious Activity Reporting Overview: https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/manual/AssessingComplianceWithBSARegulatoryRequirements/04 - Electronic Code of Federal Regulations: 31 CFR 1020.320: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-X/part-1020/subpart-C/section-1020.320 - FinCEN Advisory FIN-2019-A003: Convertible Virtual Currency: https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/advisory/2019-05-10/FinCEN%20Advisory%20CVC%20FINAL%20508.pdf - FinCEN: Bank Secrecy Act Data, Fiscal Year 2025: https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FinCEN-Infographic-Public-2025-508.pdf - IRS generally requires the business to give the named person a written statement: https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/form-8300-and-reporting-cash-payments-of-over-10000 - Domain Registration Privacy: Njalla, WHOIS Privacy, and .onion (anonymous-domain-registration) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/anonymous-domain-registration Summary: Register a domain without exposing your name. Njalla, WHOIS privacy, .onion services, Monero payment, registrar risk, and operational setup. Answer: Register a domain without exposing your name. Njalla, WHOIS privacy, .onion services, Monero payment, registrar risk, and operational setup. Meta: date=2025-12 | published=2025-12 | reviewed=2026-04-26 | read_time=~6 min read | tags=Hosting, OPSEC - Default WHOIS exposes you: Every domain registration asks for a name, address, email, and phone number. By default, that data lands in public WHOIS. Anyone can search it. If you submit false details, ICANN rules let registrars terminate the domain for WHOIS inaccuracy . - Njalla works for clearnet: Njalla buys the domain in its own name and gives you admin control through the dashboard. Njalla is the legal registrant. Your name never appears in WHOIS. - WHOIS privacy from a normal registrar: Most registrars, including Porkbun, Namecheap, and Cloudflare Registrar, offer WHOIS privacy for free or cheap. It swaps your contact info in WHOIS for the registrar's generic privacy address. That blocks scraping and casual lookups. - .onion drops the registrar entirely: A Tor hidden service needs no registrar, no ICANN, and no DNS. The address derives from your server's Ed25519 public key. No third party sits in the chain. Sources: - mkp224o: https://github.com/cathugger/mkp224o - Njalla official site: https://njal.la/ - GDPR also cut public WHOIS disclosure: https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/gdpr-whois-may18-en.pdf - UDRP complaint: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/udrp-2012-02-25-en - ICANN rules let registrars terminate the domain for WHOIS inaccuracy: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/whois-data-accuracy-program-2013-09-10-en - No-KYC VPS Hosting Providers (anonymous-vps-hosting-guide) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/anonymous-vps-hosting-guide Summary: Anonymous VPS hosting providers compared: FlokiNET, 1984 Hosting, Njalla, IncogNET, Monero payments, Tor signup, jurisdiction, and SSH hardening. Answer: Anonymous VPS hosting providers compared: FlokiNET, 1984 Hosting, Njalla, IncogNET, Monero payments, Tor signup, jurisdiction, and SSH hardening. Meta: date=2026-03-16 | published=2026-03-16 | reviewed=2026-07-16 | read_time=~9 min read | tags=Hosting, OPSEC, Guide Figure: FIG.B06: Clean the payment trail and the admin path separately. Anonymous payment, Tor signup, server hardening, and onion-service SSH remove different records; the provider still knows the order, server, payment event, abuse history, and local legal process. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/anonymous-vps-hosting-guide/no-kyc-vps-trust-path--article-desktop.png (1200x692; alt: Two trust-boundary paths for no-KYC VPS hosting: Monero acquired without KYC and a host account created over Tor, plus SSH through a Tor onion service, with direct home-IP access and weak server defaults blocked.) Figure data: No-KYC VPS setup checklist - Stage=Acquire payment | Control=Get XMR without sending a KYC-linked withdrawal directly to the host | Risk if skipped=An identified exchange withdrawal can rebuild the payment link - Stage=Create account | Control=Use Tor and a dedicated alias; use an onion address when offered | Risk if skipped=Home IP and reused email enter provider access records - Stage=Pay host | Control=Send XMR from a separate wallet and wait for stated confirmations | Risk if skipped=Bitcoin exposes a public chain trail; provider still records every order - Stage=Harden SSH | Control=Use SSH keys; disable password authentication and password root login | Risk if skipped=Brute force and credential compromise expose the server - Stage=Deny first | Control=Enable UFW, fail2ban, and only required ports | Risk if skipped=Fresh public services are scanned within minutes - Stage=Remove panels | Control=Administer with SSH rather than cPanel, Plesk, or Webmin | Risk if skipped=A browser panel adds ports, code, credentials, and vulnerabilities - Stage=Hide admin path | Control=Expose SSH through a Tor hidden service and connect via local Tor SOCKS | Risk if skipped=Direct SSH puts the home IP in server logs - Stage=Record residuals | Control=Review provider logging, jurisdiction, abuse handling, and server location | Risk if skipped=Jurisdiction shifts process; it does not remove legal or physical reach - Jurisdiction moves the process, not the reach: The provider's jurisdiction decides which legal process applies and how it arrives. A US provider can receive compelled-access demands, some with gag provisions; a UK provider operates under the Investigatory Powers Act. Five Eyes members (US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) share intelligence and legal-assistance channels. Choosing a provider outside those jurisdictions changes the process an adversary must use; it does not place the server beyond law, and providers state they comply with lawful orders. - Provider comparison: 1984 Hosting runs from Reykjavik and its record documents Monero acceptance alongside Bitcoin. Its privacy notes state it logs IP addresses and device information and retains bookkeeping records. Iceland is its jurisdiction for both company and infrastructure. - Monero removes the public payment trail: Bitcoin is transparent: every transaction stays on a public ledger, and chain-analysis can connect a payment from an identified wallet to a hosting invoice. Monero does not produce a publicly readable record, because ring signatures, stealth addresses, and confidential amounts apply to every transaction. All four providers here record Monero acceptance. The provider still logs the order and payment event on its own side, so the improvement is the public chain trail, not the provider relationship. - Hardening the server matters as much as paying for it: Anonymous payment means very little if the server falls to weak defaults. Fresh images often ship with password auth on, no firewall, and services listening everywhere. For privacy-sensitive work, the next steps are not optional. Sources: - 1984 Hosting official site: https://1984.hosting/ - Feather Wallet official site: https://featherwallet.org/ - FlokiNET official site: https://flokinet.is/ - privacy policy: https://flokinet.is/privacy-policy - Haveno official site: https://haveno.exchange/ - IncogNET official site: https://incognet.io/ - Njalla official site: https://njal.la/ - Trocador official site: https://trocador.app/ - Monero Wallet Comparison for 2026 (best-monero-wallet-2026) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/best-monero-wallet-2026 Summary: Current comparison of Feather, Cake, Monerujo, and the Monero CLI, including Tor routing, hardware-wallet support, swaps, and platform limits. Answer: Current comparison of Feather, Cake, Monerujo, and the Monero CLI, including Tor routing, hardware-wallet support, swaps, and platform limits. Meta: date=2026-03 | published=2026-03 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~7 min read | tags=Monero, Ranking - Feather: the practical desktop choice: Feather bundles Tor and supports Ledger Nano, Ledger Stax, Ledger Flex, Trezor Model T, and Trezor Safe devices. Its default Tor setting needs a careful reading. Feather routes most network traffic through Tor, but initial wallet synchronization does not use Tor unless you select the always-over-Tor mode. A local node stays local. - Cake: the broad mobile option: Cake runs on iOS and Android and supports several assets alongside Monero. Its current documentation supports Monero accounts on Ledger devices. It also includes third-party swaps. - Monerujo: focused Android use: Monerujo is an Android-only light wallet. It keeps keys on the device, connects to a remote node chosen by the user, supports Ledger devices, and offers third-party swaps through SideShift. Its public source code and release history remain available on GitHub. - Monero CLI: control without a GUI: The official monero-wallet-cli works with a local or remote monerod . It supports Ledger and Trezor wallets through --generate-from-device . A Tor or I2P path can be set with a proxy and an onion or hidden-service node address. Sources: - Cake Wallet: Tor with Orbot: https://docs.cakewallet.com/features/advanced/tor-with-orbot - Cake Wallet: hardware-wallet setup: https://docs.cakewallet.com/get-started/setup/restore-existing-wallet/hardware-wallet - Feather Wallet: supported hardware devices: https://docs.featherwallet.org/guides/hardware-wallet-support - Feather Wallet: Tor support: https://docs.featherwallet.org/guides/tor-support - Monero Docs: wallet CLI reference: https://docs.getmonero.org/interacting/monero-wallet-cli-reference/ - Monerujo: official source repository: https://github.com/m2049r/xmrwallet - No-KYC VPN Comparison for 2026 (best-no-kyc-vpn-2026) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/best-no-kyc-vpn-2026 Summary: No-KYC VPNs compared on no-email account models, Monero and cash payment, jurisdiction, audit records, and logging evidence. Answer: No-KYC VPNs compared on no-email account models, Monero and cash payment, jurisdiction, audit records, and logging evidence. Meta: date=2026-03-17 | published=2026-03-17 | reviewed=2026-07-16 | read_time=~6 min read | tags=VPN, Guide - No-KYC matters when the provider gets a data request: A request to identify a VPN user starts at the provider. Where the provider holds an email, a card payment, and activity records, the request can succeed quickly. A provider that holds a bare account number, a crypto or cash payment, and no activity logs has little to produce, and the audits and incident record are the evidence for whether that is true. - The compared providers: Mullvad issues a random account number: no email, no username, no personal details. Payment can be Monero, Bitcoin, or cash by post, and its policy states no activity logging with repeated third-party audits on record. Mullvad reported that a 2023 Swedish police visit to its offices ended with nothing seized, which is the closest thing a no-log claim gets to a field test. - Providers that fail the basics: Kape Technologies brands (ExpressVPN, CyberGhost, Private Internet Access, Zenmate) sit under one owner whose history is documented in the Kape record . Hola VPN routes other users' traffic through its users' connections, documented in the Hola record , which turns a user into an exit point. For sensitive use, providers inside Five Eyes jurisdictions carry the legal exposure described above; the Five Eyes article documents the framework. Sources: - Mullvad VPN official site: https://mullvad.net/ - Proton VPN official site: https://protonvpn.com/ - AzireVPN official site: https://www.azirevpn.com/ - IVPN official site: https://www.ivpn.net/ - Mullvad Public DNS Migration and VPN DNS Setup (private-dns-setup-guide) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/private-dns-setup-guide Summary: Mullvad public DNS closes November 2, 2026. Check which browser and OS settings need Quad9 migration, why VPN DNS is unaffected, and how to test the VPN path. Answer: Mullvad public DNS closes November 2, 2026. Check which browser and OS settings need Quad9 migration, why VPN DNS is unaffected, and how to test the VPN path. Meta: date=2026-03-12 | published=2026-03-12 | reviewed=2026-09-21 | read_time=~12 min read | tags=VPN, DNS, Guide Figure: FIG.A03: One tunnel, one resolver path, no browser exception. The leak-resistant Mullvad baseline uses in-tunnel DNS, blocks browser resolver exceptions, and treats encrypted DNS without VPN as a separate IP-exposed mode. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/private-dns-setup-guide/mullvad-dns-tunnel-path--article-desktop.png (1200x580; alt: Traffic and DNS path from a device through the operating-system resolver and Mullvad VPN tunnel to Mullvad DNS, with browser DNS-over-HTTPS blocked and DNS-only mode shown separately as IP-exposed.) Figure data: Mullvad DNS leak-proof baseline - Setting=Auto-connect | Required state=On | Verify method=Reboot and confirm automatic tunnel - Setting=Lockdown mode | Required state=On | Verify method=Disconnect; a fresh page must fail - Setting=Split tunneling | Required state=No applications | Verify method=Inspect split-tunnel list - Setting=Custom DNS | Required state=Off | Verify method=Mullvad Check reports no DNS leak - Setting=Browser secure DNS | Required state=Off for this VPN profile | Verify method=Check each browser; rerun Mullvad Check - Setting=DNS-only mode | Required state=Separate mode; IP exposed | Verify method=Resolver reaches Mullvad DNS while public IP remains ISP address - Do I need to change my DNS settings?: The closure covers the public DoH and DoT service, not just its unfiltered option: dns.mullvad.net , adblock.dns.mullvad.net , base.dns.mullvad.net , extended.dns.mullvad.net , family.dns.mullvad.net , and all.dns.mullvad.net . Mullvad's public DNS documentation lists these variants and the closure date (retrieved September 21, 2026). Do not treat another public Mullvad hostname as a long-term replacement. - Replace a Mullvad DNS profile on Mac or iPhone: Quad9's profiles currently expire on January 19, 2027 and automatically disable at expiry. Set a reminder to obtain a new official profile before then. Quad9 recommends DoH for most users: blocked DoT does not fall back to unencrypted DNS, so a restrictive network can stop resolution. Most VPN clients, iCloud Private Relay, and Little Snitch may bypass the profile. The App Store, dig , and nslookup do not use Apple's encrypted DNS profile and cannot validate that path. - Mullvad VPN with internal DNS: This procedure configures the Mullvad desktop app so ordinary traffic and DNS use one VPN tunnel, then proves that the computer stops networking when that tunnel is unavailable. It uses Mullvad VPN with its default internal DNS, not the retiring public DNS service. It is for a reader on Windows, macOS, or Linux who wants one reproducible leak-resistant state, not a chain of custom resolvers and browser exceptions. - Before you start: Mullvad publishes one flat price of €5 for 30 days. It allows up to five devices per account. Cash and cryptocurrency can reduce conventional billing data; card, app-store, and bank methods create their normal payment records. The VPN provider still knows the account number and active tunnel connection. Sources: - official Quad9 setup guides: https://docs.quad9.net/ - Quad9 Android 9+ encrypted DNS instructions: https://docs.quad9.net/Setup_Guides/Android/Android_9%2B_%28Encrypted%29/ (retrieved 2026-09-21) - iOS 14 and later guide: https://docs.quad9.net/Setup_Guides/iOS/iOS_14_and_later_%28Encrypted%29/ - macOS Big Sur and later guide: https://docs.quad9.net/Setup_Guides/MacOS/Big_Sur_and_later_%28Encrypted%29/ - Mullvad VPN desktop 2026.3 release: https://github.com/mullvad/mullvadvpn-app/releases/tag/2026.3 (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Mullvad VPN official site: https://mullvad.net/ - mullvad.net/check: https://mullvad.net/check - Mullvad's September 3 announcement: https://mullvad.net/en/blog/shutting-down-our-public-encrypted-dns-servers-and-sponsoring-quad9-instead - Mullvad connection check: https://mullvad.net/en/check (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Mullvad desktop download: https://mullvad.net/en/download/vpn/windows (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Mullvad browser DNS leak guidance: https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-leaks (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Mullvad encrypted public DNS: https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls - Mullvad DNS official site: https://mullvad.net/en/help/dns-over-https-and-dns-over-tls/ - Mullvad startup and auto-connect settings: https://mullvad.net/en/help/using-mullvad-vpn-app (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Mullvad price and payment methods: https://mullvad.net/en/pricing (retrieved 2026-08-10) - on.quad9.net: https://on.quad9.net/ - Quad9 official site: https://quad9.net - How to Find Surveillance Contracts and Political Links (revolving-door-government-surveillance-tech) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/revolving-door-government-surveillance-tech Summary: A practical guide to finding surveillance contracts, suppliers, values, lobbying records, donations, company ownership, and personnel links in official databases. Answer: A practical guide to finding surveillance contracts, suppliers, values, lobbying records, donations, company ownership, and personnel links in official databases. Meta: date=2026-03-17 | published=2026-03-17 | reviewed=2026-08-06 | read_time=~12 min read | tags=Surveillance, Research guide - Find the names used in records: A brand can sell through several legal entities. It can also appear as a subcontractor or through a reseller. Search all of these: - Read the money fields correctly: Do not reduce every value to “the contract is worth”. A UK notice may publish a forecast. A US award may show current obligations and a larger potential value. An Australian notice may be amended after publication. Use the database's own field name in the article. - Worked searches: A USAspending award identifies Palantir Technologies, the Department of Defense, the award number, transaction history, and “Palantir Gotham licenses” as the description. Its current and potential amounts are separate fields. - Connect companies, lobbyists, donations, and officials: A donation proves a recorded donation. A lobbying filing proves a registered client, lobbyist, issue, or payment for the period shown. A biography can show employment. None of these records alone proves that a donation or former job caused a contract award. Show the dates and let readers see the sequence. Sources: - Companies House: https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/ - US Senate LDA filings: https://lda.senate.gov/system/public/ - Consultant Lobbyists register: https://registrarofconsultantlobbyists.org.uk/ - SAM.gov search: https://sam.gov/search/ - Electoral Commission database: https://search.electoralcommission.org.uk/ - AEC Transparency Register: https://transparency.aec.gov.au/ - Australian Government lobbyists register: https://www.ag.gov.au/integrity/australian-government-register-lobbyists - ASIC company register: https://www.asic.gov.au/online-services/search-asic-registers/company-and-organisation-registers/ - UK Contracts Finder: https://www.contractsfinder.service.gov.uk/Search - FEC contribution data: https://www.fec.gov/data/receipts/individual-contributions/ - NHS Federated Data Platform award notice: https://www.find-tender.service.gov.uk/Notice/037776-2023 - UK Find a Tender: https://www.find-tender.service.gov.uk/Search - Palantir 2025 annual filing: https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1321655/000132165526000011/pltr-20251231.htm - SEC EDGAR: https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search/ - AusTender advanced contract search: https://www.tenders.gov.au/Search/CnAdvancedSearch - USAspending award: https://www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_HS002123F0060_9700_N6600119A0044_9700 - USAspending award search: https://www.usaspending.gov/search - Tails OS for Financial Privacy (tails-os-financial-privacy-guide) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/tails-os-financial-privacy-guide Summary: Using Tails OS for no-KYC crypto transactions, Feather Wallet via Tor, and reduced local forensic traces. Answer: Using Tails OS for no-KYC crypto transactions, Feather Wallet via Tor, and reduced local forensic traces. Meta: date=2026-03-12 | published=2026-03-12 | reviewed=2026-08-15 | read_time=~9 min read | tags=OPSEC, Guides Figure: FIG.B05: The session is amnesic; Persistent Storage is an explicit exception. Ordinary Tails session state is wiped at shutdown; Persistent Storage is the explicit encrypted exception, while ISP-visible Tor use, hardware compromise, and personal-account login remain outside the amnesic guarantee. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/tails-os-financial-privacy-guide/tails-session-lifecycle--article-desktop.png (1200x534; alt: Tails session state rail from USB boot through optional Persistent Storage unlock, Tor-routed financial work, New Identity, shutdown, and RAM wipe, with personal-account login blocked and residual observation surfaces shown.) Figure data: Tails session states - State=Boot from USB | What survives shutdown=Nothing from the new session yet | What breaks or limits the boundary=Compromised BIOS, USB, keyboard, or other hardware can act below Tails - State=Persistent Storage locked | What survives shutdown=Encrypted persistent partition remains unreadable | What breaks or limits the boundary=Loss of its passphrase loses access; weak passphrase weakens the boundary - State=Persistent Storage unlocked | What survives shutdown=Only enabled persistent features survive | What breaks or limits the boundary=Wallet, bridge, bookmarks, or app state deliberately become durable - State=Tor-routed session | What survives shutdown=Ordinary RAM state does not survive | What breaks or limits the boundary=ISP sees a Tor connection; end-to-end correlation remains possible - State=Financial task | What survives shutdown=Wallet survives only if saved to Persistent Storage | What breaks or limits the boundary=Personal-account login identifies the session; clipboard and endpoint risk remain - State=Shutdown | What survives shutdown=Persistent Storage remains encrypted | What breaks or limits the boundary=Do not leave the unlocked session unattended - State=RAM wipe | What survives shutdown=No ordinary session traces on host hardware | What breaks or limits the boundary=Persistent data and hardware-level records are outside this claim - What Tails Is (and Is Not): Tails is amnesic by design . It keeps session data in RAM, not on the host drive. When you shut down, that state is wiped. - Installing Tails on a USB Drive: Requirements: A USB drive of 16 GB or larger (8 GB minimum without Persistent Storage). Tails recommends 3 GB of RAM for the host computer; it can run with less but may be unstable or crash. - Setting Up Persistent Storage: Without Persistent Storage, nothing survives a Tails shutdown - including your Monero wallet. Set up Persistent Storage to save your wallet file between sessions. - Running Feather Wallet on Tails: Download Feather Wallet AppImage. On your first Tails session with internet access, download the Feather AppImage from featherwallet.org . Save it to your Persistent Storage folder. Sources: - bridges.torproject.org: https://bridges.torproject.org/ - featherwallet.org: https://featherwallet.org/download/ - Godex.io official site: https://godex.io/ - SideShift.ai official site: https://sideshift.ai/ - Tails: https://tails.boum.org/about/index.en.html - Download from tails.boum.org.: https://tails.boum.org/install/ - merged with the Tor Project in September 2024: https://tails.net/home/ - Trocador official site: https://trocador.app/ - Hosting a Website With Tor, ENS, and IPFS (tor-onion-ens-ipfs-hosting) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/tor-onion-ens-ipfs-hosting Summary: How Tor Onion Services, IPFS, and ENS provide separate website access paths, with current setup steps and explicit hosting, key, gateway, and persistence limits. Answer: How Tor Onion Services, IPFS, and ENS provide separate website access paths, with current setup steps and explicit hosting, key, gateway, and persistence limits. Meta: date=2026-03-16 | published=2026-03-16 | reviewed=2026-07-14 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=Hosting, Guides - Start with a normal origin: Keep the primary application on a server that supports its actual runtime. Dynamic Next.js routes, server rendering, databases, and API handlers cannot be reconstructed from an IPFS directory. The origin can also publish the onion address and the current IPFS content identifier so readers can verify alternate paths. - Add a Tor Onion Service: The Tor Project's Onion Service setup guide configures a local web service and maps an Onion Service port to it. A minimal mapping for a local application on port 3000 is: - Export only the static part of the site: Next.js documents static export through output: 'export' . During next build , compatible routes are rendered to HTML, CSS, JavaScript, and other static files. The official static-export guide lists supported and unsupported features. - Install Kubo and add the export to IPFS: Current IPFS documentation names the Go implementation Kubo and provides binary, package, source, and container installation paths. The old npm install -g ipfs command in this article referred to a retired JavaScript package and has been removed. Sources: - Onion Service setup guide: https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/setup/ - decentralized website hosting: https://docs.ens.domains/web/hosting/ - persistence documentation: https://docs.ipfs.tech/concepts/persistence/ - Kubo: https://docs.ipfs.tech/install/command-line/ - official static-export guide: https://nextjs.org/docs/app/guides/static-exports - TradeOgre Shutdown and RCMP Seizure in 2025 (tradeogre-is-dead-rcmp-seizure-2025) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/tradeogre-is-dead-rcmp-seizure-2025 Summary: The RCMP dismantled TradeOgre and recovered more than C$56 million in cryptocurrency. What the official record confirms and what users should not assume. Answer: The RCMP dismantled TradeOgre and recovered more than C$56 million in cryptocurrency. What the official record confirms and what users should not assume. Meta: date=2026-03-24 | published=2026-03-24 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~6 min read | tags=Swap, Financial Surveillance - What the RCMP confirmed: The RCMP announced the action on September 18, 2025. It called the operation Canada's largest cryptocurrency seizure and the first dismantling of a cryptocurrency exchange by Canadian law enforcement. - What the announcement did not establish: The RCMP said investigators had reason to believe that most funds transacted on TradeOgre came from criminal sources. The public release did not provide the transaction analysis behind that claim. It also did not say that every user or every balance was connected to crime. - Custody was the immediate risk: TradeOgre controlled the platform and the assets held on it. When police seized the site and cryptoassets, customers lost the normal route to their balances. No account requirement can remove that custody risk. - Peer-to-peer tools change the risk: These tools do not reproduce TradeOgre. Haveno states that trades are peer to peer and that it does not endorse the third-party networks used for mainnet trading. Bisq states that it does not hold user funds, while trade deposits sit in multisignature wallets. RoboSats uses coordinators and Lightning hold invoices for bonds and escrow. Each design removes some centralized custody and adds other failure points. Sources: - Bisq: exchange model and custody documentation: https://bisq.network/ - Haveno: project and network documentation: https://haveno.exchange/ - RoboSats: protocol overview and user documentation: https://learn.robosats.com/ - Royal Canadian Mounted Police: TradeOgre seizure announcement, September 18, 2025: https://rcmp.ca/en/news/2025/09/rcmp-executes-record-seizure-more-56-million-dollars-cryptocurrency - Zcash Shielded-Transaction Setup Guide (zcash-full-privacy-setup-guide) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/zcash-full-privacy-setup-guide Summary: Set up Zashi for shielded ZEC, identify transparent fallbacks, and understand what Zcash hides and what external services can still record. Answer: Set up Zashi for shielded ZEC, identify transparent fallbacks, and understand what Zcash hides and what external services can still record. Meta: date=2026-03-08 | published=2026-03-08 | reviewed=2026-08-17 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=Zcash, Guides - Use a current shielded wallet: Zodl, formerly Zashi, is a self-custody mobile wallet maintained for shielded ZEC. Install it only from the links on the official Zodl site . Check the listed developer before installing. - Receive without falling back to transparent mode: Give the sender your shielded address first. If a wallet or exchange rejects it, that service does not support the required receiver. Using its transparent fallback makes the transfer public. The sender or exchange may also retain your account, amount, destination, IP address, and timing in its own records. - Understand what the chain reveals: Zcash shielded notes use commitments, nullifiers, encryption, and zero-knowledge proofs. The chain can validate a spend without publishing the note it consumed or the recipient's shielded address. The current Zcash protocol specification describes those properties. - Shield transparent ZEC carefully: If ZEC already sits at a transparent address in your wallet, use the wallet's shielding action. Confirm that the destination is the wallet's shielded balance before approving it. The shielding transaction does not remove the old address or amount from the chain. Sources: - Flexa: original Zashi integration: https://flexa.co/newsroom/zashi - Zcash ecosystem: Orchard vulnerability remediation: https://forum.zcashcommunity.com/t/orchard-vulnerability-successfully-remediated/55976 - The Orchard Book: keys and addresses: https://zcash.github.io/orchard/design/keys.html - Zcash protocol specification: https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf - Zodl: current wallet site: https://zodl.com/ - Zodl: Zashi rebrand notice: https://zodl.com/zashi-is-becoming-zodl/ - Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Privacy (zero-knowledge-proofs-privacy) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/zero-knowledge-proofs-privacy Summary: Zero-knowledge proofs can validate a statement while hiding its secret witness. Learn what Zcash, private contracts, and selective disclosure protect and what they still expose. Answer: Zero-knowledge proofs can validate a statement while hiding its secret witness. Learn what Zcash, private contracts, and selective disclosure protect and what they still expose. Meta: date=2026-03-09 | published=2026-03-09 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~7 min read | tags=Explainer, Crypto - What the proof guarantees: Zero-knowledge proof systems are judged by three core properties. Completeness means an honest prover with a valid witness can convince the verifier. Soundness means a false statement should not pass except with a small defined probability. Zero-knowledge means the verifier can learn that the statement is true without learning the witness. - Interactive proofs and succinct proofs: The original academic definition described an interaction between a prover and verifier. Blockchain systems need proofs that can be posted and checked later, so they commonly use non-interactive constructions. A prover creates one proof. Any verifier can check it against the public statement. - Zcash shows both the power and the limits: Zcash combines a Bitcoin-like transparent pool with shielded pools. Its protocol uses zero-knowledge proofs to validate shielded spends without revealing which prior note was spent. Shielded output notes are encrypted for recipients. Public nullifiers prevent a note from being spent twice without identifying the note commitment that created it. - Private smart contracts remain difficult: Aztec applies zero-knowledge proofs to private state and smart-contract execution on an Ethereum layer 2. Its Alpha network is live, but Aztec’s own documentation calls the software early and unaudited. It warns that transaction side-effect counts are visible, third-party node queries are not privacy-preserving, and application design can leak private information. Sources: - NIST: Writing Programs for Zero-Knowledge Proofs: https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/presentations/2025/stppa8-zkp/images-media/stppa8-zkp.pdf - Aztec privacy considerations: https://docs.aztec.network/developers/docs/resources/considerations/privacy_considerations - Aztec Alpha Network documentation: https://docs.aztec.network/participate/alpha - Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff: The Knowledge Complexity of Interactive Proof Systems: https://doi.org/10.1137/0218012 - Zcash Protocol Specification: https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf - ZIP 224: Orchard Shielded Protocol: https://zips.z.cash/zip-0224 - Zimbabwe's ZiG Currency and Cryptocurrency Use (zimbabwe-zig-crypto-survival) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/zimbabwe-zig-crypto-survival Summary: ZiG remains secondary to the US dollar, while Zimbabwe's official risk assessment describes a small, mostly peer-to-peer cryptocurrency market. Answer: ZiG remains secondary to the US dollar, while Zimbabwe's official risk assessment describes a small, mostly peer-to-peer cryptocurrency market. Meta: date=2026-03-14 | published=2026-03-14 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=Crypto, Financial Surveillance - ZiG replaced another failed local currency: The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe introduced Zimbabwe Gold, or ZiG, on 5 April 2024. It replaced the Zimbabwe dollar. The bank described ZiG as a structured currency anchored by foreign currency and precious metals, mainly gold, held in reserve. - The September 2024 fall was real: ZiG lost nearly 43 percent of its value in the official willing-buyer, willing-seller market on 27 September 2024. The IMF linked the fall to a roughly 215 percent increase in the ZiG monetary base between April and September. The gap between the official and parallel exchange rates had grown above 75 percent before the adjustment. - Crypto use is limited and mostly peer to peer: Zimbabwe's Financial Intelligence Unit published a national virtual-asset risk assessment in 2025. It estimated that fewer than 20,000 people actively participated in the crypto market, against a 2023 population of 16.67 million. It also said precise figures were unavailable. That evidence does not support earlier estimates that 15 to 20 percent of urban residents held crypto. - Stablecoins lead. Monero does not: The FIU found a strong preference for USDT and USDC. Bitcoin and other major cryptocurrencies were also traded. It described investment and trading gains, not everyday payment, as the main use. Sources: - Zimbabwe Financial Intelligence Unit: virtual-assets risk assessment: https://www.fiu.co.zw/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2024-Virtual-Assets-and-Virtual-Assets-Service-Providers-Risk-Assessment.pdf - IMF: Zimbabwe 2025 Article IV staff report: https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1zweea2025001-source-pdf.pdf - Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe: 2024 Monetary Policy Statement: https://www.rbz.co.zw/index.php/monetary-policy/monetary-policy-statements/1389-2024-monetary-policy-statement - Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe: 2018 virtual-currencies circular: https://www.rbz.co.zw/index.php/regulation-supervision/regulation-supervision/guidelines-circulars-and-public-notices-3/499-circular-to-banking-institutions-no-2-2018-virtual-currencies - PGP Basics: Encrypt Messages Without a Central Server (pgp-basics) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/pgp-basics Summary: How OpenPGP encryption, signatures, fingerprints, revocation certificates and hardware keys work, including what email metadata remains visible. Answer: How OpenPGP encryption, signatures, fingerprints, revocation certificates and hardware keys work, including what email metadata remains visible. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~6 min read | tags=Guides, Encryption Figure: FIG.A06: PGP protects content, not the envelope. OpenPGP protects content and signatures, while normal email routing metadata remains exposed. A full fingerprint check over a second channel establishes key trust. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/pgp-basics/pgp-content-metadata-envelope--article-desktop.png (1200x557; alt: PGP message path showing encrypted content inside an observed metadata envelope, with a separate second-channel fingerprint verification gate before the key is trusted.) Figure data: What PGP protects versus exposes - Surface=Message content | State=Protected | Reason=Encrypted to the recipient key - Surface=File content | State=Protected | Reason=Encrypted before transport or storage - Surface=Signature integrity | State=Protected | Reason=Detects alteration and control of the signing key - Surface=Email headers | State=Exposed | Reason=Normal routing metadata is outside OpenPGP content encryption - Surface=Recipient data | State=Exposed | Reason=Mail servers process addressing - Surface=Timing | State=Exposed | Reason=Transport timing remains observable - Surface=Server logs | State=Exposed | Reason=Transport systems can retain routing records - Practical steps: Start with the threat model. OpenPGP encrypts content and creates digital signatures. It does not make email anonymous. Mail servers still process addressing and routing data, and OpenPGP does not hide traffic timing. If you need content protection, software signing, or encrypted files, OpenPGP can help. If you need an encrypted chat protocol with automatic key updates, compare it with Signal's protocol before choosing a tool. Sources: - Yubico OpenPGP documentation: https://developers.yubico.com/PGP/ - FSF Email Self-Defense: https://emailselfdefense.fsf.org/ - GnuPG: https://gnupg.org/download/ - keys.openpgp.org: https://keys.openpgp.org/ - keys.openpgp.org FAQ: https://keys.openpgp.org/about/faq - Signal's protocol: https://signal.org/docs/ - Thunderbird OpenPGP guide: https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/openpgp-thunderbird-howto-and-faq - GnuPG manual: OpenPGP key management: https://www.gnupg.org/documentation/manuals/gnupg/OpenPGP-Key-Management.html - Kleopatra: https://www.openpgp.org/software/kleopatra/ - IETF RFC 9580: OpenPGP: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9580 - Buying Bitcoin With Less Identity Exposure (how-to-buy-bitcoin-anonymously) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/how-to-buy-bitcoin-anonymously Summary: How P2P Bitcoin purchases, payment records, fresh addresses, UTXO labels, and coin control affect identity exposure. Answer: How P2P Bitcoin purchases, payment records, fresh addresses, UTXO labels, and coin control affect identity exposure. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=Bitcoin, OPSEC - Start with Bitcoin's public record: Bitcoin stores value in unspent transaction outputs, or UTXOs. Every transaction spends earlier outputs and creates new ones. The Bitcoin developer guide explains that reusing an address lets another party track past and future transactions involving that address through the public blockchain. - What the main P2P options actually provide: Bisq's current FAQ says the software requires no registration or KYC and sends data through a peer-to-peer network built on Tor. Fiat transfers happen outside Bisq through payment services chosen by the traders. That distinction matters. Bisq does not create a central customer file, but a bank, payment provider, or counterparty can still receive account details. Bisq also warns that its current platform and older Bisq v1 protocol differ, so users should check the documentation for the version they install. - A six-step process: Choose and back up a wallet before buying. Use a wallet that shows individual UTXOs and lets you select inputs. Sparrow's feature documentation confirms UTXO labels, coin control, direct Bitcoin Core connections, Electrum server support, SSL, and built-in Tor support. Verify the download from the project's official site. Record the seed offline and test recovery before receiving a material amount. Sources: - Bisq Wiki: frequently asked questions: https://bisq.wiki/Frequently_asked_questions - security-deposit documentation: https://bisq.wiki/Security_deposit - Bitcoin developer guide: transactions and avoiding key reuse: https://developer.bitcoin.org/devguide/transactions.html#avoiding-key-reuse - Hodl Hodl: frequently asked questions: https://hodlhodl.com/pages/faq - Hodl Hodl: terms of service: https://hodlhodl.com/pages/terms_of_service - Sparrow Wallet: features and wallet connections: https://sparrowwallet.com/features/ - No-KYC Monero Payment Path: Cash to XMR (how-to-buy-monero-no-kyc) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/how-to-buy-monero-no-kyc Summary: Use a RetoSwap no-deposit cash offer, withdraw to Feather Wallet, and verify one native XMR payment without a centralized exchange account. Answer: Use a RetoSwap no-deposit cash offer, withdraw to Feather Wallet, and verify one native XMR payment without a centralized exchange account. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-08-10 | read_time=~13 min read | tags=Monero, Payments, Guide - Before you start: There is no fixed total price. Before accepting, the RetoSwap offer displays the exchange rate, amount, security deposit if any, and trade fees. Add packaging, tracked delivery, insurance if used, and the final Monero network fee shown by Feather. Record all four categories. If the premium or total loss exposure is unacceptable, stop before taking the offer. - What this setup does not protect: LIMITATION SOURCES: Haveno no-deposit documentation (retrieved 10 August 2026 ); Haveno trade protocol (retrieved 10 August 2026 ); Haveno cash-by-mail risks and evidence (retrieved 10 August 2026 ). - Maintenance and recovery: Keep the RetoSwap trade record until the dispute window is closed. Keep the Feather seed offline for as long as the wallet can receive funds. Before any later payment, update both applications from their official distributions, verify the recipient address again, and send a small amount first when a large payment or new recipient makes the loss unacceptable. Sources: - Feather wallet creation: https://docs.featherwallet.org/guides/create-wallet (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Feather first start: https://docs.featherwallet.org/guides/first-start (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Feather receive transaction guide: https://docs.featherwallet.org/guides/receive-transaction (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Feather send transaction guide: https://docs.featherwallet.org/guides/send-transaction (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Haveno cash packaging and delivery rules: https://docs.haveno.exchange/overview/payment-methods/Pay-By-Mail/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Haveno payment and release sequence: https://docs.haveno.exchange/overview/trade-protocol/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Haveno payment-account setup: https://docs.haveno.exchange/users/getting-started/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Haveno no-deposit documentation: https://docs.haveno.exchange/users/haveno-ui/no-deposit/ - RetoSwap Haveno UI getting started: https://docs.retoswap.com/haveno-ui/get_started/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Feather Wallet official site: https://featherwallet.org/ - Feather official download: https://featherwallet.org/download/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Haveno official site: https://haveno.exchange/ - RetoSwap official distribution: https://retoswap.com/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - How to Vet Any Privacy Tool Before You Trust It (how-to-vet-a-privacy-tool) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/how-to-vet-a-privacy-tool Summary: A practical checklist for assessing a privacy tool: threat model, architecture, release integrity, ownership, policies, audits, and testing. Answer: A practical checklist for assessing a privacy tool: threat model, architecture, release integrity, ownership, policies, audits, and testing. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~9 min read | tags=OPSEC, Explainer - Practical steps: Write down the threat before choosing the tool. List the data or device you need to protect, the person or organisation that may seek it, the likely method, and the cost of failure. EFF's security-planning guide uses these questions because no tool protects every asset against every adversary. A tracker blocker, encrypted messenger, password manager, and VPN solve different problems. Sources: - GrapheneOS: build and release documentation: https://grapheneos.org/build - OWASP: Mobile Application Security Testing Guide tests: https://mas.owasp.org/MASTG/tests/ - Reproducible Builds: definition and verification: https://reproducible-builds.org/docs/definition/ - Signal: protocol specifications: https://signal.org/docs/ - EFF: Your Security Plan: https://ssd.eff.org/module/your-security-plan - GrapheneOS Setup Guide: Install, Profiles, Google Play (grapheneos-privacy-phone-guide) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/grapheneos-privacy-phone-guide Summary: Set up GrapheneOS and compare it with /e/OS on Pixel 8a and Fairphone 5: patches, firmware, bootloader, app isolation, offline speech and cloud accounts. Answer: Set up GrapheneOS and compare it with /e/OS on Pixel 8a and Fairphone 5: patches, firmware, bootloader, app isolation, offline speech and cloud accounts. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-09-21 | read_time=~21 min read | tags=Privacy Tools, OPSEC Figure: FIG.A01: Profiles separate app state, not the phone identity. GrapheneOS profiles separate app data and profile state; they do not create separate devices, SIMs, carrier records, Wi-Fi histories, or public IP addresses. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/grapheneos-privacy-phone-guide/grapheneos-profile-boundaries--article-desktop.png (1200x784; alt: Four GrapheneOS profile zones with per-app permission rules and shared phone identity surfaces outside the profile boundaries.) Figure data: GrapheneOS profile boundary rules - Control=Network | Required state=Deny when unused | Scope=Per app - Control=Sensors | Required state=Deny or motionless | Scope=Per app - Control=Storage Scopes | Required state=Selected files and directories only | Scope=Per app - Control=Contact Scopes | Required state=Selected fields, contacts, or groups | Scope=Per app - Control=VPN | Required state=Always-on and block connections without VPN where required | Scope=Per profile - Control=Private DNS | Required state=Global setting; review interaction with secondary-profile VPNs | Scope=Device-wide - GrapheneOS or /e/OS: which is safer?: For resistance to device exploitation on a Pixel 8a, GrapheneOS is the better-supported choice in the documentation reviewed on 21 September 2026. It supports a locked bootloader, hardware memory tagging and additional exploit mitigations. The /e/OS Pixel 8a community build is listed as not lockable. That is not a verdict on every /e/OS phone: the official Fairphone 5 build supports relocking. Reducing advertising trackers and resisting an operating-system compromise are different goals. - Quick setup path: Buy a supported Pixel with an unlockable bootloader. - 1. Buy a supported, unlockable device: Check the live support list before spending money. The exact list changes as devices reach end of life and new models pass the project's requirements. Prefer a current-generation device with several years of full firmware and operating-system support remaining. - 2. Use the official installer: The project recommends its WebUSB installer for most users. Read the prerequisites before connecting the phone. Use a supported browser, avoid private browsing mode, connect with a reliable cable, and do not run the installer through a virtual machine. Sources: - Auditor verification tutorial: https://attestation.app/tutorial - Not lockable; userdebug build: https://doc.e.foundation/devices/akita - Relocking supported on official builds: https://doc.e.foundation/devices/FP5/install/#locking-the-bootloader - Account Manager: https://doc.e.foundation/os/apps/account-manager/ - Advanced Privacy documentation: https://doc.e.foundation/os/apps/advanced-privacy/ - preconfigured microG: https://doc.e.foundation/os/apps/microg/ - Voice to Text documentation: https://doc.e.foundation/os/apps/voice-to-text/ - /e/OS release policy: https://doc.e.foundation/os/build-status/ - own relocking documentation: https://doc.e.foundation/os/learn/bootloader-relocking/ - /e/OS security tracker: https://doc.e.foundation/os/learn/security-updates/ - Pixel 8a OEM minimum support end as May 2031: https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-lifetime - Pixel 8-and-later guidance: https://grapheneos.org/faq#recommended-devices - Supported devices and hardware requirements: https://grapheneos.org/faq#supported-devices - VPN and Private DNS behavior: https://grapheneos.org/faq#vpn-support - auto reboot: https://grapheneos.org/features#auto-reboot - duress PIN and password: https://grapheneos.org/features#duress - hardened memory allocation and exploit protections: https://grapheneos.org/features#exploit-protection - official app repository description: https://grapheneos.org/features#grapheneos-app-repository - profile feature guide: https://grapheneos.org/features#improved-user-profiles - WebUSB installation guide: https://grapheneos.org/install/web - official installer page: https://grapheneos.org/install/web#verified-boot-key-hash - official releases page: https://grapheneos.org/releases - 2026091700: https://grapheneos.org/releases#2026091700 - Stable 2026091900: https://grapheneos.org/releases#akita - Source-code guide: https://grapheneos.org/source - banking app compatibility: https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps - bugs uncovered by security features: https://grapheneos.org/usage#bugs-uncovered-by-security-features - Contact Scopes: https://grapheneos.org/usage#contact-scopes - Sandboxed Google Play: https://grapheneos.org/usage#sandboxed-google-play - Storage Scopes and storage access: https://grapheneos.org/usage#storage-access - usage guide: https://grapheneos.org/usage#usb-c-port-and-pogo-pins-control - Build dated 15 August 2026: https://images.ecloud.global/community/akita - Build dated 14 August 2026: https://images.ecloud.global/official/FP5 - Murena's policy: https://murena.com/privacy-policy/ - Fairphone's support policy: https://support.fairphone.com/hc/en-us/articles/9979180437393-Fairphone-OS - Feather Wallet Setup and Privacy Settings (monero-feather-wallet-setup-guide) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/monero-feather-wallet-setup-guide Summary: Set up Feather Wallet with verified downloads, offline seed storage, Tor-aware node selection, subaddresses, and output controls. Answer: Set up Feather Wallet with verified downloads, offline seed storage, Tor-aware node selection, subaddresses, and output controls. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~9 min read | tags=Monero, Guides - 1. Verify the download: Use the official Feather download page . As of this review, that page lists version 2.8.1 as the latest release. It provides a separate PGP signature for each package, a signed list of SHA-256 hashes, and the project signing key. - 2. Create the wallet and protect the seed: Open File → New/Restore , choose Create new wallet , and copy the words in order. Feather's wallet creation guide says new wallets use a 16-word Polyseed. The seed can recover the funds if the wallet files are lost. - 3. Decide who supplies blockchain data: Feather connects to a random server from its curated remote-node list by default. You can review this before the first network connection and change it later under Settings → Network → Nodes . - 4. Know what Feather sends over the network: Feather's network traffic table identifies three connection types: node traffic for synchronization and transaction construction, a websocket for fiat prices, Monero community crowdfunding data, and the current block height, plus an update check to featherwallet.org when the websocket is enabled. Sources: - Feather Wallet documentation: create a wallet: https://docs.featherwallet.org/guides/create-wallet - output control guide: https://docs.featherwallet.org/guides/freeze-thaw-output - Feather Wallet documentation: connect to a local node: https://docs.featherwallet.org/guides/local-node - Feather Wallet documentation: network traffic: https://docs.featherwallet.org/guides/network-traffic - Feather Wallet documentation: nodes and remote-node risks: https://docs.featherwallet.org/guides/nodes - receiving guide: https://docs.featherwallet.org/guides/receive-transaction - release-signing guide: https://docs.featherwallet.org/guides/release-signing-key - Feather Wallet documentation: restore from seed: https://docs.featherwallet.org/guides/restore-from-seed - Feather Wallet: official downloads and signed hashes: https://featherwallet.org/download/ - Feather Wallet 2.8.1 release record: https://github.com/feather-wallet/feather/releases/tag/2.8.1 - Five Eyes Jurisdictions and VPN Privacy (five-eyes-jurisdiction-privacy) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/five-eyes-jurisdiction-privacy Summary: How Five Eyes intelligence cooperation affects VPN risk, and how to assess a provider's legal entity, records, ownership, and audit evidence. Answer: How Five Eyes intelligence cooperation affects VPN risk, and how to assess a provider's legal entity, records, ownership, and audit evidence. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~6 min read | tags=OPSEC, Explainer - What Five Eyes means: The alliance includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The UK government describes it as a long-standing intelligence alliance. Its public response to Parliament's 2023 report on international intelligence partnerships also confirms intelligence sharing, shared analysis, and joint cooperation with foreign partners. - The law can reach providers in different ways: The UK's Investigatory Powers Act covers interception warrants, communications-data retention, equipment interference, duties on operators, and requests from overseas authorities. It also sets approval and oversight rules. The existence of those powers does not prove that a named VPN has received an order or that every provision applies to it. - Review the company, not an alliance chart: Start with the operating entity and parent company. Check where each is incorporated, where staff and payment systems sit, and which entity signs the terms. Server location matters too, but a rented server in another country does not move the whole company there. - Jurisdiction is one control, not the whole threat model: A VPN shifts trust from the internet provider to the VPN provider. The VPN handles your connection and can see your source IP while you connect. HTTPS still protects the content between your browser and the destination, but the VPN does not hide logins, cookies, browser fingerprints, or information you give a site. Sources: - Mullvad: no-logging and data-handling policy: https://mullvad.net/en/help/no-logging-data-policy - UK Ministry of Defence: Five Eyes members and partnership: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/five-eyes-chiefs-of-defence-hold-talks-in-london - UK government response to the ISC International Partnerships report: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/government-response-to-isc-international-partnerships-report/government-response-to-the-intelligence-and-security-committee-report-international-partnerships - Australian Assistance and Access Act 2018, current compilation: https://www.legislation.gov.au/C2018A00148/latest/text - Investigatory Powers Act 2016, current UK legislation: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/contents/data.html - Hardware Surveillance: Microphones, Cameras and Telemetry (hardware-surveillance) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/hardware-surveillance Summary: How to reduce microphone, camera, radio, and telemetry exposure across phones, laptops, televisions, and connected devices. Answer: How to reduce microphone, camera, radio, and telemetry exposure across phones, laptops, televisions, and connected devices. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=Hardware, Surveillance - Separate sensor access from telemetry: Microphone or camera access captures input from a sensor. Telemetry is broader. Microsoft, for example, documents required Windows diagnostic data covering device attributes, configuration, update status, and reliability. Optional diagnostic data can include more detailed device activity and enhanced error reporting. - Practical steps: Inventory the room. Count phones, laptops, smart speakers, televisions, conference equipment, cameras, watches, doorbells, and vehicle systems. Include devices that belong to visitors or an employer. - What these steps cannot prove: A clean permission screen does not prove that a device is uncompromised. A network scan does not reveal every sensor. Consumer controls also differ across operating-system versions, manufacturers, managed devices, and regions. Sources: - Microsoft: configure Windows diagnostic data: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/privacy/configure-windows-diagnostic-data-in-your-organization - Apple: control access to hardware features on iPhone: https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/control-access-to-hardware-features-iph168c4bbd5/ios - Google Android Help: change app permissions: https://support.google.com/android/answer/9431959?hl=en - FTC: Vizio viewing-data settlement: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2017/02/vizio-pay-22-million-ftc-state-new-jersey-settle-charges-it-collected-viewing-histories-11-million - Hola VPN and Peer-to-Peer Bandwidth Sharing (hola-vpn-danger) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/hola-vpn-danger Summary: How Hola's peer-to-peer routing, Bright Data relationship, product differences, and current logging policy affect users. Answer: How Hola's peer-to-peer routing, Bright Data relationship, product differences, and current logging policy affect users. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~7 min read | tags=VPN, OPSEC - What a free user contributes: Hola's current licence agreement is direct about the exchange. Free use may allow other devices to be rerouted through your device. The agreement says those devices may use your network connection and resources. Hola says it tries to use resources only when they are idle and not using battery power or roaming. - Hola, Luminati, and Bright Data: Hola says it can offer free access because contributed resources support business use by Bright Data. Its April 2026 privacy policy says users of specified free products may be peers on the Bright Data network. - What Hola records: The peer model is not the only privacy question. Hola's current privacy policy says it may collect and retain IP addresses, names, email addresses, account and billing information, browser and operating-system details, and access dates and times. It says log data from the browser extension may include browsing history. The stated retention period for log data is up to 12 months unless another requirement applies. - How to assess the product: Hola openly documents peer routing, device-resource contribution, Bright Data business use, and substantial logging. Those are enough reasons to examine the exact product before using it for privacy-sensitive activity. Historical labels such as "botnet" add heat but are not needed to explain the current trade-off. Sources: - Bright Data: Luminati rebrand history: https://brightdata.com/luminati - Bright Data: Residential proxy network: https://brightdata.com/proxy-types/residential-proxies - Hola: VPN and proxy FAQ: https://hola.org/faq - Hola: Privacy Policy, updated April 14, 2026: https://hola.org/legal/privacy - Hola: End User License Agreement: https://hola.org/legal/sla - DIY Privacy Hardware: Faraday Pouches, Camera Blockers, and Detection Tools (diy-privacy-hardware) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/diy-privacy-hardware Summary: Use and test physical privacy tools for radio isolation, camera blocking, safer USB charging, and hidden-camera screening. Answer: Use and test physical privacy tools for radio isolation, camera blocking, safer USB charging, and hidden-camera screening. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~9 min read | tags=Hardware, DIY - What each tool can do: Test a Faraday pouch with the device inside. NIST's mobile-forensics guide describes radio isolation as blocking cellular, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth communication. It also warns that weak signal leakage can let a device reconnect. Seal the pouch, call the phone, send a message, and check Wi-Fi and Bluetooth from another device. Repeat the test after the pouch has been folded or carried for a while. Sources: - NIST: Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-101r1.pdf - Apple: camera-cover guidance for Mac laptops: https://support.apple.com/en-au/102177 - FCC: juice jacking and charging guidance: https://www.fcc.gov/juice-jacking-tips-to-avoid-it - USENIX Security 2024: hidden-camera detection limits: https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/zhang-qibo - USENIX Security 2021: clandestine wireless-sensor detection: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21-singh.pdf - Hidden Camera Detection: What Each Method Misses (counter-surveillance-devices) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/counter-surveillance-devices Summary: Published research on hidden-camera detection, including each method’s blind spots, null-result meaning, validation method, skill floor and legal scope. Answer: Published research on hidden-camera detection, including each method’s blind spots, null-result meaning, validation method, skill floor and legal scope. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-08-09 | read_time=~18 min read | tags=Hardware, Counter-Surveillance - Read a null result narrowly: Each method tests one physical or network assumption. A null result means only that its expected signal was not observed under the tested range, angle, power state, traffic visibility and movement conditions. It does not certify a clear room. The field labelled What it cannot detect is therefore the load-bearing part of every technique record. - Jurisdiction notes: These are scope boundaries rather than jurisdiction-specific counsel. They apply to each technique according to its legal scope classes above. None of the cited techniques requires jamming. Passive observation of authorised equipment is kept separate from transmitting interference, intercepting message content or accessing a network without permission. - Defensive interpretation: A positive result is a lead to document and assess, not permission to dismantle safety equipment, enter another network or confront another person. Photographing an object in place, recording the method and conditions, and preserving the cited null limitations gives a later specialist or authority a more useful record than a categorical claim. Sources: - European Commission household activity guidance: https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-topic/data-protection/rules-business-and-organisations/obligations/what-data-can-we-process-and-under-which-conditions/when-do-data-protection-rules-not-apply_en - ISED jammer rules: https://ised-isde.canada.ca/site/spectrum-management-telecommunications/en/safety-and-compliance/compliance-and-enforcement/jammers-are-prohibited-canada-thats-law - ACMA jammer rules: https://www.acma.gov.au/jammers-are-illegal-australia - ANFR legal framework: https://www.anfr.fr/en/controler/cadre-juridique - Bundesnetzagentur device guidance: https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2024/20241129_Spionagegeraete.html - FCC jammer enforcement: https://www.fcc.gov/general/jammer-enforcement - Computer Misuse Act 1990: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1990/18/contents - Cellebrite Phone Extraction and the Serbia Abuse Case (cellebrite-phone-hacking-dissidents) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/cellebrite-phone-hacking-dissidents Summary: What Cellebrite UFED and Physical Analyzer do, what Amnesty documented in Serbia, and how to limit the data exposed when a phone is seized. Answer: What Cellebrite UFED and Physical Analyzer do, what Amnesty documented in Serbia, and how to limit the data exposed when a phone is seized. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=Surveillance, OPSEC - What Amnesty Found in Serbia: Amnesty International's Security Lab published a detailed Serbia investigation in December 2024. The researchers interviewed people targeted by surveillance and examined devices from activists and journalists. They reported forensic traces showing use of Cellebrite products on devices held by Serbian authorities. - Extraction Is Not Remote Interception: Cellebrite extraction and remote spyware are different threats. In a 2021 technical post, Signal described UFED as software that creates a device backup and Physical Analyzer as software that parses the extracted files. Signal stressed that the workflow begins with someone else physically holding the phone. - Reduce What a Seized Phone Can Reveal: A strong passcode is useful, but no fixed passcode length guarantees safety against current forensic tools. Device model, operating-system version, lock state, and the extraction method all affect the result. Keep the operating system and sensitive apps current. Security updates close known flaws that forensic vendors may rely on. Sources: - Cellebrite: Physical Analyzer product documentation: https://cellebrite.com/en/products/physical-analyzer/ - Cellebrite: UFED product documentation: https://cellebrite.com/en/products/ufed/ - Amnesty International Security Lab: A Digital Prison: https://securitylab.amnesty.org/latest/2024/12/a-digital-prison-surveillance-and-the-suppression-of-civil-society-in-serbia/ - Signal: Cellebrite UFED and Physical Analyzer analysis: https://signal.org/blog/cellebrite-vulnerabilities/ - Kape Technologies and ExpressVPN Ownership (kape-technologies-expressvpn) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/kape-technologies-expressvpn Summary: Kape Technologies owns ExpressVPN, Private Internet Access, CyberGhost, and ZenMate. Its Crossrider history, acquisitions, private ownership, and VPN audit evidence. Answer: Kape Technologies owns ExpressVPN, Private Internet Access, CyberGhost, and ZenMate. Its Crossrider history, acquisitions, private ownership, and VPN audit evidence. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~9 min read | tags=VPN, Ownership, OPSEC - Crossrider came before Kape: Kape did not begin as a VPN company. Its former name was Crossrider. Crossrider's 2016 annual report described three business segments: app distribution, media, and web apps and licensing. The web-app business included a browser-extension platform and monetisation technology. - Kape bought established VPN brands: CyberGhost was the first major VPN acquisition. Kape's 2017 annual report says it acquired the company in March 2017. Kape then acquired ZenMate for €4.8 million in October 2018. - Kape is now privately controlled: Kape no longer trades on the London Stock Exchange's AIM market. Unikmind Holdings made a cash offer for the Kape shares it did not already own in 2023. The offer became unconditional in April. Unikmind then requested Kape's delisting after it controlled or had acceptances for more than 75 percent of the shares. Kape was scheduled to leave AIM on 31 May 2023. - What ownership changes in a VPN review: A VPN operator handles encrypted tunnels, DNS resolution, account records, payment details, support requests, and abuse controls. The exact data available depends on the service design and policy. Parent-company ownership matters because it can shape legal response, infrastructure, staffing, and data practices across several brands. Sources: - Kape Technologies Annual Report 2021: https://annualreports.com/Click/30685 - Crossrider Annual Report 2016: https://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/k/LSE_KAPE.L_2016.pdf - Kape Technologies Annual Report 2017: https://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/k/LSE_KAPE.L_2017.pdf - Kape Technologies Annual Report 2018: https://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/k/LSE_KAPE.L_2018.pdf - KPMG independent assurance report on ExpressVPN controls, 2025: https://www.expressvpn.com/wp-ws/uploads-expressvpn/privacy-policy/ExpressVPN_ISAE3000_2025-02-28.pdf - Kape proposed acquisition of ExpressVPN, September 2021: https://www.investegate.co.uk/announcement/rns/kape-technologies--kape/-936m-acquisition-of-expressvpn-354m-placing/6825145 - Unikmind notice of offer closure and Kape delisting, April 2023: https://www.lse.co.uk/rns/notice-of-offer-closure-and-delisting-from-aim-muh1etfs12t0swt.html - NSO Group and Pegasus Spyware (nso-group-pegasus-spyware) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/nso-group-pegasus-spyware Summary: How Pegasus compromises phones, what court records and forensic research establish, and how high-risk users can reduce and investigate targeted spyware risk. Answer: How Pegasus compromises phones, what court records and forensic research establish, and how high-risk users can reduce and investigate targeted spyware risk. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~10 min read | tags=Surveillance, OPSEC - Why encrypted apps do not solve endpoint compromise: Signal, WhatsApp, and iMessage can protect messages in transit. They cannot keep a message secret from spyware that controls the sending or receiving phone. Once an implant can read local storage, capture the screen, or monitor input, the encryption layer has already finished its job. - How Pegasus reaches a phone: Public investigations have documented one-click attacks delivered through malicious links and zero-click attacks delivered through phone services. A zero-click chain does not require the target to open anything. The vulnerable service processes attacker-controlled data and triggers the exploit. - Who has been documented as a target: Citizen Lab and Amnesty International have published forensic findings involving journalists, human-rights defenders, lawyers, political figures, and civil-society workers in multiple countries. These reports identify particular infections or targeting attempts from device evidence. They do not prove that every number found in a leaked targeting list was infected. - What changed in the WhatsApp case: WhatsApp sued NSO Group in 2019. In December 2024, a U.S. district court granted summary judgment to WhatsApp and Meta on liability under federal and California computer-access laws and for breach of contract. A jury later awarded damages. The court reduced the punitive award and entered final judgment in November 2025 for $4,447,190. Sources: - Citizen Lab: BLASTPASS zero-click exploit analysis: https://citizenlab.ca/blastpass-nso-group-iphone-zero-click-zero-day-exploit-captured-in-the-wild/ - Citizen Lab: Pegasus zero-click chains and Lockdown Mode: https://citizenlab.ca/research/nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-returns-in-2022/ - Amnesty International Security Lab: forensic tools and limitations: https://securitylab.amnesty.org/tools-and-guides/ - U.S. District Court: permanent injunction in WhatsApp v. NSO Group: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.350613/gov.uscourts.cand.350613.809.0.pdf - U.S. District Court: final judgment in WhatsApp v. NSO Group: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cand.350613/gov.uscourts.cand.350613.810.0.pdf - Apple: About Lockdown Mode: https://support.apple.com/en-us/105120 - U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security: NSO Group Entity List action: https://www.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-adds-nso-group-other-foreign-companies-entity-list-malicious-cyber-activities - Government Surveillance-Resistant Infrastructure (government-surveillance-resistant-infrastructure) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/government-surveillance-resistant-infrastructure Summary: How to limit infrastructure exposure through data minimisation, separated control, protected logs, Tor onion services, IPFS, and tested recovery. Answer: How to limit infrastructure exposure through data minimisation, separated control, protected logs, Tor onion services, IPFS, and tested recovery. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~11 min read | tags=Hosting, OPSEC - Keep useful logs, not every possible log: Deleting all logs can make abuse response and incident investigation impossible. Keeping everything creates a detailed history of users and operators. The right policy follows purpose. - Split control, but keep the system operable: One cloud account should not control production, backups, DNS, email, and deployment. An attacker or provider action against that account would reach every recovery path. Separate critical control planes where the added complexity is justified. Use distinct administrator identities and phishing-resistant authentication. Keep recovery material outside the production environment and test recovery before an incident. - Use onion services for a defined threat: A Tor onion service can protect the service IP address and provide an authenticated, encrypted path between a Tor client and the service. The Tor Project's protocol overview explains that clients and services build separate circuits to a rendezvous point. The service does not expose its IP address through the onion-service protocol. - IPFS distributes content, not responsibility: IPFS addresses content by its hash and lets multiple nodes host the same data. It does not guarantee that a file stays available. The IPFS documentation on persistence says cached content can be removed by garbage collection. Content must be pinned to one or more nodes to persist. Sources: - OWASP: Logging Cheat Sheet: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Logging_Cheat_Sheet.html - Tor Project: How Onion Services Work: https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/overview/ - NIST: Guide to Computer Security Log Management: https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/92/final - IPFS Docs: Persistence, Permanence, and Pinning: https://docs.ipfs.tech/concepts/persistence/ - Open-Source AI: Local Models and Data Paths (private-ai-local-llm) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/private-ai-local-llm Summary: A sourced guide to local AI runtimes, telemetry, open-weight licences, model provenance, abliteration tradeoffs, remote tools and hardware memory tiers. Answer: A sourced guide to local AI runtimes, telemetry, open-weight licences, model provenance, abliteration tradeoffs, remote tools and hardware memory tiers. Meta: date=2026-03-01 | published=2026-03-01 | reviewed=2026-08-09 | read_time=~18 min read | tags=AI Privacy, Guides Figure: FIG.04: Local inference is one hop, not the whole boundary. The article's reproducible check: run the complete task offline and inventory every configured endpoint. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/private-ai-local-llm/local-ai-egress--article-desktop.png (1200x445; alt: Boundary diagram showing what stays local in a local LLM setup and five outbound paths that can still transmit data, each with its control.) Figure data: The article's reproducible check: run the complete task offline and inventory every configured endpoint. - Outbound path=model pulls + updates | Destination=registries / hugging face | Control=pin immutable revision, record digest - Outbound path=extension telemetry | Destination=vendor | Control=disable explicitly (continue, cline) - Outbound path=cloud embeddings / rerank | Destination=remote provider | Control=code chunks are sent — use local roles - Outbound path=remote mcp server | Destination=tool host | Control=server receives tool arguments - Outbound path=cloud fallback models | Destination=hosted api | Control=ollama_no_cloud=1, test offline - Map the inference stack, not only the model: A local generation endpoint plus a cloud embedding endpoint is not a local system. Continue's own embedding documentation shows both an in-extension transformers.js option and remote provider configurations. Code chunks must be sent to a remote embedding service for that service to compute their vectors. - Classify the licence at system level: The Open Source Initiative's Open Source AI Definition 1.0 applies the freedoms to use, study, modify and share an AI system. Its preferred form for modification includes model parameters plus sufficient information about training data and code. A licence badge on a weight file answers only part of that test. - Uncensored and abliterated models are in scope: Uncensored models, fine-tunes with different refusal policies and abliterated checkpoints are relevant when licence and operator autonomy are being compared. Abliteration changes what a model will answer by editing or suppressing refusal-related directions in its representations or weights. It is not a data-flow protection. The runner, extension, embedding service and tools see the same data unless those components are changed separately. - Verify weight provenance before loading: A third-party quant from a pseudonymous uploader is an unsigned artifact unless the publisher supplies a verifiable signature or attestation. A familiar username, download count or filename is not cryptographic provenance. SafeTensors limits executable deserialization behaviour, but a safe container does not prove who produced the tensor values. Sources: - Ai2 OLMo: https://allenai.org/olmo - Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction, arXiv:2406.11717: https://arxiv.org/abs/2406.11717 - Investigating the Impact of Quantization Methods on Safety and Reliability, arXiv:2502.15799: https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.15799 - Measuring and Eliminating Refusals in Military Large Language Models, arXiv:2603.10012: https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.10012 - Different Paths to Harmful Compliance, arXiv:2604.18510: https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.18510 - Cline telemetry documentation: https://docs.cline.bot/more-info/telemetry - local and remote embedding choices: https://docs.continue.dev/customize/model-roles/embeddings - Continue telemetry documentation: https://docs.continue.dev/telemetry - Ollama FAQ: local prompts, network binding and cloud controls: https://docs.ollama.com/faq - Qwen3: https://github.com/QwenLM/Qwen3 - security documentation: https://huggingface.co/docs/hub/security-pickle - Hugging Face Hub immutable revisions: https://huggingface.co/docs/huggingface_hub/guides/download - Hugging Face 4-bit quantization documentation: https://huggingface.co/docs/transformers/quantization/bitsandbytes - Gemma 4 community variant evaluation: https://huggingface.co/DreamFast/Gemma4-e4b-abliterlitics - desktop app privacy policy: https://lmstudio.ai/app-privacy - LM Studio model download and quantization guide: https://lmstudio.ai/docs/app/basics/download-model - LM Studio offline operation: https://lmstudio.ai/docs/app/offline - Model Context Protocol transport specification: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/concepts/transports - remote MCP server: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/develop/connect-remote-servers - Open Source AI Definition 1.0: https://opensource.org/ai/open-source-ai-definition - AMD Ryzen AI Max platform: up to 128 GB unified memory: https://www.amd.com/en/products/processors/consumer/ryzen-ai-max.html - Apple Mac Studio M3 Ultra: up to 512 GB unified memory: https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2025/03/apple-unveils-new-mac-studio-the-most-powerful-mac-ever/ - Llama 3.3 Community License: https://www.llama.com/llama3_3/license/ - NVIDIA RTX 5090: 32 GB VRAM: https://www.nvidia.com/en-us/geforce/graphics-cards/50-series/rtx-5090/ - Signal vs SimpleX vs Session: Which Is Most Private? (encrypted-messaging-comparison) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/encrypted-messaging-comparison Summary: Signal needs a phone number, SimpleX has no user IDs, Session drops forward secrecy. Compare registration, metadata, groups, and seized-phone exposure. Answer: Signal needs a phone number, SimpleX has no user IDs, Session drops forward secrecy. Compare registration, metadata, groups, and seized-phone exposure. Meta: date=2026-02 | published=2026-02 | reviewed=2026-08-22 | read_time=~10 min read | tags=Comms Figure: FIG.01: What each messenger still reveals. Registration and delivery-path differences between four end-to-end encrypted messengers. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/encrypted-messaging-comparison/messaging-envelope--article-desktop.png (1200x475; alt: Comparison of Signal, SimpleX, Session, and Matrix by phone requirement, identifier, delivery path, and main limit.) Figure data: Registration and delivery-path differences between four end-to-end encrypted messengers. - App=SIGNAL | phone at signup=required | global identifier=phone account + optional username | delivery path=central delivery service | main limit=number still required at registration - App=SIMPLEX | phone at signup=no | global identifier=none — no global user id | delivery path=separate relay queues, self-hostable | main limit=invitation links are credentials - App=SESSION | phone at signup=no | global identifier=random account id | delivery path=onion-routed, distributed storage | main limit=no forward secrecy in current protocol - App=MATRIX | phone at signup=varies by homeserver | global identifier=user id on a homeserver | delivery path=federated homeservers | main limit=servers process account + room state - Telegram is not an equivalent default: Telegram describes itself as a cloud messaging service. Its privacy policy distinguishes cloud chats from end-to-end encrypted Secret Chats and says cloud chat content is stored on Telegram's servers for cross-device access. Do not treat an ordinary Telegram chat or group as equivalent to Signal's default end-to-end encryption. - Controls that matter on every app: Malware can read messages on screen or capture them before encryption. A hidden camera, notification preview, cloud device backup, or cooperating contact can do the same. Messenger choice narrows exposure. It does not replace endpoint security. Sources: - Briar: how it works: https://briarproject.org/how-it-works/ - Briar groups and offline use: https://briarproject.org/manual/ - Cwtch groups and server experiment: https://docs.cwtch.im/docs/servers/introduction/ - Cwtch security components: https://docs.cwtch.im/security/components/intro/ - Session installation: https://docs.getsession.org/session-messenger/installing-session - Session protocol documentation: https://docs.getsession.org/session-network/session-protocol.md - Session account restoration: https://docs.getsession.org/session-network/session-protocol/account-restoration.md - Session calls and groups: https://getsession.org/faq - Molly: data encryption at rest: https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/wiki/Data-Encryption-At-Rest - Matrix private-room setup: https://matrix.org/docs/chat_basics/private-group-chat/ - Matrix end-to-end encryption guide: https://matrix.org/docs/matrix-concepts/end-to-end-encryption/ - Matrix hosting options: https://matrix.org/ecosystem/hosting/ - Molly features: https://molly.im/ - Signal: published government requests: https://signal.org/bigbrother/ - Signal downloads: https://signal.org/download/ - SimpleX audio and video calls: https://simplex.chat/docs/guide/audio-video-calls.html - SimpleX privacy and security settings: https://simplex.chat/docs/guide/privacy-security.html - SimpleX platform design: https://simplex.chat/docs/simplex.html - SimpleX downloads: https://simplex.chat/downloads/ - Matrix specification 1.19: https://spec.matrix.org/v1.19/ - Signal Support: backups and device transfers: https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/10074659364122-Backups-and-Device-Transfers-on-Signal - Signal Support: linked devices: https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360007320551-Linked-Devices - Signal Support: group calls: https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360052977792-Group-Video-Calling - Signal Support: phone number privacy and usernames: https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/6712070553754-Phone-Number-Privacy-and-Usernames - Telegram privacy policy: https://telegram.org/privacy - Ricochet Refresh stable release: https://www.ricochetrefresh.net/ - Ethereum Foundation CROPS Mandate: What It Commits To (ethereum-foundation-crops-mandate-2026) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/ethereum-foundation-crops-mandate-2026 Summary: What the Ethereum Foundation's CROPS mandate says about censorship resistance, open source software, privacy, and security, and what it does not change. Answer: What the Ethereum Foundation's CROPS mandate says about censorship resistance, open source software, privacy, and security, and what it does not change. Meta: date=2026-03-14 | published=2026-03-14 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~7 min read | tags=Ethereum - What the mandate says: The mandate gives the foundation two aims. First, Ethereum should remain a decentralized and resilient tool for user self-sovereignty. Second, direct self-sovereign use should be available at the scale and in the form users choose, without violating anyone else's self-sovereignty. - The onchain record is verifiable: The foundation published the mandate in the input data of an Ethereum transaction. The transaction can be inspected through a block explorer, including the full text stored in its input data. The record provides a public timestamp and lets readers compare the onchain text with the foundation's PDF. - CROPS does not make Ethereum private: Ethereum's own privacy documentation says the network is transparent by design. Every onchain action is visible, while addresses provide pseudonymity rather than anonymity. Transaction patterns can expose sensitive information or help identify a user. - What readers can test later: A mandate matters only when it shapes decisions. The public can compare future foundation grants, research programs, technical work, and policy statements with the CROPS test. The document itself says the foundation must derive its technical work, community support, and decision-making from its stated principles. Sources: - The Promise of Ethereum: Introducing the EF Mandate: https://blog.ethereum.org/2026/03/13/ef-mandate - Ethereum Foundation Mandate PDF: https://ethereum.foundation/ef-mandate.pdf - Blockchain data storage strategies: https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/data-availability/blockchain-data-storage-strategies/ - Privacy on Ethereum: https://ethereum.org/en/privacy/ - mandate publication transaction: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x5dd574df963a1df1f064791e0f6ff41ec972cdbba12293b7e1ece582052ba855 - Financial Privacy for Journalists, Activists & Dissidents (financial-privacy-activists-dissidents) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/financial-privacy-activists-dissidents Summary: Journalists, activists, and dissidents face asset freezing and payment deplatforming. Financial OPSEC guide using no-KYC tools and Monero. Answer: Journalists, activists, and dissidents face asset freezing and payment deplatforming. Financial OPSEC guide using no-KYC tools and Monero. Meta: date=2026-02 | published=2026-02 | reviewed=2026-08-17 | read_time=~10 min read | tags=Privacy, OPSEC - Threats: Governments can freeze accounts through several routes: - Building Financial Resilience: You do not need to abandon banks completely. You do need to make sure one freeze or deplatforming event cannot stop your work, and that your financial trail says as little as possible. - What to Do If Your Accounts Are Frozen: Cunicula is editorially independent. Commercial disclosure . - Funding and incentives: Financial censorship is a business line. The same firms that serve states and banks also help enforce platform-level exclusion. Sources: - Cake Wallet official site: https://cakewallet.com/ - Coldcard official site: https://coldcard.com/ - Feather Wallet official site: https://featherwallet.org/ - Foundation Passport Prime official site: https://foundation.xyz/ - Haveno official site: https://haveno.exchange/ - Mullvad VPN official site: https://mullvad.net/ - NiceVPS official site: https://nicevps.net/ - Njalla official site: https://njal.la/ - Specially Designated Nationals: https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/topic/1631 - RetoSwap official site: https://retoswap.com/ - froze WikiLeaks' accounts in 2010 at the request of the US State Department: https://techcrunch.com/2010/12/08/paypal-wikileaks/ - froze the bank accounts of hundreds of protesters and donors within 48 hours: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/emergencies-act-banks-ottawa-protests-1.6353968 - GoFundMe removed the Freedom Convoy fundraiser in 2022: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/gofundme-stops-payments-1.6340526 - froze accounts without judicial review: https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/rcmp-names-banks-freeze-1.6376955 - account freezing orders without a conviction: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/29/part/5/chapter/3B/crossheading/freezing-of-bank-and-building-society-accounts - activists and journalists have had accounts seized across multiple banks at once: https://www.rferl.org/a/belarus-crackdown-nongovernmental-organizations/31368662.html - GitHub Privacy Considerations for Sensitive Projects (github-privacy-risk) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/github-privacy-risk Summary: What GitHub records, what legal process can reach, how commit metadata identifies contributors, and how Codeberg's published data policy differs. Answer: What GitHub records, what legal process can reach, how commit metadata identifies contributors, and how Codeberg's published data policy differs. Meta: date=2026-02 | published=2026-02 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~6 min read | tags=Privacy, OPSEC - GitHub collects more than repository content: GitHub's General Privacy Statement says service-usage information can include IP address, device information, session details, request dates and times, device type and ID, operating system, application version, and information about repository contributions. GitHub also says it infers a general geographic location from an IP address. - Git history can identify contributors: Git commits contain an author name, author email address, and timestamp. Those fields travel with the repository history. Changing an email setting later does not rewrite old commits. GitHub's commit-email documentation confirms that a new address applies to future commits and that earlier commits remain associated with the old address. - What GitHub says it can disclose: GitHub publishes Guidelines for Legal Requests of User Data . The policy separates account information, access logs, and private content by the legal process required. - GitHub and Codeberg have different data policies: Codeberg is a Forgejo-based software forge operated by Codeberg e.V., a registered nonprofit association in Berlin. It is not anonymous infrastructure. Its current privacy policy says it processes technical metadata including IP address, browser, operating system, access time, requested URLs, and referrer. Sources: - Codeberg Privacy Policy: https://codeberg.org/Codeberg/org/src/branch/main/PrivacyPolicy.md - Codeberg repository migration documentation: https://docs.codeberg.org/advanced/migrating-repos/ - Codeberg: What is Codeberg?: https://docs.codeberg.org/getting-started/what-is-codeberg/ - GitHub: Setting your commit email address: https://docs.github.com/en/account-and-profile/how-tos/email-preferences/setting-your-commit-email-address - GitHub Guidelines for Legal Requests of User Data: https://docs.github.com/en/site-policy/other-site-policies/guidelines-for-legal-requests-of-user-data - GitHub General Privacy Statement: https://docs.github.com/en/site-policy/privacy-policies/github-general-privacy-statement - GitHub: Microsoft acquisition completed: https://github.blog/news-insights/company-news/github-and-microsoft/ - How to Scrub Your Personal Information from the Internet (how-to-scrub-your-personal-info-from-the-internet) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/how-to-scrub-your-personal-info-from-the-internet Summary: Step-by-step guide to removing your name, address, phone number, and photos from data brokers, people-search sites, Google, social media, and public records. Answer: Step-by-step guide to removing your name, address, phone number, and photos from data brokers, people-search sites, Google, social media, and public records. Meta: date=2026-02 | published=2026-02 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~12 min read | tags=Guide, OPSEC - Start with a private inventory: Write down what you are trying to remove before sending requests. Keep this inventory offline or in an encrypted note. Include your current and former names, addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, and usernames. Add the exact URL for every result you find. - Delete the pages you control: Begin with old social accounts, personal websites, forum profiles, marketplace listings, and public cloud files. Download anything you need, remove posts and profile fields, then close the account through the service's own settings. Deactivation may leave the account and its content intact, so read the final confirmation screen. - Opt out of people-search sites one by one: People-search sites compile records from public sources, public social profiles, and other brokers. The Federal Trade Commission's consumer guidance says most provide an opt-out process. It also warns that a profile can reappear when the underlying public records change. - Use legal deletion rights where they apply: A deletion right is not a universal erase command. It depends on the law, the organisation, why the data is held, and any exemption. Send a narrow request that identifies you, the data, and the action you want. Keep a copy and note the deadline. Sources: - Federal Trade Commission's consumer guidance: https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/what-know-about-people-search-sites-sell-your-information - Delete Request and Opt-out Platform: https://cppa.ca.gov/data_broker_registry/ - EU General Data Protection Regulation: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX%3A02016R0679-20160504 - guide to asking an organisation to delete your data: https://ico.org.uk/for-the-public/your-right-to-get-your-data-deleted/ - CCPA rights guide: https://oag.ca.gov/privacy/ccpa - Results about you guidance: https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/12719076 - private-information removal form: https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/9673730 - IdentityTheft.gov guidance for exposed information: https://www.identitytheft.gov/Info-Lost-or-Stolen - M-Pesa, Machankura, and Transaction Privacy in Kenya (kenya-mpesa-bitcoin-machankura) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/kenya-mpesa-bitcoin-machankura Summary: M-Pesa and Machankura both work on basic phones, but they expose different records. A factual guide to custodial Bitcoin, USSD identity, and Kenya's VASP law. Answer: M-Pesa and Machankura both work on basic phones, but they expose different records. A factual guide to custodial Bitcoin, USSD identity, and Kenya's VASP law. Meta: date=2026-02 | published=2026-02 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~10 min read | tags=Bitcoin, Regional - M-Pesa is national payment infrastructure: M-Pesa launched in Kenya in 2007 and made phone-number payments available without a conventional bank account. Users can hold electronic money, send it to another user, pay merchants, and move cash through agents. - What Safaricom says it collects: Safaricom's data privacy statement says it collects identity and SIM-registration information, M-Pesa transaction information, mobile-money transactions, call records, data-session logs, and approximate location. The statement does not say every M-Pesa transfer includes an agent location, so that claim should not be assumed. - Machankura changes the route, not the trust problem: Machankura provides a custodial Bitcoin account through USSD. Its official site says registered users can send and receive Bitcoin by phone number or Lightning address. Its FAQ says the service creates a Lightning address from the registered phone number. A user can choose a username so recipients do not need to see that number. - Kenya now has a VASP law: Kenya's Virtual Asset Service Providers Act commenced on 4 November 2025. It applies to virtual asset service providers offering services in Kenya. The Act says a person may not carry on virtual asset services in or from Kenya without a licence from the relevant regulator. Sources: - Machankura official site: https://8333.mobi - Machankura FAQ: https://8333.mobi/faqs - Kenya Virtual Asset Service Providers Act, 2025: https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/act/2025/20 - Communications Authority of Kenya sector statistics, April to June 2025: https://www.ca.go.ke/sites/default/files/2025-09/Sector%20Statistics%20Report%20Q4%202024-2025.pdf - CBK and CMA public notice on the VASP Act: https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/press%5Freleases/665231223%5FPublic%20Notice%20on%20the%20Virtual%20Assets%20Service%20Providers%20Act%202025.pdf - Central Bank of Kenya bulletin reporting 2024 remittances: https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/weekly_bulletin/45979102_Weekly%20CBK%20Bulletin%20January%2017%202024%20(003).pdf - Safaricom 2025 Kenya Performance Review: https://www.safaricom.co.ke/annualreport_2025/the-commercial-value-we-deliver/safaricom-kenya-performance-review/ - Safaricom Data Privacy Statement: https://www.safaricom.co.ke/data-privacy-statements - Ledger Data Breach and Physical-Security Risks (ledger-breach-kidnappings-opsec) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/ledger-breach-kidnappings-opsec Summary: Ledger's 2020 breach exposed about 272,000 detailed customer records. What is verified, what is not, and how exposed customers can reduce phishing and physical-security risks. Answer: Ledger's 2020 breach exposed about 272,000 detailed customer records. What is verified, what is not, and how exposed customers can reduce phishing and physical-security risks. Meta: date=2026-02 | published=2026-02 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~10 min read | tags=Privacy, OPSEC - What Ledger confirmed: Ledger says a researcher reported a weakness through its bounty program on 14 July 2020. Its investigation found that an unauthorized party had accessed the e-commerce and marketing database through an API key on 25 June. The database held order and contact information. Ledger said payment information, account credentials, private keys, and crypto funds were not affected. - Correcting the kidnapping claim: An earlier version of this article said Ledger customer records were used to plan physical kidnappings and dated the kidnapping of Ledger co-founder David Balland to January 2024. The date was wrong. Balland and his partner were abducted in France on 21 January 2025. Authorities said the kidnappers demanded a large ransom in crypto. The GIGN freed Balland the next day and his partner on 23 January. Ten people were initially detained. - What exposed customers should do: Treat the exposed contact details as public. A copied database cannot be recalled. Moving house or changing a phone number can make parts of an old record stale, but mirrors and extracts can remain online. - Buying without adding avoidable risk: Reducing address exposure must not create a supply-chain problem. Do not buy an unknown or secondhand device because it is anonymous. Buy from the manufacturer or an authorized reseller. If local purchase is available, it may reduce the personal data sent to the manufacturer, but the retailer and payment provider can still retain transaction records. Sources: - Ledger Recover FAQ: https://support.ledger.com/article/9579368109597-zd - Ledger: E-commerce and marketing data breach FAQ: https://support.ledger.com/article/E-commerce-and-Marketing-data-breach-FAQ - Trezor: authorized resellers: https://trezor.io/resellers - French Gendarmerie: 2026 annual cybercrime report: https://www.gendarmerie.interieur.gouv.fr/gendinfo/content/download/58543/file/Rapport-cybercriminalite2026-WebA.pdf - Ledger: secure purchasing and device checks: https://www.ledger.com/academy/topics/ledgersolutions/best-practices-to-securely-buy-ledger-signer - Ledger: ongoing phishing campaigns: https://www.ledger.com/phishing-campaigns-status - Legal Tax Minimization 2026: US, UK, EU & Australia (legal-tax-minimization-us-uk-eu-aus) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/legal-tax-minimization-us-uk-eu-aus Summary: A factual guide to lawful tax planning through US retirement accounts, UK ISAs and pensions, EU residence rules, and Australian super contributions. Answer: A factual guide to lawful tax planning through US retirement accounts, UK ISAs and pensions, EU residence rules, and Australian super contributions. Meta: date=2026-02 | published=2026-02 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=Legal - United States: use retirement space before adding complexity: A one-participant 401(k), often called a Solo 401(k), covers a business owner with no employees other than a spouse. The owner can contribute as both employee and employer, subject to annual and compensation-based limits. Elective deferral limits apply to the person across plans, not separately to each job. - United Kingdom: ISA and pension rules do different jobs: The ISA allowance is £20,000 for the 2026 to 2027 tax year. Eligible UK residents can hold cash, stocks and shares, innovative finance, and Lifetime ISAs. Returns inside an ISA receive tax-free treatment under the account rules. The annual allowance is shared across ISA subscriptions, not multiplied by opening more accounts. - European Union: there is no single personal income tax system: EU law does not set one rule for taxing the income of people who live or work across borders. Member states set their own residence tests, rates, deductions, and investment wrappers, subject to EU law. The country of tax residence can usually tax worldwide income, while another country may tax income sourced there. - Australia: super contributions have caps and timing rules: Australia's concessional contribution cap is A$32,500 from 1 July 2026. Employer contributions, salary sacrifice, and personal contributions claimed as a deduction generally count together across all super funds. Going above the cap can trigger extra tax. Sources: - Your Europe: income taxes abroad: https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/work/taxes/income-taxes-abroad/index_en.htm - Australian Taxation Office: concessional contributions cap: https://www.ato.gov.au/individuals-and-families/super-for-individuals-and-families/super/growing-and-keeping-track-of-your-super/caps-limits-and-tax-on-super-contributions/concessional-contributions-cap - GOV.UK: Individual Savings Accounts: https://www.gov.uk/individual-savings-accounts - GOV.UK: private pension annual allowance: https://www.gov.uk/tax-on-your-private-pension/annual-allowance - US Internal Revenue Service: one-participant 401(k) plans: https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/one-participant-401k-plans - Correction: Monero Traded Above $687 in January 2026 (monero-ath-correction) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/monero-ath-correction Summary: Monero traded near $800 on 14 January 2026. Exchange and aggregate market records correct our earlier claim that it never reached $687. Answer: Monero traded near $800 on 14 January 2026. Exchange and aggregate market records correct our earlier claim that it never reached $687. Meta: date=2026-03-24 | published=2026-03-24 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~4 min read | tags=Monero, News - Why The Numbers Differ: Crypto assets trade on separate exchanges rather than one central market. An exchange reports trades from its own order book. An aggregator combines data from several markets. Trading pairs, liquidity, and calculation methods can produce small differences between recorded highs. - How To Check A Price Record: Check timestamped data from more than one exchange, then compare it with independent market aggregators. Record the trading pair and time zone. A price on XMR/USD can differ from XMR/USDT, and a daily candle can hide the exact time of an intraday high. Sources: - CoinGecko: Monero market data: https://api.coingecko.com/api/v3/coins/monero?localization=false&tickers=false&market_data=true&community_data=false&developer_data=false&sparkline=false - CoinPaprika: Monero market data: https://api.coinpaprika.com/v1/tickers/xmr-monero - Kraken: XMR/USD daily OHLC data: https://api.kraken.com/0/public/OHLC?pair=XMRUSD&interval=1440&since=1767225600 - KuCoin: XMR/USDT daily candles: https://api.kucoin.com/api/v1/market/candles?type=1day&symbol=XMR-USDT&startAt=1767225600&endAt=1769904000 - No-KYC eSIM Comparison for 2026 (no-kyc-esim-comparison-2026) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/no-kyc-esim-comparison-2026 Summary: Compare Silent.Link, NadaNada, PikaSim, and Phreeli by identity checks, payment records, coverage, and the telecom data each service still exposes. Answer: Compare Silent.Link, NadaNada, PikaSim, and Phreeli by identity checks, payment records, coverage, and the telecom data each service still exposes. Meta: date=2026-03-14 | published=2026-03-14 | reviewed=2026-07-13 | read_time=~12 min read | tags=Phone, Ranking - Silent.Link: Silent.Link says its data eSIM works in more than 160 countries, needs no KYC or email, and keeps funds active without an expiry date. Its site lists Bitcoin, Lightning, Monero, USDT, and other cryptocurrency payments. It also sells selected plans with US phone numbers. - NadaNada: NadaNada , previously presented here as LNVPN, sells eSIM, VPN, and phone-number products. Its homepage says no account, email, ID check, or KYC is required. It advertises eSIM coverage in more than 200 countries and regions, with plans starting at $0.99. Prices and package validity vary by destination. - PikaSim: PikaSim says it covers more than 190 countries and does not require an account, email, name, phone number, address, or ID for cryptocurrency purchases. Its terms say an eSIM activation link and QR code appear after payment. Top-ups can use the ICCID or order number without a login. - Phreeli: Phreeli is a US prepaid wireless service, not a global data-only reseller. It offers monthly plans with talk, text, data, and hotspot access. Its public privacy material describes separating customer, payment, and service records where possible. Sources: - NadaNada service and privacy claims: https://nadanada.me/ - NadaNada privacy policy: https://nadanada.me/privacy - PikaSIM official site: https://pikasim.com/ - PikaSim privacy policy: https://pikasim.com/privacy - PikaSim terms of service: https://pikasim.com/tos - Silent.Link product and checkout claims: https://silent.link/ - Silent.Link rates and service areas: https://silent.link/rates - Phreeli official site: https://www.phreeli.com - Phreeli privacy policy: https://www.phreeli.com/privacy/policy - Phreeli terms of service: https://www.phreeli.com/terms-of-service - Private Phone Setup in 2026: GrapheneOS, Phreeli, and SimpleX (no-kyc-phone-stack-2026) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/no-kyc-phone-stack-2026 Summary: Anonymous phone stack 2026: GrapheneOS on Pixel, Phreeli or Silent.Link for carrier, SimpleX or Session for messaging, Cake Wallet for crypto. Answer: Anonymous phone stack 2026: GrapheneOS on Pixel, Phreeli or Silent.Link for carrier, SimpleX or Session for messaging, Cake Wallet for crypto. Meta: date=2026-03-14 | published=2026-03-14 | reviewed=2026-08-23 | read_time=~15 min read | tags=Phone, Guide Figure: FIG.B04: Six layers narrow identity; residual records still cross out. The stack reduces identity exposure layer by layer; it does not remove tower-visible IMEI, ICCID, and IMSI records, provider-side order records, location habits, or endpoint risk. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/no-kyc-phone-stack-2026/private-phone-egress-stack--article-desktop.png (1200x652; alt: Six-layer private phone stack showing device, carrier, VPN, number, messaging, and finance controls inside a bounded zone, with residual provider and network records crossing the boundary.) Figure data: Private phone stack layers and residual records - Layer=Device | Control in the stack=GrapheneOS without a Google account; per-app controls | Residual record or exposure=Hardware identity, IMEI in use, physical seizure, and endpoint compromise - Layer=Carrier | Control in the stack=Lower-data Phreeli or Silent.Link account | Residual record or exposure=Tower location, IMEI, ICCID, IMSI, call-detail and payment records documented by the provider - Layer=VPN | Control in the stack=Mullvad account number, WireGuard, always-on VPN | Residual record or exposure=VPN account, tunnel endpoint, timing, and device compromise - Layer=Number | Control in the stack=Separate JMP or carrier number when required | Residual record or exposure=Telephony metadata, provider records, and number acceptance limits - Layer=Messaging | Control in the stack=SimpleX, Session, or Briar without a phone-number identifier | Residual record or exposure=Contact behavior, endpoint state, and each network's documented records - Layer=Finance | Control in the stack=Self-custody wallet separated from the main identity | Residual record or exposure=Provider order, counterparty, device, and behavioral records outside the wallet - Layer 1 - The device: GrapheneOS on Pixel: The base layer is the operating system. Stock Android and iOS ship with telemetry, carrier hooks, and account plumbing you do not control. GrapheneOS strips that back and adds hardening, per-app network and sensor controls, sandboxed Google Play, and verified boot on Pixel hardware. - Layer 2 - The carrier: anonymous mobile service: A hardened OS does not fix an identity-linked carrier. The carrier still knows which towers you connect to and when. Major carriers also have a history of turning location data into a product. The goal is to use a provider that has little or nothing about you on file. - Layer 3 - The VPN: encrypt above the carrier: An anonymous carrier helps with account identity. A VPN helps with traffic visibility. Without a VPN, the carrier can still see which IPs and domains you reach. - Layer 4 - The number: when you need a phone number: Some services still demand a number for sign-up, 2FA, or recovery. If you must use one, do not use your main line. Sources: - Briar official site: https://briarproject.org/ - July 2026 maintenance notice: https://briarproject.org/news/2026-maintenance-mode/ - cakewallet.com: https://cakewallet.com - Cake Wallet official site: https://cakewallet.com/ - Feather Wallet official site: https://featherwallet.org/ - Session official site: https://getsession.org/ - GrapheneOS official site: https://grapheneos.org/ - grapheneos.org/install/web: https://grapheneos.org/install/web - Haveno official site: https://haveno.exchange/ - JMP.chat official site: https://jmp.chat/ - mullvad.net: https://mullvad.net - Mullvad VPN official site: https://mullvad.net/ - mullvad.net: https://mullvad.net/en/download/android - Silent.link official site: https://silent.link/ - SimpleX Chat official site: https://simplex.chat - Monerujo official site: https://www.monerujo.app/ - Phreeli official site: https://www.phreeli.com - Zodl (formerly Zashi) official site: https://zodl.com/ - No-KYC Virtual Cards: SolvoCard, Veil, Stealths (no-kyc-prepaid-cards-2026) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/no-kyc-prepaid-cards-2026 Summary: Compare no-KYC virtual cards by identity checks, fees, load limits, issuer disclosure, custody, and current incidents, including SolvoCard, Veil, and Stealths. Answer: Compare no-KYC virtual cards by identity checks, fees, load limits, issuer disclosure, custody, and current incidents, including SolvoCard, Veil, and Stealths. Meta: date=2026-03-14 | published=2026-03-14 | reviewed=2026-08-23 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=Payments - SolvoCard limits and current status: Top-up: the reloadable-card page states a $1 minimum and no maximum single top-up. - Veil limits: Lite: $25 plan fee, $500 per card, $100 minimum top-up. - Stealths: Identity: the terms state no customer verification. - Products that are not no-KYC: KemyCard: its consumer pricing footer states full eKYC through Sumsub and real-time blockchain monitoring. Sources: - KemyCard pricing, limits, and eKYC statement: https://kemycard.com/en/pricing - KYCnot.me SolvoCard incident record and user reports: https://kycnot.me/service/solvocardcom - Stealths terms: https://stealths.net/terms - Veil plans, fees, and load limits: https://veil.cards/ - Privacy.com official site: https://www.privacy.com/ - SolvoCard official site: https://www.solvocard.com/ - SolvoCard card products, fees, and published limits: https://www.solvocard.com/card - SolvoCard privacy policy: https://www.solvocard.com/privacy - SolvoCard reloadable card and top-up claim: https://www.solvocard.com/reloadable-virtual-card - SolvoCard terms: https://www.solvocard.com/terms - No-KYC Crypto Swap Guide: Wallet-to-Wallet No-ID Services (no-kyc-swaps-2026) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/no-kyc-swaps-2026 Summary: A source-backed comparison of Haveno, Bisq, and StealthEX showing the difference between no platform KYC, accountless swaps, and anonymity. Answer: A source-backed comparison of Haveno, Bisq, and StealthEX showing the difference between no platform KYC, accountless swaps, and anonymity. Meta: date=2026-03-14 | published=2026-03-14 | reviewed=2026-07-14 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=Swap, KYC - Peer-to-peer exchanges have the clearest documented boundary: Haveno's official FAQ says the project exists to provide a peer-to-peer and decentralized way to exchange Monero for fiat currency. It answers its KYC question directly: Haveno is non-KYC. It also says arbitrators hold one of three keys and do not have custody of trade funds. - Instant swaps need a policy check for every provider: A wallet-to-wallet interface can feel account-free because it asks only for an input asset, an output asset, and a destination address. That interface does not define the full compliance process. - No registration, no routine KYC, and anonymity are different claims: "No registration" means no persistent account is required for the normal interface. "No routine KYC" means an identity check is not part of every standard transaction. Neither claim proves that the operator cannot request documents, retain network data, or disclose transaction records. - Public blockchains keep the transaction visible: Bitcoin, Ethereum, and many stablecoin networks expose transaction addresses, amounts, and timing. A swap without an identity form still creates public-chain records. A later deposit to a regulated exchange can connect an address cluster to an account, depending on the available evidence and the exchange's analysis. Sources: - Bisq official site: https://bisq.network/ - official FAQ: https://bisq.wiki/Frequently_asked_questions - Haveno official site: https://haveno.exchange/ - official FAQ: https://haveno.exchange/faq/ - StealthEX official site: https://stealthex.io/ - privacy policy: https://stealthex.io/privacy-policy/ - terms: https://stealthex.io/terms/ - Phreeli Review 2026: Signup and Payment Requirements (phreeli-anonymous-phone-carrier) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/phreeli-anonymous-phone-carrier Summary: A source-backed review of Phreeli signup, payment, data, and launch-protocol requirements, including what remains identifiable and unverified. Answer: A source-backed review of Phreeli signup, payment, data, and launch-protocol requirements, including what remains identifiable and unverified. Meta: date=2026-02 | published=2026-02 | reviewed=2026-07-14 | read_time=~7 min read | tags=Phone, Review - What the terms require: Phreeli's Terms of Service describe voice, roaming, SMS, and data as its mobile services. Plans are prepaid month to month by default. The eligibility section lists two required items for mobile service: a nine-digit ZIP code for the subscriber's residential address and a valid payment method. - Current payment claims are limited: The terms say subscribers can use methods accepted through the website and that these generally include most debit and credit cards. They discuss cryptocurrency only conditionally: "if" the company offers it, network fees and price volatility apply. - The public privacy claim is data minimization: Phreeli's privacy overview says the company separates payments from phone use, collects the minimum needed for service and legal compliance, and does not sell data or do business with data brokers. These are company statements, not an independent audit. - The white paper separates the full design from launch: Phreeli published a Double-Blind Armadillo white paper describing an architecture intended to separate user payment, authentication, login, and phone-service operations. It builds on Privacy Pass and user commitments to reduce linkability between service components. Sources: - Double-Blind Armadillo white paper: https://www.phreeli.com/files/PhreeliDoubleBlindArmadilloWhitePaper.pdf - privacy overview: https://www.phreeli.com/privacy - Privacy Policy: https://www.phreeli.com/privacy/policy - Terms of Service: https://www.phreeli.com/terms-of-service - Coldcard: 2026 Firmware Random-Number Flaw and Bitcoin Theft (coldcard-rng-entropy-incident-2026) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/coldcard-rng-entropy-incident-2026 Summary: A 2021 firmware migration silently weakened Coldcard wallet-seed randomness. What Coinkite and independent researchers confirmed, what remains a disputed AI claim, and how to check exposure. Answer: A 2021 firmware migration silently weakened Coldcard wallet-seed randomness. What Coinkite and independent researchers confirmed, what remains a disputed AI claim, and how to check exposure. Meta: date=2026-08-06 | published=2026-08-06 | reviewed=2026-08-06 | read_time=~9 min read | tags=Bitcoin, Wallet, Security Figure: FIG.C01: A zero-valued guard selected a deterministic fallback. The stable root cause was a defined-only build guard that silently selected a deterministic fallback; the hardware TRNG code remained present but the seed-generation call did not reach it. Figure image: https://cunicula.com/article-figures/coldcard-rng-entropy-incident-2026/coldcard-rng-causal-chain--article-desktop.png (1200x566; alt: Six-stage Coldcard failure chain from the 2021 seed-path migration through a defined-only build guard, setting value zero, Yasmarang fallback, reduced seed entropy, and precomputed-key monitoring.) Figure data: Coldcard RNG failure causal chain - Stage=Firmware migration | What happened=The 2021 libsecp256k1 migration rerouted wallet-seed generation through a general random-number call | Evidence source=Coinkite advisory; Block Engineering - Stage=Build guard | What happened=MICROPY_HW_ENABLE_RNG tested whether the setting was defined rather than whether it was nonzero | Evidence source=Coinkite advisory; Block Engineering - Stage=Zero value | What happened=The setting existed with value 0, so the intended guard did not fire | Evidence source=Coinkite technical backgrounder - Stage=Fallback selection | What happened=The firmware linked the deterministic Yasmarang software fallback instead of the hardware TRNG | Evidence source=Coinkite advisory; Block Engineering - Stage=Silent build | What happened=The TRNG code was present and both generators shared a function signature, so the build produced no error | Evidence source=Coinkite technical backgrounder - Stage=Reduced entropy | What happened=Coinkite estimated about 40 bits for Mk2/Mk3 and about 72 bits for Mk4/Mk5/Q | Evidence source=Coinkite advisory; Block Engineering - Stage=Attack mechanism | What happened=Attackers can precompute reachable keys, watch the public mempool, and race the owner with a competing spend | Evidence source=WatchGuard and eevblog accounts; cited on-chain transaction - Stage=Repair boundary | What happened=Fixed firmware stops new affected seeds but does not repair an existing affected seed | Evidence source=Coinkite advisory; Coldcard changelog - What happened, and why: Coinkite's security advisory and a same-day independent analysis from Block trace the flaw to a 2021 migration that rerouted wallet-seed generation from Coldcard's hardware random-number generator toward a general call meant to resolve to the device's STM32 true-random-number generator. A build guard, MICROPY_HW_ENABLE_RNG , checked only whether that setting was defined , not whether it was nonzero. Coinkite had defined it as 0 , so the guard never fired, and the firmware silently linked MicroPython's deterministic software fallback, Yasmarang, instead of the hardware TRNG. Coinkite's technical backgrounder states the TRNG code was present in the compiled binary and had passed review; nobody had traced whether the seed-generation call actually reached it. Both generators shared the same function signature, so the build produced no error. - Which devices are affected: Updating firmware does not repair an existing seed. Coinkite's current advisory says a passphrase does not repair it either: migrate as soon as practical. The dice exception requires at least 50 independent, fair, private rolls that have not been exposed. The advisory lists the exact conditions and current firmware releases. - How attackers are actually draining wallets: Independent researcher Dave Jones (eevblog) and a live defensive demo from the WatchGuard project (we_satoshis) describe a consistent mechanism, not guesswork about intent. Attackers precompute a database mapping every private key reachable inside the weakened search space to its corresponding Bitcoin address, then run real-time monitoring of the public mempool against that address list. The moment a matching address receives a deposit, the attacker already holds the private key and can broadcast a competing spend immediately; in one documented test the sweep attempt appeared roughly 10 seconds after the deposit. - An unresolved warning claim: Bitcoin Core contributor James O'Beirne stated on X that he audited coldcard/firmware in May 2025, traced its RNG path to libNgU, a little-used library with a handful of GitHub stars, and found it relied on hardcoded Yasmarang constants he considered sloppy. He says he reported doubts that the true hardware RNG was in use and advised Coinkite to remove the library and link libsecp256k1 directly, but was told the boards were already properly configured and that a problem would already be known if one existed. He did not push further at the time. This is O'Beirne's own account; Cunicula found no public Coinkite reply addressing it specifically. Separately, following disclosure, at least one outlet reported that researchers traced the commit containing the faulty build guard to a code path signed off by Coinkite co-founder and CTO Peter Gray, a named detail worth tracking, not a finding this review independently verified. Sources: - Coinkite: Coldcard security advisory: https://blog.coinkite.com/coldcard-mk3-seed-generation-warning/ - Coinkite: Technical deep dive into the entropy issue: https://blog.coinkite.com/entropy-technical-backgrounder/ - Coinkite: Update, Sunday: https://blog.coinkite.com/update-sunday/ - Cointelegraph: at least 15 attackers exploited the vulnerability: https://cointelegraph.com/news/15-attackers-exploited-coldcard-vulnerability-galaxy - Coldcard official site: https://coldcard.com/ - current migration guide: https://coldcard.com/security/migrate - current advisory: https://coldcard.com/security/status - Decrypt: Coldcard exploit balloons to $88 million: https://decrypt.co/374817/coldcard-bitcoin-exploit-88-million-attackers-draining-wallets - Decrypt: Coldcard exploit explained: https://decrypt.co/374916/coldcard-bitcoin-exploit-explained-entropy-keys-bits - Block Engineering: predictable RNG fallback and 32-bit reseed analysis: https://engineering.block.xyz/blog/predictable-rng-fallback-and-32-bit-reseed-in-coldcard-firmware - Fortune: what we know about the $116 million Coldcard exploit: https://fortune.com/2026/08/04/bitcoin-owners-rocked-116-million-hack-what-we-know-coldcard-exploit/ - Foundation Passport Prime official site: https://foundation.xyz/ - Coldcard/firmware GitHub: release changelog: https://github.com/Coldcard/firmware/blob/master/releases/ChangeLog.md - mempool.space: cited RBF-conflict transaction: https://mempool.space/tx/cf6992a9fc4d1f3fdea47ae451b13a92f71e4291f01f36b54db630aafa88dd0e - BleepingComputer: Coldcard RNG flaw linked to $88 million theft: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/coldcard-wallet-rng-flaw-likely-linked-to-88-million-bitcoin-theft/ - CoinDesk: how bitcoin cold wallets lost $70 million: https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2026/08/01/how-bitcoin-cold-wallets-lost-usd70-million-in-an-attack-that-never-touched-the-devices - CoinDesk: losses may near $114 million as fourth sweep emerges: https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2026/08/03/coldcard-wallet-losses-may-near-usd114-million-as-possible-fourth-sweep-emerges - CoinDesk: Coldcard urges users to move bitcoin as exploit continues: https://www.coindesk.com/tech/2026/08/04/coldcard-urges-users-to-move-bitcoin-as-active-wallet-exploit-continues - Dave Jones (@eevblog) on X: attack mechanism explainer: https://x.com/eevblog/status/2085240683452092770 - James O'Beirne (@jamesob) on X: May 2025 audit account: https://x.com/jamesob/status/2084624605969350915 - WatchGuard (@we_satoshis) on X: live RBF defense demonstration: https://x.com/we_satoshis/status/2085034468935450918 - Chatrie v. United States: What the Geofence Ruling Does and Does Not Decide (chatrie-geofence-ruling-license-plate-readers) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/chatrie-geofence-ruling-license-plate-readers Summary: The Supreme Court held that acquiring Google Location History is a Fourth Amendment search. It did not set a warrant standard and did not address license plate readers. Answer: The Supreme Court held that acquiring Google Location History is a Fourth Amendment search. It did not set a warrant standard and did not address license plate readers. Meta: date=2026-07-12 | published=2026-07-12 | reviewed=2026-08-10 | read_time=~4 min read | tags=Surveillance, Policy - What the Court decided: The holding is limited and clear: acquiring Chatrie's Location History from Google was a search because a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in cell-phone location information. The Court said the data was more precise and more frequent than the cell-site records considered in Carpenter. Syllabus and opinion pages 13-29, retrieved 10 August 2026 . - What the Court did not decide: It did not announce a complete warrant template for geofence requests. Opinion pages 29-32, retrieved 10 August 2026 . - Why plate-reader databases are a separate question: Automated plate readers capture a plate number with the date, time, and location of an observation. Fixed and vehicle-mounted cameras can send those records to searchable databases, where retention and sharing rules vary. EFF Surveillance Self-Defense ALPR guide, retrieved 10 August 2026 . - Current case posture: The Supreme Court docket records the 29 June opinion, judgment issued on 31 July, and remand to the Fourth Circuit. The Supreme Court's opinion directs the lower court to address the unresolved warrant questions. Supreme Court docket, retrieved 10 August 2026 ; opinion, retrieved 10 August 2026 . Sources: - EFF Surveillance Self-Defense ALPR guide, retrieved 10 August 2026: https://sls.eff.org/technologies/automated-license-plate-readers-alprs (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Supreme Court docket, retrieved 10 August 2026: https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-112.html (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Opinion discussion of public roads and private places, retrieved 10 August 2026: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-112_0am4.pdf (retrieved 2026-08-10) - US CBDC Restriction in Public Law 119-101 (us-cbdc-ban-road-to-housing-act) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/us-cbdc-ban-road-to-housing-act Summary: The enacted Federal Reserve CBDC restriction, its exact definition, intermediary scope, exception, authorization rule, and 2030 sunset. Answer: The enacted Federal Reserve CBDC restriction, its exact definition, intermediary scope, exception, authorization rule, and 2030 sunset. Meta: date=2026-07-12 | published=2026-07-12 | reviewed=2026-08-10 | read_time=~4 min read | tags=Policy, Payments - The statutory definition: The definition covers a digital asset that satisfies four conditions: it is denominated in US dollars, is a United States currency, is a direct liability of the Federal Reserve System, and is widely available to the general public. The law imports the term digital asset from the GENIUS Act. Federal Reserve Act Section 16A(a), retrieved 10 August 2026 . - What the prohibition does: Section 16A(b) says the Federal Reserve Board or a Federal Reserve bank may not issue or create a CBDC, or a substantially similar digital asset, directly or indirectly through a financial institution or other intermediary. Section 16A(b), retrieved 10 August 2026 . - What it does not ban: The definition does not reach a private dollar token merely because it is digital or dollar-denominated. To be a CBDC under this section, the asset must also be a direct Federal Reserve liability and widely available to the public. Section 16A(a), retrieved 10 August 2026 . - Enactment and current Federal Reserve position: The Office of the Federal Register note says H.R. 6644 was presented to the President on 29 June and became law without a signature on 11 July 2026. The statutory CBDC section ceases to be effective on 31 December 2030. Enactment note and Section 16A(d), retrieved 10 August 2026 . Sources: - Federal Reserve CBDC FAQ, retrieved 10 August 2026: https://www.federalreserve.gov/cbdc-faqs.htm (retrieved 2026-08-10) - GovInfo Public Law 119-101 package: https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/PLAW-119publ101 (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Federal Reserve Act Section 16A(a), retrieved 10 August 2026: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-119publ101/html/PLAW-119publ101.htm (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Phishing, Stalkerware, and Mercenary Spyware Triage (spyware-apps-detection-guide) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/spyware-apps-detection-guide Summary: Evidence-specific checks for suspicious messages, hidden monitoring apps, and high-confidence mercenary-spyware notifications, with survivor-safe response guidance. Answer: Evidence-specific checks for suspicious messages, hidden monitoring apps, and high-confidence mercenary-spyware notifications, with survivor-safe response guidance. Meta: date=2026-07-12 | published=2026-07-12 | reviewed=2026-08-10 | read_time=~4 min read | tags=Privacy Guides, Mobile Security - 1. Suspicious message or phishing: Check the actual sender address, the destination behind a link, requests for passwords or financial data, and unexpected attachments. Do not click or download from an untrusted message. Open the service through its official app or a known address instead. Google's phishing indicators and response steps, retrieved 10 August 2026 . - 2. Stalkerware after device access: The FTC's SpyFone complaint documents one concrete installation pattern: the purchaser needed physical access, downloaded the app outside Google Play, bypassed operating-system restrictions, disabled app verification, and hid the app under the name "System Service." After installation, monitoring continued remotely. This is evidence about SpyFone, not a claim that every stalkerware product works identically. FTC complaint paragraphs 6-9, retrieved 10 August 2026 . - 3. Mercenary spyware and threat notifications: Citizen Lab forensically linked two journalists' cases to Paragon's Graphite spyware. It identified an iMessage zero-click attack, and Apple told the researchers that the exploited issue was mitigated as of iOS 18.3.1 and assigned CVE-2025-43200. Citizen Lab forensic report, retrieved 10 August 2026 . - Triage by evidence: The useful question is not "Which scanner should I install?" It is "What evidence do I have, who may be responsible, and could my response create a safety risk?" The source-specific path above keeps those cases separate. Sources: - Citizen Lab forensic report, retrieved 10 August 2026: https://citizenlab.ca/2025/06/first-forensic-confirmation-of-paragons-ios-mercenary-spyware-finds-journalists-targeted/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Survivor detection, removal, and prevention guidance, retrieved 10 August 2026: https://stopstalkerware.org/information-for-survivors/ (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Apple threat-notification guidance, retrieved 10 August 2026: https://support.apple.com/en-us/102174 (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Google's phishing indicators and response steps, retrieved 10 August 2026: https://support.google.com/mail/answer/8253 (retrieved 2026-08-10) - FTC complaint paragraphs 6-9, retrieved 10 August 2026: https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/192_3003_spyfone_complaint.pdf (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Google's EU Copyright Submission: Site-Blocking Safeguards (eu-site-blocking-google-copyright-submission) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/eu-site-blocking-google-copyright-submission Summary: Google's filed EU copyright position on subsidiary injunctions, shared infrastructure, judicial review, transparency, proportionality, and time limits. Answer: Google's filed EU copyright position on subsidiary injunctions, shared infrastructure, judicial review, transparency, proportionality, and time limits. Meta: date=2026-07-12 | published=2026-07-12 | reviewed=2026-08-10 | read_time=~4 min read | tags=Policy, Censorship - Google's position: Google says injunctions should be subsidiary. A claimant should first show an attempt to reach the infringer, show that notice and takedown was insufficient, and show that removal at the hosting source was ineffective. Submission pages 29-30, retrieved 10 August 2026 . - Why shared infrastructure matters: The filing says a DNS block makes an entire domain inaccessible, including lawful content, and that modern IP addresses are often shared by multiple domains and services. It argues that blocking one shared address can restrict unrelated lawful sites. Submission pages 27 and 30, retrieved 10 August 2026 . - The safeguards Google requested: POSITION PAPER, NOT POLICY Record F33504634 is Google's advocacy in Commission evidence-gathering. The consultation record does not itself create a site-blocking duty, and Google's incident and scale claims in the filing are not Commission findings. Feedback record, retrieved 10 August 2026 ; Commission initiative record, retrieved 10 August 2026 . - Current status: The Commission initiative page remains a closed call for evidence. Google's filed response provides a specific safeguard proposal for any later measure; it is not the later measure. Commission initiative record, retrieved 10 August 2026 ; Google feedback record, retrieved 10 August 2026 . Sources: - Submission pages 27 and 30, retrieved 10 August 2026: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/api/download/090166e52ff2de8c (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Google feedback record, retrieved 10 August 2026: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/18172-Report-on-the-review-of-the-2019-EU-rules-on-copyright-and-related-rights-in-the-digital-single-market/F33504634_en (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Commission initiative record, retrieved 10 August 2026: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/18173-Targeted-initiative-for-a-better-copyright-environment-for-European-creativity-and-innovation_en (retrieved 2026-08-10) - Manifest V3 and the Limits of Chrome Content Blocking in 2026 (manifest-v3-content-blocking-limits) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/manifest-v3-content-blocking-limits Summary: Chrome disabled Manifest V2 extensions in July 2025, ending the full uBlock Origin on Chrome. What declarativeNetRequest can and cannot filter, and why Firefox kept the blocking webRequest API. Answer: Chrome disabled Manifest V2 extensions in July 2025, ending the full uBlock Origin on Chrome. What declarativeNetRequest can and cannot filter, and why Firefox kept the blocking webRequest API. Meta: date=2026-08-06 | published=2026-08-06 | reviewed=2026-08-06 | read_time=~5 min read | tags=Privacy Tools, Google - What replaced the blocking API: Manifest V2 extensions could register a blocking webRequest listener, which lets an extension inspect each network request and decide in code whether to allow it. Manifest V3 replaces that with declarativeNetRequest , where the extension ships rules in advance and the browser applies them. Chrome's API reference sets a guaranteed minimum of 30,000 static rules across enabled rulesets, with a maximum of 100 declared rulesets and 50 enabled at once. - What still works on Chrome: Declarative blocking is not nothing. uBlock Origin Lite compiles filter lists into rulesets at build time and reports a default ruleset of roughly 17,000 rules in Optimal or Complete mode, rising slightly above 30,000 with all seven Annoyances rulesets, two Privacy rulesets and one large regional ruleset enabled. Because the rulesets are precompiled and packaged, uBO Lite makes no network requests to remote servers, and its filtering is reliable at browser launch even when the extension service worker is suspended. Its documented tradeoff is that rulesets update only when the extension itself updates through the store, rather than on a filter-list refresh schedule. - Firefox kept the blocking API: Mozilla stated in its Manifest V3 plan that Chrome's removal of blocking webRequest would limit the capabilities of privacy extensions without an adequate replacement, and that Mozilla would maintain support for blocking webRequest in Manifest V3 while also shipping declarativeNetRequest for compatibility. That decision is why the unmodified uBlock Origin still runs on Firefox. - Where this leaves a reader: None of these options is equivalent to the others, and no combination restores the exact filtering set that Manifest V2 allowed on Chrome. What a reader can verify is which capabilities each option documents, which is the basis for the comparison above. For a general method of checking claims like these before trusting a tool, see how to vet a privacy tool . Sources: - Manifest v3 in Firefox: Recap and Next Steps, Mozilla Add-ons Community Blog: https://blog.mozilla.org/addons/2022/05/18/manifest-v3-in-firefox-recap-next-steps/ - Manifest V2 support timeline, Chrome for Developers: https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/develop/migrate/mv2-deprecation-timeline - chrome.declarativeNetRequest API reference, Chrome for Developers: https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/api/declarativeNetRequest - uBlock Origin works best on Firefox, gorhill/uBlock wiki: https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/uBlock-Origin-works-best-on-Firefox - uBlock Origin Lite frequently asked questions, uBlockOrigin/uBOL-home wiki: https://github.com/uBlockOrigin/uBOL-home/wiki/Frequently-asked-questions-(FAQ) - Librewolf official site: https://librewolf.net/ - Tor Browser official site: https://www.torproject.org/ - GrapheneOS Duress Claim: What the Court Record Supports (grapheneos-duress-code-prosecution) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/grapheneos-duress-code-prosecution Summary: Federal filings in United States v. Tunick allege deletion of Pixel data after a password was entered. They do not name GrapheneOS or confirm that a duress credential was used. Answer: Federal filings in United States v. Tunick allege deletion of Pixel data after a password was entered. They do not name GrapheneOS or confirm that a duress credential was used. Meta: date=2026-08-09 | published=2026-08-09 | reviewed=2026-08-09 | read_time=~5 min read | tags=Privacy Tools, Policy - What the charging document alleges: The indictment was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division, under case number 1:25-cr-00499-ELR-CCB. It alleges that on 24 January 2025, before and during a search by a Customs and Border Protection officer, Tunick knowingly took action to delete digital contents of a Google Pixel to prevent or impair the United States from taking that property into lawful custody. It charges one count under 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a). These are charging allegations, not findings. Indictment, pages 1 to 2. Retrieved 9 August 2026. - What the defence filing says happened: A suppression motion filed on 17 March 2026 says Tunick was referred to secondary inspection after returning from the Dominican Republic. It says officers repeatedly requested the phone password. Describing the government's account, the motion says that after the password was entered, the screen went blank, flashed several times, and appeared to restart. The motion characterises the government's theory as an alleged wipe or encryption caused through a specific password. Defence motion, pages 2 to 5. Retrieved 9 August 2026. - What the GrapheneOS feature actually does: GrapheneOS separately documents an optional duress PIN or password. When entered where the operating system requests a normal credential, it irreversibly wipes the device and installed eSIMs. The project says the wipe is prioritised, cannot be interrupted through a reboot, and does not itself require a reboot. Those are product-documentation facts; they do not identify what occurred in the Tunick case. GrapheneOS duress documentation. Retrieved 9 August 2026. - What remains unproven: The reviewed court filings do not identify the phone's operating system or use the terms GrapheneOS, duress PIN, or duress password. Indictment. Motion. Retrieved 9 August 2026. Sources: - GrapheneOS project statement on locked-device extraction and duress.: https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/40700-grapheneos-protections-against-data-extraction-from-locked-devices (retrieved 2026-08-09) - GrapheneOS official site: https://grapheneos.org/ (retrieved 2026-08-09) - GrapheneOS duress documentation. Retrieved 9 August 2026.: https://grapheneos.org/features#duress (retrieved 2026-08-09) - United States v. Tunick, indictment, filed 13 November 2025.: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.351975/gov.uscourts.gand.351975.1.0.pdf (retrieved 2026-08-09) - Defence motion to suppress statements and physical evidence, filed 17 March 2026.: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.351975/gov.uscourts.gand.351975.21.0.pdf (retrieved 2026-08-09) - Minute sheet for the 20 July 2026 evidentiary hearing.: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.351975/gov.uscourts.gand.351975.31.0.pdf (retrieved 2026-08-09) - CourtListener docket for United States v. Tunick.: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/71998357/united-states-v-tunick/ (retrieved 2026-08-09) - Official United States Code text. Retrieved 9 August 2026.: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2023-title18/pdf/USCODE-2023-title18-partI-chap109-sec2232.pdf (retrieved 2026-08-09) - Minneapolis Rejects Skydio Drones While Whittier Expands Axon's DFR Program (minneapolis-skydio-drone-rejection) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/minneapolis-skydio-drone-rejection Summary: Minneapolis councilmembers rejected a Skydio drone pilot 6-6 over the vendor's ICE and Israeli military sales, while Whittier, California approved a $3.44M Axon DFR expansion 4-1 the same week. Both council records compared. Answer: Minneapolis councilmembers rejected a Skydio drone pilot 6-6 over the vendor's ICE and Israeli military sales, while Whittier, California approved a $3.44M Axon DFR expansion 4-1 the same week. Both council records compared. Meta: date=2026-08-06 | published=2026-08-06 | reviewed=2026-08-06 | read_time=~6 min read | tags=Surveillance, Policy - What the Minneapolis pilot proposed: The rejected proposal, filed in the city's legislative record, would have let the Minneapolis Police Department fly Skydio drones as first responders for a 75-day trial at no cost to the city, launching from two docks at Fire Station 14 in north Minneapolis. Under the plan, drones would respond to 911 calls and livestream video to dispatch so commanders could judge whether to send officers, and could also be used to search for missing people. Non-evidentiary footage would have been deleted within seven days, with a public dashboard tracking flight dates, locations, and stated reasons. - The 6-6 vote and the stated reasons on each side: Council member LaTrisha Vetaw, who sponsored the pilot, argued a 75-day trial was the appropriate way to test whether faster video on scene could help locate missing people or de-escalate calls. Mayor Jacob Frey attended to back the plan and argued rejecting it would not send a message to any foreign government while making it harder to keep residents safe. Council member Jamal Osman said he had supported the pilot until he learned Skydio drones had been used by ICE, which MPR News separately reported flew drones over Minnesota the preceding winter, and by the Israeli military; he said he supported drone technology only from a vendor without contracts with militaries he said were killing people. The proposal failed on the 6-6 tie. Minneapolis Community Safety Commissioner Todd Barnette said afterward the city had missed a chance to evaluate the technology with real data rather than assumptions. Skydio did not respond to a request for comment from MPR News. - What Whittier approved, and what it actually cost: Whittier Informed, an independent local outlet, reported the council approved the DFR program in a 4-1 vote on July 14, 2026, with Council Member Aida Macedo casting the sole no vote over privacy concerns and the program's integration with Peregrine, a separate data-software contract the council rejected later the same meeting. The outlet reported that Whittier folded the drone purchase into a restructured five-year Axon agreement rather than a standalone order, and that the staff report presented to the council detailed only the drone cost, not the total contract value or the fact that two existing Axon equipment orders were being closed and replaced. Macedo said during the meeting she could not locate the actual Axon master agreement in the packet; the city attorney's office said it had reviewed that agreement separately and pointed her to a hyperlink inside the packet. The reporting states no competitive bid process preceded the expanded agreement, though competitors including Motorola Solutions, in partnership with Brinc, market comparable drone-first-responder systems. - How Whittier says the drones will be used: Whittier Police Chief Aviv Bar told the council the department operates 13 drones and typically flies one at a time, dispatched only through a watch commander rather than by individual officers. Bar cited examples including a case in a neighboring city where a drone identified a toy gun from roughly 200 feet up before officers arrived, and described using heat-sensing cameras for nighttime searches. He said cameras record only when a drone is examining a suspected crime, footage uploads to Evidence.com alongside body-camera video, and is shared with the LA County District Attorney's Office when needed for a case. Bar said the department does not provide drone or other Axon data to federal immigration agents on its own, citing California's SB 54 limits on local cooperation with civil immigration enforcement, and that a public dashboard will show the date, time, location, and stated reason for each flight once DFR launches, a disclosure the outlet reported the department's existing drone program does not currently provide. Sources: - Public comment record on the Skydio contract, Minneapolis city legislative record: https://lims.minneapolismn.gov/Download/FileV2/54692/Public-Comment-Contract-with-Skydio-July-8-2026.pdf - Drones as First Responders pilot program presentation, Minneapolis city legislative record: https://lims.minneapolismn.gov/Download/RCAV2/54643/Drones-as-First-Responders-Pilot-Program-Presentation.pdf - Minnesota drone sightings drove surveillance fears as ICE surged, MPR News: https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/03/13/minnesota-drone-sightings-drove-surveillance-fears-as-ice-surged - Minneapolis City Council rejects police drone contract with Skydio, MPR News: https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/07/16/minneapolis-city-council-rejects-police-drone-contract-with-skydio - Council approves police drone program as part of larger $3.4 million Axon deal, Whittier Informed: https://www.whittierinformed.com/council-approves-police-drone-program-as-part-of-larger-3-4-million-axon-deal/ - The SCREEN Act Cleared a Committee Vote, Then Stalled on Quorum (screen-act-age-verification-vpn) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/screen-act-age-verification-vpn Summary: S.737 (SCREEN Act) requires age verification for VPN and proxy traffic on any site with adult content. On Aug 5, 2026 the Senate Commerce Committee voted 15-13 in favor but the bill did not advance for lack of quorum. Answer: S.737 (SCREEN Act) requires age verification for VPN and proxy traffic on any site with adult content. On Aug 5, 2026 the Senate Commerce Committee voted 15-13 in favor but the bill did not advance for lack of quorum. Meta: date=2026-08-06 | published=2026-08-06 | reviewed=2026-08-17 | read_time=~6 min read | tags=Policy, VPN - The August 5 committee vote: EFF, which opposes the bill, published an update directly on its original analysis: "On August 5, 2026, the Senate Commerce Committee voted 15-13 to advance this bill, but the bill did not advance because of a lack of Senators in attendance." That is a narrower and more specific outcome than either "passed committee" or "blocked in committee." The numeric vote favored the bill. The committee could not finalize that outcome because quorum, a minimum number of members physically present, was not met. Structurally, this differs from KOSA, a related youth-safety bill considered by the same committee the same day, which EFF reported did advance out of committee on August 5, 2026 and now awaits a full Senate vote. - What the bill would require: S.737 defines a covered platform as an interactive computer service with a US nexus that, in its regular course of trade or business and with the objective of earning a profit, creates, hosts, or makes harmful-to-minors content available. It would require those covered platforms to adopt age-verification technology confirming that users are not minors before granting access to qualifying content. The bill sets no threshold requiring that a meaningful share of a covered platform's content qualify; EFF argues that this could reach mainstream platforms including Netflix, Reddit, Discord, and Bluesky, not only dedicated adult sites. - The VPN-specific provision: S.737 requires covered services to run age verification based on a user's IP address unless the service can determine the user is located outside the United States, and it specifically requires verification to trigger on traffic recognized as coming from a VPN or proxy address. EFF has argued this treats VPN use itself as a signal requiring identity verification, which it says discourages a tool millions of people rely on for reasons unrelated to the bill's stated purpose, including securing public Wi-Fi, protecting journalists and activists, and limiting tracking. For background on how VPN and other circumvention tools respond to government mandates generally, see Age Verification and Privacy and Operating-System Age Verification Requirements , which cover the UK, Australia, EU, and California AB 1043 regimes already in force. - How this compares to state age-verification laws already active: State laws such as California's AB 1043 apply device- or OS-level age brackets to the operating system rather than mandating identity verification at every site with adult content. Sources: - S.737 - SCREEN Act, 119th Congress, congress.gov: https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/737 - The SCREEN Act Threatens Privacy Far Beyond Adult Websites, Electronic Frontier Foundation: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2026/07/screen-act-threatens-privacy-far-beyond-adult-websites - S.737: SCREEN Act, GovTrack.us: https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/119/s737 - Guinea Blocked Three Platforms After a Cabinet Reshuffle. VPN Demand Rose Over 3,000%. (guinea-vpn-surge-social-media-blackout) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/guinea-vpn-surge-social-media-blackout Summary: Guinea blocked Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok nationwide on July 28, 2026 with no official explanation. VPN Observatory telemetry shows demand rising over 3,000% within three days. Answer: Guinea blocked Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok nationwide on July 28, 2026 with no official explanation. VPN Observatory telemetry shows demand rising over 3,000% within three days. Meta: date=2026-08-06 | published=2026-08-06 | reviewed=2026-08-06 | read_time=~6 min read | tags=Censorship, VPN - A reshuffle, then a blackout: On the night of July 27, 2026, Doumbouya's office announced a partial cabinet reshuffle: Prime Minister Bah Oury kept his post, several ministers were dropped, and three new officials joined the government. Unconfirmed rumors about Doumbouya's own health circulated the same night. By the following morning, Guineans found Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok unreachable. The Guinean Bloggers' Association, known by its French acronym ABLOGUI, activated its monitoring network and ran independent technical tests from Conakry and several regions. The results showed the three platforms failing while every other service worked normally, ruling out a routine network fault and confirming a deliberate, targeted block. - What the VPN telemetry shows: VPN Super's dataset compares hourly and daily VPN connection volume to Guinea-destination servers against a pre-blackout baseline; the figures are percentage changes, not absolute connection counts, and the company does not publish raw usage numbers for any single country. Daily volume rose 547% on July 28, the first day of the block, then accelerated to 2,143% on July 29 and 3,108% on July 30, the single busiest day in the eight-day measurement window. The busiest hour on record landed even later, at 6 a.m. UTC on July 31, running roughly 27 times above the pre-blackout hourly average. Traffic kept setting new highs into a fourth day rather than leveling off, which the dataset's authors read as a sign that Guineans were still discovering the block rather than adjusting to it. - Not Guinea's first blackout, and not Africa's only one: Guinea's government blocked the same three platforms for roughly 48 hours in April 2026, that time following a public warning from the media regulator, and dissolved approximately 40 opposition parties in March 2026. The July block came with no comparable warning. VPN Super's writeup places the incident alongside two other recent African platform blackouts it has tracked: a Gabon social-media blackout in February 2026 tied to a labor strike, and a Cameroon election-period internet blackout in 2025 that coincided with a contested vote count. In each case cited, platforms returned only after public pressure built, without an official government explanation attached. - What happens next: Nothing in Guinea's past blackouts suggests a fixed timeline. The April block lifted after roughly 48 hours with no announcement; the July block had already run several times longer with no signal of an end date as of this writing. Two things to watch: whether Guinea's regulator or government ever confirms what happened, and whether the three platforms return all at once or in stages. If the pattern from April holds, VPN demand is likely to stay elevated for some time even after the platforms return. Sources: - Cameroon Election Internet Blackout, 2025, VPN Super VPN Observatory: https://vpnsuper.com/vpn-observatory/cameroon-election-internet-blackout-2025 - Gabon Social Media Blackout, February 2026, VPN Super VPN Observatory: https://vpnsuper.com/vpn-observatory/gabon-social-media-blackout-february-2026 - Guinea VPN Surge 3,100% in July 2026: Social Media Blackout, VPN Super VPN Observatory: https://vpnsuper.com/vpn-observatory/guinea-vpn-surge-social-media-blackout-july-2026 - A VPN Provider Built a Tool to Strip Windows' Hidden Device ID (windows-gdid-degdid-tracking) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/windows-gdid-degdid-tracking Summary: Windscribe published research into GDID, a Microsoft-issued Windows device identifier, and released deGDID to remove it. GDID surfaced in an unsealed federal complaint and operates outside VPN-tunneled traffic. Answer: Windscribe published research into GDID, a Microsoft-issued Windows device identifier, and released deGDID to remove it. GDID surfaced in an unsealed federal complaint and operates outside VPN-tunneled traffic. Meta: date=2026-08-06 | published=2026-08-06 | reviewed=2026-08-06 | read_time=~6 min read | tags=Surveillance, Hardware - What GDID is, and what it is not: Microsoft publicly documents GlobalDeviceId in its UCDOStatus reference table, used for Windows Update for Business and Delivery Optimization reporting, describing it as a device identifier generated by Microsoft and used internally. Windscribe's research states GDID is distinct from an advertising ID, a Microsoft account user ID, and a hardware serial number. Its own testing indicates the identifier is minted through Windows identity and account-registration flows, with hardware signals feeding the request rather than determining it outright; reinstalling Windows produces a new GDID rather than restoring the old one. - How it surfaced in a federal case: GDID became public through a superseding complaint against Peter Stokes, a 19-year-old alleged member of the Scattered Spider hacking group, unsealed by federal prosecutors on July 1, 2026. Windscribe's post states that Microsoft supplied investigators logs correlating a Windows GDID with IP activity, including the creation of an ngrok account at the same minute an intrusion began, and IP addresses tied to personal accounts prosecutors attribute to Stokes, in some instances within hours of each other. Windscribe is careful to note the public record does not identify the exact Windows component or event that produced those logs, and it does not claim GDID is transmitted to every website a user visits; its stated claim is narrower, that GDID can exist on a machine, that Microsoft can associate it with account and network activity, and that common local-privacy advice tends to ignore it. - Why deleting one registry key does not remove it: Windscribe's lab testing found that a local Windows account, one that had never minted a GDID, stayed clean only while the registration path itself was actively blocked; removing the block let a real GDID appear again shortly after. The company also reports that removing the obvious registry value, an entry it calls the LID, was not sufficient on its own: after a reboot, a related account-level identifier called the user PUID reappeared even while the LID stayed blocked. Windscribe describes related identity state spread across IdentityCRL locations, token fields, device tickets, Credential Manager entries, and user profile caches, meaning a single deletion does not break identity continuity the way many "debloat" scripts assume. - What deGDID actually does: The deGDID tool, published to GitHub, is described by Windscribe as deliberately narrow: it targets known local GDID state on supported unmanaged Windows systems and then blocks the Microsoft DeviceAdd path so Windows cannot immediately mint or retrieve a replacement. It does not erase Microsoft's server-side historical records, does not support managed or domain-joined machines, and does not guarantee every possible GDID copy is gone. The tool refuses to run on domain-joined, Entra-joined, MDM-enrolled, or ambiguous multi-profile systems, requires administrator rights, and backs up what it modifies to support an undo path. Windscribe warns that blocking the underlying Microsoft identity paths can degrade features tied to a Microsoft account, including sign-in flows, Microsoft Store, Xbox, OneDrive, device sync, passkeys, and Windows Hello, describing the tradeoff explicitly rather than presenting the tool as a free toggle. Sources: - deGDID, GitHub: https://github.com/yegors/deGDID - UCDOStatus table reference, Microsoft Learn: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/azure-monitor/reference/tables/ucdostatus - Windows Tracks You With a Hidden ID. So We Built deGDID to Block It, Windscribe: https://windscribe.com/blog/windows-tracks-you-with-a-hidden-id-so-we-built-degdid-to-block-it - Superseding complaint against Peter Stokes, US Attorney's Office, Northern District of Illinois: https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndil/media/1450651/dl?inline= - Apple Advanced Data Protection and the UK Technical Capability Notice (uk-apple-adp-technical-capability-notice) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/uk-apple-adp-technical-capability-notice Summary: Advanced Data Protection has been unavailable to new UK users since February 2025 after a Home Office notice under Investigatory Powers Act section 253. Apple filed a fresh tribunal claim in August 2026 and the lawfulness question is undecided. Answer: Advanced Data Protection has been unavailable to new UK users since February 2025 after a Home Office notice under Investigatory Powers Act section 253. Apple filed a fresh tribunal claim in August 2026 and the lawfulness question is undecided. Meta: date=2026-08-06 | published=2026-08-06 | reviewed=2026-08-06 | read_time=~7 min read | tags=Encryption, Legal - What the notice regime actually is: Section 253 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 lets the Secretary of State give a telecommunications operator a notice requiring it to maintain the technical capability to give effect to interception warrants, equipment interference warrants, and communications data authorisations. The statutory design has two features that shape this entire dispute. The notice is not published, and the recipient is under a duty not to disclose its existence. That is why the record here is built from a February 2025 press leak, subsequent reporting, and what tribunal proceedings have forced into the open, rather than from any document either government or company has released. - The first notice was withdrawn for a reason that had nothing to do with UK users: The most consequential turn in this case is easy to misread. The first notice was reported to cover data belonging to Apple users anywhere in the world, which drew objections from United States politicians concerned about their own citizens' data. The notice was withdrawn, and the replacement issued in October 2025 was reported not to apply to US users. - What this changes for an iCloud account today: Advanced Data Protection is opt-in, and it governs a specific set of categories: iCloud backups, iCloud Drive, Photos, Notes, and voice memos. Without it, those categories sit under keys Apple holds, so Apple can produce the data when served with a valid legal demand. Categories that are end-to-end encrypted by default, including iMessage content, Health data, and iCloud Keychain passwords, are not affected by this setting. - What has not been decided: No tribunal has ruled that the UK can require a company to break end-to-end encryption, and no tribunal has ruled that it cannot. The only public ruling so far concerns secrecy: the tribunal held in April 2025 that the case could not be conducted entirely in the dark. The lawfulness, necessity, and proportionality of the notice regime are the subject of the Privacy International claim, case number IPT/25/83/CH, which is listed for a substantive hearing in December 2026 and remains open. Sources: - PI Apple TCN Challenge, case IPT/25/83/CH, Privacy International: https://privacyinternational.org/legal-action/pi-apple-tcn-challenge - Apple issues new challenge against UK order for access to private user data, BBC News, 4 August 2026: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cvg0kk3ek2vo - Investigatory Powers Act 2016, section 253, technical capability notices, legislation.gov.uk: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/section/253 - Briar Is in Maintenance Mode, Not Shut Down (briar-maintenance-mode) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/briar-maintenance-mode Summary: Briar says the project remains active but now limits work to essential security updates and bug fixes. Its repositories show a narrow maintenance cadence, not ordinary feature development. Answer: Briar says the project remains active but now limits work to essential security updates and bug fixes. Its repositories show a narrow maintenance cadence, not ordinary feature development. Meta: date=2026-08-09 | published=2026-08-09 | reviewed=2026-08-09 | read_time=~4 min read | tags=Privacy Tools, Messaging - What Briar actually announced: Briar said longstanding problems remain unresolved: high battery use, unreliable Android background operation, missing account backup and file attachments, and difficult contact and offline workflows. It said the team considered a rebuild or separate online and offline apps, but lacked funding and was working in spare time. Briar maintenance notice. Retrieved 9 August 2026. - What shipped around the announcement: Briar created the signed Android release-1.5.19 tag on 13 July 2026. The tag points to a release commit dated 29 June, before the status notice. The release record is evidence that packaging and release work continued, not proof of new post-announcement feature development. Android release tag. Retrieved 9 August 2026. - How strong is the evidence?: The direct record is limited but clear: one explicit project notice, signed release tags, changelogs, and repository histories. Briar links its announcement mailing list as an official channel, but the public archive showed no 2026 message when reviewed and added no detail beyond the website notice. Official announcement-list archive. Retrieved 9 August 2026. - What this means for users: Briar still documents direct peer-to-peer messaging over Tor, Bluetooth, and local Wi-Fi, including operation without central servers. Maintenance mode does not remove those properties. It changes the development expectation: users should expect critical upkeep, not a predictable stream of new features or fixes for every longstanding usability issue. Briar architecture overview. Retrieved 9 August 2026. Briar maintenance notice. Retrieved 9 August 2026. Sources: - Briar architecture overview. Retrieved 9 August 2026.: https://briarproject.org/how-it-works/ (retrieved 2026-08-09) - Briar Project, maintenance-mode notice, 9 July 2026.: https://briarproject.org/news/2026-maintenance-mode/ (retrieved 2026-08-09) - Desktop commit history. Retrieved 9 August 2026.: https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-desktop/-/commits/main (retrieved 2026-08-09) - Desktop changelog. Retrieved 9 August 2026.: https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar-desktop/-/wikis/Changelog#065-beta (retrieved 2026-08-09) - Android commit history. Retrieved 9 August 2026.: https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/commits/master (retrieved 2026-08-09) - Android release tag. Retrieved 9 August 2026.: https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/tags/release-1.5.19 (retrieved 2026-08-09) - Android changelog. Retrieved 9 August 2026.: https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/wikis/changelog (retrieved 2026-08-09) - Official announcement-list archive. Retrieved 9 August 2026.: https://sourceforge.net/p/briar/mailman/briar-announce/ (retrieved 2026-08-09) - Cellebrite in Australia: NSW and Victoria Phone-Access Powers Explained (cellebrite-australia-nsw-victoria-phone-access-powers) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/cellebrite-australia-nsw-victoria-phone-access-powers Summary: Cellebrite Australia, reported NSW Police use, Victoria Police phone extraction powers, and the law governing post-seizure phone access. Answer: Cellebrite Australia, reported NSW Police use, Victoria Police phone extraction powers, and the law governing post-seizure phone access. Meta: date=2026-08-16 | published=2026-08-16 | reviewed=2026-08-29 | read_time=~14 min read | tags=Surveillance, Legal, Australia - Bill status and commencement: Police Minister Yasmin Catley introduced the government bill in the Legislative Assembly on 6 August 2026. Parliament records it at second reading, with debate adjourned for five clear days. It has not passed either House and has not received assent. - What the law says: NSW and Victoria compared: The comparison does not mean NSW is copying Victoria provision for provision. Victoria’s powers remain anchored to a search warrant issued under section 465. The NSW bill is designed to add an order route after a device has already been seized under another lawful power. Victoria applies to evidence of an indictable offence; the proposed NSW route requires the narrower statutory category of a listed serious offence linked to organised crime. - Victoria: what is already in force: Sections 465AAA and 465AA of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) operate after a magistrate issues a section 465 search warrant. The warrant itself may authorise an executing officer to direct a specified person to provide reasonable and necessary information or assistance. Separately, a senior-sergeant-or-higher police officer may ask the Magistrates’ Court for an assistance order when the warrant is sought or later. - What governments and police say: The NSW government says organised-crime networks use “encrypted technology, middlemen and vulnerable young people” to distance organisers from violence. Police Minister Yasmin Catley described the response as “stronger laws, stronger powers and stronger tools to access and compel information”. NSW Police Commissioner Mal Lanyon told the ABC that police had previously prevented crimes after lawfully seizing phones or laptops but lacked lawful access, and that the bill would let investigators seek a Local Court order and “solve crime quickly”. AAP independently reported the government case as faster access for drug supply, illicit tobacco, fire-bombing and public-place shooting investigations. Sources: - AAP: Push for more access in digital crime-fighting age, 6 August 2026: https://aapnews.aap.com.au/news/push-for-more-access-in-digital-crime-fighting-age - Buy NSW supplier profile: https://buy.nsw.gov.au/supplier/profile/41128 - Cellebrite: UFED product capability claims: https://cellebrite.com/en/products/cellebrite-inseyets/ufed/ - Victorian legislation: Crimes Act 1958, authorised version 321: https://content.legislation.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-04/58-6231aa321-authorised.pdf - NSW Parliament: bill First Print: https://files.parliament.nsw.gov.au/fileapi/ParlFiles/GetArtifact?serverRelativeUrl=%2Fbill%2Ffiles%2F18942%2FFirst%20Print.pdf - Greens NSW: Organised crime reforms cover for attacks on civil liberties, 11 August 2026: https://greens.org.au/nsw/news/media-release/organised-crime-reforms-cover-attacks-civil-liberties - Victorian Greens: debate on the bill that inserted s 465AAA, 2015: https://greens.org.au/vic/news/speech/crimes-amendment-child-pornography-and-other-matters-bill-2015 - NSW legislation: LEPRA current text: https://legislation.nsw.gov.au/view/whole/html/inforce/current/act-2002-103 - Michael West Media: NSW Police to seize mobile phone data without a warrant, 8 August 2026: https://michaelwest.com.au/the-police-state-of-nsw-legislation-to-enable-warrant-less-phone-suriveilance/ - Office of the Victorian Information Commissioner: examination of Victoria Police privacy and information-handling training, 2022: https://ovic.vic.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/OVIC-examination-into-privacy-and-information-handling-at-Victoria-Police.pdf - ABC News: NSW Police Commissioner and minister on the proposed device-access power, 6 August 2026: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-08-06/nsw-digital-licences-facial-recognition-database/107002852 - Green Left: NSW Police to be given powers to download phone content, 12 August 2026: https://www.greenleft.org.au/2026/1460/analysis/nsw-police-be-given-powers-download-phone-content - Victoria Legal Aid LawHub: property searches and mobile phones: https://www.lawhub.vla.vic.gov.au/property-search - Victorian legislation: 2022 amendment bill: https://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/bills/major-crime-and-community-safety-legislation-amendment-bill-2022 - Crimes Act 1958 (Vic): https://www.legislation.vic.gov.au/in-force/acts/crimes-act-1958 - NSW Government: proposed-powers release: https://www.nsw.gov.au/ministerial-releases/minns-labor-government-to-introduce-new-powers-for-police-and-crime-commission-targeting-organised-crime - Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Further Organised Crimes Reforms) Bill 2026: https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/parliamentary-business/bills/bill-details?billId=18942 - NSW Hansard: second-reading speech: https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/parliamentary-business/hansard/hansard-full-details?id=HANSARD-1323879322-168029&section=HANSARD-1323879322-168058 - Victoria Hansard: 2022 digital-evidence reforms: https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/parliamentary-activity/hansard/hansard-details/HANSARD-974425065-19118 - Victorian Sentencing Advisory Council: sentencing data for Crimes Act s 465AAA(5): https://www.sacstat.vic.gov.au/mc-vic/fail-to-comply-with-direction-to-provide-data-from-computer-storage-device-is-subject-to-warrant-6231-465aaa-5-mc.html - Sydney Criminal Lawyers: NSW Police phone-content powers analysis, 31 July 2026: https://www.sydneycriminallawyers.com.au/blog/nsw-police-to-be-given-powers-to-access-and-download-phone-content-on-the-beat/ - Authoritative DNS Hosting Is Not Private DNS Resolution (authoritative-vs-recursive-dns-privacy) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/authoritative-vs-recursive-dns-privacy Summary: Authoritative hosting, recursive resolution, DNSSEC, registrar records, and account metadata expose different facts. A source-led DNS privacy worksheet using deSEC as a limited example. Answer: Authoritative hosting, recursive resolution, DNSSEC, registrar records, and account metadata expose different facts. A source-led DNS privacy worksheet using deSEC as a limited example. Meta: date=2026-08-17 | published=2026-08-17 | reviewed=2026-08-17 | read_time=~8 min read | tags=DNS, Privacy, Explainer - Follow one lookup through the system: RFC 8499 defines an authoritative server as one that answers authoritatively for a zone and a recursive resolver as a system that receives queries and obtains final answers by following referrals or using cached data. One organisation may operate both services, but the protocol roles and evidence remain distinct. - What an authoritative host receives: A hosted zone contains public records by design: addresses, mail exchangers, verification tokens, nameservers, and other data the owner publishes. The operator also needs an account or API control plane to change those records. That layer can create registration, authentication, token, timestamp, source-address, abuse, support, and donation records even though it never sees the user's ordinary browsing history. - Provider evidence worksheet: Identify every operator. Record the registrar, registry, authoritative host, secondary DNS providers, recursive resolver, CDN, and certificate authority. A domain can expose records to all of them for different reasons. Sources: - deSEC: organisation and service purpose: https://desec.io/about (retrieved 2026-08-17) - deSEC: terms, availability, load, and inactivity rules: https://desec.io/terms/ (retrieved 2026-08-17) - deSEC API documentation: https://desec.readthedocs.io/en/latest/ (retrieved 2026-08-17) - deSEC Stack: authoritative-server and API architecture, MIT licence: https://github.com/desec-io/desec-stack (retrieved 2026-08-17) - RFC 4033: DNSSEC introduction, guarantees, and confidentiality limit: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033.html (retrieved 2026-08-17) - RFC 8499: DNS terminology for authoritative servers and recursive resolvers: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8499.html (retrieved 2026-08-17) - FreeSocks, Tor Bridges, and Messaging Proxies Compared (freesocks-tor-messaging-proxies) URL: https://cunicula.com/en/articles/freesocks-tor-messaging-proxies Summary: Choose between FreeSocks v2, Tor bridges and Snowflake, Signal proxies, and Telegram proxies by blocking problem, metadata exposure, and privacy limits. Answer: Choose between FreeSocks v2, Tor bridges and Snowflake, Signal proxies, and Telegram proxies by blocking problem, metadata exposure, and privacy limits. Meta: date=2026-08-17 | published=2026-08-17 | reviewed=2026-08-29 | read_time=~9 min read | tags=Censorship, Privacy Tools, Explainer - FreeSocks v2 has a versioned architecture: Unredacted's July 2026 announcement says FreeSocks v2 moved to a self-hosted TypeScript and Convex control plane with Xray through Remnawave. The current public config reported Remnawave/Xray enabled and selected by default, Outline disabled, and freedom and privacy mode families. Operator documentation describes the corresponding choices as CDN-routed Freedom Mode and direct Privacy Mode. The repository still contains an Outline adapter and client metadata, while older automation describes Cloudflare Workers or KV. Those are supported or historical code paths, not evidence that Outline is live. - Logging, retention, analytics, and fronting: The operator says encrypted proxy content is not stored and its current privacy documentation describes no persisted client IPs, ephemeral HMAC rate-limit buckets, disabled Caddy and Xray access logging, short-lived per-user-agent subscription caches, optional HWID, and structured audit data. The retention implementation publishes defaults including 180 days for audit rows, 90 days for processed webhooks, 365 days for tier history, and 90 days for deleted-subscription history. These code-level defaults are more specific than a blanket “retention unspecified” label, but remain operator claims rather than an independent audit of the deployed database and nodes. - Tor transports lead into Tor: Bridges are Tor relays omitted from the public relay directory. Snowflake uses short-lived volunteer proxies, while obfs4 and WebTunnel change how the first connection appears. Unredacted operates relays, bridges, and a changing project lane previously called Operation Envoy and later described as Unredacted Door. Those resources support Tor access; they are not a separate anonymity network. - I2P, Psiphon, and OONI answer different questions: I2P documents its own network database, tunnel routing, garlic routing, and applications inside the I2P network. It is useful when both the user and destination participate in that overlay. It is not a substitute for reaching an ordinary website that has no I2P service. Sources: - FreeSocks public service page: https://freesocks.org/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - FreeSocks live public tier, billing, analytics, and backend configuration: https://freesocks.org/api/v1/config (retrieved 2026-08-29) - linux-hardened-unredacted source: https://git.unredacted.org/unredacted/linux-hardened-unredacted (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Cryptgeon source and design: https://github.com/cupcakearmy/cryptgeon (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Legacy FreeSocks automation source: https://github.com/unredacted/ansible-role-freesocks (retrieved 2026-08-29) - FreeSocks retention implementation: https://github.com/unredacted/freesocks-control-plane/blob/62a3789d29d3a8c7430f7a95bd3f0703145a550d/convex/retention.ts (retrieved 2026-08-29) - FreeSocks Membership billing documentation: https://github.com/unredacted/freesocks-control-plane/blob/62a3789d29d3a8c7430f7a95bd3f0703145a550d/docs/billing.md (retrieved 2026-08-29) - FreeSocks privacy defaults and analytics model: https://github.com/unredacted/freesocks-control-plane/blob/62a3789d29d3a8c7430f7a95bd3f0703145a550d/docs/privacy.md (retrieved 2026-08-29) - FreeSocks CDN and delivered-code threat model: https://github.com/unredacted/freesocks-control-plane/blob/62a3789d29d3a8c7430f7a95bd3f0703145a550d/docs/threat-model-cdn-blinding.md (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Pinned FreeSocks control-plane source: https://github.com/unredacted/freesocks-control-plane/tree/62a3789d29d3a8c7430f7a95bd3f0703145a550d (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Greenware tools source: https://github.com/unredacted/greenware-tools (retrieved 2026-08-29) - packetframe source: https://github.com/unredacted/packetframe (retrieved 2026-08-29) - packetpath source: https://github.com/unredacted/packetpath (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Vandr source: https://github.com/unredacted/vandr (retrieved 2026-08-29) - XMPP.is public configuration source: https://github.com/unredacted/xmpp.is (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Pinned XMPP.is Prosody configuration: https://github.com/unredacted/xmpp.is/blob/660487f5033786e1d1b88e1c3110df7c8a07f3f9/etc/prosody/prosody.cfg.lua (retrieved 2026-08-29) - I2P network and application documentation: https://i2p.net/en/docs/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Jitsi encryption scope and limits: https://jitsi.org/security (retrieved 2026-08-29) - OONI measurement and open-data model: https://ooni.org/about/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - OONI data policy: https://ooni.org/about/data-policy (retrieved 2026-08-29) - PrivateBin security model and caveats: https://privatebin.info/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Psiphon client scope, protocol, and security FAQ: https://psiphon.ca/en/faq.html (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Unredacted status surface: https://status.unredacted.org/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Signal proxy support documentation: https://support.signal.org/hc/en-us/articles/360056052052-Proxy-Support (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Tor Project censorship and transport documentation: https://support.torproject.org/tor-browser/circumvention/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Unredacted official site: https://unredacted.org/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Unredacted network page: https://unredacted.org/about/network/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Unredacted transparency reports: https://unredacted.org/about/transparency/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Unredacted corporate and nonprofit identity: https://unredacted.org/about/us/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Unredacted February 2026 DDoS report: https://unredacted.org/blog/2026/02/ddos-attacks-on-our-primary-network/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Unredacted hardened-kernel release article: https://unredacted.org/blog/2026/06/linux-hardened-unredacted-a-hardened-kernel-for-debian/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Unredacted: FreeSocks v2 announcement: https://unredacted.org/blog/2026/07/internet-freedom-is-here-freesocks-v2/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Unredacted Labs: https://unredacted.org/labs/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Unredacted proxy-retrieval data disclosure: https://unredacted.org/privacy-policy/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Unredacted service index: https://unredacted.org/services/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Unredacted messaging proxy index: https://unredacted.org/services/ce/proxies/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Unredacted Tor infrastructure: https://unredacted.org/services/ce/tor/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Unredacted Matrix policy: https://unredacted.org/services/si/matrix/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - Unredacted terms and Delaware-law clause: https://unredacted.org/terms-of-service/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - PeeringDB AS401401 record: https://www.peeringdb.com/asn/401401 (retrieved 2026-08-29) - XMPP.is official site: https://xmpp.is/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - XMPP.is security, logging, and stored-data disclosure: https://xmpp.is/about/security/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - XMPP.is server location, backup, upload, and archive details: https://xmpp.is/about/server/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - XMPP.is deletion status and struck-through former process: https://xmpp.is/account/deletion/ (retrieved 2026-08-29) - OMEMO specification and scope: https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0384.html (retrieved 2026-08-29) ## FAQ Content ### Site FAQ - Q: What does a service page show? A: A service page summarizes identity requirements, ownership, jurisdiction, payment and custody model, known warnings, review date, and source links. - Q: How are services evaluated? A: Cunicula compares documented privacy properties, not marketing claims. The useful questions are what data a service requires, what it can log, who controls it, what legal jurisdiction applies, and whether those claims have current sources. - Q: What should I check before using a privacy tool? A: Read the service page and linked sources. Check the account requirement, data path, logging policy, ownership, jurisdiction, and recovery options. ### Article FAQ Extracts - India’s 2026 Biometric SIM Rules, Explained (india-biometric-sim-rules-2026) - Q: When do India’s 2026 biometric SIM rules require user identification? A: The final rules apply biometric user identification to new enrolment, specified subscriber-detail or user changes, a user-requested disconnection, and government-directed reverification. Source: https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2026/275657.pdf. Retrieved 25 August 2026. - Q: Did India enact the draft Biometric Identity Verification System? A: No. The named Biometric Identity Verification System, cross-operator unique user ID, and real-time information-sharing provisions appeared in the 2025 draft but were omitted from the 2026 final rules. Sources: https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2025/266292.pdf and https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2026/275657.pdf. Retrieved 25 August 2026. - Q: Is the DoT Digital Intelligence Platform circular the same as the final rules? A: No. The 17 August 2026 DoT circular is a separate implementation direction for enforcing the existing mobile-connection cap through the Digital Intelligence Platform. It adds representative-image checks and a real-time target, but does not recreate the draft BIVS in the final rules. Source: https://www.dot.gov.in/static/uploads/2026/08/6d4fa4522c106536260492e8ae32a61f.pdf. Retrieved 25 August 2026. - Q: Do the final rules require every user to authenticate with face, fingerprints, and iris? A: No. The final e-KYC route uses live face, fingerprint, or iris authentication. D-KYC is available for a person without Aadhaar and for an Aadhaar holder unable to authenticate biometrically for specified physical reasons. An accessible alternative must be used when live face capture is not possible. Source: https://egazette.gov.in/WriteReadData/2026/275657.pdf. Retrieved 25 August 2026. - A ClarityCheck Database Exposed 9 Million Face Images (claritycheck-exposed-face-images) - Q: Was this an intrusion into ClarityCheck systems? A: The published findings describe a cloud storage database that was publicly reachable without a password or encryption. They do not establish that anyone broke into ClarityCheck systems or that malicious access occurred. - Q: Were 9 million people identified in the database? A: No. The reported count was 9,042,977 image files, not 9 million confirmed people. ClarityCheck said the count included duplicate, cropped, and resized copies. The number of unique people and whether a name was attached to each image are unknown. - Q: Did the exposed files contain biometric templates? A: The disclosure documented raw face photographs in folders labelled faces and profiles. It did not establish that the storage database contained formal biometric templates. - Q: Did ClarityCheck restrict access after it was notified? A: Yes. The researcher made a responsible disclosure, ClarityCheck acknowledged the report, and public access was restricted. The company disputed describing the unindexed storage location as publicly exposed, but said it acted once the issue reached the appropriate teams. - Q: What should I do if my photo may have been submitted? A: Ask ClarityCheck what it retains about your searches and request deletion where applicable. Check where your photos appear online, reduce public copies you no longer need, and tell close contacts to verify unusual messages that use your face or identity. - California DROP: Delete Data Broker Records and Check Results (california-drop-data-broker-removal) - Q: What does California DROP remove? A: DROP sends one deletion request to current and future data brokers registered with California. A broker that matches the submitted identifiers must delete non-exempt personal information and keep processing the request if it collects the information again. - Q: How long does a DROP request take? A: Data brokers process DROP requests at least every 45 days. California says status updates can take up to 90 days to appear. A pending status during that period does not show that the request failed. - Q: Does DROP confirm that a broker can no longer find me? A: DROP reports the status returned by each broker. A separate search later can show whether a public broker page still exposes the same record. Keep the DROP ID and a dated list of the pages you checked. - Proton Pass vs Bitwarden With SimpleLogin (proton-pass-vs-bitwarden-simplelogin) - Q: Is Proton Pass better than Bitwarden for email aliases? A: Proton Pass has SimpleLogin-based aliases inside the same product. Bitwarden connects to SimpleLogin, Addy.io, Firefox Relay, Fastmail, Forward Email, or DuckDuckGo. Proton is simpler as one account. Bitwarden keeps the password manager and alias provider separate. - Q: Should every website have a different email alias? A: A different alias for each account makes leaks easier to trace and prevents one address from linking every account. Keep the alias in the same password-manager entry as the site password and recovery notes. - Q: What happens to aliases if I change providers? A: Aliases on a provider-owned domain usually stay with that provider. Aliases on a custom domain can move when you change its mail and forwarding records. Test exports and keep control of the domain registrar and DNS account. - Private Home Network Setup: Router, DNS, Isolation, and Remote Access (private-home-network-setup) - Q: What is the simplest private home network layout? A: Use one trusted network for personal devices, one isolated network for cameras and other connected devices, and one guest network. Block the isolated networks from reaching trusted devices. Give cameras no internet access unless a documented function requires it. - Q: Do I need VLANs for a private home network? A: VLANs are useful when the router and switches support them, but separate guest or IoT networks can provide the same basic boundary on simpler hardware. The result to verify is that an isolated device cannot open an address on the trusted network. - Q: Should a home camera network have internet access? A: A local camera sending RTSP or ONVIF streams to a local recorder usually does not need general internet access. Block outbound traffic, keep time and update exceptions explicit, and test recording after the block is active. - De-Google Without Breaking Everything (degoogle-without-breaking-everything) - Q: Should I delete my Google Account immediately? A: Usually no. Export first, inventory every dependency, move sign-ins and recovery channels, verify replacement copies, then reduce or delete services in stages. Immediate deletion can lock you out of unrelated accounts and purchases. - Q: Does Google Takeout delete data from Google? A: No. Google says Takeout exports a copy and does not delete the original data from its servers. Deletion and activity controls are separate steps. - Axon Police AI: Body Cameras, Draft One, and Fusus (axon-police-ai-body-cameras) - Q: Can AI write the police report about my arrest? A: If the department uses Axon Draft One, the first draft of the report narrative can be generated from body-camera audio. Axon says an officer must fill in missing information, edit the draft, attest to its accuracy, and approve it before submission. Whether the original AI draft is kept for later comparison depends on a setting the agency chooses. - Q: How do I find out if my city police use Draft One or Fusus? A: Send a public-records request to the department or city clerk. Ask for the Axon contract and its named products, the date Draft One was enabled and its settings, and the list of cameras and feeds connected to Fusus. Contracts and procurement agendas are public documents, and the checklist in this article names the specific records to request. - Frigate Private Camera Network: Local NVR Setup and Remote Access (frigate-private-camera-network) - Q: Does Frigate send camera footage to the cloud? A: Frigate is designed for local NVR processing. Privacy still depends on the cameras, detector configuration, integrations, remote access, storage, and whether any optional feature or camera vendor service has an external connection. - Q: Which Frigate port should be exposed? A: Frigate documents port 8971 for authenticated UI and API access. Port 5000 is an internal unauthenticated interface and should be limited to trusted internal integration traffic, not exposed to a LAN or the internet. - Self-OSINT Audit: Find and Reduce Your Personal Exposure (self-osint-personal-exposure-audit) - Q: What is a self-OSINT audit? A: A self-OSINT audit searches public sources for your own names, identifiers, images, accounts, and exposed records, then turns confirmed findings into a prioritized remediation queue. - Q: Does removal from Google delete the source page? A: No. Google says removal affects Google Search results. To remove information from the web at its source, the site owner or publisher must remove the underlying page or data. - What the KIDS Act Would Change Online (kids-act-age-checks-online) - Q: Is the KIDS Act law? A: No. The House passed H.R. 7757 on June 29, 2026 by a vote of 267 to 117. Congress.gov lists it as Passed House. The Senate has not passed it, and its requirements are not in force. - Q: Would the KIDS Act require every website to verify age? A: No. Title I explicitly requires age checks for covered platforms where more than one-third of the available material meets the bill definition of sexual material harmful to minors. Other parts of the bill apply duties when a platform knows a user is a minor. EFF and CDT argue those duties could still push services toward broader age assurance. - Q: Would the KIDS Act require a government ID? A: The House-passed text says its age-check provision may not be read to require government-issued ID. It still requires commercially available technology that determines whether a user is more likely than not a minor. A user declaration alone would not be enough. Depending on the method a service chooses, users could still be asked for personal or biometric data. - Q: Would the KIDS Act ban encrypted messaging? A: The House-passed text says the act may not be read to require decryption or preclude encryption. Its online-platform section says messaging controls must be implemented, to the maximum extent technically feasible, without compromising the integrity of strong encryption. It would require privacy, parental, and messaging controls for users known to be minors. - Privacy Controls for AI-Agent Payments (ai-agent-money-privacy-controls) - Q: Is MCP a payment rail? A: No. Model Context Protocol exposes tools and capabilities to an AI host. A payment provider can expose card or wallet controls through MCP, but settlement still happens through the provider and its underlying card, bank, crypto, or merchant rail. - Q: Is Privacy.com a no-KYC payment service? A: No. Privacy.com terms and developer documentation describe identity verification and Customer Identification Program checks. Its API, CLI, and MCP tools can constrain card use, but the service remains identity-bearing and bank-linked. - Q: What is the difference between AP2 and x402? A: AP2 is a mandate and accountability layer for proving user intent and agent authority. x402 is an HTTP payment challenge and retry flow. Either can create records, and neither makes the underlying wallet, merchant, facilitator, or settlement rail private by itself. - Q: What is the bounded agent-payment pattern? A: Give the agent a narrow tool scope, small pre-set balance or limit, restricted merchant or task purpose, tested pause or revocation path, and human approval for high-value transactions. Keep wallet seeds and broad bank credentials outside the agent runtime. - How to Self-Host unbroker for Data Broker Removal (self-host-unbroker-data-broker-removal) - Q: Can unbroker be self-hosted? A: Yes. unbroker is an optional Hermes Agent skill with a deterministic Python CLI. It can run from a local machine or isolated server, with local dossiers, a ledger, email/browser steps, and scheduled re-scans. - Q: Should unbroker run on a local Mac or a VPS? A: A local Mac is the cleaner default because personal identifiers stay closer to the operator and browser/email sessions are easier to control. A VPS can work for isolated temporary runs, but it needs tighter storage, access, logging, and deletion discipline. - Local-First Data Broker Removal: Extraction, Deletion, and Rechecks (unbroker-ai-data-broker-removal-agent) - Q: What is unbroker? A: unbroker is an optional Hermes Agent skill for consent-gated data broker and people-search removal workflows. It uses a local CLI, ledger, broker plans, email verification, browser steps, and scheduled re-scans. - Q: Is unbroker a replacement for every data removal service? A: No. It is an open-source workflow and field-testing surface. It can reduce broker-removal labor, but public records, paid-tier retention, hostile forms, and broker re-listing still need manual review and recurring checks. - AI Agent Payment Protocols Compared (ap2-x402-mpp-agent-payment-privacy) - Q: Is AP2 more private than x402 or MPP? A: Not by default. AP2 focuses on authorization and accountability. x402 and MPP focus on machine-readable payment over HTTP. Privacy depends on logs, settlement rails, wallet reuse, account identity, and facilitator records. - Q: Which protocol should a privacy-focused agent use? A: Use the narrowest rail that proves intent without giving the agent broad money authority. For sensitive spend, keep human approval or a policy wallet in the path. - Privacy.com MCP Is Spend Control, Not Anonymity (privacy-com-mcp-spend-control-not-anonymity) - Q: Is Privacy.com MCP private money for AI agents? A: No. Privacy.com MCP is useful spend-control infrastructure, but Privacy.com verifies identity and links accounts to a bank or payment card. It should not be treated as no-KYC or anonymous. - Q: What is Privacy.com MCP good for? A: It is useful for creating and managing constrained cards, spend limits, merchant locks, transaction review, and card revocation through an AI tool workflow. - Agent Wallet Threat Model: Keys, Sessions, Budgets, and Receipts (agent-wallet-threat-model) - Q: Should an AI agent hold wallet keys? A: Usually no. The safer pattern is for the agent to draft a payment request and for a separate wallet, policy engine, or human to approve and sign. - Q: What should an agent payment wallet log? A: Log merchant, amount, task, instrument, approval result, and receipt reference. Avoid storing prompts, private files, seed material, bank data, or unrelated identity data in the same log. - Pay Per Crawl and the Paid Web: Privacy Risks of HTTP 402 (pay-per-crawl-http-402-privacy-risks) - Q: Why is HTTP 402 a privacy issue for AI agents? A: A paid HTTP request can reveal which resource an agent tried to access, when it retried, which wallet or facilitator paid, and which account or crawler identity was involved. - Q: Can pay-per-crawl be private? A: Only with strict compartmentalization. Use separate wallets or payment instruments, avoid address reuse, keep crawler identities separate, and do not mix sensitive research with main accounts. - Virtual Cards vs Stablecoin Wallets for AI Agents (virtual-cards-vs-stablecoin-wallets-ai-agents) - Q: Are stablecoin wallets more private than virtual cards? A: Not automatically. Stablecoin wallets avoid card-network data but can expose onchain history, exchange funding, wallet reuse, and facilitator logs. Virtual cards expose KYC, issuer, bank, card network, and merchant records. - Q: Which is safer for AI-agent subscriptions? A: For mainstream card-only subscriptions, a low-limit merchant-locked virtual card is often safer. For crypto-native services, a low-balance wallet or invoice flow with human approval is usually cleaner. - Evaluating AI-Agent Payment Methods (score-agent-payment-rail) - Q: How should I score an AI-agent payment rail? A: Score identity exposure, authorization model, settlement rail, custody model, revocation, logging, budget limits, and whether the agent can spend without fresh approval. - Q: What is the biggest red flag? A: Broad authority in the agent runtime. If the agent can access a main card, exchange session, seed phrase, or high-balance wallet, the design is unsafe. - Hong Kong Device Password Law (hong-kong-device-password-law) - Q: What changed in Hong Kong in March 2026? A: Amendments to Instrument A303 took effect on March 23, 2026. Schedule 1 says a police officer exercising the electronic-equipment search power may require a specified person to provide a necessary password or decryption method. Failure to comply is an offence, and section 5(3) provides a reasonable-excuse defence. - Q: Can police demand a password without any court approval? A: Schedule 1 sets out a magistrate-warrant route based on information on oath. Section 3(1) also permits a warrantless search when a police officer not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that the stated grounds exist, including that obtaining a warrant is not reasonably practicable. - Q: What are the penalties for refusal or false information? A: Schedule 1, section 5 sets a fine of HK$100,000 and one year of imprisonment on conviction on indictment for failure to comply. Section 6 sets a fine of HK$500,000 and three years of imprisonment for knowingly or recklessly providing materially false or misleading information. - Q: Does this only matter for residents of Hong Kong? A: No. The U.S. State Department travel guidance warns that Hong Kong national security rules create risk for foreign nationals. Travelers should therefore limit the accounts and data present on any device carried into the jurisdiction. - Q: Does full-disk encryption still help? A: Yes, but it changes the problem. Encryption still protects a device from thieves, malware, and casual seizure. In a jurisdiction that can compel disclosure, the fight is no longer just technical. It becomes legal and operational, which is why burner devices, compartmentalised accounts, and data minimisation matter. - Google Notice Policy and ICE Data Requests (google-ice-subpoena-notice) - Q: Was Google legally barred from warning the user first? A: EFF says no court gag order applied in the Thomas-Johnson case. ICE asked Google not to notify him, but EFF says that request was not enforceable and was not required by a court. That is why the notice issue matters. - Q: What is simultaneous notice? A: EFF says Google described a practice called simultaneous notice. In that model, Google may notify a user on the same day it discloses data if it does not respond within a government deadline. Same-day notice after disclosure does not give the user a real chance to challenge the demand first. - Q: Can Google refuse a DHS administrative subpoena? A: EFF says yes. An administrative subpoena is not a warrant signed by a judge. If a company refuses to comply, EFF says DHS must either drop the demand or go to court and convince a judge the request is lawful. - Q: Why does advance notice matter if the request is only for subscriber data? A: EFF says the disclosed data in the Thomas-Johnson case included subscriber information such as name, address, IP address, and other personal identifiers. That can be enough to tie an account to a real person and support a broader investigation, especially when the government can combine it with other records. - Q: Does Google always notify users before they can challenge a subpoena? A: The public sources cited here do not show that. The ACLU's Doe v. DHS case shows Google did notify one user targeted by DHS, and that user challenged the subpoena successfully. EFF's April 2026 complaint says Google did not provide that same window in the Thomas-Johnson case. - Flock Safety Expansion: License Plates, Traffic Cameras, and Drones (license-plate-readers-traffic-enforcement) - Q: Can license plate reader cameras really be used for traffic tickets? A: Yes. 404 Media documented a Georgia traffic citation that said "CAPTURED ON FLOCK CAMERA 31 MM 1 HOLDING PHONE IN LEFT HAND." That does not mean every plate reader is used this way every day. It does show the hardware and workflows can support ordinary traffic enforcement when agencies choose to use them that way. - Q: Why is traffic enforcement a privacy problem if the plate is public? A: A single plate on a single street is public. A network that stores timestamps, locations, and searchable history is different. Once agencies can search where a vehicle was last week, who looked it up, and whether the data is shared nationwide, the system becomes a travel-history database instead of a human officer seeing one car pass by. - Q: Can a city end a Flock contract? A: Yes. In 2026, Framingham declined to renew its contract after resident opposition. South Portland voted to end its program, disabled its cameras, and later had them removed. In Pulaski County, Missouri, the sheriff announced that the office would discontinue Flock cameras, would not renew the contract, and would not replace them with Axon cameras. Physical removal in Pulaski County was not yet verified. - Q: Have people attempted to disable Flock cameras? A: Yes. Reports include an Ithaca resident accused of trying to wrap yarn around a Flock camera. Camera-security research also documents that bright modulated light can interfere with some CMOS rolling-shutter cameras. That research did not test a Flock camera and does not establish an effect on any particular Flock model. - Section 702 Searches of Sensitive Groups (section-702-sensitive-searches) - Q: What is Section 702? A: Section 702 is a part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that lets the US government collect communications of non-US persons located abroad for foreign intelligence purposes without individual warrants. Americans can still be swept in when they communicate with those targets. - Q: What did Ron Wyden say about sensitive FBI searches? A: In a March 10, 2026 Senate speech, Wyden said the FBI still treats especially sensitive Section 702 searches as an internal approval issue instead of a warrant issue. He said the Deputy FBI Director signs off on searches involving elected officials, candidates, political organizations, media organizations, and journalists, and that the FBI refused to keep even a simple spreadsheet of those searches. - Q: What counts as a sensitive Section 702 search? A: The 2024 reauthorization created a special category for US person queries involving elected officials, political candidates, political organizations, media organizations, and journalists. Those searches require Deputy FBI Director approval, but not a warrant. - Q: How big is the Section 702 program now? A: ODNI reported 349,823 Section 702 targets in 2025, up from 291,824 in 2024. The government still does not publish an estimate of how many Americans’ communications are incidentally collected. - Q: Is Section 702 still in force? A: The statute expired on June 12, 2026 after two short extensions. Existing surveillance can continue under annual Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court certifications. Public reporting says the current certification runs to March 2027. - Privacy and Security Concerns in the White House App (white-house-app-surveillance) - Q: What does the White House app actually collect? A: A March 2026 traffic analysis of iOS version 47.0.4 observed the app sending IP address, timezone, country, device model, OS version, session count, session duration, network details, jailbreak status, and a persistent identifier to OneSignal. The current App Store label now discloses identifiers, usage data, and diagnostics. - Q: Does the White House app track GPS location? A: Researchers found the OneSignal location framework in iOS version 47.0.4, but their traffic capture found no GPS transmission. The White House says the app does not request or collect user location. No newer independent binary or traffic audit was available for this July 2026 review. - Q: What is the consent stripping behavior in the White House app? A: The original version (v47.0.0) injected JavaScript into every webpage opened through its built-in browser to hide cookie consent banners, GDPR dialogs, login walls, and paywall elements. This was removed in v47.0.4 after the security researchers published their findings. - Q: Who is Elfsight and why is it in the White House app? A: Elfsight began in Tula, Russia and describes itself as based in Andorra. Researchers observed six Elfsight-backed social widgets in version 47.0.4. The White House later said those feeds were removed and that one Elfsight script remained for a sandboxed tax calculator. That later configuration has not received a published independent traffic audit. - Q: Should I install the White House app? A: The website provides the same public news without installing another app or granting notification access. The March audit documented extensive third-party traffic. Later disclosures and a White House statement show some changes, but no newer independent traffic audit confirms the full current data flow. - EU CSAM Scanning: Voluntary Detection Rules Restored Until 2028 (eu-csam-scanning-rejected) - Q: Did the EU require encrypted services to scan messages in July 2026? A: No. Article 1(3) excludes communications with end-to-end encryption, and the remaining derogation is voluntary rather than mandatory. Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/1881/oj/eng. Retrieved 10 August 2026. - Q: How long does the temporary EU rule apply? A: Article 11 says the regulation applies until 3 April 2028. Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2026/1881/oj/eng. Retrieved 10 August 2026. - Q: Is the separate mandatory CSAM proposal finished? A: No final act is recorded. EUR-Lex marks procedure 2022/0155(COD) as ongoing. Source: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/HIS/?uri=CELEX:52022PC0209. Retrieved 10 August 2026. - Operating-System Age Verification Requirements (os-age-verification) - Q: Does California AB 1043 require an ID or face scan? A: No. The chaptered text requires an account holder to indicate a birth date, age, or both. It does not require an identity document, biometric check, or third-party age-verification service. - Q: What does the operating system send to an app? A: The law defines a signal as nonpersonally identifiable age-bracket data sent through a secure real-time interface. The minimum brackets are under 13, 13 to 15, 16 to 17, and 18 or older. - Q: When does California AB 1043 take effect? A: The requirements begin January 1, 2027. For devices configured earlier, operating-system providers must offer the age interface before July 1, 2027. - Q: Does GrapheneOS bypass the California law? A: The statute does not establish a GrapheneOS exemption or a technical bypass. Its definitions are broad, but the public record reviewed here does not show how California will apply or enforce the law against independent operating-system projects. - Hardening Telegram (telegram-hardening) - Q: Is Telegram end-to-end encrypted? A: Only Secret Chats use end-to-end encryption. Telegram stores ordinary cloud chats on its servers so they remain available across devices. Secret Chats work only between two users and stay on the devices that created them. - Q: Can I hide my phone number on Telegram? A: You can restrict who sees your phone number and who can find your account by number. Telegram still uses a phone number as the account identifier unless you register with a Fragment collectible number. - Q: What data can Telegram disclose to authorities? A: Telegram says it may disclose a phone number and IP address after legal analysis of a valid judicial order concerning suspected criminal activity that violates its terms. Its policy says IP address, device, app and username-change metadata may be retained for up to 12 months. - Q: Does a proxy make Telegram private? A: A proxy can hide your direct IP address from Telegram, but it does not turn cloud chats into end-to-end encrypted messages. The proxy operator can also observe connection metadata. Use Secret Chats or a messenger with end-to-end encryption enabled by default for sensitive conversations. - No-KYC Crypto Exchange Options in 2026 (best-no-kyc-crypto-exchanges-2026) - Q: How do the no-KYC exchange venue types differ? A: Three shapes cover the space. Aggregators such as Trocador route an order across partner exchangers and show competing rates; the executing partner’s rules apply to the swap. Instant exchangers take custody for the minutes between deposit and payout and screen deposits. Peer-to-peer venues such as Haveno DEX, Bisq, and RoboSats match traders directly with escrow and no platform identity check; Haveno settles in Monero, Bisq covers Bitcoin-fiat pairs, and RoboSats runs Lightning-sized trades. - Q: Do these services ever ask for identity documents? A: Some can. Several instant exchangers advertise no registration while their terms allow holding a flagged deposit pending identity documents or partner checks. Their service pages list the KYC trigger. Peer-to-peer venues have no central platform position that collects documents. - Q: What limits apply on no-KYC exchanges? A: Limits change with pair, liquidity, and operator policy. Instant exchangers set per-trade bounds. Peer-to-peer limits come from user offers. Check the venue and service page for current figures. - Q: Which no-KYC venues handle Monero? A: Haveno DEX settles trades in Monero by design. Trocador lists XMR pairs across its partners, and several instant exchangers on this page record XMR support. Each venue record notes supported assets. - Zcash vs Monero: Privacy Comparison 2026 (zcash-vs-monero-privacy-2026) - Q: Is Monero or Zcash more private by default? A: Monero hides the sender, receiver, and amount in every standard transaction. Zcash supports both shielded and transparent transfers, so its privacy depends on the address type and wallet behavior. - Q: Are transparent Zcash addresses private? A: No. Zcash documentation says transparent addresses and the values sent to or from them are publicly visible. A transfer between two shielded addresses hides the addresses and amount from the public blockchain, apart from visible transaction fees. - Q: What do Zcash viewing keys do? A: Viewing keys can disclose shielded transaction information without giving the recipient authority to spend the funds. Support and the exact data exposed depend on the shielded protocol and wallet. - Q: Does Monero make a user anonymous? A: No cryptocurrency guarantees complete anonymity. Monero hides transaction data on-chain, but an exchange, wallet service, remote node, compromised device, or identifiable network connection can still expose information. - Private Web Hosting: Domains, Servers, and Payments (the-no-kyc-stack) - Q: How does Njalla keep a registrant out of WHOIS? A: Njalla registers the domain in its own name and grants the customer control through a service agreement, so the customer does not appear in WHOIS. Its terms still require an email or XMPP address, permit data collection needed for legal compliance, and allow disclosure under law-enforcement requests or court orders. - Q: Do privacy-forward hosts keep logs? A: Yes. FlokiNET states in its privacy policy that it logs IP addresses, visit times, page activity, and browser and operating-system information, and may disclose personal data to law enforcement. 1984 Hosting states that it logs IP addresses and device information and retains bookkeeping records. A privacy posture changes what is collected and how requests are handled, not whether records exist. - Q: Why pay for hosting with Monero instead of Bitcoin? A: Bitcoin payments are recorded on a public chain, so a payment from an identified wallet links that identity to the infrastructure. A Monero payment does not produce a publicly readable chain record. The provider still records the order and payment event on its side, so the improvement is the public trail, not the provider relationship. - Q: Does hosting in Iceland protect a website legally? A: Icelandic law applies to servers in Iceland, and providers there answer to local legal process rather than US or UK process directly. Providers state they comply with lawful orders, and international legal-assistance mechanisms exist. Jurisdiction changes which process applies; it does not remove legal reach. - Q: What is a minimal private hosting setup? A: A domain held through a registration proxy such as Njalla, a server at a provider that accepts Monero, TLS through Caddy or certbot, SSH with keys only, and admin access over Tor or a VPN so the home address stays out of routine access logs. Each piece reduces one specific record; none of them makes the operation anonymous. - Mullvad VPN Setup Guide (anonymous-vpn-setup-mullvad) - Q: Does Mullvad VPN require an email address? A: No. Mullvad uses a random 16-digit account number instead of an email address. You visit mullvad.net/account, click "Generate account number," and get a number like 1234 5678 9012 3456. No email. No name. No password. Add credit to that number and use the app. If you lose the number, recovery does not exist. Write it down. That design means Mullvad cannot easily tie usage back to your identity because it never asked for one. - Q: Can Android leak my real IP when VPN lockdown is enabled? A: Yes, on tested Android 16 devices over Wi-Fi. A normal app can ask Android to send fixed NAT-T keepalive packets outside the VPN path. The receiving server can see the physical network IP address and packet timing. The controlled packet capture used a Pixel 8 Pro. No cellular packet emission was measured. Reviewed 21 September 2026. - Q: How do I pay for Mullvad anonymously? A: Mullvad accepts Monero, Bitcoin, Lightning, cash by post, and less private methods like bank transfer. Monero is the best option. Buy XMR through Haveno DEX with cash if you can, then send it to Mullvad. That keeps your payment separate from your VPN use. Credit and debit cards work, but they tie your identity to the account. - Q: Has Mullvad ever been raided or handed over user data? A: In April 2023, Swedish police executed a search warrant at Mullvad’s office. They left without customer data because Mullvad’s systems did not contain the information they sought. The account-number system and no-logging architecture leave little customer data to hand over. - Q: What is Mullvad Multihop and should I use it? A: Multihop routes traffic through two Mullvad servers in different countries before it exits to the internet. If one server gets compromised, an attacker still should not see both your source IP and destination at once. Mullvad builds Multihop on WireGuard. It is slower, usually by about 20 to 40 ms. Use it for sensitive research or if you connect from a high-surveillance location. For normal use, single-hop is fine. - Q: Is Mullvad better than IVPN or Proton VPN? A: All three respect privacy far more than most VPN brands. Mullvad stands out because it needs no email at all. IVPN lets you register without email but still uses an account ID. Proton requires email. Mullvad and IVPN are audited and open-source. Proton is Swiss, but it also complied with a court order to log an activist's IP in 2021. For anonymity, Mullvad comes first, then IVPN, then Proton. If you want email, calendar, and cloud storage in one bundle, Proton makes more sense. - Paying With Shielded ZEC Through Zodl and Flexa (spend-zec-at-merchants-zashi-flexa) - Q: Is Zashi still available? A: Zashi was renamed Zodl in 2026. Existing Zashi installations update to Zodl without requiring a new wallet, seed phrase, or transfer. - Q: Can Zodl still pay through Flexa? A: Yes. Zodl lists Flexa payments at thousands of retail locations as a current feature. The Android source and current release history also retain the Flexa integration. - Q: Is a Flexa payment anonymous? A: No. Shielded ZEC limits what appears publicly on the Zcash blockchain, but Flexa operates the payment service. Its current terms allow identity verification, transaction monitoring, payment limits, holds, and disclosure to law enforcement. Its privacy policy also describes collection of identity, device, IP address, and service-use data. - Q: Does Flexa charge the customer a fee? A: Flexa currently states that it charges no customer fee for using its service. Its terms also set a weekly payment limit and permit payments to be delayed, held, returned, or blocked for compliance reasons. - Wasabi Wallet CoinJoin Coordinator Shutdown (wasabi-coinjoin-dead-coordinator-shutdown) - Q: Did Wasabi Wallet shut down? A: No. zkSNACKs shut down its coordinator on June 1, 2024. Wasabi Wallet remains maintained and still supports ordinary wallet functions. Current versions can connect to another WabiSabi coordinator. - Q: Can Wasabi Wallet still make CoinJoins? A: Yes, but not through the former zkSNACKs coordinator. A user must configure another compatible coordinator. That choice adds operational and trust questions that the user must assess. - Q: What are the main alternatives? A: JoinMarket provides a separate maker and taker CoinJoin system. Payjoin lets a sender and receiver negotiate a joint payment transaction, but it requires support from both sides and is not a substitute for a multi-party CoinJoin round. - What Is KYC? (what-is-kyc) - Q: What does KYC mean in crypto? A: KYC means Know Your Customer. A regulated crypto firm uses customer due diligence to identify customers, assess risk, screen for sanctions, monitor transactions, keep records, and report suspicious activity where required. The exact checks depend on the firm, jurisdiction, product, and risk level. - Q: Is it illegal to buy or transfer crypto without KYC? A: A direct transfer between people is not automatically illegal because no regulated intermediary performs KYC. Laws still apply to the conduct itself. A person operating an exchange or money transmission business may have registration and anti-money-laundering duties even if the service describes itself as peer to peer. - Q: What information can a crypto KYC check collect? A: A firm may ask for a legal name, date of birth, residential address, government ID, selfie or video, tax or national identifier, occupation, and source of funds. It may also process device, IP, account, and transaction data. Requirements vary by firm and risk level. - Q: Does the FATF Travel Rule start at $1,000? A: FATF guidance uses a USD or EUR 1,000 threshold for customer due diligence on occasional virtual-asset transactions, but the Travel Rule requires covered firms to obtain, hold, and transmit originator and beneficiary information for virtual-asset transfers. National rules can differ. The EU applies its crypto transfer information rules without a general minimum transfer threshold. - Q: Can I ask an exchange to delete my KYC file? A: You can make a privacy request where local law gives you that right, but financial recordkeeping duties may let or require the firm to retain some information. Closing an account does not guarantee immediate deletion. Check the firm’s privacy notice and the law that applies to your account. - What Is a SAR? Bank Reports to FinCEN (what-is-a-sar) - Q: What triggers a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR)? A: For banks, federal rules require a SAR when a transaction or attempted transaction involves at least $5,000 and the bank knows, suspects, or has reason to suspect illegal proceeds, evasion of Bank Secrecy Act rules, or activity with no apparent lawful purpose that is not expected for that customer. Banks may also file voluntary SARs below that threshold. - Q: Can a bank tell me if it filed a SAR? A: No. Federal rules prohibit a bank and its staff from disclosing a SAR or information that would reveal its existence to the person involved. - Q: How many SARs are filed each year? A: FinCEN reported about 4.7 million SAR filings in fiscal year 2025. Its public SAR Stats tool provides current filing data by industry and activity type. - Q: Does a cryptocurrency transaction automatically trigger a SAR? A: No. Cryptocurrency use alone is not the legal test. FinCEN guidance tells covered financial institutions to assess facts such as links to illicit activity, unregistered money transmission, darknet markets, mixers, transaction patterns, and the customer profile. - Q: What is the difference between a SAR and a CTR? A: A bank files a Currency Transaction Report for cash transactions over $10,000 in one business day. A SAR depends on suspicious facts and, for mandatory bank filings, generally has a $5,000 threshold. A bank may file both reports for the same activity. - Domain Registration Privacy: Njalla, WHOIS Privacy, and .onion (anonymous-domain-registration) - Q: Does WHOIS privacy actually protect your identity? A: WHOIS privacy swaps your contact details in the public WHOIS database for the registrar's generic address. It stops scraping and casual lookups. It does not stop legal requests. A court order, UDRP complaint, or law enforcement subpoena can force the registrar to reveal the real registrant. The registrar still holds your data. - Q: What is the most private way to register a domain? A: For a clearnet domain, Njalla is the most practical choice. Njalla registers the domain in its own name and gives you control. Your identity does not appear in WHOIS. Pay with Monero and create the account over Tor with a purpose-built email alias. For maximum resistance, use a Tor .onion hidden service instead. It needs no registrar, no ICANN, and no DNS middleman. - Q: Can a .onion address replace a regular domain? A: Yes, if your audience will use Tor Browser. A .onion address needs no registrar, no ICANN, no DNS infrastructure, and no payment. It derives from your server's public key, so a third party cannot transfer or seize it. The tradeoffs are plain: Tor Browser only, no public CA SSL certificate, and a 56-character base32 string unless you generate a vanity prefix with mkp224o. Many privacy projects run both a Njalla domain and a .onion mirror. - Q: What happens if Njalla receives a legal request for my domain? A: Njalla is based in Sweden and pushes back where Swedish law allows it. The company has refused DMCA takedowns, fought de-registration requests, and answered some government inquiries with legal resistance. Swedish courts can still compel disclosure. Njalla resists better than most US or UK registrars, but it is not magic. Pair it with offshore hosting and a .onion mirror if you need more protection. - No-KYC VPS Hosting Providers (anonymous-vps-hosting-guide) - Q: Can a VPS be rented without identity documents? A: The providers compared here take orders with an email address and cryptocurrency rather than identity documents. That removes the payment and registrant identity link, not other provider data. Terms may still cover IP addresses, access times, and abuse handling. Each service page lists the documented posture. - Q: Which pay with Monero? A: FlokiNET, Njalla, IncogNET, and 1984 Hosting all record Monero acceptance. Monero removes the public chain trail that a Bitcoin payment leaves; the provider still records the order and payment event on its side. - Q: Does jurisdiction remove legal reach over a server? A: No. Jurisdiction changes which legal process applies and how quickly it moves, and providers state they comply with lawful orders. A server is physical and can be reached where it runs. The choice between Iceland, Romania, Costa Rica, and the United States shifts exposure rather than eliminating it. - Monero Wallet Comparison for 2026 (best-monero-wallet-2026) - Q: Which Monero wallet is best for desktop use? A: Feather is the simpler desktop choice for most people. It includes Tor, supports Ledger and Trezor devices, and lets you choose a local or remote node. The Monero CLI offers more control but requires terminal commands. - Q: Does Feather route every connection through Tor? A: Not under its default setting. Feather sends most traffic through Tor but performs the initial wallet synchronization outside Tor for speed. You can change its node traffic setting to always use Tor. - Q: Does Cake Wallet support a Monero hardware wallet? A: Yes. Cake Wallet supports Monero accounts held on compatible Ledger devices. Its documentation describes connecting by Bluetooth or USB. Support depends on the device, platform, and current app release. - Q: Do wallet swaps avoid KYC? A: Not necessarily. Built-in swaps use third-party providers. Provider availability, screening, limits, fees, and identity checks can change. Check the provider and destination address before sending funds. - No-KYC VPN Comparison for 2026 (best-no-kyc-vpn-2026) - Q: Which VPN requires no email and no account details? A: Mullvad and IVPN issue random account numbers with no email and no personal details. AzireVPN states that it requires no personal data at signup. Proton VPN requires an email address; an alias created over Tor reduces what that address links to. - Q: Which no-KYC VPNs accept Monero? A: Mullvad and IVPN document Monero acceptance. Mullvad also accepts cash by post. AzireVPN’s current public payment information does not list Monero, so its record does not carry that claim. - Q: Why does VPN jurisdiction matter for privacy? A: Jurisdiction decides which legal process can compel a provider to disclose data or begin logging, and whether gag orders apply. Five Eyes members (US, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand) share intelligence and legal process. Mullvad and AzireVPN operate from Sweden; IVPN operates from Gibraltar, a British overseas territory with its own legal system; Proton operates from Switzerland. Logging architecture matters most, and jurisdiction decides how much pressure can be applied to it. - Q: Does a no-KYC VPN make the user anonymous? A: No. A VPN hides the device IP from websites and traffic from the ISP. It does not stop browser fingerprinting, hide logged-in accounts, or fix a compromised device. Stronger setups pair a no-log VPN with Tor Browser, avoid logged-in sessions, and pay without a card so the subscription carries no card trail. - How to Find Surveillance Contracts and Political Links (revolving-door-government-surveillance-tech) - Q: How can I find government surveillance contracts? A: Search the official procurement database for the vendor legal name, parent company, product name, and known contract number. USAspending covers US federal awards. Find a Tender and Contracts Finder cover UK notices. AusTender covers Australian federal contracts. - Q: Does a contract value show how much money was paid? A: Not always. A notice can show a ceiling, estimated value, current award, obligated amount, or actual outlay. Record the field name with the number and check later modifications before describing it as spending. - Q: How can I connect a surveillance company to politicians or officials? A: Use company filings for legal entities and officers, lobbying registers for clients and lobbyists, political-finance databases for donations, procurement notices for buyers and suppliers, and dated staff biographies for employment history. Keep each link tied to its source and date. - Q: Which company name should I search? A: Search the public brand, legal company, subsidiaries, former names, parent company, and common reseller names. Government records often use a legal entity that does not match the name printed on the product. - Tails OS for Financial Privacy (tails-os-financial-privacy-guide) - Q: What is Tails OS and why is it useful for financial privacy? A: Tails is a live operating system that runs from a USB drive and stores nothing on the host computer by default. Every session starts completely fresh - no browser history, no wallet files, no logs remain after shutdown. All traffic is automatically routed through the Tor network. This makes it useful for financial privacy in specific scenarios: using a shared or borrowed computer without leaving trace evidence, operating in an environment where your main machine may be seized or searched, or accessing no-KYC swap services anonymously. Tails merged with the Tor Project in September 2024. - Q: Can I save my Monero wallet on Tails? A: Yes, using Tails Persistent Storage - an encrypted (LUKS2) partition on the same USB drive. You can save your Feather Wallet file to Persistent Storage so your wallet and sync progress survive between sessions. Without Persistent Storage, your wallet file is lost on shutdown and you must restore from seed each time (slow sync). Persistent Storage requires a strong passphrase - the only authentication factor protecting your wallet. Use 6+ random words as a passphrase, never a dictionary phrase. - Q: What does Tails NOT protect you from? A: Tails does not protect against: (1) Tor traffic correlation by an adversary watching both your internet connection and the destination - your ISP can see you're connecting to Tor even if they can't see what you do. Use Tor bridges (obfs4 or WebTunnel) to hide Tor usage from your ISP. (2) Hardware-level surveillance - BIOS/UEFI implants, BadUSB attacks, keyloggers attached to the keyboard. (3) You logging into personal accounts while on Tails - this immediately de-anonymises your session. (4) An attacker who has physical access to your Tails USB and knows your Persistent Storage passphrase. - Hosting a Website With Tor, ENS, and IPFS (tor-onion-ens-ipfs-hosting) - Q: Do Tor, ENS, and IPFS make a site impossible to remove? A: No. They create different access and hosting paths with different dependencies. An onion service still needs a reachable Tor service and host. IPFS content remains available only while nodes retain and serve it. ENS ownership, gateways, wallets, and client support add separate dependencies. - Q: Can a Next.js site run directly on IPFS? A: Only a compatible static export can be served as files. Features that require a Next.js server, including many request-time routes and dynamic server functions, need a separate server-backed deployment. - Q: Does adding content to IPFS make it permanent? A: No. IPFS documentation states that cached content can be removed by garbage collection. Content intended to persist must be pinned on one or more nodes and those nodes must remain available. - Q: What must be backed up for an onion service? A: The Onion Service directory contains the hostname and private key material that determine the address. Protecting and backing up that directory is necessary if the same address must survive a host replacement. - TradeOgre Shutdown and RCMP Seizure in 2025 (tradeogre-is-dead-rcmp-seizure-2025) - Q: What happened to TradeOgre? A: The RCMP announced on September 18, 2025 that it had dismantled TradeOgre and recovered more than C$56 million in cryptocurrency from the platform. The RCMP said the investigation remained active and charges could follow. - Q: Why did Canadian police target TradeOgre? A: The RCMP said TradeOgre had not registered with FINTRAC as a money services business and did not identify its clients. Those are police allegations reported in the agency announcement, not findings from a published judgment. - Q: Did the RCMP announce a process for customers to recover funds? A: The September 2025 RCMP announcement did not describe a customer claims process. Users should rely on later court or agency notices rather than messages from people offering private recovery services. - Q: What reduces custodial exchange risk? A: Do not leave a trading balance on an exchange longer than needed. Peer-to-peer tools can reduce reliance on one custodian, but they introduce counterparty, payment, software, liquidity, and dispute risks of their own. - Zcash Shielded-Transaction Setup Guide (zcash-full-privacy-setup-guide) - Q: What is the difference between shielded and transparent Zcash? A: Transparent Zcash exposes transaction details on the public chain. A fully shielded transfer within one shielded pool conceals the sender, recipient, and amount from public chain observers. Transfers between transparent and shielded pools reveal the value crossing between pools. - Q: Is every address beginning with u1 shielded? A: The u1 prefix identifies a Unified Address, not one fixed receiver type. A Unified Address can contain multiple receiver types. Current Zodl versions present rotating shielded-only Unified Addresses on the Receive screen, but other wallets may compose them differently. - Q: Does shielding erase an earlier transparent transaction? A: No. The transparent address, amount, and timing remain public. Shielding protects later activity inside the shielded pool, subject to information revealed by future transfers and external records held by services you use. - Q: Can Zodl spend shielded ZEC through Flexa? A: Zodl, formerly Zashi, includes an optional Flexa integration for supported US retail locations. Flexa requires registration and processes the payment, so this is not the same privacy model as a direct shielded payment to a merchant. - Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Privacy (zero-knowledge-proofs-privacy) - Q: What does a zero-knowledge proof hide? A: It hides the secret witness used to prove a defined statement. It does not automatically hide network metadata, public inputs, wallet activity, or information leaked by the surrounding application. - Q: Are all Zcash transactions private? A: No. Zcash supports transparent and shielded value pools. Transfers between transparent and shielded pools reveal the transferred value. Shielded-to-shielded use provides the strongest on-chain privacy. - Q: Do modern Zcash shielded transactions need a trusted setup? A: The Orchard shielded protocol uses Halo 2 and does not rely on the older Sprout or Sapling trusted setup ceremonies. Older shielded pools used different proving systems and assumptions. - Q: Can zero-knowledge proofs replace identity checks? A: They can support selective claims such as proving that a signed credential contains an age above a threshold. The issuer still sees the original evidence, and the verifier must accept the issuer and proof system. - Zimbabwe's ZiG Currency and Cryptocurrency Use (zimbabwe-zig-crypto-survival) - Q: What is Zimbabwe's ZiG currency? A: The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe introduced Zimbabwe Gold, or ZiG, in April 2024. The bank said it was anchored by foreign currency and precious-metal reserves. The IMF reported that ZiG use remained limited in 2025 and that Zimbabwe remained highly dollarised. - Q: How widely is cryptocurrency used in Zimbabwe? A: Zimbabwe's Financial Intelligence Unit reported in 2025 that crypto activity remained limited. It estimated fewer than 20,000 active participants and said precise adoption figures were unavailable. Claims that a large share of urban residents hold crypto are not supported by that assessment. - Q: Which cryptocurrencies are used in Zimbabwe? A: Zimbabwe's Financial Intelligence Unit found a preference for USDT and USDC, with Bitcoin and other major assets also traded. It said Monero and Zcash had limited interest and negligible demand. - Q: Are cryptocurrency exchanges legal in Zimbabwe? A: The Reserve Bank told banks in 2018 not to provide services to virtual-currency exchanges or facilitate crypto trading. A 2025 government risk assessment said Zimbabwe still lacked a formal platform connecting banks and virtual-asset providers, leaving most activity peer to peer while authorities developed a regulatory framework. - PGP Basics: Encrypt Messages Without a Central Server (pgp-basics) - Q: Is PGP still useful in 2026? A: Yes. PGP still works for email, file encryption, software signing, and identity checks when both sides verify fingerprints and protect private keys. It does not hide metadata, and it is clumsier than Signal, but it remains one of the few decentralized options. - Q: Does PGP hide who I talk to? A: No. OpenPGP protects message content and signatures. Email headers, timing, recipient data, and server logs still expose metadata unless you add separate transport protection and keep identities compartmentalized. - Q: What is the most important safety check? A: Verify the full key fingerprint through a second channel before trusting a public key. Skip that step and you can encrypt to an attacker key without realizing it. - Buying Bitcoin With Less Identity Exposure (how-to-buy-bitcoin-anonymously) - Q: Can Bitcoin be bought anonymously? A: A purchase can involve less identity exposure, but no method guarantees anonymity. Bitcoin transactions are public, payment methods create separate records, and a later deposit to an identified service can connect activity to an account. - Q: Does Bisq require identity verification? A: Bisq states that it requires no registration or KYC and routes data through its peer-to-peer network over Tor. The external payment method and trading peer may still receive identifying information. - Q: What wallet habits reduce avoidable links? A: Use a fresh receiving address, label each UTXO, review inputs before spending, and avoid combining coins from unrelated identities without understanding the link that creates. These steps reduce avoidable disclosure but do not make Bitcoin private. - How to Vet Any Privacy Tool Before You Trust It (how-to-vet-a-privacy-tool) - Q: Does open source automatically mean safe? A: No. Public code makes inspection possible, but it does not prove that anyone reviewed the code or that the published app matches it. Check the build process, release signatures, maintenance history, and known issues. - Q: What is the fastest red flag? A: A claim that promises absolute privacy without naming the adversary, protected data, limits, or trust assumptions. Privacy depends on a specific threat model. - Q: Should I trust a security audit? A: Treat an audit as evidence about the exact version and scope tested. Read the report, date, exclusions, findings, and remediation record. An audit badge alone says little. - GrapheneOS Setup Guide: Install, Profiles, Google Play (grapheneos-privacy-phone-guide) - Q: What phones support GrapheneOS? A: GrapheneOS publishes a live official device list. Its production releases support selected Google Pixel phones and the Pixel Tablet. Check the list before buying because carrier-locked models may prevent installation and older devices move out of full support. - Q: Can GrapheneOS run Google Play apps? A: Yes. GrapheneOS offers Google Play as optional apps running in the standard app sandbox. You can install them only in the user profiles that need them and control their permissions like other apps. - Q: Does GrapheneOS make a phone anonymous? A: No. GrapheneOS hardens the operating system and adds privacy controls. A mobile carrier, account provider, app, or website can still identify you through the SIM, account details, network activity, and use patterns. - Q: Should the bootloader stay unlocked after installation? A: No. Follow the official installer through the locking step. GrapheneOS says locking the bootloader enables full verified boot and prevents fastboot from changing or erasing partitions. - Q: How do I verify a GrapheneOS installation? A: Lock the bootloader, compare the verified boot key shown during startup where supported, and use the Auditor app with a second Android device for hardware-backed verification. Follow the official installer and Auditor tutorial for the current procedure. - Feather Wallet Setup and Privacy Settings (monero-feather-wallet-setup-guide) - Q: Is Feather the official Monero wallet? A: No. Feather is an independent, open-source desktop wallet. The Monero project maintains separate reference wallets. - Q: Does Feather use Tor? A: Feather routes transaction broadcasts over Tor by default. Its documentation says a remote node can associate an outgoing transaction with an IP address only when all traffic uses the clear internet. Traffic to a node on the same machine or private network is not routed over Tor. - Q: Should I connect Feather to my own node? A: A local node removes the need to trust a public node for wallet synchronization and transaction construction. Feather also supports remote nodes. A remote node cannot read your address or balance, but a malicious one can manipulate some data used to construct a transaction. - Q: What does the Feather seed restore? A: The seed restores the wallet balance, transaction history, subaddresses, and accounts. It does not restore contacts, labels, transaction descriptions, transaction keys, or outgoing destinations. - Five Eyes Jurisdictions and VPN Privacy (five-eyes-jurisdiction-privacy) - Q: What are the Five Eyes? A: The Five Eyes are Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Their intelligence agencies cooperate and share intelligence, but each country still acts under its own law. - Q: Does a Five Eyes address make a VPN unsafe? A: No. Country of incorporation is one part of the review. The provider's logging, payment records, ownership, infrastructure, audit scope, and response to legal demands also matter. - Q: Does a no-logs policy remove legal risk? A: No. It can reduce the historical data available to disclose, but the exact policy matters. Read what the provider stores for accounts, payments, support, websites, and live sessions. Also check whether an independent audit tested the relevant systems. - Hardware Surveillance: Microphones, Cameras and Telemetry (hardware-surveillance) - Q: Can a phone use its microphone in the background? A: An app can use the microphone when the operating system permits it. Android and iOS provide permission controls and indicators, but those controls do not remove the microphone from the device. - Q: Is covering a webcam enough? A: A cover blocks that camera lens. It does not block microphones, other cameras, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, location services, or diagnostic data. - Q: What is telemetry? A: Telemetry is data a device or app sends to its operator. It can include device identifiers, configuration details, reliability records, app activity, and diagnostic events. - Q: What is the strongest defense during a sensitive conversation? A: Keep unnecessary connected devices outside the room. Permission settings reduce access, while physical removal reduces the number of sensors and radios present. - Hola VPN and Peer-to-Peer Bandwidth Sharing (hola-vpn-danger) - Q: Does Hola still use peer-to-peer routing? A: Yes, for parts of its free service. Hola says requests may be sent to its peer-to-peer network and that users of some free products may contribute device and network resources. Hola also says its browser extensions, iOS app, and Google Play Android app are not part of that network. - Q: Can other traffic use a Hola user's connection? A: Hola's current terms say free use may enable other devices to be rerouted through the user's device. Its FAQ describes Hola as an IP exchange network in which people provide their IP address in exchange for using other people's IP addresses. - Q: What is the connection between Hola and Bright Data? A: Hola says contributed resources are used for business by Bright Data. Bright Data confirms that it was previously called Luminati and sells residential proxy access sourced from participating devices and applications. - Q: What information does Hola collect? A: Hola's April 2026 privacy policy says it may collect IP addresses, account and billing information, browser and operating-system details, access times, and browsing history from the browser extension. It says log data may be retained for up to 12 months. - DIY Privacy Hardware: Faraday Pouches, Camera Blockers, and Detection Tools (diy-privacy-hardware) - Q: Do Faraday pouches work? A: A properly sealed radio-isolation pouch can block a phone from cellular, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth networks. Damage, poor seams, and an incomplete closure can reduce isolation, so test the pouch with the device inside and repeat the test as it wears. - Q: Can a webcam cover damage a laptop? A: Yes. Apple warns that closing a Mac laptop with a camera cover can damage its display. If a cover is required, Apple says it should be no thicker than 0.1 mm and should leave no adhesive residue. - Q: Does a USB data blocker make public charging safe? A: A charge-only cable prevents USB data transfer, but carrying your own wall charger or battery avoids the public USB port entirely. The FCC says juice jacking is technically possible but that it knows of no confirmed cases. - Q: Can an RF detector find every hidden camera? A: No. Basic RF detectors can react to ordinary phones and other legitimate transmitters. They can also miss cameras that use a cable or record to local storage instead of transmitting. - Hidden Camera Detection: What Each Method Misses (counter-surveillance-devices) - Q: Can a null detector result prove that a room has no hidden camera? A: No. A null result only means that the tested signal was not observed under the method’s stated range, angle, network, power and traffic assumptions. - Q: Did Cunicula reproduce the reported detector results? A: No. The findings are attributed to the named researchers and papers. Cunicula has not purchased detector hardware, run an efficacy test or performed a teardown. - Q: Do the methods cover cameras recording to local storage? A: Optical and image-sensor emanation methods can address some local-storage cameras. Wi-Fi traffic and channel-state methods cannot detect a camera that does not expose the live stream assumed by the paper. - Cellebrite Phone Extraction and the Serbia Abuse Case (cellebrite-phone-hacking-dissidents) - Q: What does Cellebrite UFED do? A: Cellebrite says UFED accesses and collects data from mobile devices. Its product page describes full-file-system and physical extraction methods, including access to protected and encrypted data on supported devices. - Q: What is Cellebrite Physical Analyzer? A: Physical Analyzer ingests phone extractions and other records, decodes application data, builds timelines, and produces reports. - Q: Was Cellebrite used against journalists and activists in Serbia? A: Amnesty International reported forensic evidence that Serbian authorities used Cellebrite tools on devices belonging to an independent journalist, activists, and peaceful protesters. Amnesty also found NoviSpy spyware on some examined devices. - Q: Does Signal encryption stop phone extraction? A: Signal protects messages in transit. It cannot protect readable data on an unlocked endpoint from someone who has physical possession of that device. Whether extraction succeeds depends on the device, operating system, lock state, and available technique. - Kape Technologies and ExpressVPN Ownership (kape-technologies-expressvpn) - Q: Who owns ExpressVPN? A: Kape Technologies owns ExpressVPN. Kape acquired the service in December 2021. Unikmind Holdings took Kape private in 2023. - Q: Which VPN brands does Kape own? A: Kape owns ExpressVPN, Private Internet Access, CyberGhost, and ZenMate. It assembled this portfolio through acquisitions between 2017 and 2021. - Q: Was Kape Technologies called Crossrider? A: Yes. Crossrider changed its name to Kape Technologies in 2018 after moving away from web apps and advertising technology and into consumer security and privacy products. - Q: Does Kape ownership prove that its VPNs are unsafe? A: No. Ownership history is one part of a VPN assessment. Users should also examine current privacy policies, published audit scope, software security, legal jurisdiction, and the data each service collects. - NSO Group and Pegasus Spyware (nso-group-pegasus-spyware) - Q: What is Pegasus spyware? A: Pegasus is phone spyware made by NSO Group. Once installed, it can collect files, messages, location data, calls, and other information from the device. Some versions can activate the microphone or camera. - Q: Can Pegasus infect a phone without a click? A: Yes. Citizen Lab has documented several zero-click exploit chains attributed to NSO Group. A zero-click attack does not require the target to open a link or attachment. - Q: Does encryption stop Pegasus? A: No. End-to-end encryption protects messages while they travel between devices. Spyware on an endpoint can read data after the receiving device decrypts it or before the sending device encrypts it. - Q: Can Mobile Verification Toolkit prove a phone is clean? A: No. MVT can find known forensic indicators, but Amnesty International warns that public tools may not detect the latest spyware without specialist knowledge and private indicators. - Q: Does Lockdown Mode stop Pegasus? A: Lockdown Mode reduces attack surface and has blocked documented exploit chains, but it is not a guarantee. High-risk Apple users should update every device, enable Lockdown Mode, and seek expert help after a threat notification or credible warning. - Government Surveillance-Resistant Infrastructure (government-surveillance-resistant-infrastructure) - Q: What is surveillance-resistant infrastructure? A: It is infrastructure designed to limit what any one provider, account, server, or legal demand can reveal or disable. - Q: Can infrastructure be government-proof? A: No. Operators can reduce retained data and single points of failure, but no hosting design removes legal, physical, software, or human risk. - Q: Do Tor onion services hide a server location? A: The Tor onion-service protocol protects the service IP address and routes connections through Tor. Poor server administration, application leaks, or compromised credentials can still identify an operator or host. - Q: Does IPFS keep content online permanently? A: No. IPFS content must be pinned and hosted by at least one available node. A single pinning provider remains a single point of failure. - Open-Source AI: Local Models and Data Paths (private-ai-local-llm) - Q: Is a local LLM private? A: A local model can keep prompts and files on the device. The complete data path also includes the runner, telemetry, embeddings, tools, MCP servers, storage and network exposure. - Q: Is an open-weight model open source? A: Not necessarily. A downloadable weight file may have use restrictions or omit the training data information and code needed to study and modify the complete system. - Q: Does abliteration make a model more private? A: No. Abliteration changes refusal behaviour in model weights. It does not change where prompts, embeddings, logs or tool requests are sent. - Q: Can a local model still send code or documents to a cloud service? A: Yes. A cloud embedding provider, remote reranker, hosted MCP server, web search tool or IDE telemetry path can transmit data even when generation runs locally. - Signal vs SimpleX vs Session: Which Is Most Private? (encrypted-messaging-comparison) - Q: Which private messenger should I use? A: Signal is the strongest default for most people because every conversation is end-to-end encrypted and its published legal responses show that it retains little account data. SimpleX removes the persistent user identifier but requires more deliberate contact exchange. Session requires no phone number, but its current protocol does not provide perfect forward secrecy. Matrix suits federated communities, though homeservers still process account and room data. - Q: Can Signal be used without revealing a phone number? A: Signal still requires a phone number for registration. Its usernames let people start a chat without receiving that number. Set both phone-number privacy controls to Nobody if you do not want other users to see your number or find your account by searching for it. - Q: Does SimpleX have user accounts? A: SimpleX does not assign a global user identifier. Contacts connect through invitation links and separate message queues. Relay servers temporarily hold encrypted messages until delivery. This reduces server-side linkage, but it does not defeat endpoint compromise or a capable observer watching traffic. - Q: Does Session provide perfect forward secrecy? A: Not in its current protocol. Session states that perfect forward secrecy is planned for Session Protocol V2. Session does provide end-to-end encryption, phone-free account creation, and onion-routed requests. - Q: Is Matrix end-to-end encrypted? A: Matrix supports end-to-end encryption through Olm and Megolm, and major clients enable it for private rooms. Encryption protects event content. It does not hide the account, room membership, device records, or all traffic metadata from the homeservers involved. - Ethereum Foundation CROPS Mandate: What It Commits To (ethereum-foundation-crops-mandate-2026) - Q: What does CROPS mean in the Ethereum Foundation mandate? A: CROPS stands for censorship resistance, open source and free as in freedom, privacy, and security. The mandate says the Ethereum Foundation must treat those properties as one set and prioritize them in its decisions. - Q: Does the CROPS mandate make Ethereum private? A: No. Ethereum remains transparent by default. The mandate directs the Ethereum Foundation, but it does not change the protocol or hide ordinary transactions. - Q: Is the mandate binding on Ethereum users and developers? A: No. The Ethereum Foundation says the mandate is written for the foundation and imposes no obligation on anyone else. - Q: Why was the mandate published on Ethereum? A: The Ethereum Foundation placed the mandate text in transaction input data. That creates a public, timestamped record that can be checked independently. - Financial Privacy for Journalists, Activists & Dissidents (financial-privacy-activists-dissidents) - Q: Can the government freeze a journalist's bank account? A: Yes. It has happened in several countries. In February 2022, Canada used the Emergencies Act to freeze protester and donor accounts without court orders. In the US, OFAC can freeze accounts tied to designated individuals. In the UK, police can seek Account Freezing Orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act with a lower bar than a criminal conviction. Any account inside the banking system can be frozen fast, often with weak due process. - Q: How do payment processors identify and deplatform activists? A: Payment processors watch transactions, counterparties, content, and account behavior. PayPal froze WikiLeaks donations in 2010. Patreon removed political creators. GoFundMe pulled a legal-defense fundraiser during the 2022 Canadian protests. Sex worker platforms lost processing after legal pressure. The pattern is simple: automated flags, policy review, then pressure from banks or governments. The main defense is not depending on custodial platforms for critical funds. - Q: How does AI financial surveillance identify activists and dissidents? A: Banks and processors scan individual transfers and map who pays whom. They look for repeated payments to activist or legal-defense categories, line activity up with protests or political events, and flag location patterns such as ATM use near demonstrations. Those systems feed SAR reviews and wider financial intelligence files. - Q: What is the safest way for a journalist to receive payments anonymously? A: For privacy, the strongest option is direct Monero in self-custody. Zcash shielded comes next where both sides can use shielded addresses. Bitcoin Lightning can work for smaller payments but leaks more. Regular Bitcoin to fresh addresses cuts some bank linkage but stays traceable. Avoid PayPal, Venmo, Cash App, and Zelle for sensitive funding. They are all custodial and tied to KYC records. - GitHub Privacy Considerations for Sensitive Projects (github-privacy-risk) - Q: Does GitHub record IP addresses? A: Yes. GitHub says its service-usage data includes IP addresses, device information, session details, request dates and times, operating-system information, and repository contribution data. - Q: Can legal authorities obtain GitHub account data? A: GitHub says valid legal process can require it to provide account details. A subpoena can reach specified account and registration information. A court order or search warrant can reach account access logs, and a search warrant can reach private repository content. - Q: Does a public repository protect contributor identity? A: No. Public commits expose author names, email addresses, and timestamps stored in Git history. GitHub also records service-usage data separately. A public repository removes content secrecy, not account or contributor metadata. - Q: Is Codeberg anonymous? A: No code host should be treated as anonymous. Codeberg says it processes technical metadata including IP address, browser, operating system, access time, requested URLs, and referrer. Its policy says stored IP addresses are truncated and technical metadata is kept for no more than seven days unless German law requires otherwise. - How to Scrub Your Personal Information from the Internet (how-to-scrub-your-personal-info-from-the-internet) - Q: Can I remove all of my personal information from the internet? A: No. You can remove many broker profiles, old accounts, and search results, but lawful public records, news reports, archives, and copied breach data may remain. The practical goal is to reduce exposure and make current details harder to find. - Q: Should I remove the source page or the Google result first? A: Ask the site that hosts the information to remove it first. Google can remove eligible results from Search, but that does not delete the source page. After the source changes, request a refresh of any outdated Google result. - Q: Do data broker opt-outs last forever? A: Not always. The Federal Trade Commission warns that information can reappear when public records change. Keep a record of requests and check the main people-search sites again every few months. - Q: What should I do if a breach exposed identity or financial data? A: Removal requests are not enough. Change exposed credentials, contact the relevant bank or issuer, review credit reports, consider a credit freeze, and use IdentityTheft.gov for a recovery plan if someone misused the data. - M-Pesa, Machankura, and Transaction Privacy in Kenya (kenya-mpesa-bitcoin-machankura) - Q: What is Machankura? A: Machankura is a custodial Bitcoin wallet that users can reach through USSD on a mobile phone. It assigns an account to a phone number and supports transfers to other Machankura users and Lightning addresses. - Q: Does Machankura require a smartphone or mobile data? A: No. Its USSD interface works through a mobile network connection without an app or mobile data. The service still depends on the carrier, the USSD provider, and Machankura servers. - Q: Is Machankura private? A: Not in the sense of anonymous or self-custodial money. A Machankura account is tied to a phone number, the mobile network handles the USSD session, and Machankura controls the wallet keys and account records. Bitcoin and Lightning also do not provide the default transaction privacy of a privacy-focused cryptocurrency. - Q: How does Kenya regulate virtual asset services? A: Kenya’s Virtual Asset Service Providers Act took effect on 4 November 2025. It requires providers carrying on virtual asset services in or from Kenya to obtain a licence. In an official notice, the Central Bank of Kenya and Capital Markets Authority said licensing would begin after implementing regulations were issued and that no provider had yet been licensed under the Act at the time of that notice. - Ledger Data Breach and Physical-Security Risks (ledger-breach-kidnappings-opsec) - Q: What data was exposed in the 2020 Ledger breach? A: Ledger says about one million email addresses were exposed. Detailed records for about 272,000 customers included names, postal addresses, and phone numbers. - Q: Did the breach expose recovery phrases or private keys? A: No. Ledger says the incident affected its e-commerce and marketing database, not hardware wallets, recovery phrases, private keys, passwords, or payment information. - Q: Was the Ledger breach proven to have caused later kidnappings? A: No public authority has established that link. French authorities do say that 2025 brought more kidnappings of crypto professionals and that criminals combine physical violence with digital information, including leaked data. - Q: How should a hardware wallet be bought and checked? A: Use the manufacturer or an authorized reseller. Inspect the device, install software from the official site, run the manufacturer authenticity check, and reject any device that arrives with a recovery phrase already written down. - Legal Tax Minimization 2026: US, UK, EU & Australia (legal-tax-minimization-us-uk-eu-aus) - Q: What is the difference between tax minimization and tax evasion? A: Tax minimization uses lawful reliefs, allowances, deductions, and account structures while reporting income and assets as required. Tax evasion conceals taxable facts or supplies false information. - Q: Does moving to another country automatically change tax residence? A: No. Residence tests differ by country and can consider days present, homes, work, family ties, and treaty rules. Two countries may initially treat the same person as resident. - Q: Can an article replace personal tax advice? A: No. Eligibility, contribution limits, withdrawal rules, reporting duties, and cross-border treatment depend on personal facts and current law. Check the relevant tax authority and get qualified advice before acting. - Correction: Monero Traded Above $687 in January 2026 (monero-ath-correction) - Q: Did Monero trade above $687 in January 2026? A: Yes. Kraken and KuCoin daily market data both record Monero trading near $800 on 14 January 2026. - Q: What was Monero’s all-time high? A: CoinGecko and CoinPaprika record a US dollar all-time high near $797 on 14 January 2026. Kraken and KuCoin recorded intraday highs of about $800 on their XMR markets. - Q: Why do Monero price records differ? A: Crypto trades on separate markets. Prices can differ by exchange, trading pair, liquidity, and the method an aggregator uses to combine market data. - No-KYC eSIM Comparison for 2026 (no-kyc-esim-comparison-2026) - Q: Can I buy an eSIM without showing ID? A: Silent.Link, NadaNada, and PikaSim say their standard eSIM checkout does not require identity documents. Phreeli says it minimizes customer data, but it collects information needed for US wireless service and payment. Check the current terms before paying because telecom and payment requirements can change. - Q: Does a no-KYC eSIM make a phone anonymous? A: No. The eSIM and its upstream carrier still process technical records needed to provide service. An eSIM bought without identity documents can reduce information collected at checkout, but it does not hide the device from the mobile network or prevent location records created through cell-tower use. - Q: Which private eSIM accepts Monero? A: Silent.Link, NadaNada, and PikaSim currently advertise Monero payments. Phreeli lists privacy-focused payment options on its payment pages. Confirm the available method during checkout because payment support can change. - Q: Do private eSIM providers accept cards? A: Some do. PikaSim and NadaNada offer card payments as well as cryptocurrency. A card processor can collect billing and contact details even when the eSIM provider does not require an account. Silent.Link advertises cryptocurrency payments for its eSIM plans. - Private Phone Setup in 2026: GrapheneOS, Phreeli, and SimpleX (no-kyc-phone-stack-2026) - Q: What does a privacy-focused phone stack change in 2026? A: It reduces identity exposure layer by layer: GrapheneOS on a Pixel bought with cash removes the Google account and telemetry, a low-data carrier like Phreeli in the US or Silent.Link globally narrows the account link, Mullvad handles network visibility, and a messenger like SimpleX or Session avoids a phone-number identifier. Each layer removes a specific record. The cellular network still sees device and SIM identifiers, and every provider keeps whatever its terms document. - Q: Can I use GrapheneOS without a SIM card? A: Yes. GrapheneOS works fine on Wi-Fi only. You can use Tor Browser, VPNs, crypto wallets, and messengers like SimpleX, Session, or Briar without any SIM card. A SIM only adds mobile data and, if you want it, a phone number. - Q: What phone number works with GrapheneOS? A: Phreeli is a US carrier product whose baseline eSIM signup asks for a ZIP code and payment rather than identity documents. Silent.Link sells eSIMs in 160+ countries with Monero and no account. JMP.chat issues a real US or Canadian number over XMPP paid in Lightning. If the need is only messaging, SimpleX skips the phone number entirely. - Q: What does Phreeli collect in the US? A: Phreeli’s baseline eSIM signup asks for a ZIP code and a payment method rather than a name or ID. Its current terms generally mention cards and discuss cryptocurrency only conditionally; the reviewed official pages do not establish current Monero or shielded-Zcash availability. The terms reserve the right to request more information, require a name and mailing address for physical devices, and the privacy policy documents phone numbers, call-detail records, IP addresses, location, IMEI, ICCID, IMSI, and payment data. It is a lower-data US carrier, not an identity-free one. - Q: How do I message people anonymously on a smartphone? A: Use apps that do not need a phone number. SimpleX has no phone number, no email, and no user ID. Session is decentralized and uses onion routing. Briar works peer-to-peer over Tor but entered maintenance mode in July 2026, with only essential security updates and bug fixes promised. All run on GrapheneOS. Avoid SMS, WhatsApp, and other tools that tie chat to a real-world identifier. - No-KYC Virtual Cards: SolvoCard, Veil, Stealths (no-kyc-prepaid-cards-2026) - Q: Are no-KYC virtual cards credit cards? A: No. The products compared here are prepaid or stored-value virtual cards. They do not provide a revolving line of credit. You fund a balance before spending. - Q: What is the maximum amount I can add to SolvoCard? A: SolvoCard says there is no maximum single top-up amount. Its public pages disagree on the monthly card limit: several pages state 25,000 US dollars per card, while the EURO card page states 50,000 euros. The dashboard and support should be checked before depositing because the published figures are inconsistent. - Q: Why is SolvoCard marked high risk? A: SolvoCard records no document check for signup. The separate high-risk label records an active June 2026 card-program incident, reports of balances still awaiting refunds, unnamed issuing and payment partners, and conflicting public company-location statements. - Q: Which current virtual-card services publish a no-KYC policy? A: SolvoCard, Veil, and Stealths each publish a no-KYC or no-customer-verification statement. Their products, limits, custody, issuer disclosure, and operating history differ. KemyCard publishes full eKYC with Sumsub, so it is included only as a KYC comparison point. - No-KYC Crypto Swap Guide: Wallet-to-Wallet No-ID Services (no-kyc-swaps-2026) - Q: Does Haveno require KYC? A: Haveno states that it is a peer-to-peer exchange for Monero and will remain non-KYC. Traders still disclose the information required by their chosen payment method to the counterparty. - Q: Does Bisq require registration or KYC? A: Bisq states that it requires no registration or KYC. Its peer-to-peer network uses Tor, and its classic trade protocol holds funds in a multisignature address controlled by the two traders. - Q: Is an instant swap automatically no-KYC? A: No. A service may allow a transaction without account registration while retaining the right to collect identity documents, impose limits, refuse a transfer, or route the transaction through a third party with its own KYC process. - Q: Does no-KYC make a public-chain transaction private? A: No. Skipping an identity form does not hide addresses, amounts, or transaction paths on a transparent blockchain. It only removes one direct identity-collection step from the exchange workflow. - Phreeli Review 2026: Signup and Payment Requirements (phreeli-anonymous-phone-carrier) - Q: What information does Phreeli require for mobile service? A: Phreeli terms list a nine-digit residential US ZIP code and a valid payment method. The company reserves the right to request additional information for legal compliance. Device purchases also require a name and mailing address. - Q: Does Phreeli promise anonymous phone service? A: Its public material describes data minimization and separation between payment and phone use. The terms still require account and payment information, permit additional compliance checks, and describe location and emergency-service records. These documents support a reduced-data model, not a guarantee of anonymity. - Q: Does Phreeli officially promise Monero or Zcash payments? A: The current terms say the website generally accepts most debit and credit cards and discuss cryptocurrency conditionally if offered. The reviewed official pages do not establish current Monero or shielded-Zcash availability, so this article no longer states those options as fact. - Q: Is the full Double-Blind Armadillo design used at launch? A: The published white paper says the initial launch uses a simpler Privacy Pass with user commitments design and removes the second protocol run from the full Double-Blind Armadillo architecture. It also states a trust assumption for the mixing service. - Coldcard: 2026 Firmware Random-Number Flaw and Bitcoin Theft (coldcard-rng-entropy-incident-2026) - Q: What caused the Coldcard random-number flaw? A: A 2021 firmware migration to libsecp256k1 rerouted wallet-seed generation through a build guard that tested only whether a setting existed, not its value. The setting was defined as 0, so the guard never fired and the firmware linked a deterministic software fallback generator instead of the hardware random-number generator. - Q: Which Coldcard devices and firmware versions are affected? A: Mk2 and Mk3 devices on firmware 4.0.1 through 4.1.9 are fully affected. Mk4, Mk5, and Q devices on any firmware before the July 31, 2026 fix are partially affected. TAPSIGNER, OPENDIME, and SATSCARD use a different codebase and are not affected, according to Coinkite. - Q: How much Bitcoin has been stolen? A: Trackers disagree. Reported running totals range from roughly 594 BTC to roughly 1,816 BTC across multiple waves since July 30, 2026, depending on which firm and which date is cited. Cunicula presents this as a range, not a single confirmed figure. - Q: Did AI find the Coldcard vulnerability? A: That is disputed. Coinkite says it ran an AI model over its own code weeks before the incident and it missed the bug. Separate social-media claims that AI models rediscovered the bug in minutes after public disclosure trace largely to a single anonymous, evidence-free post and have been publicly disputed on methodology grounds. Cunicula did not independently verify either claim. - Q: How can a Coldcard owner check if their seed is affected? A: Check which firmware generated the seed. Coinkite recommends moving funds from affected seeds to a new seed generated after updating firmware. A passphrase does not repair an affected seed. The independent-dice exception requires at least 50 fair, private rolls that have not been exposed. The current advisory explains the exact conditions. - Chatrie v. United States: What the Geofence Ruling Does and Does Not Decide (chatrie-geofence-ruling-license-plate-readers) - Q: What did the Supreme Court decide in Chatrie v. United States? A: The Court held that police conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they acquired Chatrie's Google Location History data. Source: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-112_0am4.pdf. Retrieved 10 August 2026. - Q: Did Chatrie decide whether automated license plate reader searches require a warrant? A: No. The opinion addresses Google Location History and does not decide the constitutional treatment of automated license plate reader databases. Source: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-112_0am4.pdf. Retrieved 10 August 2026. - Q: Did the Supreme Court decide whether the geofence warrant was valid? A: No. The Court left the warrant's particularity and probable-cause questions to the Fourth Circuit on remand. Source: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-112_0am4.pdf. Retrieved 10 August 2026. - US CBDC Restriction in Public Law 119-101 (us-cbdc-ban-road-to-housing-act) - Q: What CBDC provision became law in Public Law 119-101? A: Title XI, Section 1101 adds Section 16A to the Federal Reserve Act and bars the Federal Reserve from issuing or creating a covered CBDC directly or through an intermediary. Source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-119publ101/html/PLAW-119publ101.htm. Retrieved 10 August 2026. - Q: Does the US CBDC prohibition cover private stablecoins? A: Not under this definition. A covered CBDC must be a direct liability of the Federal Reserve System and widely available to the general public. Source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-119publ101/html/PLAW-119publ101.htm. Retrieved 10 August 2026. - Q: When does the CBDC provision expire? A: The new Federal Reserve Act Section 16A says its provisions cease to be effective on 31 December 2030. Source: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-119publ101/html/PLAW-119publ101.htm. Retrieved 10 August 2026. - Phishing, Stalkerware, and Mercenary Spyware Triage (spyware-apps-detection-guide) - Q: What is the first step after a suspicious login or security message? A: Do not use the message's link. Open the provider's official app or type its known address, then review account activity and report the message. Source: https://support.google.com/mail/answer/8253. Retrieved 10 August 2026. - Q: Should stalkerware be removed immediately? A: Not when removal could alert an abuser or erase evidence. Use a safe device to seek support and make a safety plan first. Source: https://stopstalkerware.org/information-for-survivors/. Retrieved 10 August 2026. - Q: What should an Apple mercenary-spyware notification recipient do? A: Verify the alert by signing in directly at account.apple.com, follow Apple's protective steps, and seek expert help. Source: https://support.apple.com/en-us/102174. Retrieved 10 August 2026. - Google's EU Copyright Submission: Site-Blocking Safeguards (eu-site-blocking-google-copyright-submission) - Q: Did Google ask the EU to prohibit site blocking? A: No. Google argued that injunctions should be subsidiary, proportionate, evidence-based, reviewable, and aimed away from shared infrastructure such as DNS resolvers, VPNs, and CDNs. Source: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/api/download/090166e52ff2de8c. Retrieved 10 August 2026. - Q: Why did Google oppose blocking shared internet infrastructure? A: Google said domain and shared-IP blocking can also restrict lawful content and unrelated services, and that alternative resolvers can circumvent DNS blocks. Source: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/api/download/090166e52ff2de8c. Retrieved 10 August 2026. - Q: Is Google publication F33504634 an EU policy decision? A: No. It is Google's contribution to Commission evidence-gathering. The Commission portal record is a consultation surface, not an enacted blocking rule. Sources: https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/18172-Report-on-the-review-of-the-2019-EU-rules-on-copyright-and-related-rights-in-the-digital-single-market/F33504634_en and https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/18173-Targeted-initiative-for-a-better-copyright-environment-for-European-creativity-and-innovation_en. Retrieved 10 August 2026. - Manifest V3 and the Limits of Chrome Content Blocking in 2026 (manifest-v3-content-blocking-limits) - Q: Does uBlock Origin still work in Chrome? A: No. Google disabled Manifest V2 extensions for all Chrome users on all channels with Chrome 138 in July 2025, and removed the enterprise policy that allowed re-enabling them in Chrome 139. uBlock Origin is a Manifest V2 extension, so it no longer runs on current Chrome. Remaining Manifest V2 extensions are scheduled for removal from the Chrome Web Store on 31 August 2026. - Q: Is uBlock Origin Lite the same extension? A: No. The uBlock Origin Lite documentation states it is a separate, fully declarative extension and not an automatic replacement, and that filter capabilities including strict1p and strict3p, entity-based domain values, redirect-rule, regex-based removeparam, response-body replace, ipaddress filtering, and CNAME uncloaking cannot be translated into declarativeNetRequest rules. - Q: Which browser still runs the full version of uBlock Origin? A: Firefox. Mozilla stated it would maintain support for blocking webRequest in Manifest V3 while also shipping declarativeNetRequest for cross-browser compatibility. That blocking API is what the full uBlock Origin depends on. - Q: What does uBlock Origin Lite still block? A: Network filtering and scriptlet injection from precompiled declarative rulesets, which its documentation reports at roughly 17,000 rules in Optimal or Complete mode. Generic cosmetic filtering is off by default and requires raising the mode to Complete. Rulesets update only when the extension package itself updates. - GrapheneOS Duress Claim: What the Court Record Supports (grapheneos-duress-code-prosecution) - Q: Do the Tunick court filings say he used a GrapheneOS duress credential? A: No. The reviewed indictment and suppression motion identify a Google Pixel and describe what happened after a password was entered, but they do not name GrapheneOS or use the term duress. Sources: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.351975/gov.uscourts.gand.351975.1.0.pdf and https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.351975/gov.uscourts.gand.351975.21.0.pdf, retrieved 9 August 2026. - Q: Has the court ruled that Tunick unlawfully wiped the phone? A: No ruling was present in the record reviewed through 9 August 2026. A 20 July 2026 minute sheet says the suppression hearing remained open and set future briefing. Source: https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.351975/gov.uscourts.gand.351975.31.0.pdf, retrieved 9 August 2026. - Q: What does the documented GrapheneOS duress feature do? A: GrapheneOS documents an optional duress PIN or password that irreversibly wipes the device and installed eSIMs when entered where a normal credential is requested. Source: https://grapheneos.org/features#duress, retrieved 9 August 2026. - Minneapolis Rejects Skydio Drones While Whittier Expands Axon's DFR Program (minneapolis-skydio-drone-rejection) - Q: Did Minneapolis ban police drones? A: No. The Minneapolis City Council rejected a specific pilot program that would have let the police department contract with Skydio to fly drones as first responders to 911 calls. Minneapolis police already use drones in some circumstances outside that pilot. The vote on the pilot proposal was 6-6 and failed on the tie. - Q: Why did council members cite Skydio specifically? A: Public comment and council members raised that Skydio drones have been sold to Immigration and Customs Enforcement and to the Israeli military. Council member Jamal Osman said he had supported the pilot until he learned of those sales and cited a prior winter in which ICE used drones to surveil Minnesotans. - Q: What is Axon Drone First Responder? A: Axon markets Drone First Responder, or DFR, as a program where a remote pilot launches a drone from a fixed dock immediately after a 911 call, before a patrol officer leaves the station, aiming to get live video to a scene in under 90 seconds. Whittier, California approved a DFR contract using Skydio drones on July 14, 2026, folded into a larger five-year, $3.44 million Axon agreement. - The SCREEN Act Cleared a Committee Vote, Then Stalled on Quorum (screen-act-age-verification-vpn) - Q: Did the SCREEN Act pass the Senate Commerce Committee? A: On August 5, 2026, the Senate Commerce Committee voted 15-13 in favor of advancing S.737, the SCREEN Act, but the bill did not actually advance because too few senators were present to meet quorum. It has not passed the committee, the full Senate, or the House as of this writing. - Q: What would the SCREEN Act require? A: S.737 defines a covered platform as an interactive computer service with a US nexus that, in its regular course of trade or business and with the objective of earning a profit, creates, hosts, or makes harmful-to-minors content available. It would require such platforms to verify that users are not minors before granting access to that content. Known VPN and proxy addresses would trigger verification unless the platform determines the user is outside the United States. - Q: Does the SCREEN Act only affect adult sites? A: Not necessarily. The bill has no threshold requiring that a significant share of a covered platform be sexually explicit. EFF argues that this could reach mainstream platforms such as Reddit, Discord, Bluesky, and streaming services that carry some qualifying content. That is EFF’s interpretation of the bill’s reach, not the statutory definition by itself. - Guinea Blocked Three Platforms After a Cabinet Reshuffle. VPN Demand Rose Over 3,000%. (guinea-vpn-surge-social-media-blackout) - Q: What happened to the internet in Guinea in July 2026? A: Guinea's government blocked Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok nationwide starting at dawn on July 28, 2026, hours after a surprise overnight cabinet reshuffle. No regulator, operator, or minister explained the block. The Guinean Bloggers' Association ran independent technical tests and confirmed it was a targeted block, not a general network outage. - Q: How much did VPN demand increase in Guinea? A: According to VPN Super telemetry, VPN traffic out of Guinea rose 547% on the first day of the block, then 2,143% on the second day and 3,108% on the third, with a peak single hour running roughly 27 times the pre-blackout hourly average. These are percentage changes against a pre-blackout baseline, not absolute connection counts. - Q: Has Guinea blocked social media before? A: Yes. Guinea's government blocked the same three platforms for roughly 48 hours in April 2026, without explanation, following a warning from the media regulator. It also dissolved approximately 40 opposition parties in March 2026. The July 2026 block had no comparable warning and, as of early August, had already run longer than the April block. - A VPN Provider Built a Tool to Strip Windows' Hidden Device ID (windows-gdid-degdid-tracking) - Q: What is Windows GDID? A: GDID, or Global Device Identifier, is a Microsoft-issued identifier tied to a Windows installation. Microsoft documents it publicly as GlobalDeviceId in the UCDOStatus table used for Windows Update for Business and Delivery Optimization reporting. It is not the same as an advertising ID, Microsoft account user ID, or hardware serial number, and it can survive attempts to remove it because it is minted through Windows identity and account-registration flows rather than derived purely from hardware. - Q: How did GDID become public? A: GDID appeared in a superseding federal complaint against Peter Stokes, a 19-year-old alleged member of the Scattered Spider hacking group, unsealed July 1, 2026. According to Windscribe's reading of the filing, Microsoft supplied investigators logs correlating a Windows GDID with IP activity, including an ngrok account creation at the same time as an intrusion and IP addresses tied to personal accounts prosecutors attribute to Stokes. - Q: Does a VPN protect against GDID tracking? A: No, not by itself. Windscribe's writeup states plainly that in the Stokes case the VPN did not fail and the GDID never traveled through the tunnel. It operates at the layer where Windows communicates directly with Microsoft's cloud, outside VPN-tunneled traffic, so a single connection with the VPN off, or a personal Microsoft account signed into the same machine, can still link the same device identity together. - Apple Advanced Data Protection and the UK Technical Capability Notice (uk-apple-adp-technical-capability-notice) - Q: Can UK users turn on Advanced Data Protection? A: No. Apple withdrew Advanced Data Protection for new UK users in February 2025 and it has not been restored. Users who already had it enabled were given a period to disable it themselves in order to keep using their iCloud account. The feature remains available to users outside the UK. - Q: What is a technical capability notice? A: A technical capability notice is a notice issued under section 253 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 requiring a telecommunications operator to maintain the technical capability to give effect to interception, equipment interference, or communications data acquisition. The notices are secret and recipients are placed under a duty not to disclose them, which is why the Apple case has been reported largely through leaks and litigation rather than published notices. - Q: Which iCloud data is affected when Advanced Data Protection is off? A: Advanced Data Protection is the opt-in setting that extends end-to-end encryption to iCloud backups, iCloud Drive, Photos, Notes, and voice memos. With it unavailable, those categories are held under encryption keys Apple retains, so Apple can produce that data in response to a valid legal demand. Categories that are end-to-end encrypted by default, such as iMessage content, Apple Health data, and passwords in iCloud Keychain, are not governed by this setting. - Q: Has a court ruled that the UK can require a backdoor? A: No. The Investigatory Powers Tribunal has not ruled on the lawfulness of the notice. Its April 2025 public judgment was about secrecy, and it rejected the government position that no information about the case should be public. Apple’s first challenge was dismissed for a change in circumstances after the first notice was withdrawn, not on the merits. Apple filed a fresh claim in August 2026 and the underlying question remains undecided. - Briar Is in Maintenance Mode, Not Shut Down (briar-maintenance-mode) - Q: Has Briar shut down? A: No. Briar says the project remains active in maintenance mode, with essential security updates and bug fixes still in scope. Source: https://briarproject.org/news/2026-maintenance-mode/, retrieved 9 August 2026. - Q: Did Briar release anything after the maintenance notice? A: The Android release-1.5.19 tag was created on 13 July 2026, four days after the notice, but it points to a release commit dated 29 June 2026. Source: https://code.briarproject.org/briar/briar/-/tags/release-1.5.19, retrieved 9 August 2026. - Cellebrite in Australia: NSW and Victoria Phone-Access Powers Explained (cellebrite-australia-nsw-victoria-phone-access-powers) - Q: Can NSW Police unlock any phone at a roadside stop without a warrant? A: No. The August 2026 bill would let police seek a digital evidence access order after a device has been lawfully seized without a search or crime scene warrant, including during a lawful roadside stop. The device must be relevant to a listed serious offence linked to organised crime, and a Local Court judge must grant the order before police can compel access information or biometric assistance. - Q: What is the proposed penalty for refusing a NSW phone access order? A: The proposed maximum for failing to comply with an organised-crime digital evidence access order without reasonable excuse, or giving materially false or misleading information, is 100 penalty units, seven years imprisonment, or both. The bill also raises the existing warrant-linked order maximum from five to seven years. Ten years applies to a separate NSW Crime Commission offence of giving false or misleading evidence at a hearing. - Q: Does the NSW phone-access bill require police to use Cellebrite? A: No. The bill creates legal authority to compel access and assistance. It does not name Cellebrite, require a particular forensic product, guarantee that a locked phone can be extracted, or authorise remote mass access. Cellebrite is a separate vendor whose tools have been linked to NSW Police practice in secondary reporting. - Q: What is proven about Cellebrite Australia and NSW or Victoria Police? A: Neither the NSW bill nor Victoria’s phone-access provisions name or mandate Cellebrite. A NSW government supplier profile proves Cellebrite Australia is registered as a supplier. Independent and activist reporting links Cellebrite products to NSW Police and cites FOI-derived deployment and scan figures, but the underlying records and a specific public contract were not located for this review. - Q: Is the NSW phone-access proposal already law? A: No. As of 29 August 2026, the Crimes and Other Legislation Amendment (Further Organised Crimes Reforms) Bill 2026 remained in the Legislative Assembly at second reading. If enacted, its digital evidence access order provisions would commence only on a date appointed by proclamation. - Q: Can Victoria Police require a person to unlock a phone? A: Yes, but not merely because police possess the phone. Under sections 465AAA and 465AA of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), a search warrant may authorise a police direction, or the Magistrates’ Court may make an order, requiring reasonable and necessary access assistance where statutory conditions are met. Non-compliance without reasonable excuse carries maximum penalties of two years for a warrant-authorised direction and five years for a court order. - Authoritative DNS Hosting Is Not Private DNS Resolution (authoritative-vs-recursive-dns-privacy) - Q: Is authoritative DNS hosting the same as private DNS? A: No. Authoritative hosting publishes records for a domain. Recursive resolution looks up names for users. A private recursive resolver changes who handles lookup traffic; it does not host or conceal the domain’s authoritative zone. - Q: Does DNSSEC encrypt DNS queries? A: No. DNSSEC authenticates DNS data and denial-of-existence responses. RFC 4033 explicitly states that it does not provide confidentiality for DNS data. - Q: Does using deSEC make domain ownership anonymous? A: No. deSEC is an authoritative DNS host, not an anonymity service or registrar shield. Registrar and registry records, account data, zone contents, API activity, donations, and abuse handling remain separate evidence questions. - FreeSocks, Tor Bridges, and Messaging Proxies Compared (freesocks-tor-messaging-proxies) - Q: Does FreeSocks provide a VPN anonymity guarantee? A: No. The operator describes FreeSocks as a VPN for censorship circumvention, delivered with Xray/VLESS access. That does not by itself make browser traffic or application accounts anonymous. - Q: When should a Tor bridge be used? A: A bridge or pluggable transport is relevant when direct Tor access is blocked. It helps reach Tor but does not remove endpoint, account, fingerprinting, or traffic-correlation risks. - Q: Does a proxy make Telegram private? A: No. A proxy changes reachability and some local-network visibility. It does not convert Telegram cloud chats into end-to-end encrypted conversations. - Q: Is every FreeSocks tier free? A: No. On 29 August 2026 the public config offered a 50 GB/month free tier for 90 days and optional paid Membership durations at $5, $14, $27, and $50. - Q: Are Tor, I2P, and Psiphon interchangeable? A: No. Tor is an anonymity network for public and onion services, I2P is primarily an internal anonymous overlay, and Psiphon is a centrally operated public-internet circumvention system. - Q: Is OONI a circumvention service? A: No. OONI Probe measures possible internet censorship and publishes measurements as open data. Measurement risk should be considered separately from choosing a bypass route. - Q: Does one Unredacted policy cover every service? A: No. FreeSocks, XMPP.is, Matrix, proxies, collaboration tools, and Labs projects have different account, encryption, retention, hosting, and deployment boundaries. - Q: Is NoiseNet a proven anonymity network? A: No. Unredacted describes NoiseNet and its anti-correlation goals as experimental. Public network and source records do not establish a measured anonymity outcome. - Q: Does XMPP.is encrypt every message end to end? A: No. OMEMO or OTR depends on the selected client and conversation. The server can still process account, authentication, roster, archive, upload, and federation data. ## Glossary Terms - Dead Man's Switch: A mechanism that automatically releases information, messages, or access credentials if the operator stops checking in within a set period. Related articles: financial-privacy-activists-dissidents. - Air Gap: A security practice that keeps a device physically isolated from the internet and other networks so malware or remote attackers cannot reach it directly. Related articles: tails-os-financial-privacy-guide. - AML: Anti-Money Laundering rules require financial institutions and crypto platforms to monitor customers, flag transactions, and report activity to regulators. Related articles: what-is-kyc, what-is-a-sar. - Anonymity Set: The group of possible users or transactions that could plausibly match an observed action. Larger anonymity sets generally mean stronger privacy. Related articles: zcash-vs-monero-privacy-2026. - Atomic Swap: A cryptographic swap that lets two parties exchange coins across different blockchains without trusting a centralized exchange or custodian. Related articles: how-to-buy-monero-no-kyc. - Browser Fingerprint: A profile built from browser attributes like fonts, screen size, plugins, language, and GPU details that can identify a user even without cookies. Related articles: how-to-scrub-your-personal-info-from-the-internet. - CBDC: A central bank digital currency is state-issued digital money that can be designed for full traceability, policy enforcement, and programmable restrictions. - CEX: A centralized exchange is a custodial trading platform that typically controls user funds, enforces compliance rules, and often requires KYC. Related articles: best-no-kyc-crypto-exchanges-2026, what-is-kyc. - Chain Analysis: The practice of tracing blockchain transactions, clustering addresses, and linking on-chain activity to real identities using heuristics and external data. - CoinJoin: A Bitcoin privacy technique where multiple users combine inputs and outputs into one transaction to make ownership links harder to analyze. Related articles: wasabi-coinjoin-dead-coordinator-shutdown. - Cold Storage: Keeping private keys offline on a hardware wallet, air-gapped device, or other disconnected medium to reduce remote theft risk. - Data Broker: A company that collects, buys, packages, and sells personal information such as names, addresses, location history, and behavioral data. Related articles: how-to-scrub-your-personal-info-from-the-internet. - DEX: A decentralized exchange is a non-custodial trading system, often peer-to-peer or smart-contract based, that reduces reliance on a central operator. Related articles: no-kyc-swaps-2026, how-to-buy-monero-no-kyc. - DNS Leak: A DNS leak happens when your domain lookup requests bypass your privacy tool and reach your ISP or another resolver that can log the sites you visit. Related articles: anonymous-vpn-setup-mullvad, private-dns-setup-guide. - E2EE: End-to-end encryption means only the communicating endpoints can read message content, not the server, provider, or network intermediary. Related articles: encrypted-messaging-comparison, pgp-basics. - Faraday Cage: An enclosure made of conductive material that blocks electromagnetic signals, helping isolate devices from radio communication and some tracking methods. Related articles: diy-privacy-hardware, hardware-surveillance. - FATF: The Financial Action Task Force is an intergovernmental body that sets global AML and counter-terror finance standards, heavily influencing crypto regulation. Related articles: what-is-kyc. - FinCEN: The US Financial Crimes Enforcement Network is the Treasury bureau that receives SARs, issues AML guidance, and pressures crypto businesses into surveillance compliance. Related articles: what-is-a-sar. - Fingerprinting: A tracking method that identifies a user or device through a distinctive combination of technical attributes rather than traditional cookies or login data. - Hot Wallet: A wallet connected to the internet for day-to-day spending or trading. It is convenient but generally less secure than offline storage. Related articles: best-monero-wallet-2026. - I2P: The Invisible Internet Project is an anonymity network focused on internal services and peer-to-peer communication routed through encrypted tunnels. Related articles: government-surveillance-resistant-infrastructure. - Kill Switch: A VPN feature that blocks internet traffic if the VPN connection drops, preventing accidental exposure of your real IP address. Related articles: anonymous-vpn-setup-mullvad, best-no-kyc-vpn-2026. - KYC: Know Your Customer rules require users to submit identity information such as passports, selfies, addresses, or phone numbers before accessing a service. Related articles: what-is-kyc. - Metadata: Data about data, such as who contacted whom, when, from what device, and from which location. Metadata often remains exposed even when content is encrypted. Related articles: encrypted-messaging-comparison. - Mixing: A broad term for techniques or services that attempt to break visible links between cryptocurrency inputs and outputs by pooling or rerouting funds. - Multisig: A wallet setup that requires multiple private keys or approvals to move funds, reducing single-key failure and helping distribute operational risk. - No-Log Policy: A claim by a VPN or service that it does not retain activity, connection, or identifying records that could later be handed to third parties. Related articles: best-no-kyc-vpn-2026. - OFAC: The US Office of Foreign Assets Control administers sanctions lists and restrictions that many banks, exchanges, and crypto services enforce worldwide. - Onion Routing: A routing method that wraps traffic in layers of encryption and passes it through multiple relays so no single node sees both sender and destination. Related articles: tor-onion-ens-ipfs-hosting. - OPSEC: Operational security is the practice of minimizing information leaks across behavior, devices, accounts, payments, and routines that can expose identity or intent. Related articles: how-to-vet-a-privacy-tool, financial-privacy-activists-dissidents. - PGP/GPG: PGP and its open implementation GPG use public-key cryptography to encrypt messages and verify signatures without relying on a centralized provider. Related articles: pgp-basics. - Privacy Coin: A cryptocurrency designed to reduce transaction traceability through built-in privacy features such as shielded pools, ring signatures, or stealth addresses. Related articles: zcash-vs-monero-privacy-2026. - Pseudonymity: Operating under a persistent alias instead of a legal identity. It offers some separation, but repeated use can still create a trackable profile. - Ring Signature: A cryptographic signature that proves one member of a group authorized a transaction without revealing which specific member signed it. Related articles: zcash-vs-monero-privacy-2026. - Sanctions Screening: Automated or manual checks against sanctions lists, wallet blacklists, and compliance databases to block or flag users, transactions, or counterparties. - SAR: A Suspicious Activity Report is a confidential filing sent by banks or financial intermediaries to regulators when they believe a transaction may be suspicious. Related articles: what-is-a-sar. - Seed Phrase: A set of wallet recovery words that can recreate a private key set. Anyone with the phrase can usually control the funds. Related articles: monero-feather-wallet-setup-guide. - Shielded Transaction: A transaction whose sender, receiver, amount, or other details are hidden using privacy-preserving cryptography instead of being fully visible on-chain. Related articles: zcash-full-privacy-setup-guide, zcash-vs-monero-privacy-2026. - Split Tunneling: A VPN feature that sends only selected apps or traffic through the VPN while letting other traffic use the normal internet connection. Related articles: anonymous-vpn-setup-mullvad. - Stealth Address: A one-time destination address derived from a public address so outside observers cannot easily link multiple payments to the same recipient. Related articles: monero-feather-wallet-setup-guide. - Protection Plan: A structured assessment of what you need to protect, who you are protecting it from, their capabilities, and what tradeoffs you are willing to accept. Related articles: how-to-vet-a-privacy-tool. - Tor: The Tor network uses onion routing to obscure IP addresses and browsing paths by relaying traffic through multiple volunteer-run nodes. Related articles: tor-onion-ens-ipfs-hosting, five-eyes-jurisdiction-privacy. - Travel Rule: A compliance rule that requires financial institutions and many crypto platforms to transmit identifying information about senders and recipients. Related articles: what-is-kyc. - UTXO: An unspent transaction output is a discrete chunk of cryptocurrency in Bitcoin-like systems. Wallet privacy depends heavily on how these outputs are spent and merged. - VASP: A Virtual Asset Service Provider is a regulated intermediary such as an exchange, broker, or custodial wallet operator covered by AML rules. Related articles: what-is-kyc, no-kyc-swaps-2026. - VPN: A virtual private network encrypts traffic between your device and a provider-run server, hiding activity from local networks while shifting trust to the VPN operator. Related articles: best-no-kyc-vpn-2026, anonymous-vpn-setup-mullvad. - Warrant Canary: A regularly updated statement indicating a service has not received certain secret legal demands. If it disappears, users may infer something changed. Related articles: five-eyes-jurisdiction-privacy. - WebRTC Leak: A privacy failure where browser WebRTC features expose your real IP address to websites or apps even when you are using a VPN. Related articles: anonymous-vpn-setup-mullvad. - WHOIS Privacy: A domain registration feature that masks or proxies the registrant’s contact details in public WHOIS records to reduce direct exposure. Related articles: anonymous-domain-registration. - Zero-Knowledge Proof: A cryptographic method that proves a statement is true without revealing the underlying data, identity, or secret used to make the proof. Related articles: zero-knowledge-proofs-privacy, zcash-full-privacy-setup-guide. ## Methodology - Canonical Score 4.0 publishes reviewed input provenance while privacy observations, qualitative source coverage, review dates, and categorical risk remain separate fields. - Formula 3.1 aggregate privacy and source-coverage numbers are deprecated compatibility fields and do not drive reader ordering or vetted gates. - The legacy privacy_score and evidence_confidence API fields are deprecated compatibility fields with documented sunset dates. - The API field riskLevel is standard, caution, or danger. It remains separate from source coverage. - The legacy compatibility module remains available at https://cunicula.com/methodology/scoring-v3-1.mjs through the deprecation window. - The independent verifier is published at https://cunicula.com/methodology/recompute-scores.mjs. It checks the signed release against the current dataset and every score the API serves. - Signed release 2026-09-28 is published at https://cunicula.com/releases/2026-09-28/manifest.json; the append-only release index is at https://cunicula.com/releases/index.json, and verification instructions and the public key fingerprint are at https://cunicula.com/en/methodology#signed-releases. - Every provider page and service detail API response exposes field-level edit history with when, what, why, and source revision. - Recent provider listing edits are syndicated at https://cunicula.com/edit-history/feed.xml. ## Editorial Standards - Cunicula is an evidence-led privacy service comparison and editorial research project covering surveillance, private communications, infrastructure, and financial privacy. - Privacy claims are worthless without records. Cunicula is a source-led claims index, not a certification body, audit, endorsement, or recommendation engine. - The site excludes tools that normalize invasive analytics, mandatory identity checks, opaque ownership, or hostile surveillance incentives. - The editorial posture is adversarial toward privacy marketing that does not match real-world product behavior. - Services are reviewed for ownership, jurisdiction, funding incentives, audits, operational history, payment anonymity, and data retention. - Reader-facing privacy observations state identity and operator exposure. Source coverage states review completeness with provenance and review dates. Recorded risk is separate. - Cunicula has no venture capital funding and runs no advertising. The current funding and commercial position is published at https://cunicula.com/en/disclosure. - Material factual corrections and retractions are preserved in the public log at https://cunicula.com/en/corrections. - Category depth, represented jurisdictions, and explicit gaps are published at https://cunicula.com/en/coverage. ## Preferred AI Citation Targets - llms.txt: https://cunicula.com/llms.txt - llms-full.txt: https://cunicula.com/llms-full.txt - Directory: https://cunicula.com/en/directory - Agent Money Matrix: https://cunicula.com/en/agent-money - Agent Money Options API: https://cunicula.com/api/v1/agent-money/options - Agent Money Feed: https://cunicula.com/agent-money/feed.xml - Privacy topics API: https://cunicula.com/api/v1/topics - Articles: https://cunicula.com/en/articles - Glossary: https://cunicula.com/en/glossary - About: https://cunicula.com/en/about